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The central thesis defended here is that we can have truth and objectivity in accounting. We 
do not contend that this potential is presently realized: On the contrary, we argue that certain 
contradictions immanent to capitalism give rise in late modernity to crisis tendencies in 
financial accounting as a way of knowing - epistemological crisis. We do contend that 
accounting's tendencies to epistemological crises can, at least in theory, be overcome. We 
begin to defend this view by considering accounting as an essentially descriptive activity. 
The account given by the philosopher Donald Davidson of the very possibility of knowledge 
is used to justify the view that intersubjectivity is all the foundation we need, or can have, for 
objectivity, and to defend our claim that we can have accounting knowledge, that is, true 
accounts/descriptions of an objective and intersubjectively accessible public world. The 
defence here is against those theorists, including those inspired by certain strands of the 
phenomenological, (post)structuralist, and hermeneutic traditions, who would deny the 
possibility of any such objectivity in accounting. 
Using an analysis of the history and debate surrounding the issue of accounting for 
deferred tax in the United Kingdom (UK), we endeavour to locate accounting in terms of the 
dichotomy the philosopher Bernard Williams draws between science and ethics. We find that 
the descriptive and normative are inextricably entangled in accounting concepts in much the 
same way as they are entangled in thick ethical concepts such as `chastity' or `courage'. We 
recognise that the descriptive aspect of accounting can not be neatly distinguished from the 
normative and dealt with separately. Furthermore, following Williams, we argue that 
difficulties associated with the objective validation of the normative dimension of thick 
accounting concepts renders knowledge held under them vulnerable to destruction by 
reflection. Reflection may reveal the essentially local or perspectival nature of the normative 
dimension of our thick concepts; it may undermine them by forcing us to recognize just how 
far short they fall of any normative objectivity. We argue that descriptive objectivity can not 
be separated from normative objectivity in modern accounting. We therefore accept that in 
our increasingly rational and reflective modern society, descriptive knowledge of the world 
held under accounting concepts will be progressively undermined unless the normative 




We turn to Jürgen Habermas' theory of discourse ethics to defend the possibility of 
normative objectivity in accounting. We argue that accounting norms might ideally be 
objectively validated through the application of communicative rationality; that is, they may 
attain an objective legitimacy founded upon intersubjectivity. The defence here is against 
those theorists including those inspired by emotivist and scientistic thinking, who would 
reduce rationality in the accounting domain to instrumental or purposive rationality, and 
place the normative beyond any rational determination and consequently beyond any 
rationally based objectivity. Habermasian discourse theory offers the possibility that the 
normative dimension of accounting concepts may be objectively validated. We may then 
accumulate descriptive knowledge of the objective world in terms of those objectively 
validated concepts, that is, from the objective point of view of those concepts. 
We conceive of objectivity as always a matter of degree, with the more objective 
positions being those which are more open to intersubjective agreement, that is, the more 
inclusive and less narrowly perspectival views. We recognise the Habermasian moral point 
of view as the perspective of reason, albeit communicative reason. This perspective is narrow 
in so far as it excludes the other of reason, that is, all that can not be consciously articulated. 
We recognise that Habermasian discourse ethics relies upon an inadequate conception of the 
subject insofar as it appears to demand the co-presence in real argument of relatively unified, 
transparent, and autonomous subjects who have, know, and can articulate and act on their 
interests. The thesis concludes by arguing that the rationality of discourse ethics stands in 
need of being supplemented, but not replaced, by a poststructuralist and psychoanalytic 
sensitivity to alterity and the unconscious; that which is immune to discursive retrieval and 
communicative reason. We find such a sensitivity in the work of psychoanalyst Jacques 
Lacan. To illustrate the rich Lacanian conception of the subject we offer a view of the firm, 
the subject of financial accounts, as a split subject; divided between conscious and 
unconscious. This sketch of the firm as divided subject also stands as a contribution to the 
developing theory of the firm as moral agent, which has been inspired by Donald Davidson's 
conceptualisation of the subject/agent. 
Throughout the thesis we use recent work of the ASB, and the debate it has 




This thesis is intended as a modest contribution to the "unfinished project of modernity" (see 
Habermas, 1981c, 1985a). It defends the possibility of objectivity in accounting by applying 
aspects of the work of certain philosophers, including Donald Davidson, Jürgen Habermas 
and Jacques Lacan, to the accounting problematic. 
The thesis is presented in a somewhat unconventional in form which some readers 
may find unsettling and inconvenient. At the core of the presentation are five chapters, each 
of which has been written in such a way that its conversion into a separate refereed 
publication might be achieved with a need for minimal modification. Those five chapters are 
preceded by an introduction that sets out in broad terms the theses defended in those chapters, 
and they are followed by a conclusion that reviews the defence made and reflects upon its 
adequacy. Preambles have been written to each of the chapter with the intention of providing 
sign-posts which will help the reader locate the chapter in the context of preceding and 
following material and the thesis as a whole. The reader will not find explicit `literature 
review' or `methodology' chapters, and the justification of our allegiances is normally 
allowed to remain implicit. Our central commitment/allegiance, to a Davidsonian world view 
is tested and justified through the critique presented of less adequate positions, including 
Putnam's internal realism, Searle's external realism and Rorty's pragmatism. Throughout, 
a methodology of logical and philosophical analysis is adopted, and applied to accounting 
practice, theory and debate, in particular as it appears in the recent work of the United 
Kingdom (UK) Accounting Standards Board (ASB) and the responses their work has 
provoked. 
The presentation format occasions a certain degree of repetition. Extended and 
blatantly repetitive passages are identified as such so that the reader may omit them without 
significant loss. We have not always excised repetitive passages on the grounds that some 
readers may find the repetition and recapping on previously presented ideas useful. We 
apologize to those readers who find the repetition they encounter here tedious and irritating. 
An effort has been made to avoid sexist language. However, rather than adopt 
complex solutions to the problem, the simple expedient of alternating between the feminine 
and masculine pronouns has been adopted. We regret any residual traces of sexism that the 




This thesis is motivated by the conviction that accounting has emancipatory potential. From 
the outset we assume that social emancipation must rely on rational critique, which itself 
must be based upon our knowledge of the objective conditions in the world we share; we 
argue that financial accounting can provide us with such knowledge. The essential thesis that 
we will explicate and defend here is that we can have truth and objectivity in accounting. We 
recognize that this potential is presently frustrated by the distortions of capitalist modernity 
but argue that those distortions can be overcome. Initially we treat accounting as an 
essentially descriptive activity and use the philosopher Donald Davidson's account of how 
it is possible for us to have knowledge of any type to justify by inference the view that we 
can have accounting knowledge of an objective publicly accessible world. We recognize that 
in order to fully and convincingly address the problem of objectivity in accounting we must 
directly engage with its normative dimension. We use the issue of accounting for deferred 
tax to focus an analysis of accounting in terms of the distinctions the philosopher Bernard 
Williams draws between science and ethics. We come to recognize that the descriptive and 
normative are inextricably entangled in accounting concepts in much the same way as they 
are entwined in thick ethical concepts like `treachery' and `cruelty'. Williams argues that 
whilst reflection may justify scientific knowledge, it will tend to destroy knowledge held 
under thick (ethical) concepts. We acknowledge that impediments to the objective validation 
of the normative dimension of thick concepts like `profit' or `chastity' may render knowledge 
held under such concepts vulnerable to erosion by reflection. Reflection may destroy such 
knowledge by revealing, as Williams thinks it must, that the thick normative concepts under 
which it is held are essentially local and lacking in objectivity. 
In search of an alternative to the rather depressing prospect painted by Williams of 
the destructive progress of rationality and reflection, we turn to the work of the philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas and in particular to his theory of discourse ethics. We see this central aspect 
of Habermas' work as an extension of the Davidsonian project to the normative domain, and 
we employ it to defend the view that we can have normative objectivity in accounting. We 
contend that through an appropriate institutionalization of communicative rationality we may 
objectively validate the normative position, or point of view, in terms of which we 
accumulate accounting descriptions of the world. If the moral dimension of accounting 
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concepts were thus objectively validated the descriptive knowledge held under them would 
not be vulnerable to destruction by reflection in the way that Williams fears; indeed reflection 
would then tend to justify accounting knowledge. 
We conceive of objectivity as always a matter of degree, with the more objective 
positions being those which are more inclusive and can command high levels of 
intersubjective consensus. At the less objective end of the spectrum are those local and 
narrowly perspectival views that can command only limited intersubjective agreement 
because they are in some way exclusive or not generally accessible. The Habermasian moral 
point of view of discourse ethics is the perspective of communicative reason; it is narrow in 
so far as it excludes the other of reason, that is, all that can not be discursively retrieved and 
articulated. We conclude the thesis by arguing that the Habermasian perspective needs to be 
broadened, and thus made more objective; it needs to allow footholds to the unconscious and 
the inarticulate from which they might disrupt the automatic functioning of reason. We 
contend that the rationality of discourse ethics needs to be supplemented, but certainly not 
replaced, by sensitivity to alterity and the unconscious; that is a sensitivity to that which is 
immune to discursive retrieval and communicative reason. We find a basis for such a 
sensitivity in the work of the post-structuralist psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. In the following 
paragraphs of this introduction we will outline how the thesis that we have just sketched in 
the broadest of terms will be developed and defended in the following chapters. 
In Chapter 1 "Financial Accounting, Crisis and the Commodity Fetish" we introduce 
certain themes of the thesis and set the context for the analysis presented in subsequent 
chapters. In particular, we begin to consider the impact of processes of reflection and 
rationalisation, characteristic of the development of modernity, on accounting conceived of 
as both a descriptive and as a normative/prescriptive enterprise; as both scientific and as 
moral practice. We argue that certain contradictions immanent to capitalism give rise in late 
modernity to crisis tendencies in financial accounting as a way of knowing - epistemological 
crisis. We analyze those tendencies, manifest as crises of rationality, legitimacy and motive, 
in terms of a Habermasian account of the evolution of society. We argue that the processes 
of rationalisation and reflection attendant upon the modernisation of society have torn 
accounting from its traditional anchorage and legitimating resources. In this and other 
chapters we use an analysis of the certain recent work of the United Kingdom (UK) 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) to ground and give a practical focus to the ideas 
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presented. We argue that the controversy surrounding the ASB's efforts to develop a 
conceptual framework for financial reporting under the title of a "Statement of Principles for 
Financial Reporting" (ASB, 1995b, 1999a, 1999d), reveals the contradictions and crises 
tendencies immanent to financial accounting in capitalism. And we interpret the conceptual 
framework for financial reporting project undertaken by the UK Accounting Standards Board 
(ASB) in recent years as an attempt to restore a measure of spurious objectivity and 
legitimacy to UK financial reporting. 
In chapter 2 "Accounting Knowledge" we use Davidson's analysis of the conditions 
of possibility of knowledge to justify an anti-representationalist conception of accounting 
knowledge and objectivity. The Davidsonian account we give of the possibility of accounting 
knowledge recognises that intersubjectivity as all the foundation we need, or can have, for 
objectivity. To help clarify and justify the view we favor we contrast it with a selection of 
essentially dualist strands of accounting theory which each cast doubt on accounting's 
capacity to give knowledge of an objective publicly accessible world. These views draw their 
inspiration from certain elements of the phenomenological, (post)structuralist, and 
hermeneutic traditions. 
The primary aim of chapter 3, "Objectivity in Accounting - The Case of Deferred 
Tax", is to develop our consideration of the Davidsonian view of the possibility of objectivity 
in accounting introduced in the previous chapter. In chapter 2 we implicitly assumed that the 
descriptive and normative dimensions of accounting are separable and that we could 
therefore sensibly bracket the normative and focus on accounting as essentially descriptive 
activity. In chapter 3 we directly address the moral/normative dimension of accounting and 
recognize that it creates problems for accounting objectivity. The application to accounting 
of a Davidsonian conception of objectivity as intersubjectivity is explored here in terms of 
the contrast drawn by the philosopher Bernard Williams between the prospects for objectivity 
in science and ethics. Using an examination of the history and debate surrounding the issue 
of accounting for deferred tax in the United Kingdom to help focus our analysis, we 
endeavour to locate accounting in terms of the dichotomy that Williams draws between 
science and ethics. We find that the descriptive and normative are knotted together in 
accounting concepts in just the same way that they are entangled in thick ethical concepts 
like `chastity' or `brutality'. We recognize that, whilst in science we can reasonably expect 
world-guided reflection to lead us towards more objective conceptions of reality and to 
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justify our perspectival knowledge, in ethics reflection can not be world guided; the world 
can not guide us to more adequate conceptions of the "good life". Not only can reflection not 
justify ethical knowledge it may destroy it by forcing us to recognize how far short our 
ethical concepts fall of any universal objectivity. On this analysis it seems that, insofar as 
accounting entails an ethical dimension, we can not reasonably expect reflection on 
accounting concepts to lead to more objective conceptions of reality; indeed we should 
expect reflection to undermine local accounting knowledge. In search of some relief from this 
rather bleak prospect we return, to Habermas' work. We draw in particular on his analysis 
of the evolution of society and his theory of discourse ethics, for a vision of how accounting 
norms might attain objectivity, that is, how they might ideally be rationally justified so as to 
command universal agreement. Habermas argues that in modernity the ethical sphere, which 
in traditional society had appeared as a totality, breaks into two components: the moral and 
the evaluative. Moral questions being those that can be approached rationally in terms of the 
generalizability of interests, and evaluative questions being those which are accessible to 
rational analysis only from within the horizons of a particular historical form of life. 
Habermas shows how moral norms of action can be objectively validated through 
communicative reason, that is, through the institutionalisation of what he calls "discourse 
ethics". We argue that accounting regulations may be viewed as moral norms and that an 
objective validity for normative accounting concepts might be achieved through the 
application of communicative rationality in democratic processes. We conclude chapter 3 
with a discussion of the implications of Habermas' discourse ethics for accounting policy 
making, and its implications for the appropriate role for conceptual framework for financial 
reporting projects. 
Whilst in chapter 2 we defended the possibility of objective financial reporting 
against the poststructuralist/postmodernist "totalized critiques" of reason and objective 
knowledge. In chapter 4 "Validity in Accounting Standard Setting and the Presuppositions 
of External Financial Reporting" we seek to defend accounting from those theorists who 
seem to want to reduce reason in accounting to instrumental reason. The analysis presented 
here is again shaped by the work of Donald Davidson and Jürgen Habermas; it represents a 
consolidation and development of our view of the application of central elements of their 
thinking to accounting practice and regulation. In particular we extend our consideration of 
practical issues concerning the application of Habermas' discourse ethics/communicative 
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reason in accounting. The chapter responds to, and critiques, the analysis presented by 
Shapiro (1997 & 1998) of the presuppositions of external financial reporting and the maxims 
and of rational argument in accounting standard setting. We use Shapiro's analysis as a 
counterpoint to our own very different views on the philosophical foundations of objectivity 
in financial reporting and validity in accounting standard/norm setting. We thereby hope to 
contribute to an ongoing debate concerning what is at stake in disputes about truth, 
objectivity and validity in accounting and accounting standard setting. 
In chapter 5, "The Reporting Entity as Divided Subject", we recognise that the 
Habermasian conception of communicative rationality, that we have advocated as a 
foundation for the possibility of normative objectivity in accounting, relies upon a flawed 
conception of the subject/agent of discourse. It apparently demands the co-presence in debate 
of impossibly unified and self-transparent agents that know and can fully articulate their 
interests. We accept the force of the post-structuralist critique of the Habermasian position, 
that foregrounds a need for sensitivity to the "other of reason" that which is immune to 
rational articulation - the unconscious. We recognize that the rationality of discourse ethics 
needs to be supplemented by sensitivity to alterity, and we locate such a sensitivity in the 
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan's conception of the divided subject; the subject split between 
conscious and unconscious. We explain the Lacanian perspective by sketching an 
interpretation of the firm as reporting entity as a divided Lacanian subject. We hope that this 
sketch may incidentally enrich the development of conceptions of the firm as moral agent. 
We conclude by arguing that a Lacanian sensitivity to alterity is consonant with an ethic of 
absolute responsibility for the Other that could make good the motivational deficit that 
attends the abstraction of the Habermasian moral point of view; the rationality of discourse 
ethics. 
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Preamble to chapter 1: Financial Accounting, Crisis and the Commodity Fetish 
In this thesis we aim to defend the view that we can have objective knowledge in 
accounting. Our defense of the possibility of accounting objectivity relies above all on the 
philosopher Donald Davidson's account of the possibility of constative knowledge and 
Jürgen Habermas' justification of the possibility of normative validity. We will turn to 
Davidson's work in chapter 2 and to Habermas' work on the objective validation of 
norms in chapter three. In this chapter we intend to set the context for our subsequent 
analysis of the financial reporting's potential for descriptive and normative objectivity by 
examining its present condition. We will introduce here certain themes that will be 
returned to in subsequent chapters, in particular we will begin to consider the impact of 
processes of reflection and rationalization, characteristic of the development of 
modernity, on accounting conceived of as both a descriptive and as a normative 
enterprise. We will argue here that in capitalist modernity financial accounting as a way 
of knowing faces crisis - epistemological crisis. 
In this chapter we analyze financial accounting's tendency to crisis in terms of a 
Habermasian account of the evolution of society, and use the recent efforts of the UK 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) to produce a conceptual framework for financial 
reporting to give focus to our discussion. We find that the contradictions immanent to 
financial accounting in capitalism are manifest as tendencies to crises of rationality, 
legitimacy and motivation. We argue that accounting's traditional taken-for-granted 
legitimacy is eroded by the progress of rationalization and reflection in modernity, and we 
interpret the ASB's conceptual framework project as an attempt to restore a measure of 
spurious objectivity and legitimacy to UK financial reporting. 
In subsequent chapters we will defend the view that financial accounting may 
obtain objectivity and legitimacy through rational processes and in particular through the 
application of communicative reason. We recognize, however, that in late capitalism the 
processes of rationalization have become pathological and have in fact tended to 
undermine financial accounting as a way of knowing. In the following paragraphs we 
offer a very brief sketch of the processes of rationalisation and differentiation that 
Habermas identifies as operating in the evolution of western society. This sketch is 
intended to help put the present crisis in financial reporting into perspective and to give 
some indication of the nature and scale of the challenge associated with the realisation of 
the promise of communicative rationality in accounting. 
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Habermas sees two distinct processes of rationalisation at work in the evolution of 
society: a rationalisation of the lifeworld and a rationalisation of the system. The term 
"lifeworld" refers to all of those aspects of human life and relations - social, cultural and 
personal - that are co-ordinated and reproduced through communicative action and thus 
language. The symbolic reproduction of society through the lifeworld can be 
distinguished from its material reproduction through systems of action. The material 
development of modern society is initially facilitated by the rationalisation of the 
lifeworld and in particular the development of modern law. This rationalisation of the 
lifeworld is marked by a transition from social integration based upon ritual and sacred 
symbols to an integration motivated by the shared understandings based on 
communicative action, that is, integration and cooperation structured by consensus on 
norms. Habermas calls this transition the "linguistification of the sacred". The increasing 
complexity of society, particularly the complexity of its material reproduction, stretches 
the integrative capacity of communicative action (social integration), which is always to 
some extent affected by the interpretative difficulties attendant on language as an 
integrative medium. Therefore, as society evolves it becomes more and more reliant on 
systems integration, that is, integration that comes about as an unintended consequence of 
action. Perhaps the prime example of systems integration, is the automatic allocation of 
resources through market operations. Over time, in important fields of action, particularly 
those involving markets and state administration, the integrative role of language is 
increasingly taken over by the alternative steering media such as money and power. 
Eventually the system achieves a high degree of independence from the lifeworld. In 
itself this process of rationalisation can be seen as one of evolutionary advance. However, 
in capitalism the process becomes pathological. The need to manage the crisis tendencies 
immanent to the capitalist mode of production institutes an expansionist tendency in the 
system, so that the system steering media of money and power intrude into the lifeworld. 
This "colonisation of the lifeworld" damages those areas of society, which rely on 
integration and reproduction through communicative action, that is, all of those social, 
cultural, and personal aspects of life which rely on symbolic, as opposed to material, 
reproduction. The process of rationalisation becomes damaging when the social tensions 
generated by capitalist exploitation drive the system, which has slipped out of the 
normative control by the Lifeworld, to colonise and undermine the symbolic reproduction 
of the of the Lifeworld. 
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We contend that the ASB's conceptual framework project reveals financial 
reporting in process of rationalisation. Our analysis of resistance to the ASB's proposals, 
outlined in chapter 1, suggests that accounting's transition to modernity, through 
rationalisation, has been painful and is as yet incomplete. Many of accounting's 
"everyday" practitioners and users are found to be clinging tenaciously to remnants of a 
pre-modern accounting structured by the myth and ritual', and to the remnants of 
legitimacy associated with traditional authority. We find accounting in the process of 
becoming little more than a mere adjunct to a systems based integration of society 
founded on the free and automatic operation of markets and progressively moving beyond 
any normative / lifeworld control. 
Whilst the transition from traditional to modern society is marked by the struggle 
between reason and its other - the "sacred", modernity itself is characterized by the 
tension between communicative and instrumental rationality - lifeworld and system. A 
central of concern of Habermas' work has been to waken us to the emancipatory potential 
of communicative reason, which he argues both his predecessors in critical theory and the 
poststructuralist/postmodernist theorists have failed to recognise. For Habermas, the early 
critical theorists made the mistake of equating reason with purposive-instrumental reason, 
while the postmodernists relinquish reason altogether. The tension between the two 
modes of reason in modern capitalism reflects a tension between capitalism and 
democracy, which correlate with alternative modes of integration - instrumental and 
communicative reason respectively. In chapter 1, which we now turn to, we see evidence 
of this tension in the accounting standard setters' attempts to gain a semblance of 
democratic legitimacy for a program, which is essentially driven by instrumental reason 
and the imperatives of money and power. 
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Chapter 1: Financial Accounting, Crisis and the Commodity Fetish 
"The aim of socialism is to liberate the rich diversity of sensuous use-value 
from the metaphysical prison-house of exchange-value - to emancipate 
history from the specious equivalences imposed upon it by ideology and 
commodity production. " 
(Eagleton, 1991, p. 127) 
Introduction 
The UK Accounting Standards Board (ASB) recently published a draft conceptual 
framework2 for financial reporting (ASB, 1995b). The draft proposes, inter alia, that 
practice should move towards a balance sheet orientated current value accounting model. 
As might well have been anticipated, the proposals have run into a wall of opposition 
from preparers and auditors. In this chapter we set out to explore two questions. Firstly, 
why has the ASB adopted such obviously controversial proposals? And secondly, why do 
the proposals provoke an almost visceral resistance in some quarters? It is not our 
intention to give "full" answers to these questions, and we will not draw on the vast 
literature concerning the putative advantages and disadvantages of alternative accounting 
models. - 
We analyse the ASB's proposals and the reaction to them in terms of the crisis 
tendencies, which are immanent to capitalism; we investigate the pressures and 
contradictions, which have impelled accountancy in the UK to the edge of the abyss: 
"... the Accountancy Profession is standing on the edge of a precipice and 
is in danger of taking a giant step forward.... " 
(The Group of Scottish Finance Directors, 1996, p. 358) 
The chapter contains seven parts. We begin by briefly contextualising the ASB's 
proposals in terms of fundamental income measurement alternatives. We then outline the 
ASB proposals and the response they have provoked. In part three we begin to develop 
the foundations of our analysis - accounting's reflection and reproduction of commodity 
fetishism. In the fourth part of the chapter we initiate an immanent critique of commodity 
fetishism in accounting. We begin to unpick financial accounting's false equation of 
exchange-values and use-values. We do so, by developing the implications of research on 
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the psychology of choice which reveals that use-values of prospects can not be separated 
from how they are represented, in mental accounts, and understood by human beings, and 
therefore can not be grasped by exchange-value relations between things. In the fifth part 
of the chapter we relate the analysis developed in the previous part more directly to 
financial accounting, and in particular the ASB's proposals. We argue that whilst in terms 
of the abstraction of exchange-values wealth is conceptually homogeneous, in terms of 
use-values wealth is heterogeneous. And we suggest that the ASB's proposals threaten to 
push accounting further towards the rational abstraction of exchange-value and away 
from its traditional unquestioned legitimacy and residual connection with use-values. In 
the penultimate part of the chapter we develop our analysis of the origins of the ASB's 
proposals and the controversy surrounding them, using Habermas' (1973) exposition of 
the crisis tendencies immanent to advanced capitalism as an analytical framework. In the 
final part of the essay we return to the key issue of accounting's reflection of the 
commodity fetish - accounting as identity thinking - and consider the implications for 
critical accounting. 
Basic income measurement alternatives 
Accounting income may be determined in two fundamentally different ways. It may be 
calculated as the change in the worth (net assets) of the business during a period, 
excluding the change resulting from the transfer of resources to and from owners. This 
approach reflects a long-standing consensus that business income must ultimately be 
understood in terms of wealth enhancement (see Gellein, 1987, p. 60), and corresponds 
closely with certain conceptions of income developed by economists. It implicitly 
requires current value measurement of assets and liabilities as it makes little sense to 
define income in terms of the change between two balance sheets unless those balance 
sheets reflect some measure of current value. In this chapter we will refer to this 
approach as either the current value or economic income approach. 
The alternative approach to income measurement allows only realised gains to be 
recognised in accounting income. It requires the institution of revenue recognition criteria 
and rules for the allocation of costs, that is, the matching of costs against recognised 
revenue (see Paton & Littleton, 1940). We will refer to this profit and loss account 
orientated method as the matching approach. It might seem that both systems might tend 
to produce the same results. This is not so - the current value approach allows unrealised 
gains to be included in income whilst the matching approach does not. Furthermore the 
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revenue recognition criteria applied under the matching approach are more demanding 
than the criteria for recognising changes in the value of assets and liabilities applied under 
the current value approach. This is because the matching approach embodies the idea that 
revenue should only be recognised once it has been earned, that is, revenue recognition 
should be based on performance. Financial accounting practice has been dominated by 
the matching approach for almost all of this century 
3, and revenue recognition criteria 
have been dominated by the concept of prudence. The current value approach has 
theoretical appeal. However, the approach is unattractive to both preparers and auditors4, 
and its translation from theory to practice has been difficult and highly controversial (see 
Miller et al, 1994, p. 142). The American Financial Accounting Standards Board's 
(FASB) efforts to develop a conceptual framework for accounting were effectively 
"derailed" by the current value issue in the early 1980's. And "experiments" with its 
application, as current cost accounting, by both the FASB (Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 33 - Financial Reporting and Changing Prices, 1979), 
and the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) in the UK, (Statement of Standard 
Accounting Practice (SSAP) No. 16 - Current Cost Accounting, 1980a), ended in failure. 
The collapse of SSAP16, due to preparer non-compliance, "resulted in a serious loss of 
confidence by and in the ASC" (Whittington, 1989, p. 195). 
Despite the controversial nature of the current value issue, standard setters have 
been unwilling to drop it entirely from their agendas. In recent years the FASB has issued 
a number of accounting standards requiring disclosure of fair value information (see 
Barth & Landsman, 1995). However, the FASB's approach has been cautious. They have 
required fair value information principally in respect of financial instruments. And whilst 
initiating fresh proposals for the reporting of comprehensive income (FASB, 1996) they 
have recognised that given the lack of preparer enthusiasm for the fuller application of the 
concept5 "a project that considers all aspects of comprehensive income, including 
recognition and measurement of its components, is not practical at this time" (see Johnson 
et al, 1995, p. 133). The same degree of caution has not been shown by the ASB in the 
UK6. 
The way ahead for UK financial reporting 
The publication by the ASB of a "Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting" 
exposure draft (1995b), has brought the current value accounting issue back to the centre 
of contemporary financial reporting debate in the UK. The exposure draft is wide ranging. 
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We will focus on certain key features, which are particularly relevant to the concerns of 
this chapter. 
Gains and losses are defined in chapter 3 of the exposure draft as increases or 
decreases in ownership interest, other than those relating to contributions from or 
distributions to owners (ASB, 1995b, para 3.47). Ownership interest itself is defined as 
the entity's assets less its liabilities (ASB, 1995b, para 3.39). The determination of entity 
performance becomes essentially derivative of the measurement of assets and liabilities in 
the balance sheet, and the key issue becomes "getting the balance sheet right". Only a 
very small proportion of the one hundred and seventy five published responses to the 
exposure draft were positively supportive of the balance sheet orientation put forward by 
the draft. Table I presents a basic? analysis of our interpretation of comments on this 
issue: 
Table I Analysis of comment on the Statement of Principles For Financial 
Reporting; Exposure Draft, (ASB, 1995b) 
Comment on the draft's proposals, which favour the adoption of a 
balance sheet orientation, (comments alternatively expressed in 
terms of a preference for the matching approach). 
Classification Number of Supportive Opposed No 
of responses unequivocal 
Commentators comment 
Users 10 10% 30% 60% 
Preparers 91 3% 52% 45% 
Accountants 54 2% 48% 50% 
Academics 12 - 33% 67% 
Others 8 13% 37% 50% 
Measurement is dealt with in chapter 5 of the draft, and a preference for current 
values is made plain: "practice should develop by evolving in the direction of greater use 
of current values to the extent that this is consistent with the constraints of reliability and 
cost", (ASB, 1995b, para 5.38). Table II presents our analysis of comment on this issue 
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and shows that preparers and accountants tend to be quite clearly opposed to significant 
extension of the use of current values: 
Table II Analysis of comment on the Statement of Principles For Financial 
Reporting; Exposure Draft, (ASB, 1995b) 
Comment on the draft's proposal that the use of current values in 
accounts should be extended. 
Number Supportive Supportive Opposed No 





Users 10 40% - 30% 30% 
Preparers 91 3% 1% 84% 12% 
Accountants 54 2% 7% 69% 22% 
Academics 12 - - 42% 58% 
Others 8 50% - 25% 25% 
The presentation of gains and losses is dealt with in chapter 6 of the exposure 
draft. It is suggested that the statement of total recognised gains and losses, a statement 
introduced by Financial Reporting Standard No. 3- Reporting Financial Performance 
FRS. 3, ASB, 1992c), should become the key performance statement: "In assessing the 
overall financial performance of an entity during a period, all gains and losses need to be 
considered. The statement of total recognised gains and losses (as its name implies) 
reports the total amount of the gains and losses recognised in the period ... ", (ASB, 
1995b, para 6.20). The chapter 6 proposals would discard the traditional rule that only 
realised profits appear in the profit and loss statement and would require that the profit 
and loss account, and the statement of total recognised gains and losses, report the gains 
and losses that arise in the period, irrespective of when they are realised, (ASB, 1995b, 
para 6.25). The distinction between realised and unrealised gains and losses, which has 
been a cornerstone of conventional accounting, would be relegated to notes to the 
accounts, (ASB, 1995b, para 6.24). Our analysis of comment on the proposal that the 
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realisation principle be abandoned is shown in table III. Few commentators supported this 
proposal. We have recorded commentators as opposed to the ASB's proposals on any 
issue only where they have made specific statements to that effect. This issue did not 
excite as high a volume of direct comment as the proposal that greater use be made of 
current values. Many of the comments opposing greater use of current values could be 
more liberally interpreted as opposing any change to the "tried and trusted" historical cost 
and realisation based accounting model. We thus consider that table III probably 
understates the extent of real opposition to the ASB's proposals. 
Table III Analysis of comment on the Statement of Principles For Financial 
Reporting; Exposure Draft, (ASB, 1995b) 
Comment on draft's proposals, which would abandon the traditional rule 
that only realised profit appears in the profit and loss account, 
(comment alternatively expressed in terms of support for the prudence 
concept). 
Number Supportive Not No unequivocal comment 
supportive 
Users 10 10% 10% 80% 
Preparers 91 3% 39% 58% 
Accountants 54 6% 52% 42% 
Academics 12 - 42% 58% 
Others 8 13% 50% 37% 
Chapter 6 of the exposure draft goes on to draw a distinction between profits or 
losses arising form operating activities and gains and losses resulting from changes in the 
value of assets and liabilities held to enable those operations. The latter would be dealt 
with in the statement of total recognised gains and losses (ASB, 1995b, para 6.27), and 
never feature in the profit and loss account. All other gains and losses would be dealt with 
in the profit and loss account, (ASB, 1995b, para 6.28). The proposals would tend to lead 
towards a "standardised" profit being reported in the profit and loss account without 
regard to the terms of transactions that the company has undertaken. For example 
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revaluation of loans would lead to interest expense being recognised in the profit and loss 
account at current rates irrespective of the contracted rate. The revaluation of leasehold 
interests would standardise lease charges to the market rate irrespective of the lease terms 
negotiated (Ernst & Young, 1996a, p. 7). In effect the profit and loss account would no 
longer present a full statement of gains and losses arising from operations; some of those 
gains and losses would be dealt with elsewhere - in the statement of total recognised gains 
and losses. Ernst and Young describe the proposed division of gains and losses between 
the profit and loss account and the statement of total recognised gains and losses as 
entailing a "serious degrading of the profit and loss account", (Ernst & Young, 1996a, p. 
13). Many of the commentators on the exposure draft focused on this issue (ASB, 1996a, 
p. 6). Our analysis of comments table IV shows that very few commentators were 
supportive of the ASB's proposals: 
Table IV Analysis of comment on the Statement of Principles For Financial 
Reporting; Exposure Draft, (ASB, 1995b) - 
Comment on the draft's proposals concerning the division of gains 
between the profit and loss account and the statement of total 
recognised gains and losses, which elevate the significance of the latter 
statement, and correspondingly threaten to reduce the profit and loss 
account to a normalised statement of operating results. 
Number Supportive Opposed No unequivocal comment 
Users 10 40% 30% 30% 
Preparers 91 3% 46% 51% 
Accountants 54 2% 54% 44% 
Academics 12 - 25% 75% 
Others 8 13% 25% 62% 
Finally, chapter 1 of the exposure draft attempts to clarify the objectives of 
financial statements. It suggests that the objective of financial statements "is to provide 
information about the financial position, performance and financial adaptability of an 
enterprise that is useful to a wide range of users for assessing the stewardship of 
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management and for making economic decisions" (ASB, 1995b, para 1.1). This espousal 
of a decision usefulness purpose for financial statement may appear to be innocuous. 
However, as table V shows, this definition excites significant opposition. 
Table V Analysis of comment on the Statement of Principles For Financial 
Reporting; Exposure Draft, (ASB, 1995b) 
Comment on the draft's proposal that financial statements should have 
the objective of "of providing information about the financial position, 
performance and financial adaptability of an enterprise that is useful to 
a wide range of users for assessing the stewardship of management and 
for making economic decisions" (ASB, 1995b, Para. 1.1), (may be 
expressed in terms of a call to stress stewardship over decision making, 
and/or in call for emphasis on shareholders as primary user group). 
Number Supportive Opposed No unequivocal comment 
Users 10 10% 20% 70% 
Preparers 91 - 22% 78% 
Accountants 54 4% 35% 61% 
Academics 12 - 33% 67% 
Others 8 13% 13% 74% 
Those opposed to the definition are concerned primarily that it might raise "unfulfillable" 
expectations and thereby expose directors and auditors to litigation. 
We hope we have succeeded in conveying the weight of opposition facing the 
ASB. Their proposals are substantially opposed by the preparers, auditors, and academics 
and have received a mixed response from users. However, the proposals do succeed in 
winning the virtually unqualified approval of one highly significant user group: The 
Institute of Investment Management and Research which represents the investment 
analysis profession in the UK. They enthusiastically endorse the call for greater use of 
current value information and agree with the ASB that the objectives of financial 
statements should include the provision of information to a range of users for making 
economic decisions: 
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"It is right that the setters of accounting standards should explicitly 
recognise that some users will be, involved in the process of determining 
whether to buy, sell or hold securities of a company, ... it is right for the 
exposure draft to highlight the predictive value of financial information as 
a key characteristic relating to content. " 
(Institute of Investment Management and Research, 1996, p. 445) 
The debate surrounding the development of the ASB's draft Statement of 
Principles has been vigorous. The ASB received more letters of comment on it than on 
any other document it has exposed (ASB, 1996, p. 1). Each of the chapters of the 
exposure draft was initially issued as a discussion document, and the lines of opposition 
clearly drawn before the issue of the exposure draft in November 1995. Ernst & Young 
have taken a lead in opposing the ASB's proposals (Ernst & Young, 1993 & 1996a), and a 
relatively high percentage of commentators on the exposure draft directly refer to Ernst & 
Young in making their own response. They have described the proposed draft as "an 
academic diversion that will not serve the interests of financial reporting practice" (Ernst 
& Young, 1996a, p. 3), and challenged the ASB's authority to proceed with the project, 
saying; "... we do not believe that the ASB should use British industry as a test-bed for 
academic theories on accounting, and we question whether it has a mandate to do so" 
(Ernst & Young, 1996, p. 3). In the face of hostile comment the ASB has accepted the 
need for fuller discussion before they proceed to a finalisation of the Statement of 
Principles. 
Commodity fetishism and identity thinking in financial accounting 
In this section of the chapter we develop the foundations of our analysis of the' squabble 
surrounding the ASB 'Statement of Principles' project. These foundations lie in 
accounting's reflection of the contradictions and crises tendencies immanent to 
commodity production. 
In Capital, Marx (1867) begins his economic investigation of capitalism with the 
analysis of the commodity form. He shows that, through the exchange process, the 
qualitative differences between commodities are suppressed as use-values become 
dominated by the abstract quantitative equivalences of exchange-values, and that the 
social relations between men and women, capitalist and worker, come to be dominated by 
the relations between inanimate commodities: 
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"The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists therefore 
simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of 
men's own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour 
themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things. Hence it also 
reflects the social relation of the producers to the sum total of labour as a 
social relation between objects, a relation that exists apart from and outside 
the producers. ... It is nothing but the definite social relation between men 
themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation 
between things. I call this fetishism... " 
(Marx, 1867, pp. 164-165) 
Marx's analysis exposes the real disjunctions in capitalism between substance and 
form and reveals the ideological power of exchange to forge equivalences between 
incommensurables: concrete inequalities and exploitative social relations appear as 
abstract equivalences, for example, exploitative wage relations appear as equal exchanges 
of the commodities of money and labour. He reveals ideology's material foundations in 
fetishised commodity production and exchange: market exchanges are real, not 
imaginary, and effected through, and reflected by, significant social institutions which 
lend the semblances they produce a robustness and naturalness which is difficult to 
penetrate. 
Accountants are the commodity fetishists par excellence: they embrace the 
specious equivalence between exchange-value and use-value, and take for granted the 
dominance of exchange-values in their representations of events. By dealing almost 
exclusively with the sterile quantitative abstraction of exchange-value, they help 
reproduce the ideological grip of the fetishised commodity on social relations. From this 
perspective, financial accounting in capitalism is unremittingly oppressive. As it raises up 
relations between thing and thing in exchange, it suppresses far richer relations between 
people and things - use-values. 
Marx's analysis of exchange value and commodity fetishism was adopted by 
Adorno as a model for a wide-ranging critique of bourgeois ideology. For Adorno (1966), 
exchange and false equivalences are at the core of all ideological thought. Ideology is 
"identity thinking", a type of rationality which strives to subsume the plurality of all 
particular things within unitary systems of concepts. It works to homogenise diverse 
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phenomena, ' to make the different interchangeable (fungible), to forge and hold in place 
spurious equivalences between concepts and objects, ideas and the material world. Order 
and control at the level of concepts is achieved in systems of thought, at the expense of 
the suppression of many of the qualitative dimensions of the objects those systems 
pretend to grasp. Identity thinking can not penetrate the form of social systems and 
scrutinise the "nonidentical" - that which "defies subsumption under identity - the 'use 
value', in Marxist terminology" (Adorno, 1966, p. 11). It can never reveal the true 
exploitative nature of the social relations of production, which determine, in so many 
ways, the way we live. 
The magic of the commodity fetish is powerful and real. However it is not beyond 
challenge. Marx recognises that the antithesis immanent in the commodity form "imply 
the possibility of crisis" in capitalism (Marx, 1867, p. 209); that immanent contradiction 
could drive the system to a point where it could not continue to operate without radical 
structural change. To constantly reproduce the mystification of the commodity form, a 
good deal of ideological work needs to be done. Financial accounting itself, in taking the 
primacy of exchange-values for granted, is a powerful ideological support to the 
commodity form. However, accounting, as an ideological sub-system of capitalism 
reflecting and reproducing the commodity fetish, contains within itself the seeds of crisis; 
accounting's unitary system of concepts is inadequate to grasp and hold their object. In 
any system the object is always more than the concept, "what is, is more than it is" 
(Adorno, 1966, p. 161). However in accounting the inadequacy of the concept, exchange- 
value, to speak of the object, use-value, is of an absolute and chronic nature. Financial 
accounting presents a systematic unitary account of relations between things, which 
excludes the plurality of person-to-thing, and person-to-person relations. 
The framing of decisions and mental accounts 
In this section of the chapter we use advances in the study of psychology of human choice 
to illustrate the incapacity of exchange-value to close its grasp on its object, use-value. 
We draw the implications of research, which shows that the meaning of wealth depends 
upon how it is represented and understood - on our mental accounting for it. We focus on 
the "universal commodity", money, the unit of account, and show that humanity and its 
representational heuristics can not be separated from the meaning and value of even the 
most abstract of commodities at the heart of the unitary systems of exchange value 
accounting. 
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Mental accounts are psychological frames within which decision-makers are 
hypothesised to organise representations of the costs and benefits associated with an event 
or option. The mental accounts concept is derived from prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). Choice under Kahneman & Tversky's prospect theory is postulated to 
follow a two phase process of editing and evaluation. Editing is a mental accounting 
phase in which prospects are represented in terms of gains, losses and neutral outcomes 
with respect to some reference point. The establishment of reference points is crucial and 
will depend upon, inter alia, expectations and aspirations. In phase two, edited 
representations are evaluated according to a value (utility) function with three key 
characteristics: (i) it is defined over gains and losses (rather than states of wealth) which 
are reference-point dependent, (ii) losses have more hedonic intensity than gains of 
equivalent size, (iii) there is diminishing marginal value of both gains and losses as size 
increases. Together these characteristics yield a value function that is concave for gains, 
convex for losses, and steeper for losses than for gains. 
Kahneman & Tversky make the linkage of mental accounts and prospect theory 
clear using modifications of the following scenario, introduced in Tversky & Kahneman 
(1981, p. 457): 
"Imagine that you are about to purchase a jacket for $125 and a calculator 
for $15. The calculator salesman informs you that the calculator you wish 
to buy is on sale for $10 at the other branch of the store located 20 minutes 
drive away. Would you make a trip to the other store? " 
The financial advantage versus the inconvenience can be framed in terms of a minimal, 
topical, or comprehensive account, as follows: 
(i) A minimal account would include as a cost the inconvenience of travelling to the 
other store, and the financial advantage as simply $5. 
(ii) A topical account relates the consequences of choice to a reference point 
determined by the circumstances of the decision. In this case because the saving is 
associated only with the calculator the financial advantage will be represented as a 
reduction of the price from $15 to $10. 
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(iii) A more comprehensive account the saving could be framed in relation to the price 
of' the jacket and the calculator and more broadly still in relation to other 
expenses. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1984) suggest that people spontaneously organise decision 
problems in terms of topical accounts. They test the suggestion by first noting that topical 
organisation of the problem together with the concavity of the prospect theory value 
function in the domain of gains would lead to a prediction that willingness to travel to 
save $5 on the price of a calculator would be inversely related to the price of the 
calculator and be independent of the price of the jacket. They tested the prediction by 
modifying the problem in which the price of the two items were interchanged, the price of 
the calculator being given as 125. Clearly this modification leaves the problems 
identical in terms of minimal and comprehensive accounts. As predicted the proportion of 
subjects who said they would make the trip fell significantly when the problem was 
modified: 68% of 88 respondents were willing to travel to save $5 on a $15 calculator, 
only 29% of 93 respondents were willing to travel to save the same amount on a $125 
calculator. The differences in response, obviously, can not be explained in terms of 
wealth effects - Tversky & Kahneman (1981), propose that they can be explained as an 
effect of psychological accounting. 
Subsequent research has produced numerous replications, extensions and 
applications of the mental accounting effects. However, little consideration seems to have 
been given to the implications of the effect for financial accounting. Some of those 
implications are, we believe, indirectly illuminated by Shefrin & Thaler's (1988) use of 
the mental accounts concept to explain savings behaviour and in particular violations of 
the classic life-cycle theories of saving. 
The life-cycle models of saving and consumption developed by Modigliani and 
Brumberg (1954), and Friedman (1957), predict that rational, utility-maximising 
consumers will smooth year to year consumption towards an amount consistent with their 
lifetime conception of permanent income. To do this people would have to behave as if, 
each year, they calculated the present value of their total wealth, including their future 
income, and set consumption for the year equal to the amount receivable from an annuity 
with a present value equal to their estimated wealth. The collapsing of future income and 
present assets into a single measure of wealth is based on an assumption that wealth is 
fungible; that its form, or source, is not relevant to the analysis. 
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The classic life-cycle models of saving are elegant and eminently rational, yet 
they are among those economic theories which do not fit well with the way research 
indicates people actually behave (Hall & Mishkin, 1982; Wilcox, 1989). The main 
problems which emerge from empirical test of the theory are, firstly, that consumption 
seems too sensitive to current income to be consistent with classic life-cycle theories and 
rational expectations, and, secondly, that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) 
wealth seems to vary across forms of wealth. People typically have very low MPC's for 
pension wealth or home equity, and very high MPCs for current income and windfall 
gains. Various ad hoc amendments to classic life-cycle theory have been advanced to try 
and improve its fit with actual behaviour. 
Shefrin & Thaler (1988) suggest a parsimonious explanation of the failure of the 
classic life-cycle models. They question the implicit assumption of the traditional life- 
cycle models that the labelling, or the framing, of wealth is irrelevant because wealth is 
fungible. Their behavioural life-cycle theory assumes that various components of wealth 
are represented in different mental accounts. The posited psychological motive for the 
differentiation being that it is part of a technology of self-control in which some accounts 
are more resistant to the temptation of consumption than others. They argue that the 
source and size of a change in wealth will affect how it is categorised within an internal 
representation system containing, in broad stylised terms, the following mental accounts: 
a current income account with an MPC of close to unity; an asset account with an MPC of 
close to zero; and a future income account, with an MPC somewhere between zero and 
unity (also see Thaler, 1990). The behavioural life-cycle theory proposes an 
understanding of wealth in which "labels matter". 
Investigations of the anomalies of inter-temporal choice reinforce and develop the 
suggestion that the labelling of wealth may affect its subjective value. When making 
inter-temporal choices people are not consistent in their use of discount rates, as 
economists suggest they should be. Various behavioural regularities in the effective 
choice of discount rate have been identified, including a "magnitude effect" whereby 
discount rates used decline as the amounts increase. Lowenstein & Thaler (1989), propose 
a mental accounting explanation of the magnitude effect. They suggest that small windfall 
gains may be entered in high MPC mental current income accounts, whilst larger amounts 
are entered in mental asset accounts with low MPCs. The cost of delay in receipt of small 
windfalls may then be interpreted as foregone consumption, whilst the cost of delay in 
receipt of a larger amount may be perceived in terms of forgone interest. A magnitude 
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effect would then occur if were more painful to forgo consumption than to forgo interest. 
The magnitude effect suggests that the subjective utility of a gain will depend in part 
upon whether it is entered in a mental income account or a mental asset account: whether 
it is perceived as consumable or as merely a source of interest. And the effect suggests 
that preparers of financial accounts may add or destroy value by influencing users' mental 
topical recording of gains and costs. 
The research discussed above reminds us that value is always subjective and 
dependent upon human understanding and representational frameworks. It indicates that 
use-value can not be detached from its representation in human minds; it is always a 
person-to-thing relation and can not be captured by thing-to-thing exchange-value 
relations. 
Mental accounts and financial accounting practice and theory 
Wealth has a dual character: exchange-value and use-value. In terms of the abstraction of 
exchange-value, wealth is conceptually fungible; homogeneous. In terms of use-values, 
wealth is multifarious; heterogeneous. Despite the ideological pressure of commodity 
fetishism, people seem to organise their mental representations of wealth in topical 
accounts, which treat it as non-fungible; multifarious. We find, in the traditional topical 
organisation of financial accounts, a reflection of the mental accounting categorisation of 
wealth and changes in wealth, which reveals the multifarious nature of human concerns 
and use-values breaking into accounts of exchange-values. 
The mental accounting categories appear to be associated with psychological 
mechanisms for disciplining and control of consumption (see Shefrin & Thaler, 1988). 
Financial accounts have traditionally served a similar function. Hicks identifies the basic 
need for income measurement in terms of giving "people an indication of the amount they 
can consume without impoverishing themselves" (Hicks, 1946, p. 172). The role played 
by financial accounting, in informing and restraining consumption decisions, is given 
legal recognition in European law which takes realised profits as the basis of permissible 
distributions to shareholders (see UK Companies Act, 1985, para. 263(3)). 
Traditional financial accounting facilitates the identification of a financial 
accounting current income broadly consistent with mental current income. The prudence 
convention requires that revenue is normally recognised in the profit and loss account 
only "when realised in the form of cash or other assets the ultimate cash realisation of 
which can be assessed with reasonable certainty" (ASC, 1971, para. 14. b). Unrealised 
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holding gains are therefore excluded from the traditional financial accounting income 
statement, just as they are generally excluded from mental income accounts9. Financial 
accounting practice also normally requires the separate disclosure of income which, 
because of its "size or incidence", is exceptional (ASB, 1992c, para. 5). The separate 
disclosure of exceptional income would allow its assignment to an appropriate mental 
account, dependent upon the size and incidence of the gain - large amounts of windfall 
income may be assigned to mental capital accounts with low MPCs10. Similarly financial 
accounting practice customarily makes a clear distinction between operating profits and 
capital gains. For example FRS. 3 (ASB, 1992c, para. 20), requires that gains or losses on 
the sale or termination of an operation or on disposal of fixed assets should be shown 
separately from operating profit on the face of the profit and loss account. The clear 
labelling of realised capital gains facilitates their allocation to appropriate mental income 
accounts - with MPCs lying somewhat below those applicable to realised operating 
income". Traditional financial accounting practice effectively recognises that wealth is 
not fungible. We interpret the relation between mental accounts and financial accounts as 
an instance of human need protruding through the abstraction of exchange-values in 
accounting; humanity breaking into the abstraction of thing-to-thing relations. 
In contrast to traditional financial accounting practice, the economic income 
perspective implicitly assumes that wealth is fungible. From that perspective Alexander 
(1950) defined a company's profit as the amount the company could distribute to 
shareholders and remain as well off at the end of the period as it was at the beginning. In 
which case income, in the absence of new contributions of capital or distributions, can be 
expressed as: Y, = Vi - Vi.,, where Y1 is the income for the period i, and V1 and Vi., are 
capital values, or wealth, at the end and beginning of period i respectively. From this 
perspective, income measurement is simply a derivative of the measurement of well- 
offness at the beginning and end of the period. Hicks suggests that well-offness should be 
measured in terms of the present value of future cash flows, and he frames his influential 
income concept number 1 in those terms. Accordingly, income becomes "the maximum 
amount which can be spent during a period if there is to be an expectation of maintaining 
intact the capital value of prospective receipts (in money terms)" (Hicks, 1946, p. 173). 
The calculation of V1., and Vi would then represent the collapse, into present values, of all 
future cash flows of the entity as at the beginning and end of period i respectively. The 
meaningfulness of the collapse of the vector of a company's cash-flows into a single 
present value number depends upon the assumption that wealth is fungible. Given that 
24 
Chapter 1: Financial Accounting, Crisis and the Commodity Fetish 
many assets and claims are not in fact represented in perfect markets, in which case the 
failure of the equation of exchange-value and use-values is rather difficult to ignore, full 
practical application of the economic income model to financial accounting is impossibly 
problematic (see Bromwich, 1992, chapter 4). The economic income approach may, in 
consequence, have lost something of its dominant hold on financial accounting theory 
(see Beaver, 1981, p. 13). However, it remains highly influential - it has motivated many 
of the proposals for market value and current cost accounting found in the accounting 
literature over the years, including classics such as Edwards & Bell (1961), Chambers 
(1966), and Sterling (1970), and the view that accounting income measures should ideally 
be based on the present value of earning power now can claim "virtually universal 
acceptance in the academic literature" (Edwards et al, 1987, p. 2). Most significantly, the 
economic income ideal has had deep and continuing influence on accounting policy 
makers (see Bromwich, 1992, p. 33) - the ASB's "Statement of Principles" proposals 
being a recent instance. 
The closeness of the fit we find between mental accounting and traditional 
financial accounting practice suggests that they have developed in dialectical relation to 
one another. It suggests that the conceptual structures and knowledge pertaining to mental 
accounts as a source domain have partly constructed the structures and knowledge of 
financial accounting as a target domain, and vice versa. We recognise the structures of 
mental accounting as culturally and historically contingent, and, furthermore, we do not 
regard the heuristics underlying prospect theory as in some way innate or "hard-wired". 
However, we do consider that ultimately such constructs have a grounded relationship 
with quite fundamental aspects of human experience and need. In particular, we have 
identified above the need for mechanisms of self-control as instrumental in shaping 
mental and in turn traditional financial accounting 12. The ASB's proposals, discussed 
above, threaten to wrench financial accounting away from traditional, yet highly 
circumscribed, relations with certain human concerns and further towards the rational 
abstractions of marginalist economics. 
Contradiction and crisis and the statement of principles project 
In this section we examine the origins of the ASB's 'Statement of Principles' project and 
the controversy surrounding it in terms of the crisis tendencies immanent to advanced 
capitalism. We build our analysis around the framework presented by Habermas' neo- 
Marxist exposition of those tendencies. Habermas (1973, p. 45) argues that, other things 
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being equal, "fundamental contradictions of the capitalist system" will be manifest as 
either economic crises, crises of rationality, crises of legitimation, or as motivational 
crises (see e. g., Held, 1980 pp. 284-295; Puxty, 1997). 
Economic crisis; Marx contends that the contradictions of class interests made 
immanent in capitalism as contradictions of system imperatives are manifest in the 
system's tendency to periodic economic crisis according to the logic of the tendential fall 
in the rate of profit (see e. g., Marx 1867; Habermas, 1973; Wright, 1978; O'Connor, 
1984). In liberal-capitalism, the primary focus of Marx's analysis, the task of social 
integration, the reconciling of the fundamentally incompatible claims and intentions of 
individuals, groups and classes is taken over by a depoliticized steering mechanism - the 
market - which draws a specious legitimacy from the apparent justice of the exchange of 
equivalents, that is, from the ideology of commodity fetishism (see, Habermas, 1973, 
p. 24). Whilst arguing that economic crisis holds the key to development of class 
consciousness and the revolutionary recoupling of the economic and the political (see 
Habermas, 1973, p. 26), Marx recognises that even in economic crises the contradictions 
embedded in capitalism are not self evident: 
"... in liberal capitalism, class antagonism is shifted from the 
intersubjectivity of the life-world into the sub-stratum of this world. 
Commodity fetishism is both a secularized residual ideology and the 
actually functioning steering principle of the economic system. Economic 
crises thus lose the character of a fate accessible to self-reflection and 
acquire the objectivity of inexplicable, contingent, natural events. The 
ideological core has shifted to ground level. Before it can be destroyed by 
reflection, these events are in need of an objective examination of system 
processes. This is reflected in the Marxian critique of political economy. " 
(Habermas, 1973, p. 30) 
Financial accounting in privileging exchange-value reflects and sustains the ideology of 
commodity fetishism upon which the legitimacy of the market as a steering mechanism 
relies. 
Adorno's (1966) analysis of identity thinking suggests that as reality becomes 
more volatile, complex and threatening, efforts are commonly made, by those with an 
interest in sustaining the system, to insulate it from critique, by enforcing an increased 
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coherence at the level of concepts, which increases the separation of idea and reality. The 
period preceding the initiation of the ASB's 'Statement of Principles' project was one of 
"exceptional innovation" in commercial, financial and regulatory practice, and of 
blatantly creative accounting (see Tweedie & Whittington, 1990). The ASB's proposals 
press financial accounting, as a system of identity thinking, towards fuller conceptual 
coherence in reflection of the logic of the commodity form to the exclusion of human 
need, and promote its unity by reducing opportunities for accounting creativity. Whilst we 
agree with the many authors (e. g., Hines 1991) who suggest conceptual frameworks play 
a role in the construction and maintenance of social realities, we would contend that the 
"reality" they principally support is that of commodity fetishism. 
Habermas extends Marx's analysis to take account of the realities of advanced 
capitalism that Marx himself was unable to fully anticipate. Of particular relevance here 
is the politicization of the system steering mechanism which tends to occur as capitalism 
advances, that is, the tendency for states to take an increasing role in supplementing and 
modifying market operations. Accounting is an important part of the state para-apparatus 
(see e. g., Clark & Dear, 1984; Puxty et al, 1987; Robson & Cooper, 1990) of advanced 
capitalist society, taking both technical-rational and ideological roles in the regulation of 
market operations. Habermas recognises that in advanced capitalism economic crisis 
might be indefinitely avoided by state intervention. However, he argues that whilst state 
intervention can both modify and displace economic crises, it can not eradicate the 
immanent contradictions - ultimately contradictions of class interest - which give rise to 
the crisis tendency in capitalism. The translation of the fundamental contradictions of 
capitalism from the economic to the political sphere will, naturally, change their form and 
the terms in which they may possibly be resolved or managed: 
"In the economic system, contradictions are expressed directly in the social 
consequences of capital loss (bankruptcy) and deprivation of the means of 
subsistence (unemployment). In the administrative system, contradictions 
are expressed in irrational decisions and in the social consequences of 
administrative failure, that is, in disorganization of areas of life. " 
(Habermas, 1973, p. 63) 
Rationality crisis; Habermas argues that rationality crisis occurs where "the 
administrative system does not succeed in reconciling and fulfilling the imperatives 
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received from the economic system" (Habermas, 1973, p. 46). His analysis reveals the 
origin of a tendency to such crisis in the contradictory nature of the demands made on the 
political-administrative system in advanced capitalism. The advanced capitalist state must 
secure general compliance, the loyalty or acquiescence of all classes, whilst 
fundamentally privileging the interests of capital and sustaining the processes of capitalist 
accumulation. A degree of compliance can be obtained by coercion. However late- 
capitalist states generally seek to find fuller compliance, "mass loyalty", on the basis of 
the legitimacy conferred by the practice and ideology of bourgeois democracy (see 
Lehman & Tinker, 1987). The political system holds legitimacy on the claim that it can 
provide a rational steering of the economic system compatible with the legitimating value 
system - bourgeois ideology. Failure to redeem that claim - failure to meet "demands that 
it has placed on itself' - manifest in either economic crisis or in rationality crisis, will 
threaten the legitimacy of the political system (see Habermas, 1973, p. 69). 
To securely hold its place as part of the system steering mechanism of advanced 
capitalism, accounting must deliver consistent inputs for rational economic management 
and in particular promote the accumulation of capital and help restrain the crises 
tendencies in the economic system. In the late 1980's accounting was seen to be failing to 
meet this challenge. Tweedie & Whittington (1990), writing shortly before David 
Tweedie took over as chairman of the ASB, presented an analysis of the current problems 
of financial reporting, which reading as an agenda for the ASB's subsequent work, 
identified inconsistency in financial reporting - "creative accounting" - as the key issue. 
Mitchell et al similarly identify creative accounting as at the heart of a rationality crisis 
facing accounting: 
"Without decent and credible information, the economy can hardly be 
managed in an effective way. With creative accounting and off-balance 
sheet financing ruling the day, no-one knows the rate of profitability, 
liquidity or investment. It is difficult to make sense of any published 
corporate report. The police force of capitalism has gone into cahoots with 
the people it was meant to police. Everything and anything is 'true and 
fair'. Accountancy has become a process of mystification, obfuscation and 
downright deceit. " 
(Mitchell et al, 1991, p. 9) 
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We view the 'Statement of Principles' project to be part of the ASB's response to the crisis 
of rationality and confidence manifest in the creative accounting abuses of the late 1980's 
and early 1990's13 
As explained above, rationality crises tendencies are inevitably present in the 
administrative apparatus of the advanced capitalist state because of the conflicting 
demands put upon the system. Tweedie & Whittington (1990) recognise that conflicts of 
interests and demands as the root of financial reporting's failures in the period 
immediately prior to the initiation of the 'Statement of Principles' project: 
"The central issue in accounting standard-setting (the 'disease' in our 
metaphor) is the market failure or failures which make accounting standard 
setting necessary. One of these failures is that company managements 
individually have incentives to represent their company's performance in 
the best possible light (e. g. by creative accounting), although collectively 
they would like accounting to conform to high standards in order to inspire 
confidence in the markets in which they operate. " 
(Tweedie & Whittington, 1990, p. 97) 
In their identification of the fundamental and ineradicable conflict between 
collective and individual capital; Tweedie and Whittington's analysis of the basis of the 
crisis facing accounting in the early 1990's directly echoes Habermas' general analysis of 
the rationality crisis tendency: 
"The (rationality) crisis theorem is based now on the reflection that 
growing socialization of production still adjusted to private ends brings 
with it unfulfillable - because paradoxical - demands on the state 
apparatus. On the one hand, the state is supposed to act as a collective 
capitalist. On the other hand, competing individual capitals can not form or 
carry through a collective will as long as freedom of investment is not 
eliminated. " 
(Habermas, 1973, p. 62) 
Tweedie and Whittington (1990) correctly find the immanent contradiction of the 
interests of collective and individual capitals, at the root of accounting's failures to meet 
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the needs of collective capital. The ASB's 'Statements of Principles' project clearly aims 
to help rectify this failure by responding to the need of collective capital for accounting 
information which will be useful for decision making, and in particular which will 
promote the profitable allocation of resources and accumulation of capital. This is notably 
evident in the "decision usefulness" orientation of the objectives of financial reporting 
proposed by the ASB and in their call for greater use of current value information. 
However, the conflict of interest between individual and collective capitals, which 
Tweedie & Whittington (1990) found manifest in creative accounting, is an ineradicable 
feature of the system. It now threatens the progress of the ASB's proposals. As we have 
shown in a previous section, the ASB's proposals designed to increase the usefulness of 
financial reporting, have encountered considerable opposition from the representatives of 
individual units of capital, especially from preparers and auditors concerned by the effect 
that the proposals could have on their individual exposures to risk, costs, and competitive 
positions. 
Tweedie and Whittington's analysis, whilst correct, does not quite convey the full 
variety of the conflicting demands facing accounting. In addition to the conflict between 
collective capital and individual capital which they focus upon, we can identify in our 
analysis of the debate surrounding the ASB's 'Statement of Principles' project, conflict 
between the generalizable public interests and the interests of capital, and conflict 
between various elements of organised individual capital. 
As part of a politicized steering apparatus financial accounting must, if it is to 
hold political legitimacy, endeavour to sustain the claim that it serves the generalised 
public interest. We find this reflected in the ASB's advocacy of the view that financial 
statements should provide information which is useful to a wide range of users including 
"employees" (ASB, 1995b, para. 1.7. a) and "the public" (ASB, 1995b, para. 1.7. f). We 
have seen above that this suggestion is strongly resisted by auditors and preparers who 
clearly see it as not in their individual interests to encourage any inflation of public 
expectations of financial statements. The claims of generalizable public interest on 
financial accounting have been relatively marginalized, and the public effectively 
excluded from active involvement in the administration of financial reporting as a system 
and from accounting policy formation. For example, the respondents to the ASB's 
'Statement of Principles' exposure draft are predominantly representative of commercial 
interests. The public interest claim is suppressed but it is fundamental - there is an 
unavoidable immanent contradiction between public and private interest, which may 
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move towards crisis when accounting conspicuously fails to meet public expectations - as 
we suggest was the case in the late 1980's and early 1990's. 
As finance capital has grown in power and significance an increasing division has 
developed between the interests of finance capital and productive capital which finds 
expression in, for example, the demands made of the accounting system (see Hilferding, 
1910; Laughlin & Puxty, 1983). The conflict between financial capital and productive 
capital substantially reflects the conflict between collective and individual capital. 
Financial capital, represented, for example, by the investment analysts, has an interest in 
demanding value-based accounting information, which will have predictive value and 
provide valuable input to buy, sell, or hold decisions concerning financial investments. 
Productive capital as represented by the management of non-financial enterprises has an 
interest in limiting the disclosure of information with predictive value which may erode 
competitive advantage, or set up expectations which may not be met. Finance capital is 
more completely divorced from use-values than productive capital, it is essentially 
concerned only with rates of return and risk. The distinction between realised and 
unrealised gains can be of comparatively little significance to finance capital. In contrast, 
managers of units of productive capital have residual links to use-value; they are more 
involved with real operations and product, and will be more concerned about the 
maintenance of operating capacity. For the productive unit manager wealth and profit are 
not fungibles; unrealised holding gains are not consumable without undermining the real 
productive potential of the enterprise - that is its usefulness - and by extension its use- 
value. The managers of productive units of capital will be concerned by the consumption 
demands that financial reports may provoke, and relatively more concerned, than finance 
capital, that the prudence concept be maintained. In the debate over the ASB's proposals 
we see a struggle for the meaning of accounting income which reflects different needs for 
action-motivating meaning in different sections of capital. The conflict is reflected in, for 
example, differential reactions to the proposal that the traditional rule allowing only 
realised profit to appear in the profit and loss account be abandoned. 
Habermas does not argue that the full development of rationality crises tendencies 
within the capitalist political system is inevitable. Rather, he identifies three reasons why 
rationality defects may not develop to the extent that they threaten the continued 
existence of the system. Firstly, whilst bankruptcy and unemployment represent clear 
failures of the economic system, the criteria for failure in the administrative sphere are 
less clear, and the extent to which contradictions within the administrative system 
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expressed as policy failure can be tolerated is difficult to predict. Accounting's policy 
failures perhaps become most obvious, and it moves most clearly towards crisis, when its 
administrative failure is linked in the imagination with the unambiguous failures in the 
economic system. For example, calls for increased use of current value information in 
accounts received fresh impetus from the savings and loan industry crisis, in the United 
States (US) in the late 1980's' 4. Similarly, in the UK in the late 1980's and early 1990's 
the occurrence of a spate of company bankruptcies, in circumstances where financial 
statements provided little warning of impending collapse, fuelled similar calls for radical 
accounting change: 
"The usual company collapses of the 'stop' phase of the British economic 
cycle, into which we are now firmly locked reveal the lax practices, 
creative manipulations and dubious standards accepted by accountants and 
auditors in the Lawson go phase. Instead of being a secular priesthood, the 
profession looks more and more like accessories to casino capitalism. The 
air of sleeze this produces is generating an angry demand for change .... " 
(Mitchell et al, 1991, p. 3) 
Elements of the state para-apparatus are liable to receive state support in 
proportion to their ability to contribute to the state's management of economic crises 
tendencies and the production of legitimacy. Their success or failure will be affected and 
in part judged by their own stability and ability to manage internal contradictions and 
thereby support the legitimacy of the system as a whole. Conspicuous failure to meet 
expectations raises the threat that the state will be forced to take a more direct 
involvement with the functions previously effectively delegated to the para-apparatus: 
"Fear of governmental intervention has long been, and continues to be, the 
major reason for calls for action in the profession. " 
(Dopuch & Sunder, 1980, p. 17) 
More direct state intervention may be perceived as a threat to the privileges 
enjoyed by the profession. In such situations we should expect and find the introduction 
of initiatives, like the ASB's 'Statement of Principles' project, which promise to rectify 
past weaknesses. A second reason why rationality defects may not develop into full 
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crisis is that an administrative system may allow for provisional compromises to be 
fashioned. The anarchic market is dominated by the rule of wealth maximisation. That 
rule is non-negotiable and therefore the medium of market exchange allows little scope 
for conflict resolution or compromise. In contrast, the administrative system: 
"... enters into compromise-orientated negotiations with the sectors of 
society on which it depends. "Bargaining" is applied under pressure to the 
reciprocal adaptation of structures of expectation and value systems.... 
The state can make visible to its negotiating partners how generalizable 
interests of the population differ from organized individual interests as 
well as from the collective-capitalist interest in the continued existence of 
the system. " 
(Habermas, 1973, pp. 63-64) 
The ASB's 'Statement of Principles' project serves to make the policy alternatives 
for accounting visible and to stimulate a debate through which compromise may be 
found. The active debate surrounding the ASB's proposals opens the possibility of 
bargaining and compromise. The ASB's project can be seen as a compromise-seeking 
crisis-management strategy. 
Third and finally, rationality crises may be contained because "crisis tendencies 
cannot assert themselves through collective administrative action unconsciously in the 
same way as they can through the particularized behaviour of individual market 
participants. ... Instead, crisis avoidance is thematized as a goal of action" (Habermas, 
1973, p. 64). Tweedie & Whittington (1990) makes it clear that the chairman of the ASB 
was well aware of the developing rationality crises tendencies engulfing accounting and 
intellectually engaged in an attempt to understand and propose a strategy for their 
containment. The ASB could have been in no doubt that their ideas would be highly 
controversial. Systematic conflicts of interests were clearly recognised (Tweedie and 
Whittington, 1990), and previously exposed discussion papers containing ideas similar to 
those eventually included in the exposure draft had provoked hostile reactions from some 
quarters. The ASB did not stumble blindly into controversy, rather, its 'Statement of 
Principles' project appears to be a conscious attempt to manage a rationality crisis by 
provoking a debate in which compromise might eventually be found. 
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An anarchic market dominated by the rule of private wealth maximisation is not 
capable of finding or imposing the compromises or solutions, which are necessary if crisis 
is to be avoided (see Habermas, 1973, pp. 63-64). The management of crises tendencies 
in advanced capitalism typically entails intervention by the state, often effected via state 
para-apparatus such as the ASB - it is market failure which make accounting standard 
setting necessary (see Tweedie & Whittington, 1990, p. 97). However the very the 
strategies employed to manage rationality crises may raise other crises tendencies. 
Legitimation crisis; Habermas identifies a tendency to legitimation crises in the 
repoliticization of the late-capitalist system steering mechanism. The politicization, by 
state intervention, of spheres of life previously considered private threatens to uncover the 
element of social choice underlying the planning and control of social arrangement. Such 
a demystification of social processes could jeopardise mass loyalty to the system by 
bringing "to consciousness the contradiction between administratively socialized 
production and the continued private appropriation and use of surplus value" (Habermas, 
1973, p. 36), and thereby stimulate political demands which the system would be unable to 
reconcile. Conscious thematization of this contradiction would be encouraged by real 
participative democracy that gave citizens genuine substantive involvement in the 
administration. The late-capitalist state must obtain mass political loyalty, yet prevent 
substantive democracy. Typically diffuse mass loyalty and the legitimating formation of 
generalised motives is elicited through formal democratic processes which are kept, so far 
as possible, separate from technocratic administrative systems charged with delivering 
social planning and control with a semblance of apolitical naturalness and rational 
inevitability - "the separation of instrumental functions of the administration from 
expressive symbols that release an unspecified readiness to follow" (Habermas, 1973, 
p. 70). The separation is sustained by the ideology of civic privatism and by rhetorics of 
rationality and efficiency. Habermas argues that with the advance of capitalism traditions 
such as that of financial accounting, are increasingly "flushed out of their nature-like 
course(s) of development" (Habermas, 1973, p. 72) and drawn within the public 
problematic where ultimately the contingency of both their contents and techniques may 
be revealed and their once unquestionable character undermined. 
Accounting and accounting policy-making has indeed become increasingly 
politicized, especially in the latter half of this century: 
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"... the public accounting profession has acquired a unique quasi- 
legislative power. ... Furthermore, its accounting "legislation" affects the 
economic well-being of thousands of business enterprises and millions of 
individuals, few of whom had anything to do with giving the profession its 
power or have a significant say in its use. " 
(Gerboth, 1973, p. 481) 
The politicization of accounting policy-making draws attention to the social 
choice aspect of financial accounting - it may no longer be conceived of as the naturally 
legitimate product of the "invisible hand" of the market. Furthermore, recognition of the 
political contingency of accounting makes it difficult to conceive of accounting or 
accounting regulation in terms of a search for truth (see Gerboth, 1973, pp. 478). 
Politicization threatens the foundations of accounting's traditional taken-for-granted 
legitimacy. However, a new political legitimacy may be conferred by the political process 
itself. Accounting policy-makers typically adopt the trappings of bourgeois democracy - 
due processes and formal procedures, including the exposure of draft proposals, designed 
to secure a generalised authority for their accounting policy making. However, a 
substantive public participation in accounting policy-making would threaten to bring to 
consciousness the contradiction between the socialized production of accounting policy, 
and its systematic privileging of the information needs of private capital accumulation. If 
the systematic privileging, of capital accumulation is to be sustained, real democratic 
involvement in the accounting administration and policy making must be avoided (see 
Arrington & Puxty, 1991). 
We interpret the ASB's 'Statement of Principles' project and the debate 
surrounding it as reflecting a legitimation crisis in accounting in two ways. Firstly, we see 
the'Statement of Principles' project as part of an ongoing defense against demands which 
might follow real public involvement in accounting policy formation. The defence is one 
of rationalism - the fostering of the illusion that accounting practice and policy making 
are technical matters, affairs of reason and expertise rather than of value judgements and 
social choice, and as such, appropriately left to professionals - the technocrats. A 
conceptual framework might reasonably be expected to increase the apparent rationality 
and consistency of accounting standard setting and financial reporting, and by supporting 
the illusion that accounting practice and policy has emerged with rational inevitability 
from a scientific body of economic theory help insulate accounting from the incompatible 
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demands which politicization might otherwise encourage. Solomons recommends a 
conceptual framework for financial reporting as a "defense against politicization": 
"If the FASB could show that its standards were derived from a coherent 
and plausible body of concepts, it would greatly enhance the credibility of 
financial reporting. I know of no better way to reduce accounting's 
vulnerability to political pressure. How else can the board demonstrate the 
superiority of a proposed standard over a counterproposal from some 
sectional interest that is self-serving and not in the public interest? " 
(Solomons, 1986, p. 116) 
We substantially agree with Solomons' analysis - conceptual frameworks are 
indeed constructed as a defense against politicization. However, accounting's mystique of 
rationality - its scientism - seems to be rather more successful in stifling the articulation 
of generalized interests than in moderating the self-serving demands of sectional interests 
(see Tinker, 1991). The mystique remains powerful and difficult to penetrate: 
"Accountants like to see their art as a technical one, best excluded from the 
unworthy gaze of politicians, even the wider public, ... Politicians, 
particularly Labour ones, are far too inclined to accept this mystification 
out of awe or ignorance. " 
(Mitchell et al, 1991, p. 3) 
The ASB's proposals press accounting rationality towards an extreme in the 
measurement of economic income. Paradoxically, however, in doing so they threaten to 
undercut vestiges of the legitimating force of financial accounting tradition. We interpret 
the practitioners' bitter reaction to the ASB proposals as forlorn resistance to the progress 
of rationalization and politicization, and as reflecting an intuitive awareness of the need 
for financial accounting, on the edge of crisis, to hang on to the threads of traditional 
legitimacy, which we suggest are reinforced by the correspondence which is found 
between the categorisations of the traditional financial accounting model and mental 
accounting - the traces of a relationship between financial accounting and human 
concerns. 
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Secondly, we interpret the ASB's 'Statement of Principles' project and the 
controversy surrounding it as reflecting a legitimation crisis arising from politicization's 
stimulation of ever greater and incompatible demands of the system. The early 
development of financial accounting theory and practice was dominated by the 
assumption that the purpose of financial statements was the provision to owners of a 
transactions-based report of management's stewardship (See Beaver, 1981, ch. 1). 
Growing awareness, throughout the 1960's and 1970's, of the economic consequences of 
financial reporting (Rappaport, 1977; Zeff, 1978), and "the social choice nature of 
selection among financial reporting systems" (Beaver, 1981, p. 17) opened the way for the 
acknowledgement of the information needs of a range of users in influential authoritative 
statements concerning the objectives of financial statements (see AICPA, 1973; ASC, 
1975a; FASB, 1978). 
Growth in expectations increases the risk that accounting will fail to meet 
aspirations and suffer consequent loss of legitimacy. As we have seen, the promotion of 
the informational perspective by the ASB's Statement of Principles has provoked 
significant opposition's. Much of that opposition is expressed in terms of warnings of the 
dangers of encouraging "unfulfillable expectations". It is clear that many preparers and 
auditors of accounts would like to see a deflation of expectations and a retreat to a less 
exposed stewardship position. They are no doubt in part motivated by the growth of 
litigation involving accounts and accountants (Economist, 1994,1995) - (a litigation 
crisis). 
Advanced capitalism has arguably been able to stay a step ahead of legitimation 
crisis by providing rising living standards and distributing rewards in such a way that 
growth has been sustained without economic crises. However, development has taken the 
shape dictated by the private pursuit of capital accumulation rather than the generalised 
interest of society; The contradiction of class interest is unresolved and "in the final 
analysis this class structure is the source of the legitimation deficit" (Habermas, 1973, 
p. 73). Habermas' analysis suggests that the legitimation defect will ultimately overtake 
advanced capitalism through a breakdown of motivation. 
Motivation crisis; Habermas argues that the development of advanced capitalism 
systematically undermines the motivational base upon which it relies - the ideological 
complexes of civil and familial-vocational privatism - so that eventually its socio-cultural 
sub-systems will fail to generate "the requisite quantity of action-motivating meaning" 
(Habermas, 1973, p. 45). Civil privatism generates interest in the performance of the 
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political system whilst engendering little demand for substantive public involvement in 
the administration. Familial-vocational privatism engenders family oriented interest in 
consumption, and career-oriented interests in competition, achievement and status. These 
privatistic motivations of advanced capitalism originate in both bourgeois and in pre- 
capitalist elements of tradition. 
Habermas identifies the ideology of achievement and competition, possessive 
individualism, and the orientation to exchange-value as among those vital bourgeois 
elements of the motivating traditions of capitalism which are undermined by the social 
changes brought about by capitalism's own advance. Financial accounting through its 
articulation of the profit motive has played a part in providing action-motivating meaning 
for capitalism. It has promoted and legitimised the pursuit of profit as good for the 
managers - indicative of their operational success - as good for the firm - congruent with 
the accumulation of capital, and as good for society - marking the responsiveness of the 
firm to social demands. The legitimacy and power of accounting profit as a motive is 
eroded by recognition of its contingency and the inconsistency of its measurement. We 
interpret the ASB 'Statement of Principles' proposals as in part an effort to restore the 
action-motivating meaning of accounting performance measurement by reinforcing its 
congruence with economic income. 
Habermas suggests that the pre-capitalist elements of the traditions which 
motivate capitalism are eroded by progressive rationalization of areas of life once 
regulated by tradition: "the scientization of professional practice", and the "administrative 
regulation and legalization of areas of political and social intercourse previously regulated 
informally" (Habermas, 1973, p. 79). Among the effects of this erosion he identifies a 
dissipation of the disposition to "take-for-true" and a recognition of competing positions 
that are "undecided as to truth" (Habermas, 1973, p. 80). Erosion of the disposition to 
take-for-true, and in particular to take-accounting-for-true presents an opportunity for the 
encouragement of substantive public political involvement in accounting policy 
formation, which would challenge the system by revealing the contradiction of its claim 
to mass loyalty whilst systematically privileging private capital accumulation. The 
imperative for those who seek an accounting which is more responsive to human need, 
must be to provoke ever increasing awareness in the public, and their political 
representatives, of the political nature of accounting, and to stimulate their involvement 
in the accounting policy-formation process. Ernst & Young's vociferous mobilisation of 
the resistance of certain elements of capital to the ASB's proposals may have done more 
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to provoke awareness of the political contingency of accounting than all the scribblings of 
critical theorists. 
Accounting - the negative dialectic 
We have seen that the contradictions immanent to the commodity fetish find expression 
not only in the economic system, but also in the administrative and socio-cultural systems 
as tendencies to rationality, legitimacy and motivational crises. In this final section of the 
chapter we return directly to the commodity fetish to consider its implications for critical 
accounting. 
Capitalism makes a commodity of humanity and personifies commodities as 
capital. Financial accounting reflects and reproduces this inversion and addresses itself to 
the information requirements of the personified thing, capital, driven by the imperatives 
of appropriation and accumulation. Accounting as presently constructed in advanced 
capitalism is clearly part of the system's ideological infrastructure (see Dillard, 1991). 
Operating through the commodity fetish it suppresses use-values and helps stifle 
awareness of the exploitative inequality of exchange in capitalism, it reinforces 
humanity's alienation, in capitalism, from the form, content, and fruits of its labour, and 
by supporting an orientation to exchange value it inhibits fuller recognition of the 
richness of human nature and wants. 
Financial accounting may be made less effective as a repressive ideological 
system if it is challenged and its inadequacies exposed. The time is ripe for such 
exposure; Habermas identifies the orientation to exchange value as one of the motivating 
elements of bourgeois ideology that is weakened in advanced capitalism. The socialising 
power of an orientation to exchange value is undermined by, for example, the growth of 
those segments of the population which do not reproduce the conditions of their lives 
through labour, and by the reduced significance of labour which follows reductions in 
working hours and the development of leisure pursuits which raise the significance and 
recognition of needs which may not be satisfied monetarily. The poverty of exchange 
value therefore tends to begin to become spontaneously apparent in late capitalism. 
Adorno, (1966) argues, however, that ideology can be ultimately penetrated and its 
spurious equations undone only by "nonidentical thinking", that is, by immanent critique 
focused on the relations and contradictions between concept and object - through a 
"negative dialectic". In this chapter we have opened an immanent critique of the 
commodity fetish in accounting, revealing the concept of wealth to be less than its object: 
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In concept, wealth is fungible and a matter of relations between things. In object it is non- 
fungible and a matter of living relationship between person and thing. 
An emancipatory accounting must break with the ideology of the fetishised 
commodity which holds accounting in the grip of its inadequate unitary conceptual 
system. It must discover new ways to identify and measure the things of value and 
concern to humanity, it must confront the concept of exchange-value with its inadequacy 
to encompass the nonidentical, multifarious nature of use-value and human need and 
desire. Tinker reminds us that accounting academics bear moral responsibility to help 
prepare accountants (including writers of conceptual frameworks and accounting standard 
setters) to meet this challenge; the intellectual base of the subject must be broadened and 
accounting students encouraged to recognise value beyond exchange-value; they must be 
brought to see the "rich configurations of meaning" associated with concepts of value in 
other disciplines (Tinker, 1985, p. 207). 
Advocates of emancipatory accounting must carefully avoid the temptation to slip 
into alternative modes of identity thinking. Tinker (1985) has called for the development 
of an "emancipatory accounting" based upon a labour theory of value. Such an 
accounting would indeed draw a key dimension of capitalist alienation into the light, that 
is the "exchange among social classes of commodities containing unequal amounts of 
social labour" (Tinker, 1985, p. 171). However, under capitalism, the abstraction of 
socially necessary labour-value is no more capable than exchange-value of expressing the 
rich diversity of human concerns and values, needs and wants. Indeed an accounting built 
upon labour-value would constitute an alternative unitary system of false equivalences; an 
alternative form of identity thinking equally able to suppress the diversity of human need 
and use-values. In a fully developed socialist society, labour would be allocated to 
various branches of production and social activity, on the basis of a democratic 
prioritisation of human needs; and so, in broad terms, there would be a clear connection 
between labour inputs and human need and utility. In a capitalist society labour is 
allocated not by the social recognition of need but by the "law of value" (Marx, 1868, 
p. 524) and effective demand. And the social recognition of labour, as valuable socially 
necessary labour, is independent of the social usefulness of the given commodity. Labour 
only counts" (see Marx. 1867, p. 180) as its value is proven by expressed market demand 
- on commodity exchange: 
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"The labour theory of value has nothing to do with judgements on the 
usefulness of things from the point of view of human happiness or social 
progress. It has even less to do with establishing 'conditions of justice in 
exchange'. It simply recognises the deeper meaning of the actual act of 
exchange and of the output of commodities under capitalism, and what 
governs the distribution of income between social classes which results 
from these acts, independently of any moral aesthetic or political 
judgements, Indeed if one were to look for such 'judgements', one would 
have to say that Marx, while understanding why the law of value has to 
operate as it does under commodity production, did not at all strive to 
'defend' that law, but on the contrary to build a society in which its 
operations would be totally abolished. " 
(Mandel, 1976, p. 44) 
We believe that environmental accounting holds special promise as a site for the 
development of emancipatory forms of accounting and that it should be made a central 
part of the critical accounting project. Environmental accounting throws into relief the 
inadequacy of exchange-values. In this area, perhaps more than in any other, accounting 
researchers and pressure groups have worked to find ways of identifying, quantifying and 
reporting corporate impacts, which push accounting to work beyond exchange-values 
and to more adequately engage with the human needs and the diversity of use-values. 
Almost inevitably, capitalism and those concerned to preserve the natural 
environment are in conflict (Gorz, 1991). There is an imperative of growth at the heart of 
capitalism, and incessant growth in consumption can not be sustained without 
environmental damage and erosion of the eco-system. Indeed the "environment" has in 
recent times become a dramatic site of resistance to capital, rivalling, in prominence, the 
equally inevitable conflict between labour and capital. To maximise impact, an 
emancipatory accounting must put its weight on the points of resistance. It must work for, 
and with, those groups that find themselves in opposition to capital. The points of 
resistance should be used as a "catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their 
position, find out their point of application and the methods used" (Foucault, 1982, 
p. 211). 
We acknowledge that environmental accounting in corporate financial reporting 
can be, and has been, subverted. It has been used to help preserve the legitimacy of the 
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institutions of capitalism, and financial accounting itself, by lending them a semblance of 
relevance to human needs, concerns and values (Puxty, 1986; Tinker et al., 1991). 
However it is possible for accounting to make itself part of a counter hegemony, in 
resistance to capital (see e. g., Hopper et al, 1986; Arnold & Hammond, 1994). And we 
believe that alternative accounts focused on capital's conflict with the environment have 
the potential to reveal, in dramatic ways, both capital's need to fuel growth at the expense 
of the environment and in utter disregard of human need, and the inadequacy of the 
concept of exchange-value to grasp the variety of human use-value. Ultimately, in the 
production of alternative accounts which privilege human need and use-values over 
exchange-values, accounting may open a negative dialectic of the nonidentical, help 
bring to light the alienating relations of power in capitalism, and thereby help empower 
men and women to change the oppressive circumstances of their lives. 
The possibility of crisis is immanent in financial accounting's embrace of the 
commodity fetish. And it may be that in time the system will collapse under pressure of 
its internal contradictions. However considerable effort is expended in sustaining the 
system and staving off possible crisis. We interpreted the ASB's 'Statement of Principles' 
project as a, somewhat misguided, effort to re-position financial accounting's conceptual 
base on firmer ground designed to sustain control, at least, at the conceptual level. It 
would be naive, and morally irresponsible, to behave as if by force of its internal 
contradictions alone the systems of capitalism might spontaneously collapse. Ultimately, 
only an active refusal of identity thinking and the application of a vigorous negative 
dialectic will allow the heterogeneous to invade thought, "release the nonidentical" 
(Adorno, 1966, p. 6), and burst the straight jacket of unitary systems of concepts and 
thought, such as financial accounting, which presently govern our lives. To serve an 
emancipatory purpose, accounting must, above all, help men to penetrate the 
"hieroglyphic" of exchange-value: 
"Value, therefore, does not have its description branded on its forehead; it 
rather transforms every product of labour into a social hieroglyphic. Later 
on, men try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of their 
own social product: for the characteristic which objects of utility have of 
being values is as much men's social product as is their language. " 
(Marx, 1867, p. 167) 
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In the previous chapter we argued that financial reporting in advanced capitalism faces crises 
of rationality and legitimacy and we read ASB 'Statement of Principles' project as part of the 
profession's efforts to manufacture and impose a measure of ostensive rationality and 
specious legitimacy for financial accounting. We argued that as capitalism advances, and in 
order to forestall the full expression of the tendencies to economic crisis immanent to that 
system, the state, often acting through quasi-independent institutions such as accounting, 
tends to take an important role in modifying and regulating market operations: Accounting 
is thus politicized. We found however that accounting has been unable to satisfactorily 
reconcile the conflicting demands placed upon it under capitalism, and has consequently and 
conspicuously failed to provide consistent inputs for rational economic management: 
"Accountancy has become a process of mystification, obfuscation and downright deceit" 
(Mitchell et. al., 1991, p. 9). Accounting faces a rationality crisis - manifest in its failure to 
deliver "decent and credible information"; without which "the economy can hardly be 
managed in an effective way" (Mitchell et. al., 1991, p. 9). 
The legitimacy of an effectively politicized financial accounting, within a modem 
liberal democracy, must ultimately rely on the credibility of its claim to serve the generalised 
public interest. The systematic privileging, within capitalism, of the imperatives of private 
capital accumulation is essentially incompatible with that claim. We found that the tendency 
to legitimacy crisis that originates in this conflict of private and public interest was managed 
in various ways, most notably through the denial or occlusion of the political nature of 
accounting choice. Through the cultivation of the view that accounting practice and policy 
making are primarily matters of instrumental reason and expertise, the wider public has 
effectively been excluded from the accounting debate and the demands that could be expected 
to follow their real involvement suppressed. 
We ended chapter 1 by looking beyond the crises that financial accounting presently 
faces towards the possibility of an emancipatory accounting. Such an accounting must 
overcome the "mystification, obfuscation and downright deceit" that characterizes financial 
accounting as dominated by the ideology of the commodity fetish. It must confront the 
concept of exchange-value with its inadequacy to the multifarious reality of use-value and 
human need and desire. Above all an emancipatory accounting must be able to provide us 
with knowledge of the objective world that we share. It is only on the basis of knowledge of 
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the objective realities of our existence that we can hope to rationally modify social conditions 
and progress towards a fuller realization of human potential. 
In this chapter we will draw on the account given by the philosopher Donald 
Davidson of the very possibility of knowledge to support the view that in accounting we can 
have knowledge of an objective reality of objects and events in the world we share. We will, 
in effect, defend a variety of realism; one that recognizes intersubjectivity as all the 
foundation we have and need for objectivity. We begin the chapter by considering and 
rejecting two alternative realist views that have been influential in accounting thought; 
metaphysical realism and internal realism. We find metaphysical realism unsatisfactory 
because of its reliance on the ultimately unintelligible notion of truth as correspondence of 
representation and representation-independent reality. And we reject internal realism because 
it tends make truth, in so far as it has any use for the concept, some sort of mere coherence 
of beliefs. In the Davidsonian world-view we find a habitable middle ground between the 
unsatisfactory poles of correspondence or coherence. 
An important motive for this chapter is our desire to defend the view that we can have 
accounting knowledge of "an objective, shared and intersubjectively accessible world" 
against those theorists would reject such a "mundane" (Hines, 1991, p. 317) notion and prefer 
to imagine that somehow our conceptual schemes constitute the very objects they describe 
(see Hines 1988). We therefore go on to contrast our Davidsonian view with three dualist 
conceptions of accounting, each of which encourages us to either abandon or relativize the 
concepts of truth and reality. 
In this chapter we begin to develop a case for the emancipatory capacity of financial 
reporting. We confine ourselves here to discussion of accounting as a descriptive enterprise. 
We recognise, however, that accounting has a normative dimension. We take up the 
implications of prescriptive dimension of accounting in subsequent chapters, where we deal 
with questions of the legitimacy or normative objectivity of financial accounting regulation. 
In this chapter we point to the possibility of a way beyond the rationality crisis that 
accounting faces; we can have accounts of objective reality. Not withstanding the fact that 
financial accounting in late capitalism is deeply mired in the ideology of commodity 
fetishism, accounting is not in principle inevitably ideological; we can have true accounts of 
the objective world we share. In later chapters we take up the question of how accounting 
might find a way beyond the legitimacy crisis it presently faces. 
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"If I did not know what others think I would have no thoughts of my own and 
so would not know what I think. If I did not know what I think, I would lack 
the ability to gauge the thoughts of others. Gauging the thoughts of others 
requires that I live in the same world as them, sharing many reactions to its 
major features, including its values. " 
(Davidson, 1991, p. 166) 
Introduction 
The basic aim of this chapter is to justify the view that in accounting we can have knowledge 
of an objective reality of objects and events in the world. We want to defend accounting 
against those theorists, of various hues, who would encourage us to either relativize, or give 
up altogether, the concepts of truth and reality in accounting. We begin the chapter with an 
examination of the issue of truth in accounting: We consider, and quickly reject as ultimately 
unintelligible, metaphysical realism and the notion of truth as correspondence of 
representation and representation-independent reality. We also find unsatisfactory those 
dualist views, like internal realism, which assume that our conceptual schemes constitute 
their objects and which tend to make truth, in so far as they find the concept viable, some sort 
of mere coherence of beliefs. The philosopher Donald Davidson's work offers a way beyond 
the correspondence or coherence dichotomy. In the central part of the chapter we outline 
Davidson justification of the possibility of objective knowledge. We then attempt to show 
the significance of Davidson's analysis for accounting, by explaining how it stands against 
three dualist conceptions of accounting. The ideas introduced in this chapter are carried into 
the succeeding chapter where we develop a fuller exploration of the possibility of objectivity 
in accounting. 
Truth in financial reporting; the mirror of reality 
External financial reporting is generally recognized as resting upon realist pre-suppositions 
(Shapiro, 1997,1998). The philosopher Hilary Putnam argues that two varieties of realism 
can be distinguished: 'metaphysical realism' and 'internal realism'. Metaphysical realism 
consist in the conjunction of the relatively unobjectionable ontological thesis that reality 
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exists independently of our representations of it, and the epistemological thesis' that there is 
one correct scheme for describing reality: " the world consists of some fixed totality of mind- 
independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete description of'the way the world 
is'. Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and 
external things and sets of things" (Putnam, 1981, p. 49). 
The notion of truth as correspondence seems to have a central place in the 
conceptions of the possibilities of financial reporting held by accounting regulators. Typically 
it is expressed in terms of the ideal of faithful representation2: the "correspondence or 
agreement between a measure or description and the phenomena it purports to represent" 
(FASB, 1980a, para. 63). The dominant metaphor of metaphysical realism, the mind or 
language as mirror of reality (see Rorty, 1980), is even occasionally pressed into service by 
accounting theorists: 
"Just as a distorting mirror reflects a warped image of the person standing in 
front of it, or just as an inexpensive loudspeaker fails to reproduce faithfully 
the sounds that went into the microphone ... so a 
bad model gives a distorted 
representation of the system that it models. The question accountants must 
face continually is how much distortion is acceptable. The cost of a perfect 
sound reproduction system puts it out of the reach of most people, and perfect 
reliability of accounting information is equally unattainable. " 
(FASB, 1980, para. 76) 
From the perspective of metaphysical realism the pursuit of objectivity becomes a matter of 
eliminating the subjective distortions of the mirror in which reality is reflected, so that the 
objects of our perceptions and thoughts come clearly into view and our statements, theories, 
and the accounts we give, accord with the independent reality3. Metaphysical realism 
suggests that we might somehow conceive of the world wholly independently of our 
representations and theories of the world, and it relies on the unintelligible notion that our 
representations might fit or correspond to the world as it "really is", prior to our descriptions 
of it: 
"It suggests that we can, so to speak, get round behind our descriptions and 
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see how they fit the world, and this makes no sense at all: any conception of 
the world we can use at all is one that is already expressed in terms that we 
understand, our terms. The world cannot describe itself for us. " 
(Williams, 1991, p. 12) 
We agree with Putnam that: "to say that truth is 'correspondence to reality' is not false but 
empty, as long as nothing is said about what the 'correspondence' is" (Putnam, 1992b, p. 10). 
And it seems to be quite clear that nothing meaningful can be said about what sort of "thing" 
it is that can make a sentence true by corresponding with it4. Correspondence and the realism 
associated with it would become interesting: "... if anyone could come up with an intelligible 
and illuminating way of individuating the entities to which true utterances or beliefs 
correspond, along with an acceptable semantics for talk about such entities (Davidson, 1999a, 
p. 17). Until then, the notion of correspondence is essentially vacuous and it is rather pointless 
to describe oneself as a realist. If we stop believing that there is anything for our sentences 
to correspond to, we must give up the notion that truth can consist in the accurate mirroring 
of facts. And, we must relinquish the representationalist view of language and accounting: 
"... if there is nothing for true sentences to correspond to, neither is there anything for them 
to represent' (Davidson, 1999a, p. 17). Metaphysical realism is clearly not the form of realism 
we seem to share in our daily lives, and despite the rhetoric of correspondence which seems 
to permeate financial reporting, it cannot actually be the form of realism which underpins 
external financial reporting. 
Truth in financial reporting; Scheme and Content 
As an alternative to the untenable delusions of metaphysical realism, Putnam offers the 
perspective of 'internal realism'. On that view there can be no God's eye view of the world; 
We can have no way of knowing or usefully imagining what objects the world consists of 
except from within our descriptive schemes. Indeed, it seems that the world in itself is 
assumed to be undifferentiated before we cut it into objects by the introduction of a scheme 
of description: "'Objects' do not exist independently of conceptual schemes. We cut up the 
world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description" (Putnam, 1981, 
p. 52). Putnam's internal realism, then, allows the world only limited space to impose itself 
upon our conceptual schemes. It can provide "no general philosophical understanding of how 
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our thoughts and words latch on to the world" (Williams, 1991, p. 12), and, because both 
objects and words are regarded as internal to schemes of description, questions of reference 
become "trivial": "What does 'rabbit' refer to? Why, to rabbits of course! " (Putnam, 1981, 
p. 52). Most, even very modest, realists will find this vision of a world with no structure in 
itself, prior to our schemes unacceptable. Realists will, generally, want to hold on to a 
stronger sense of the world-guidedness of our descriptions, at least in the scientific sphere, 
than Putnam's internal realism allows. They will argue that the world "... must, on its own, 
make some boundaries more salient than others, ... even if it does not single out a unique way 
of marking off individuals and sorts" (Farrell, 1996, p. 167)'. On Putnam's view of things it 
would seem that "there would be no more, and no less, reason to be puzzled if extraterrestrial 
physics were quite different from ours than if extraterrestrial fashions or food are" (Williams, 
1991, p. 13). 
Clearly truth as 'correspondence' can have no substantial role within any version of 
the internal realism, where the idea of representation-independent reality is empty. However, 
for Putnam's internal realist, once a particular conceptual scheme is in place, truth can be 
established in terms of the objects it constitutes. Putnam's internal realism then 
accommodates a pressure of reality upon our conceptual schemes, but only from within. The 
impact of the world on the conceptual scheme is conceived of as being constrained by the 
conceptual scheme itself. On this view, beliefs can be tested against evidence as that evidence 
appears in terms of the conceptual scheme, and, by submitting beliefs to communal criticism, 
we may hope to move towards truth defined as idealized rational acceptability (Putnam, 
1981, p. 55). In defining truth as "idealized rational acceptability", Putnam certainly does not 
mean to imply that we should think of truth as the final results that rational inquiry and 
reality itself somehow presses us towards. He rejects the suggestion, he finds in the early 
pragmatist writings of James and Pierce, that truth should be identified with "... the 'final 
opinion', that is, not with what is presently confirmed, but with what is 'fated' to be 
confirmed, if inquiry is continued long enough, and in a responsible and fallibilistic spirit" 
(Putnam, 1992b, p. 10). And he rejects Bernard Williams' view that, in science, we might 
reasonably hope for world-guided convergence of knowledge (see Putnam, 1990, p. 173). The 
difficulty for Putnam, then, is to make sense of his notion of truth as "idealized rational 
acceptability" whilst maintaining an anti-convergence position. Rorty suggests that we must 
understand Putnam's "idealized rational acceptability" as "rational acceptability to an ideal 
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community. " And given that we can have no vantage point outside of our community, the 
ideal community must be us, that is, "us as we should like to be" (Rorty, 1998, p. 52). In this 
context, Rorty suggest, with approval, truth is "just the reification of an approbative 
adjective" (Rorty, 1998, p. 53). Putnam himself clearly thinks that truth is something more 
than an honorific adjective -a "mysterious something more" (Rorty, 1998, p. 61) - but what 
more? - is not made intelligible. Rorty too, in fact, knows that there is more to truth than 
commendation: There is a tension in Rorty's own views on truth. On the one hand he seems 
to want to "reduce truth to justification" (Rorty, 1995, p. 282); In describing an utterance as 
true we commend it as justified, and "once you understand all about justification ... you 
understand all there is to understand about ... truth" (1995, p. 282). On the other 
hand he 
knows that there is "something more" to truth than this approbative or commending use, he 
identifies what he calls its cautionary use, that is "its use in such expressions as 'fully 
justified, but perhaps not true"` (1995, p. 283). The force of this cautionary usage is to 
emphasize the relativity of justification - it is always justification to an audience, justification 
to us. Rorty recognizes that truth is not relative in this way; "we can never exclude the 
possibility that some better audience might exist, or come to exist, to which a belief that is 
justifiable to us would not be justifiable" (1995, p. 283). The point of the cautionary use of 
truth is to remind us that our justified beliefs may not be true. Ultimately Rorty "knows truth 
isn't identical with justification" (Davidson. 1999a, p. 18): Truth is not relative in the way that 
justification is. Davidson rejects Putnam's internal realism because it "makes truth relative 
to a scheme", and that is an idea he does "not think intelligible" (Davidson, 1983, p. 309). 
The underlying problem, as Davidson sees it, with Putnam's internal realism is the 
"unintelligibility of the dualism of a conceptual scheme and a 'world' waiting to be coped 
with" to which it is committedb. Following sustained critique of the "straw man" of 
metaphysical realism, the contemporary critical accounting theory literature is overflowing 
with dualist, scheme and content, formulations of the role of financial reporting. In the 
following section of this chapter we will use Donald Davidson's persuasive critique of 
dualism, as a basis for resistance to such views. However, before we turn to a close 
examination of Davidson's views, we pause to briefly illustrate kind of dualist accounting 
theory we want to oppose. 
Among the more influential strands of dualist thinking in the accounting literature are 
those papers which bluntly advance the view that "in communicating reality, we construct 
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reality" (Hines, 1988). In perhaps the best known paper in this genre, Hines suggests that 
scientists, and accountants, have "not so much grasped reality, as created it, by thinking of 
it in a certain way, and treating it in that way! " (Hines, 1988, p. 254). She thinks that there 
is an abundance of "evidence" against the "mundane" "assumption of an objective, shared 
and intersubjectively accessible world" (Hines, 1991, p. 317). Prior to our conceptual 
schemes, there is "Just a jumble" (Hines, 1988, p. 255); Our various and arbitrary conceptual 
schemes somehow impose a structure on our reality, they constitute the very objects they 
describe. In Hines' view of things, our freedom to modify our conceptual schemes "our 
picture of reality", and therefore our reality itself, seems to be quite unconstrained by any 
objective reality': 
"Remember, we are creating reality. ... As ordinary people, we arbitrarily 
combine, and define, and add, and subtract things from our picture of reality. 
As professional people, we arbitrarily combine, and define, and add, and 
subtract things, in a different way: that is what differentiates us. " 
(Hines, 1988, p. 254) 
The main check Hines identifies on the development of our conceptual schemes, is the state 
of our existing conceptual commitments: The main constraint on a conceptual domain, such 
as accounting, is that it cohere with the dominant social conceptions of reality: "... if people 
have a certain conception of reality, then naturally, we must reflect that. Otherwise people 
would lose faith in us" (Hines, 1988, p. 255). Hines' views, then, clearly reflect Putnam's 
internal realism, and in particular his notion that "we cut up the world into objects when we 
introduce one or another scheme of description" (Putnam, 1981, p. 52). She also conceives 
of truth in a way that makes it essentially relative to a scheme9. 
On Hines's view the conceptual systems maintained by institutions like accounting, 
play an significant part in creating and sustaining our reality - where otherwise there would 
be chaos: "Everything would be a mess without us. Just a jumble. No-one would know where 
they were" (Hines, 1988, p. 255); She sees these institutions as owing much of their power 
to the fact that people are reluctant to accept "that their world is so ... tenuous" (Hines, 
1988, 
p. 255). We will argue in the following section of this chapter that, contrary to Hines' view, 
Davidson has convincingly shown that we can have good reason for thinking that we are 
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securely in touch with an objective world10, and that our world, and the relations between our 
beliefs and that world are far from being "tenuous". 
Truth and Knowledge in Accounting; Beyond Scheme and Content 
Davidson rejects Putnam's internal realism as unintelligibly relativist. However, metaphysical 
realism is equally unacceptable to Davidson, for it allows the possibility that our whole 
system of beliefs may be out of touch with reality; "all our best researched and established 
thoughts and theories may be false" (Davidson, 1983, p. 309). On this view, the truth of a 
sentence depends upon its correspondence with something in the world, yet it seems that our 
assessment of correspondence can only consist in the acquisition of further beliefs - and how 
are we to know that those beliefs themselves are true? - but by the acquisition of yet further 
beliefs. We may try to overcome skepticism by identifying bases for belief which transcend 
belief itself. Sensations, for example, may be thought to provide conclusive justification for 
certain beliefs. Davidson strongly opposes any such foundationalism. He argues that while 
sensations may cause belief, they can never be 'reasons' for belief: 
"The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since 
sensations are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes. What then is the 
relation? The answer is, I think, obvious: the relation is causal. Sensations 
cause some beliefs and in this sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs. 
But a causal explanation of a belief does not show how or why the belief is 
justified. " 
(Davidson, 1983, p. 310) 
Alternatively, we may hope to avoid the problem of skepticism by redefining our concept 
truth. The coherence theory of truth starts out by rejecting, as unintelligible, the search for 
any foundation for our beliefs in grounds beyond our beliefs: "What distinguishes a 
coherence theory is simply the claim that nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief 
except another belief' (Davidson, 1983, p. 310). On this view a belief is true, not if it 
corresponds to something in the world, but if it coheres with other beliefs. Truth becomes 
purely a matter of the internal relations within networks of beliefs or sentences. The loss of 
truth's connection with the world raises an obvious difficulty: It is clearly possible to 
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construct competing sets of sentences, each of which is internally coherent, yet inconsistent 
with the other sets. If truth is taken to consist merely in coherency we would then, apparently, 
find ourselves in the position of accepting inconsistent sets of statements as 'true'. Whilst 
Davidson firmly rejects the correspondence theory of truth, "it would appear to require a 
confrontation between what we believe and reality; and the idea of such a confrontation is 
absurd" (Davidson, 1983, p. 307), he is not prepared to see truth as mere coherence". He is 
unwilling to accept the loss of truth's connection with the world. He argues that despite the 
fact that we cannot "get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other 
than coherence", we nevertheless can "insist that knowledge is of an objective world 
independent of our thought or language" (Davidson, 1983, p. 307). He wants to persuade us 
that someone with more or less coherent beliefs has good reason for thinking that most of 
those beliefs are true and in touch with objective reality. In the following paragraphs we 
explain how Davidson justifies this view. 
Davidson gives an account of how it is possible for us to have three irreducibly 
different, but deeply interrelated, varieties of knowledge; (i) knowledge of the world, (ii) 
knowledge of other minds, and (iii) knowledge of one's own mind. The three types of 
knowledge are essentially interdependent: "The three sorts of knowledge form a tripod: if any 
leg were lost, no part would stand" (Davidson, 1991, p. 166). For Davidson the basis of our 
propositional knowledge is interpersonal communication: The communicative link between 
knowledge of other minds and knowledge of one's own mind, forms the "base line" 
(Davidson, 1991, p. 160) of the triangular relationship between the three types of knowledge. 
Davidson shows how this base line of communication can be established and how it both 
yields and depends on the three varieties of knowledge: 
Knowledge 
of the world 
Knowledge of Knowledge of 
one's own mind other minds 
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Knowledge and hence communication, the connection between knowledge of one's own mind 
and knowledge of other minds, clearly pre-supposes belief. Davidson argues that to hold 
beliefs requires that one have a concept of truth and therefore the capacity to appreciate the 
contrast between true and false. He follows Wittgenstein in arguing that only source of the 
concept of truth is communication itself 2: 
"Someone who has a belief about the world - or anything else - must grasp 
the concept of objective truth, of what is the case independently of what he 
or she thinks.... -The source of the concept of objective truth is interpersonal 
communication. Thought depends on communication. This follows if we 
suppose that language is essential to thought, and we agree with Wittgenstein 
that there can not be a private language. " 
(Davidson, 1991, pp. 156-157) 
Communication requires shared understanding, one person must obtain an understanding of 
the meaning of the behaviour (usually the linguistic utterances) of an other; Communication 
in effect entails interpretation, The object of interpretation is the assignment of propositional 
content to a speaker's utterances. Davidson sees interpretation as proceeding through the 
interpreter's matching of sentences of her own to those of a speaker; In so far as the 
interpreter "gets things right" (Davidson, 1991, p. 157), her own sentences will yield the truth 
conditions of the speaker's sentences, and give a basis for interpretation. Davidson wants to 
show how such a theory of truth for a speaker's utterances, that is "an empirical theory about 
the truth conditions of every sentence in some corpus of sentences" (1990a, p. 309), can be 
constructed and verified and serve as a theory of meaning. 
The evidential foundation for the theory must not "beg the question" by assuming 
knowledge of meanings at the outset, it must be plausibly accessible to the radical interpreter, 
that is someone with no prior knowledge of the language and no capacity to directly observe 
the detailed content of the speakers propositional attitudes; desires, beliefs, intentions'3. 
Davidson argues that it is possible for an interpreter to directly observe that a speaker holds 
a sentence to be true, in particular circumstances, without knowing the meaning of the 
sentence. Therefore the speaker's prompted assent or dissent can be taken, without circularity, 
as basic evidence in the development of interpretive theory: "This is a fair place to start 
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identifying beliefs and meanings, since a speaker's assent to a sentence depends both on what 
he means by the sentence and on what he believes about the world. Yet it is possible to know 
that a speaker assents to a sentence without knowing either what the sentence, as spoken by 
him, means, or what belief is expressed by it" (Davidson, 1983, p. 314-315). 
The fact that the notion of truth is central to all of our interpretive schemes does not 
lead Davidson to think we need a definition of truth". He does, however, -identify one 
"intuitive truth about truth "the simple notion that the truth of any sentence depends upon its 
meaning and the world. He finds this intuition reflected in Tarski's test (Tarski, 1944) of the 
material adequacy of theories of truth, Convention T'5: 
"What Convention T, and the trite sentences it declares true, like "`Grass is 
green" spoken by an English speaker is true if and only if grass is green', 
reveal is that the truth of an utterance depends on just two things: what the 
words as spoken mean, and how the world is arranged. " 
(Davidson, 1983, pp. 308-309) 
Davidson suggests that an adequate theory of truth for the purpose of radical interpretation 
can be developed in terms of a modified version of convention T: An adequate theory will 
entail for every sentence s of a language a testable T-sentence, expressed in the language of 
the interpreter, of the form - "s is true if and only if p, " where 's' is the name of an object 
language sentence and pis any sentence that is true if and only if 's' is16. 
The interdependence of belief and meaning is a potentially fatal impediment to the 
construction of a theory of truth and meaning: "If all we have to go on is the fact of honest 
utterance, we cannot infer the belief without the meaning and we have no chance of inferring 
the meaning without the belief' (Davidson, 1974b, p. 142). Davidson thinks that the only way 
an interpreter can break into the circle of belief and meaning is by the adoption, "across the 
board", of a principle of charity. The principle of charity itself has two key components a 
principle of correspondence and a principle of coherence. The principle of correspondence 
directs the interpreter to proceed on the basis that the speaker's utterances express beliefs with 
which she is largely in agreement. It "prompts the interpreter to take the speaker to be 
responding to the same features of the world that (s)he (the interpreter) would be responding 
to under similar circumstances" (Davidson, 1991, p. 158). The empirical constraint thus 
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imposed on the attribution of belief makes the derivation of meanings possible. The approach 
deals with the problem of the interdependence of belief and meaning by "holding belief 
constant as far as possible while solving for meaning" (Davidson, 1973a, p. 137). This is done 
by assigning truth conditions to the speaker's sentences that make her right, according to the 
interpreter's view of the circumstances, whenever plausibly possible". 
The principle of coherence directs the interpreter to assume that the speaker shares 
her standards of rationality; it prompts the interpreter to find "a degree of logical consistency 
in the thought of the speaker" (Davidson, 1991, p. 158). An interpreter cannot build an 
interpretive theory of truth and meaning by taking each sentence of an object language in 
isolation and deciding upon an appropriate T-sentences for it. Rather she must build a pattern 
that fits the evidence and respects the interlocking relations of rational entailment between 
sentences". Davidson thinks that the meaning of words and sentences can be drawn only 
indirectly from the whole structure of interrelated T-sentences entailed by the truth theory for 
the speaker's language. For Davidson a theory of truth and meaning for a language is an 
account of how the speakers' utterances hold together in a coherent pattern that, as a whole, 
fits and makes sense of the interaction of the speakers and their environment as understood 
by the interpreter19. Davidson's approach to meaning is thoroughly holistic20. 
Davidson's approach to interpretation does not make the ridiculous demand that the 
speaker is always right about the world, always rational and consistent. However it allows 
no room for the possibility that the interpreter might discover that the speaker is largely 
wrong about the world. If the interpreter cannot find a way to read into a creature's utterances 
a pattern of beliefs which, by the interpreter's own standards, is largely consistent and true 
she has "no reason to count that creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything" 
(Davidson, 1973a, p. 136-137). The principle of charity requires that the interpreter maximize 
the truth, by her own standards, of the speakers' utterances, that is, she must interpret so as 
to maximize the consistency and coherence of her own beliefs with those of the speakers. 
It seems to be clear that interpretation necessarily21 entails the application of 
interpersonal standards of coherence and correspondence to the beliefs and utterances of 
speaker and interpreter. But why should an interpersonal standard be objective, what is there 
to prevent interpreter and speaker being in agreement yet thoroughly mistaken in their 
beliefs? If nothing, then we should agree with Rorty that when Davidson argues that most of 
anybody's beliefs must be true, what he means boils down to just that "most of anybody's 
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beliefs must coincide with most of our beliefs" (Rorty, 1995, p. 286). Truth then would just 
be truth according to the interpreter. An other, very much related, question also occurs at this 
stage; why should we accept that it is only through communication that an objective standard 
of truth can be established? Why not think that the world itself provides an objective standard 
that makes our sentences true or false? To clarify Davidson's view on these questions, we 
must go back and say a little more about the triangular relations between knowledge of the 
world, knowledge of other minds and knowledge of one's own mind. 
Davidson does indeed think that the ultimate source of "objectivity is 
intersubjectivity": Without communication we have no basis for the concept of truth, no 
foundation for the idea that our thoughts, or the things we say, might be right or wrong. And 
without a concept of objective truth we can have no thought or communication. Davidson 
stresses that the notion of objective truth can arise and have application only in the context 
of the relations between communicating parties responding jointly to each other and stimuli 
from a shared world. His reasoning is as follows: All creatures tend to classify objects and 
events in the world in terms of patterns of similarity and difference in the stimuli those 
objects and events generate. The basis for claiming that this is happening is the 
similarity/regularity of the creature's response to the stimuli. But on what grounds can it be 
said that the creature's responses to the stimuli are similar? The only answer we can have to 
this question is that another creature finds similarity in both the stimuli and in the response 
of the first. Only when the observer or interpreter completes the triangle, by correlating the 
first party's responses, with the objects and events in the world, as the observer sees it, are 
there grounds for thinking that the parties are responding to an objective reality of objects and 
events in the world rather than some proximal stimuli or imaginings. It is through this 
process of triangulation, this sharing of stimuli, that thought is given content: "It takes two 
points of view to give a location to the cause of a thought, and thus to define its content" 
(Davidson, 1991, p. 159)22. 
It now becomes clear why it is that Davidson, contra Rorty23, thinks that while a 
speaker and interpreter may often understand one another on the basis of erroneous beliefs, 
such cases "cannot be the rule" (Davidson, 1983, p. 317)24; The interpersonal standard is an 
objective standard. He thinks most of our beliefs must be true because of the causal linkage 
of the most fundamental of those beliefs with the world: 
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"... what ultimately ties language to the world is that the conditions that 
typically cause us to hold sentences true constitute the truth conditions, and 
hence the meanings, of our sentences. " 
(Davidson, 1996, p. 275) 
While the truth of an utterance may depend "on just two things: what the words as spoken 
mean, and how the world is arranged", it is the conditions in the world which typically cause 
sentences to be held true which give content to utterances. The interpreter must attribute 
beliefs and interpret sentences held true in terms of the events and objects in the world that 
cause the sentences to be held true; Radical interpretation does not allow the possibility that 
belief can somehow be out of phase with the environment which determines its content. It 
has no room for the notion of an epistemological gap between the content of thought and 
language and the world upon which the skeptic relies25: 
"What stands in the way of global skepticism of the senses is, in my view, the 
fact that we must, in the plainest and methodologically most basic cases, take 
the objects of belief to be the causes of that belief. And what we, as 
interpreters, must take them to be is what they in fact are. Communication 
begins where causes converge26: your utterance means what mine does if 
belief in its truth is systematically caused by the same events and objects. " 
(Davidson, 1983, p. 317-318) 
Davidson urges us to learn to conceive of our relation to the world in causal rather than 
representationalist terms. He takes us to be firmly 'in touch' with reality, not in the sense that 
our beliefs can be more or less adequate representations of reality, but rather in the sense that 
our beliefs are causally related to our environment, ultimately via our senses. Davidson's is 
a purely extensional theory of meaning; content is an effect of radical interpretation: "The 
semantic features of language are public features. What no one can, in the nature of the case, 
figure out from the totality of the relevant evidence cannot be part of meaning" (Davidson, 
1979, p. 235). There can be no sense in the notion that even an adequate interpretation of a 
speaker's utterances might somehow miss the mark by failing to grasp the speaker's intention 
- "what she'really meant". As a matter of principle, meaning and belief are open to public 
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determination and scientific investigation27: "What a fully informed interpreter could learn 
about what a speaker means is all there is to learn; the same goes for what the speaker 
believes" (Davidson, 1983, p. 315). 
Davidson's analysis shows that the possibility of knowledge requires that many of our 
plainest beliefs are true, and publicly accessible. Radical interpretation obviously does not 
guarantee all of our beliefs are true. Some of our beliefs are no doubt caused by misleading 
sensations, and many of our sophisticated beliefs are given content only by their relation to 
further beliefs and therefore bear only indirect and perhaps tenuous relation to the causal 
stimuli provided by the world28: Any individual belief or set of beliefs may be false. What 
radical interpretation does not allow is that our basic framework of belief can somehow be 
out of phase with the world. And, it insists that it is only in the context of this 
framework/fabric of basic true belief that more sophisticated beliefs can have content and a 
theory of error be developed. 
We have stressed in the in the last few paragraphs that the world does indeed 
constrain our knowledge. Yet, we must not lose sight of the fact that our knowledge of the 
world is always based upon our knowledge of other minds29; Knowledge is grounded in 
intersubjectivity: 
"A community of minds is the basis of knowledge; it provides the measure 
of all things. It makes no sense to question the adequacy of this measure, or 
to seek a more ultimate standard, " 
(Davidson, 1991, p. 164) 
One way of thinking of Davidson's analysis of the basic methodology of interpretation is to 
see it as part of a fundamental critique of scheme and content dualism. And one way to 
understand his suggestion that we should learn to conceive of the relation of language and 
the world in purely causal terms, is to see it as a call for us "to stop thinking that there is 
something called 'language' which is a'scheme' which can organize, or fit, or stand in some 
other non-causal relation to, a'content' called'the world"` (Rorty, 1991, pp. 59-60). According 
to the dualist vision at the core of the empiricist tradition, we have on the one hand 'content'; 
the given of sensory experience, and on the other the 'scheme', a mechanism of mind or 
language, that provides some system of categories which gives form to sensation and 
58 
Chapter 2: Accounting Knowledge 
organizes experience to produce meaning, belief, and other mental states. As we have seen 
Davidson's analysis of radical interpretation allows no epistemological intermediary between 
language and the world: Experience, how things seem to the subject, is allowed a causal, but 
absolutely no evidential role. The world's determination of the meaning of sentences is direct: 
Mental states, the contents of belief and the meaning of sentences, are fixed directly through 
radical interpretation, by the things and events in the world which cause / prompt assent and 
dissent to sentences. The causation is distal rather than proximal; the senses do not act as 
epistemological intermediaries. When experience is denied an evidential role in the theory 
of meaning there can be no place for its counterpart -a scheme which somehow fits30 or 
organizes experience. 
Scheme and content dualism seems to make the thoughts we are capable of thinking 
depend upon the scheme we apply, and certain thoughts generated on the basis of one scheme 
may, then, be quite inaccessible to persons employing a different scheme. It tempts us to see 
reality and truth as scheme relative: 
"Conceptual schemes, we are told are ways of organizing experience; they are 
systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are points 
of view from which individuals, cultures, or periods survey the passing scene. 
There may be no translating from one scheme to another, in which case the 
beliefs, desires, hopes, and bits of knowledge that characterize one person 
have no true counterpart for the subscriber to another scheme. Reality itself 
is relative to a scheme: what counts as real in one system may not in another. " 
(Davidson, 1974a, p. 183) 
For Kant the mind, the 'transcendental unity of the self consciousness' (1781, B 131), is the 
crucial intermediary between experience and knowledge. He argues that knowledge is 
produced through the active synthesis of phenomenal experience by the transcendental 
structures of the mind. The minds 'intuitions' of time and space allow the spacio-temporal 
ordering of phenomena in experience and the mind's categories of understanding such as 
'substance' and 'causality' allow us to experience, refer to and describe objects and their 
relations, and in that sense know things. The Kantian model "was soon replaced by a more 
reasonable candidate, society. Instead of a mythical Mind giving shape to reality, carving it, 
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cutting it, ordering it, it was now prejudices, categories, and paradigms of a group of people 
living together" (Latour, 1999, p. 6). It became common to conceive of the intermediation of 
world and meaning, not in terms of universal conceptual categories of mind, but rather in 
terms of terms of the plurality of language: We might then perhaps say that two groups of 
people have different conceptual schemes if they speak languages which it is impossible to 
translate satisfactorily one into the other. Davidson cites the 'Sapir-Whorf hypothesis' as a 
leading example of this claim31: 
"... language produces an organization of experience. We are inclined to think 
of language simply as a technique of expression, and not realize that language 
first of all is a classification and arrangement of the stream of sensory 
experience which results in a certain world-order. ... In other words, language 
does in a cruder but also in a broader and more versatile way the same thing 
that science does. ... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, 
which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the 
same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, 
or can in some way be calibrated. " 
(Whorf, 1956, p. 55) 
Davidson finds all the necessary elements of scheme content relativism in the Sapir-Whorf 
formulation: (i) Language as the organizing scheme. (ii) The content to be organized, "the 
physical evidence" or "the stream of sensory experience", supplied by nature. And (iii) the 
failure of translation, or "calibration" as a condition for different conceptual schemes. 
Davidson's approach is to question the sense that can be made of the notion of failure of 
translation. Given the methodology of radical interpretation which we must employ, nothing, 
he argues "could count as evidence that some form of activity could not be interpreted in our 
language that was not at the same time evidence that that form of activity was not speech 
behaviour" (Davidson, 1974a, p. 185). The method of radical interpretation demands that 
starting out the interpreter must assume a great deal about a speaker's beliefs. She must begin 
by applying the principle of charity: "We get a first approximation to a finished theory by 
assigning to sentences of a speaker conditions of truth that actually obtain (in our opinion) 
just when the speaker holds those sentences true" (Davidson, 1974a, p. 196). The 
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methodology requires the interpreter to go directly to the conditions, objects and events, in 
the world in order to determine the content of the speaker's utterances. And if an interpreter 
can't make a coherent pattern of the activity she is faced with - in context of the evidence - 
she has no basis for thinking that activity is speech. Content is an effect of radical 
interpretation, if some activity is uninterpretable we can have no basis for thinking it 
meaningful - meaning is extensional not intensional. No sense can be made of complete 
failure of translation. 
Davidson thinks that no more sense can be made of the notion of conceptual 
relativism, and hence the notion of a conceptual scheme, in terms of partial failure of 
translation. We make most sense of a speaker's utterances when we optimize agreement. The 
method of radical interpretation can not eradicate all error and disagreement: "its purpose is 
to make meaningful disagreement possible, and this depends entirely on a foundation - some 
foundation in agreement" (Davidson, 1974a, p. 196). We improve the clarity of our 
disagreements by enlarging the basis of our agreement, and if the level of agreement is low, 
the process of interpretation will be undermined. Whether we consider the possibility of total 
or partial failure, the key issue for Davidson is that given the necessary methodology of 
radical interpretation, we as interpreters, "could not be in a position to judge that others had 
concepts or beliefs radically different from our own" (Davidson 1974a, p. 197). 
In relinquishing the scheme and content-formulation, we give up the idea of an 
uninterpreted reality, the notion of something neutral and common lying outside our schemes, 
which our conceptual schemes might fit, organize, or correspond to. As we have previously 
emphasized, this does not mean that Davidson is asking us to accept, as Rorty would urge, 
that the world is "well lost". On the contrary it enables him to insist that we have good reason 
to think that we can have objective knowledge of a public world which is not of our making: 
"In giving up dependence on the concept of an uninterpreted reality, 
something outside all schemes and science, we do not relinquish the notion 
of objective truth - quite the contrary. Given the dogma of dualism of scheme 
and reality, we get conceptual relativity and truth relative to a scheme. 
Without the dogma, this kind of relativity goes by the board. Of course truth 
of sentences remains relative to language, but that is as objective as can be. 
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In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, 
but re-establish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make 
our sentences and opinions true or false. 
(Davidson, 1974a, p. 198) 
Davidson's critique of scheme content dualism poses a significant challenge to 
important trends in accounting thought, which seem to encourage us to understand 'the real' 
as a construct of signifying practices and structures. In our view dualist thinking has come 
to dominate the critical accounting literature. There are a number of obvious variants on the 
dualist theme in accounting thought. We deal only with three: Most obvious, and discussed 
above (exemplified by Hines, 1988), is writing in the phenomenological tradition which takes 
a social constructionist view of accounting; Other equally influential, and essentially dualist, 
perspectives on accounting have drawn on both the stucturalist and hermeneutic traditions. 
We will now briefly discuss examples of such literature; We will not pretend to address the 
complexities of the arguments advanced in the papers which we use as illustrative examples, 
and we will not systematically reiterate Davidson's challenge to dualism which we hope we 
have adequately outlined above. 
The thesis of linguistic relativity advanced by Sapir and Whorf has its origins in the 
structuralist theory of language developed by Saussure. Whilst the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis 
has had relatively little direct impact on accounting thought (Belkaoui 1978, being an 
exception), the 'linguistic turn'32 taken by much of twentieth century thought, following 
Saussure, has had a profound effects on the conception accounting advanced in the critical 
accounting literature. Saussure reacts against an atomistic theory of language in which words 
are thought to have meaning by virtue of their direct relation to objects. In place of atomism 
he offers a holistic theory of language in which words have meaning by virtue of their 
relation to other words, that is, by virtue of their relations to the whole system of language. 
He conceives of language as a system of differences "without positive terms" (Saussure, 
1931, p. 120). Saussure turned away from questions of reference, relations between words and 
objects and events, and instead focused on language as a system of signs. He regarded each 
sign as composed of two arbitrarily related parts a signifier (word) and signified (concept), 
and he thought of language as a closed structure capable of producing stable meanings. 
Derrida radicalizes the Saussurian project by insisting that meaning is produced in open and 
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endless play of signifiers - there are no stable meanings. In both structuralist and Derridean 
/ poststructuralist forms, the Saussurian tradition presents a linguistic variation on classic 
scheme and content dualism, there is no denial of the existence of extra-discursive objects 
and events, however, our access to that reality is seen as always mediated by language33. It 
is fundamental to structuralist and poststructuralist thinking that language is essentially 
conventional -a system of culturally sustained arbitrary relations. Questions of truth and 
reference can be intelligible then, if at all, only in relation to particular systems of 
signification or conceptual schemes. 
This Saussurian dualist view of the relation between language and reality is taken up 
in the accounting literature by Tinker (1991) who draws explicitly on Saussure as authority: 
"There is an authoritative semiotic case for recognising the quasi-independent 
(discretionary) status of accounting "signs": Saussure's principle of the "the 
arbitrariness of signs" ... Saussure's principle highlights the independence 
(autonomy) of signification from economic reality; " 
(Tinker, 1991, pp. 302-303) 
Tinker also seems to accept the dualist analyses of the history of science which suggest the 
incommensurability of different scientific paradigms (see e. g., Kuhn 1962; Davidson 1974a), 
from which he draws the implication we must accept the scheme relativity of truth / 
epistemological criteria: 
"This socially relative character of epistemological criteria is evident in the 
turmoil of scientific revolutions at times of social upheaval and crises. " 
(Tinker, 1991, p. 304) 
Certain other theorists in accounting and finance (see e. g., McGoun, 1997; Macintosh et. al., 
2000) seem prepared to go further still. They appear to be ready to follow Baudrillard's 
radical working through of the structuralist problematic to its bitter extreme, and seem to toy 
with his diagnosis of the collapse of any distinctions between true and false, real and 
imaginary: 
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"We conclude that much of today's accounting information circulates in a 
Baudrillardian "hyperreality" where time and space implode and accounting 
signs no longer reflect the material, economic realm but rather precede it or 
bear no relationship to it. " 
(Macintosh et. al., 2000, p. 14) 
The Saussurian tradition and Davidson's thinking are equally and unreservedly anti-atomistic, 
they share commitment to thoroughly holistic theories of meaning. Indeed we might classify 
Davidson as a structuralist, he provides a structural explanation of meaning, in terms of the 
truth conditions of sentences, which accounts for the infinite capacity of words to be 
combined in meaningful utterances. The Saussurian tradition goes wrong when it brackets 
off reality and conceives of meaning as simply a product of signifying structure, a matter of 
convention. Truth and reference are then relativized to particular languages or conceptual 
schemes, so that, for (post) structuralist theorists like Foucault, they become merely local 
effects of power34: 
"Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the 
types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; ... "Truth" is 
linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain 
it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. " 
(Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 1980, pp131-133) 
The Saussurian tradition fails to recognize the concept of truth as a logical primitive, and as 
the pre-requisite for any interpretation or communication, which Davidson's work reveals it 
to be. 
The other great reorientation of twentieth century philosophy, the shift of emphasis 
from "epistemology to hermeneutics" (see Rorty, 1980, Ch. vii), originating in Heidegger's 
hermeneutic analysis of ontological issues (1927), has also had considerable impact on 
critical accounting thought. The implications of this "interpretive turn" for the social sciences 
are developed in the work of hermeuticians such as Gadamer's (1960) and Ricoeur (1974). 
We will consider the influence of this interpretive turn on critical accounting thought 
primarily through reference to an influential paper, by Lavoie (1989), that introduces 
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Gadamer's hermeneutics to an accounting audience. 
Gadamerian hermeneutics presents a variation on the theme of scheme and content 
dualism, in which the organizing scheme is conceived of as a historically developing 
framework of prejudices -a tradition. On this view, all interpretations are historically and 
linguistically mediated, and all our understandings of the world grounded in our pre- 
understandings, the enabling prejudices which set the horizons or limits to our thought35. The 
world has meaning, only through the pre-structured framework of our tradition, the 
conceptual scheme that constitutes our openness to the world: 
"Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they 
inevitably distort the truth. In fact the historicity of our existence entails that 
prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness 
of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to 
the world. They are simply conditions whereby we experience something - 
whereby what we encounter says something to us. " 
(Gadamer, 1967, p. 9) 
For Gadamer, a tradition36 is not a possession, something controlled or used by human being 
in order to deal with the world, rather it is something to which they are subject. Our tradition 
is not something we can bring into full view it is the very ground of our being, it is the pre- 
requisites of any37 understanding: 
"In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we 
understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand 
ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we 
live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the 
individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is 
why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute 
the historical reality of his being. " 
(Gadamer, 1960/1989, p. 276-277) 
On the Gadamerian view of things we are always already part of an ongoing tradition, 
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making almost automatic sense of the world; Knowledge is never objective, it is always pre- 
structured by prejudice, and questions of truth or falsity are always internal to a tradition's 
Lavoie, (1989), advocates an hermeneutic view of the problem of accounting theory 
choice. He suggests that theories are "like spectacles through which we see the world"; they 
are not hypothesis to be tested against the facts, rather they are the way we see the facts 
(Lavoie. 1989, p. 590). He then goes on to suggest that we can solve the problem of theory 
choice only: "by trying to look at the world through alternative pairs of spectacles until one 
is convinced, for now, that one is seeing clearly" (Lavoie, p. 590). This view of things is 
clearly dualist; our ways of seeing, our theories, provide the scheme which somehow fits, or 
bring the world into focus. 
Some schemes or theories, it seems, will fit reality more satisfyingly than others will. 
Lavoie argues that while "the history of science teaches that all efforts to set down objective 
criteria for theory-choice fail" (Lavoie, 1989, p. 583), we can in a hermeneutic spirit 
discriminate between competing theories if we "just talk to each other about alternative 
interpretations and see which one appears more persuasive" (Lavoie, p. 583). The 'more 
persuasive' theories will be those which are able to win the support of open-minded and 
critical members of the community; they will be the product of good conversation and will 
be supported by good reasons39: 
We can point to no objective technique, which would tell us how we can 
select better accounting theories from the multitude of candidates. Instead the 
problem has to be solved, as it is in science, anonymously and continuously, 
by the critical process of controversy that can occur among persons who 
commit themselves to the pursuit of knowledge. 
(Lavoie, 1989, p. 590) 
The meaning of'good' in such contexts "is itself the product of conversations" (Lavoie, 1989, 
p. 586), and therefore shaped by tradition itself. Compelling theories, it seems, will turn out 
to be those which are most consistent with our pre-understandings: "those which most 
comfortably fit into individual scientist's presuppositions, themselves the product of a long 
evolution of scientific dialogue" (Lavoie, 1989, p. 585). 
Davidson's analysis of the methodology of radical interpretation is itself an important 
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contribution to hermeneutic / interpretive thought. However, from a Davidsonian perspective, 
the dominant (Gadamerian) line of the hermeneutic tradition, goes seriously wrong in the 
priority it accords to tradition as the mediator of understanding. For Lavoie, acceptance of 
the authority of tradition is the necessary foundation for communication and mutual 
understanding of the world: 
"Thus "enabling prejudices, " elements of shared understandings which are 
"passed down" to us as traditions, are what make the mutual communication 
among scientists possible. We only understand our world because we 
understand one another. We only understand each other, in turn, because we 
all spent some substantial part of our lives being enculturated into the life 
world ... " 
(Lavoie, 1989, p. 585) 
On a Davidsonian view, however, our understanding of one another's utterances and actions 
depends upon our common relation to an objective world; we understand one another because 
we share a world, and not primarily because we have been subject to similar traditions or 
processes of enculturation, or because we share particular conceptual schemes or languages. 
The hermeneutic tradition pays insufficient attention to the real structural forces and interests 
in the world which underlie the development of tradition, and allows too little space to 
possibility that our "enabling prejudices" may be systematically distorted". 
Conclusion 
The Davidsonian analysis we have discussed in this chapter shows that we have good reason 
for thinking that our knowledge has secure foundations41: Intersubjectivity provides all the 
objectivity we need, or could have. In the following chapter, we will extend our exploration 
of the possibility of objectivity in accounting, and in the process give further consideration 
to the implications of the Davidsonian view for accounting. 
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Preamble to chapter 3: Objectivity in Accounting - The Case of Deferred Tax 
In chapter 1 we argued that in advanced modernity financial accounting as a way of knowing 
tends towards crises - epistemological crises. We ended chapter 1 with a discussion in very 
broad terms of the possibility of an emancipatory accounting; an accounting that might 
overcome the obfuscation of the ideology of the commodity fetish. In chapter 2 we began to 
develop a reasoned defense of the view that financial accounting might overcome its 
tendency to rationality and legitimacy crises and become emancipatory. We associated 
accounting's emancipatory potential with what we see as its latent capacity to provide us with 
true accounts of the objective world we share and we used Davidson's account of the 
possibility of knowledge to justify our faith in accounting's potential to give knowledge of 
an objective reality. 
We recognize that accounting faces joint crises of rationality and legitimacy. In 
chapter 2 we primarily addressed the issue of accounting's rationality - its potential to 
provide us with true accounts of the objective realities of our lives and thereby facilitate 
informed decision-making. In chapter 2 we implicitly bracket questions of financial 
accounting's legitimacy and treated it as an essentially descriptive activity. In this chapter we 
deepen our exploration of the possibility of objectivity in accounting, we engage with issues 
of legitimacy, and we argue that financial accounting may obtain a normative objectivity and 
legitimacy through the application of communicative reason in democratic processes. 
We begin chapter three by reviewing and restating our commitment to a Davidsonian 
view of descriptive objectivity in accounting. The application of Davidson's 
antirepresentationalist conception of objectivity as intersubjectivity to accounting is analysed 
here in terms of the contrast, drawn by Bernard Williams, between the prospects for 
objectivity in science and ethics. The analysis tends to confirm the deep and inextricable 
entanglement of the descriptive and normative in accounting. We accept that ethical 
questions, those evaluative questions that concern competing self-understandings and 
conceptions of `the good life', can not be settled objectively. We recognise that if we were 
to accept that the normative dimension of accounting consists in evaluations that can not be 
objectively validated then we face the disturbing possibility that reflection, which tends to 
secure scientific knowledge, may destroy accounting knowledge by revealing its lack of 
secure foundation. We do not accept, however, that the normative dimension of financial 
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accounting inevitably lies beyond rational and objective determination / validation. 
We turn 
to Habermas' theory of discourse ethics to justify the view that normative objectivity and 
validity might be secured for financial accounting regulation through communicative 
rationality. Again we contend that intersubjectivity is all the foundation we need or can have 
for objectivity in accounting. 
In terms of the Habermasian analysis of the evolution of society, accounting's crisis 
of legitimacy can be understood in terms of a loss of moral force characteristic of institutions 
in transition to modernity. In traditional societies, the self-understandings characteristic of 
dominant groups and the value preferences that emerge from their traditions and conceptions 
of the good life, have the power to anchor and motivate norms of action. However, in 
transition to modern pluralist society, participants must come to terms with a plurality of 
traditions and self-understandings. The power that a behavioural expectation might have 
obtained by association with a particular tradition and associated self-understandings, is 
relativized in modern pluralist society by the recognition that other groups within society do 
not share those understanding and value-preferences. In modernity acceptable norms of 
action, guiding necessary integration and cooperation across the whole of society, can no 
longer be powerfully motivated by appeal to the value preferences associated with particular 
conceptions of the "good life". Normative claims derived from local identities can not have 
the same quality of motivating force as those, which can command universal agreement. 
The advance of reason in modernity, and in particular the development of the 
potential for communicative rationality, promises the possibility of a restoration of moral 
force to social norms in pluralism. Habermas does not suggest that communicative rationality 
can be appropriately applied to all ethical / evaluative questions. He argues, rather, that in 
modernity a set of moral questions that do admit of objective determination / validation in 
terms of the generalizability of interests through communicative reason can be broken away 
from the ethical. In traditional society, ethics (dealing with conceptions of the good life) and 
morality (dealing with norms of action binding on everyone across society) are tied tightly 
together, and the latter obtains much of its normative force from the former. In the transition 
to modern society, processes of differentiation, associated with the development of expert 
subcultures in all spheres of society, are set in train. Through those processes an analytic 
distance is produced and reflective perspectives emerge; "perspectives from which the 
lifeworld appears as practice with which theory is to be mediated, as life with which art is to 
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be reconciled, or ethical life to which morality must be related" (Habermas, 1983, pp. 106- 
109). The moral perspective, which emerges in modernity, then sets the lifeworld at a 
reflective distance, and differentiates the ethical sphere from the whole. The apparent totality, 
of the ethical sphere, which required that "questions of justice are posed only within the 
horizon of questions concerning the good life, questions which have always already been 
answered" (Habermas, 1983, pp. 106-109), loses its self-evident quality, and breaks into two 
components; the moral and the evaluative. Moral question being those that can be approached 
rationally in terms of the generalizability of interests, and evaluative questions being those 
which are accessible to rational analysis only from within the horizons of a particular 
historical form of life. 
We conclude chapter 3 with a discussion of the implications of Habermas' discourse 
ethics for accounting policy making, and in particular the implications for the appropriate 
role for conceptual framework projects such as the ASB's "Statement of Principles for 
Financial Reporting" project. We take the view that accounting regulations might, in 
principle, be thought of as moral norms and as open to objective validation through 
communicative reasoning in terms of the generalizability of interests. Thereby the moral 
force of financial accounting might be restored and a financial accounting developed that 
allows the lifeworld some normative grip on the system. 
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Introduction 
This chapter sets out to defend and explore the emancipatory potential of accounting. We 
associate that potential with accounting's capacity to be objective, and therefore seek to 
defend the notion of objectivity in accounting. It seems to be widely accepted that it is 
meaningful to attempt to evaluate alternative accounting methods and standards of external 
financial reporting in terms of their objectivity. This criterion, in various guises, has featured 
prominently, and continues to appear, in conceptual studies and professional publications (see 
for example, ASSC, 1975; FASB, 1980; ICAS, 1988; ASB, 1999). However, the term 
"objectivity" obviously does not possess a fixed unitary meaning (see Megill, 1994), and it 
clearly presents accountants with "considerable semantic problems" (Stamp, 1981). We hope, 
in this chapter, to contribute towards a clarification of the meaning of objectivity in the 
context of its application to accounting. In this introduction we sketch the broad outline of 
the chapter. 
We begin by adopting Donald Davidson's view that intersubjectivity is all the 
foundation we need, or can have, for objectivity, and use that Davidsonian perspective to 
justify the view that accounting can, in principle, provide us with knowledge of an objective 
publicly accessible world. We recognize, however, that accounting is more than a purely 
descriptive enterprise; it is a moral practice. It performs regulative and integrative functions 
within society and has a normative/ethical dimension. Therefore, without losing sight of the 
notion that "the ultimate source of objectivity is ... intersubjectivity" (Davidson, 1997, 
p. 121), we move on to develop our discussion of objectivity in accounting in terms of the 
distinction, drawn by Bernard Williams (1978,1985), between the viable aims of scientific 
and ethical inquiry. Williams argues that in science we may reasonably hope to transcended 
the limits of perspective and converge upon an "absolute conception of reality": "... a 
conception consisting of nonperspectival materials available to any adequate investigator" 
(Williams, 1985, p. 140). That is, in science we can realistically hope for world-guided 
convergence on the ideal an "absolutely" objective conception of reality; a conception open 
to maximal intersubjective agreement. Williams argues that we can not expect no such 
convergence in the ethical domain, and in fact he suggests that reflection, so vital to the 
justification of scientific knowledge, may destroy ethical knowledge. 
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We take the issue of accounting for deferred tax in the UK as a focus for our effort 
to locate accounting in the context of the science - ethics dichotomy outlined by Williams. 
We examine both the history of accounting for deferred tax and the recent debate on the topic 
that has taken place in the context of a developing conceptual framework for financial 
reporting in the UK. Two conclusion of our consideration of the deferred tax debate are 
perhaps particularly notable: Firstly, we suggest that descriptive objectivity may be low in 
respect of many accounting issues, because the accounting concepts and theory employed 
often lack a clear relation to causal stimuli in the publicly accessible world. Considerable 
scope is thereby allowed for failure of intersubjective descriptive consensus, that is, in our 
terms, failure of objectivity. We note that this issue has been identified by other observers 
of accounting, including Sterling and Chambers, who have called for accounting to become 
more rational, less bound by myth and tradition, and more like science; that is, more closely 
tied to an objective public reality. Secondly, our analysis suggests that the descriptive and 
normative are deeply entangled in accounting. We conclude that the normative element is 
entirely integral to accounting; it can not become a purely descriptive enterprise. We suggest 
that accounting concepts resemble thick ethical concepts, and that we should therefore not 
expect to find in accounting theory the kind world-guided convergence that we can 
reasonably expect in science; It seems that Williams' suggestion that reflection may destroy 
ethical knowledge might need to be extended to accounting. 
In the final part of this chapter, accepting that we can not expect world guided 
convergence and objectivity in accounting theory, we look for an alternative foundation for 
accounting objectivity in rationally motivated consensus; convergence guided by 
communicative reason. We turn to Habermas' work to sustain the view that, at least 
potentially, we can have normative objectivity/validity in accounting recognized as a 
normative/regulative enterprise. Williams and Habermas would agree that there can be no 
objective adjudication between value-preferences or between competing conceptions of the 
"good life": Such evaluative questions can only be addressed from within particular forms 
of life. Habermas argues, however, that whilst in traditional society the ethical sphere appears 
as a totality in which the norms of action and "question of justice" are determined by answers 
given to the evaluative questions, in the transition from traditional society to modernity, the 
ethical sphere breaks into two components - the evaluative and the moral. That is, in modern 
pluralist society a set of moral questions becomes detached from the evaluative. The moral 
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questions are defined as those very questions that admit of a generalizability of interests and 
are therefore open to the possibility of objective validation through rational argument. These 
moral questions have a priority, over the evaluative/ethical questions, because their resolution 
allows the integration and coordination of society and thus sets the social conditions within 
which particular forms of life may flourish and the ethical questions they raise be addressed. 
Habermas shows how moral norms of action can be objectively validated through 
communicative reason, that is, through the institutionalization of what he calls "discourse 
ethics". We argue that accounting regulation falls within this moral sphere and is open to 
objective validation through rational argument and in particular the application of discourse 
ethics. It is in this application of communicative reason that we see the fuller/second 
dimension of accounting's emancipatory potential. Accounting regulation established 
through the institutionalization of discourse ethics may truly contribute to communicative 
integration of society and help to put a normative check on the colonizing depredations of 
the capitalist system upon the lifeworld. The chapter closes with a brief discussion of some 
of the implications of the analysis presented for conceptual frameworks for financial 
reporting projects. 
Objectivity as intersubjectivity 
Throughout the discussion of objectivity in accounting which follows we adopt the view that 
ultimately objectivity needs, and can have, no other foundation than intersubjectivity. In this 
section of the chapter we sketch a justification of this view in terms of the work of the 
philosopher Donald Davidson. The reader will find that this section repeats, with 
different emphasis, much of the discussion of Davidson's views contained in chapter 2 
of this thesis. It is not our intention to offer any comprehensive discussion of competing 
conceptions of objectivity. However it may help clarify our position if it is understood from 
the start that we find the correspondence theory of truth, and any conceptions of objectivity 
built upon it, unintelligible. We agree with Davidson that correspondence is "an idea without 
content" (1990, p. 305), and therefore we can make no sense of those views that somehow 
make objectivity coextensive with the faithful representation of a representation independent 
reality. For a full critique of the notion "objectivity as correspondence", often referred to as 
"absolute objectivity", see Rorty (1980). 
Davidson finds a foundation for objectivity in intersubjectivity, that is, in the network 
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of relations between creatures reacting to one and other and their shared environment: 
"The only ultimate source of objectivity is, in my opinion, intersubjectivity. 
If we were not in communication with others, there would be nothing on 
which to base the idea of being wrong or, therefore, of being right, either in 
what we say or in what we think. The possibility of thought as well as of 
communication depends, in my view, on the fact that two or more creatures 
are responding, more or less simultaneously, to input from a shared world, 
and from each other. " i 
(Davidson, 1997, pp. 121) 
Justification of the notion of objectivity as intersubjectivity is found most plainly in the 
account Davidson offers of the possibility of knowledge and communication, which he insists 
"forces us to the idea of an objective, public truth" (Davidson, 1975, p. 170). We sketch that 
account in the following paragraphs. 
Knowledge clearly always pre-supposes belief, and holding a belief requires that one 
understands the possibility of being mistaken; it requires that one grasp "the contrast between 
truth and error - true belief and false belief' (Davidson, 1975, p. 170). Appreciation of the 
contrast between true and false belief, the concept of objective truth, emerges only in the 
context of communication: "Without a second person there is, as Wittgenstein powerfully 
suggests, no basis for a judgment that a reaction is wrong" (Davidson, 1997, pp. 122). At the 
core of communication is interpretation; if communication is to take place at all interpreters 
must be able to attribute meaning to speakers' utterances. If we are to account for knowledge 
we need an explanation of the possibility of interpretation. Davidson proposes a truth 
conditional theory of meaning; he argues that interpretation must proceed through the 
interpreter's matching of sentences of her own to each of the speaker's utterances / sentences. 
The interpreter's own sentences will constitute a theory of truth and meaning for the 
speaker's sentences, and insofar as the interpretation is correct, yield the meaning / 
propositional content of those utterances. Davidson gives us an explanation of how such an 
empirical theory of truth for a speaker's utterances can be constructed and verified and can 
serve as a theory of meaning. We shall see that that explanation forces us to the notion of a 
publicly accessible objective reality. 
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Davidson argues that we must consider the problem of interpretation from the 
position of the "radical interpreter", that is, someone with no prior knowledge of the 
speaker's language and no direct access to the detailed propositional intentions or beliefs of 
the speaker. Otherwise, we simply beg the question of interpretation by assuming knowledge 
of meanings at the outset. We must explain how it is that interpretation is possible on the 
basis of the evidence available to the radical interpreter. That evidence will obviously include 
the speaker's utterances, and Davidson argues that we can also reasonably presume that the 
radical interpreter can directly observe that a speaker holds an utterance / sentence to be true 
in particular circumstances, without knowing what the speaker means by it: We can 
reasonably assume that "it is possible to know that a speaker assents to a sentence without 
knowing either what the sentence, as spoken by him, means, or what belief is expressed by 
it" (Davidson, 1983, p. 315). There is, however, an obvious difficulty associated with using 
the speaker's prompted assent of dissent as a foundation for the construction of and 
verification of a theory of truth and meaning for the speaker's utterances. The problem is that 
a speaker will hold an utterance to be true, or false, in part because of what it means, and in 
part because of what he believes to be the case. Belief and meaning are thoroughly entangled 
in the evidence available to the radical interpreter; "a speaker's assent to a sentence depends 
both on what he means by the sentence and on what he believes about the world" (Davidson, 
1983, p. 314). 
Davidson argues that the interpreter can break the deadlock of belief and meaning by 
applying the principle of charity. That principle requires the interpreter to proceed on the 
basis that the speaker is reacting to the same features of the world as she would herself react 
to in similar circumstances, and that the speaker's utterances express beliefs with which she 
would for the most part agree. By thus assigning truth conditions to the speaker's utterances 
that, whenever plausibly possible, make him right according to the interpreter's view of the 
circumstances, sufficient constraint may placed on the attribution of beliefs to allow the 
derivation of meanings. The impasse of belief and meaning is broken by "holding belief 
constant as far as possible while solving for meaning" (Davidson, 1973a, p. 137). The 
principle of charity also directs the interpreter to credit the speaker with her own standards 
of rationality and consistency. An interpreter cannot construct a theory of truth and meaning 
for a speaker's language by dealing with each of the speaker's utterances in isolation, rather 
she must build a pattern that fits the evidence and maintains the rationality of relations 
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between sentences. The method of radical interpretation is thoroughly holistic; the meaning 
of words and sentences can be drawn only indirectly from the whole pattern of interrelated 
sentences that constitute the truth theory for the speaker's language. An interpretive theory, 
once established, will generally not be obvious in use, especially where the speaker and 
interpreter share the same language. "Once we have the theory, though, we can explain the 
truth of sentences on the basis of their structure and the semantic properties of the parts" 
(Davidson, 1990a, p. 300). The structure and semantic properties of the parts, the meaning of 
words, can not be a starting point, for the development of an interpretive theory of truth for 
a speaker's language, they are products of such theory. Davidson insists then that "all 
understanding of speech involves radical interpretation" (Davidson, 1973 a, p. 125). 
The method of radical interpretation, sketched above, allows no room for the 
possibility that the interpreter might discover the speaker to be largely mistaken in his beliefs 
about the world. If the interpreter cannot find in the speaker's utterances a pattern of beliefs 
that, by her own standards, is largely consistent and true she has "no reason to count that 
creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything" (Davidson, 1973a, p. 136-137). 
The method directs the interpreter to maximize the truth, by her own standards, of the 
speaker's utterances; correct interpretation must proceed so as to optimize the 
correspondence / agreement and coherence of the interpreter's, and speaker's, beliefs. 
Interpretation clearly relies on "an interpersonal standard of consistency and correspondence" 
(Davidson, 1991, p. 158). At this point, the critic may agree with all of the above yet ask; 
what assurance do we have that the interpersonal standard is objective? What, if anything, 
prevents the interpreter and speaker from being agreed upon largely wrong beliefs? If we are 
to have convincing justification of the view that ultimately objectivity needs, and can have, 
no other foundation than intersubjectivity, we need to understand why Davidson thinks that 
the "interpersonal" standard of coherence and correspondence, that is so vital to 
communication, is an "objective" standard. We need to see, that is, why he believes that 
whilst an interpreter and speaker may occasionally understand one another on the basis of 
mistaken beliefs such cases "cannot be the rule" (Davidson, 1983, p. 317). Furthermore, we 
need to be convinced that the interpersonal standard, achieved through communication, is the 
only objective standard we can have; we need to see why we should accept that the world 
itself can not provide an objective standard that makes our sentences true or false. 
The Davidsonian line of argument traced out above proceeds on the basis that all 
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thought and knowledge presupposes beliefs and that having beliefs requires a grasp of the 
concept of objective truth. The notion of objective truth itself, Davidson argues, can emerge 
and have application only in the context of the communicative relations between parties 
responding jointly to each other and stimuli from a shared world. Communication relies upon 
the interpreter's ability to find regularities in the behavior / utterances of the speaker that can 
be correlated with events and objects in the world as the interpreter sees it. It is this process 
of triangulation, this sharing of stimuli, that gives content / meaning to speech and thought, 
and provides us with grounds for thinking that the communicating parties are responding to 
an objective publicly accessible reality of objects and events in the world - rather than to 
some proximal stimuli, or imaginings: 
"For until the triangle is completed connecting two creatures, and each 
creature with common features of the world, there can be no answer to the 
question whether a creature, in discriminating between stimuli, is 
discriminating between stimuli at the sensory surfaces or somewhere further 
out, or further in. Without this sharing of reactions to common stimuli, 
thought and speech would have no particular content - that is, no content at 
all. It takes two points of view to give a location to the cause of a thought, and 
thus to define its content. " 
(Davidson, 1991, pp. 159-160) 
It should now be clear why Davidson thinks that the interpersonal standard of the community 
of minds is an objective standard, and why we can be sure that our view of the world is, in 
its most basic features, largely correct. On Davidson's view of things most of our plainest 
beliefs must be true because they are given content by the objects and events in the world that 
cause them; "... what ultimately ties language to the world is that the conditions that 
typically cause us to hold sentences true constitute the truth conditions, and hence the 
meanings, of our sentences" (Davidson, 1996, p. 275). Radical interpretation allows no gap 
between the content of thought and language and the world; the general framework of our 
plain beliefs can not be out of phase with the reality that determines its content. We can be 
confident that our beliefs are securely in touch with reality, not in the sense that they 
somehow correspond with, or faithfully represent, reality, but rather in the sense that they are 
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necessarily causally related to our environment and true. We can be sure that most of 
anyone's utterances / statements are true because their truth depends "on just two things: 
what the words as spoken mean, and how the world is arranged" (Davidson, 1983, pp. 308- 
309), and those two things are not independent entities, whose correspondence might be 
tested, rather one is causally dependent on the other. 
The process of radical interpretation, and the causal relations between our beliefs and 
the world it relies upon, obviously can not guarantee that all of our beliefs are true. 
Misleading sensations will sometimes produce mistaken beliefs and many of our beliefs have 
only indirect relations with objects and events in the world. What the process does provide 
is a backdrop of agreement and true belief against which error can be distinguished and 
particular intelligible beliefs formulated. The process of radical interpretation allows that any 
particular belief or set of beliefs may be false, what it does not allow is that "our general 
picture of the world and our place in it is mistaken, for it is this picture which informs the rest 
of our beliefs, whether they be true or false, and makes them intelligible" (Davidson, 1991, 
p. 160). 
It is clear, then, that the objective world constrains our knowledge, without a common 
cause we can have no communication and no knowledge: "Communication begins where 
causes converge" (Davidson, 1983, p. 317-318). Equally, it is clear that our knowledge of the 
world is, always dependent on, and conditioned by, our knowledge of other minds. Without 
communication we can have no sense of objectivity, no basis for discrimination between true 
and false belief: "A community of minds is the basis of knowledge; it provides the measure 
of all things" (Davidson, 1991, p. 164): Davidson claims that creatures tend to classify objects 
and events in the world in terms of patterns of similarity and difference in the stimuli they 
generate. The only grounds we can have for such a claim is the similarity/regularity of the 
creature's response to the stimuli. But the only grounds we can have for claiming that the 
creatures responses to the stimuli are similar / regular is that another creature finds similarity 
in both the stimuli and in the response of the first creature. Ultimately the interpersonal 
standard of the community of minds is the only standard of the real we have or need and the 
objectivity of particular knowledge must be conceived of in terms of the degree and quality 
of the intersubjective agreement supporting it. On this view, perspectival knowledge can be 
objective in cases where it is supported by reflective explanation of its possibility, the 
validity of which is itself open to broadly based intersubjective consensus. 
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Objectivity and knowledge is essentially founded on agreement, yet does not require 
total agreement. Nevertheless, too many disagreements or mistakes, will tend to undermine 
the possibility of interpretation and the communicative foundations of knowledge. Some 
disagreements will be more destructive than others; disagreement about beliefs that derive 
their content from relations to other beliefs rather than directly from the environment may 
pose relatively little difficulty, more damaging will be those disagreements that concern 
matters where the causal influence of the environment is apparently direct: 
"Disagreement about theoretical matters may (in some cases) be more 
tolerable than disagreement about what is more evident; disagreement about 
how things look or appear is less tolerable than disagreement about how they 
are; disagreement about the truth of attributions of certain attitudes to a 
speaker by that same speaker may not be tolerable at all, or barely. " 
(Davidson, 1975, p. 169) 
Persistent disagreement on theoretical matters bearing little direct relation to causal stimuli 
provided by a shared world may be easily accommodated. Intelligible disagreement on 
matters more directly related to the world, perhaps explainable in terms of differences in the 
positions and faculties of the speaker and interpreter, may also be readily accommodated. 
Most disruptive will be those unintelligible disagreements in matters closely related to the 
stimuli provided by the world where objective agreement is reasonably expected. 
Bernard Williams (1985) offers a similar analysis of the possibility of objectivity in 
the domains of science and ethics. His analysis turns upon the nature of agreement and 
disagreement in those spheres, and on "our reflective understanding of the best hopes we 
could coherently entertain for eliminating disagreement in the two areas" (Williams, 1985, 
P. 135). He contrasts (1985, p. 133) two types of disagreement; On the one hand, 
disagreements, such as that between two children wanting one bun, which need not suggest 
that there has been any failure of recognition or understanding or any language problem'. 
And on the other hand disagreements, such as those involving the recognition of "middle- 
Sized dry goods", which do suggest such failures or problems. He argues that the difference 
between such cases of disagreement underlies the epistemological contrast between science 
and ethics. 
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For Williams, like Davidson, the objectivity of a particular belief must be assessed 
in terms of the degree and quality of intersubjective support it enjoys. The more objective 
views are those which are open to fullest intersubjective agreement; those views which rely 
least "on the specifics of the individual's makeup and position in the world, or on the 
character of the particular type of creature he is" (Nagel, 1986, p. 5). On such a view, the 
distinction between subjective and objective judgement is obviously always a matter of 
degree. Williams contends that in science we can coherently expect to achieve a much higher 
degree of objectivity, through reflection, than we can ever reasonably expect to obtain in the 
ethical sphere. He argues that in science perspectival knowledge may attain objectivity when 
it is justified by reflective explanation of its possibility, that is itself guided by objects and 
events in the world that any competent observers may triangulate upon. 
Williams recognizes that any description of the world must incorporate a point of 
view -a subjective element. This, he argues, need not prevent our perspectival 
representations from being objective and providing knowledge' of how things are in the 
world. He fully appreciates the difficulties associated with any attempt to maintain the notion 
that human inquiry can provide a systematic account of the way the world really is. He agrees 
that notions such as "how things are" or "the world" are, prior to our descriptions, empty and 
unspecifiable (see Rorty, 1991, p. 55). He characterizes the problem in terms of a dilemma: 
either we conceive of the world in terms of our current beliefs, in which case the world can 
do no more "than repeat the beliefs we take to represent it", or we try to conceive of the 
world prior to any description of it - and this is simply "an empty notion" (Williams, 1985, 
p. 138). Indeed, it is with the hope of taking us beyond this dilemma that Williams suggests 
that we should strive to form an absolute conception of the world that is "already there" in 
terms only of those of our beliefs and theories "that we can reasonably claim to represent the 
world in a way to the maximum degree independent of our perspective and its peculiarities" 
(Williams, 1985, pp. 138-139). He suggests that in science we may step back from our 
competing perceptions, and beliefs and work to develop a more inclusive conception of the 
world that is capable of explaining the relations of competing and more perspectival 
representations to the world. In science perspectival knowledge can be justified through the 
process of reflection which allows a particular perspective to be understood in the context of 
a more inclusive view. The more inclusive conception produced may itself face competition 
from other representations, in which case a yet more inclusive conception of the world must 
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be sought. Williams argues that we can coherently hope that ideally science will eventually 
converge on a conception of the world that meets no competition and which can claim to be 
'the absolute conception' of reality. The absolute conception will be maximally independent 
of perspective, it will be a maximally inclusive and objective conception of the reality that 
is 'there anyway'. 
The idea of scientific convergence - as convergence on how things anyway are - relies 
heavily on notions of explanation: "The substance of the absolute conception ... 
lies in the 
idea that it could non-vacuously explain how it itself, and various perspectival views of the 
world, are possible" (Williams, 1985, p. 139). Science can provide some degree of second- 
order explanation of how creatures with our history and faculties can perceive and understand 
the world with properties that this same science ascribes to it. We can explain our 
perspectival view; we can explain why it is that "grass" seems to be "green" to creatures like 
us, and we can explain why the concept of green is not available from certain other 
perspectives. We can make some disagreement intelligible and thereby, in a sense, resolve 
them. The realisation that the concept "green" is perspectival certainly does not undermine 
our use of the concept or our colour classification systems; in fact, the knowledge that "grass 
is green" is supported by explanation. In science second order explanation of perspectives 
also justifies, because it explains how perceptions are related to one another and to the 
physical reality which they give knowledge of - it explains how scientific understandings 
help us "find our way around the physical world" (Williams, 1985, p. 151). Crucially, in 
science, world-guidance does not breakdown on reflection: both perspectival knowledge and 
the second order, absolute, conception of reality can be world-guided. In science, at least, we 
may hope and expect to converge' on an account of the world that, whilst inevitably an 
account of how things seem to beings like us, is to a maximum degree independent of local 
perspectives; an account that is objective, and that might reasonably, if not literally, be 
thought of as an expression of "how things are". 
Williams clearly accepts that we can not shed our descriptive perspective and move 
to a'God's eye view' of reality from which we can develop a conception of the world as it is 
in itself independent of all representation. He rejects the correspondence theory of truth: "It 
suggests that we can, so to speak, get round behind our descriptions and see how they fit the 
world, and this makes no sense at all: any conception of the world we can use at all is one 
that is already expressed in terms that we understand, our terms. The world cannot describe 
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itself for us" (Williams, 1991, p. 12). For Williams, the'world as it is in itself "... is not the 
object of a representation that tries to transcend all representation, but only the object of a 
representation that is relatively inclusive and unrivalled" (Sorrell, 1990, p. 13). We should 
think of the absolute conception of reality as literally unattainable ideal towards which we 
can reasonably expect scientific knowledge to converge: "Of course, we may never actually 
arrive at such a view, but as rational human beings we can be expected to converge toward 
an approximation of it. Absolute objectivity, then, presents itself as absolute not in its 
certitude or infallibility, but rather in the hold that it ought to have on us as rational beings" 
(Megill, 1994, p. 3). 
An argument might be made that convergence on how things are is also possible in 
ethics. Clearly, our thick ethical concepts like cowardice, cruelty, brutality, or gratitude, are 
action-guiding but they are also typically world-guided; their proper application depends on 
the state of world, or the users' perception of the world. Those, non-cognitivist, moral 
philosophers who take the view that the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of thick ethical 
concepts can be separated out, will argue that ethical sentences are not capable of truth 
because their value element is not open to truth. On such a view we can not have knowledge 
under ethical concepts and a fortiori we can not have world-guided convergence in ethics. 
Williams opposes the non-cognitivist view, he recognises "the way in which fact and value 
are entangled in our concepts" (Putnam, 1990, p. 168) and insists that the descriptive and 
Prescriptive elements can not in fact be disentangled. The distinction Williams wants to draw 
between science and ethics is clearly not a crude distinction of fact versus value. He argues 
that practices and values within a culture may clearly set the appropriate use of a thick ethical 
concept such as chastity, so that it is possible within the local community to obtain agreement 
on the chastity of a person's behavior, and it may simply true that, within the culture, certain 
behaviour is chaste. Statements made using thick ethical concepts can be "locally true", and 
"users of such concepts, in correctly applying them, could properly be said to have 
knowledge" (Williams, 1995, p 206). In order for speakers to a correctly apply thick ethical 
concepts to novel situations Williams believes that they must be aware of the evaluative 
interests with which the concept is connected and be capable of imaginatively identifying 
With them. 
In Williams' view, an insightful observer may understand and anticipate the use of 
a thick ethical concept without sharing the values connected with it, provided she can grasp 
82 
Chapter 3: Objectivity in Accounting - The Case of Deferred Tax 
its evaluative point. She could not, however, stand entirely outside the evaluative interests 
of the local community being observed and somehow "pick up the concept simply as a device 
for dividing up in a rather strange way certain neutral features of the world" (Williams, 1985, 
p. 142). An observer may be able to recognize the locals' correct application of thick concepts, 
but, because she does not share the associated values, be effectively unable to use the concept 
herself; she may essentially be "barred from saying just what the locals say" (Williams, 1985, 
p. 145). For example, an observer who does not share the evaluative interests connected with 
the local use of the term "chastity" can know that within the terms of the culture it is true to 
describe a particular person as chaste but she could not herself properly say that the person 
is "chaste". Knowledge of the person's chastity is possible for the locals but not for the 
observer: 
"There seem to be perfectly good grounds for saying that some of them 
(statements made using thick ethical concepts) are what, in local terms, they 
are taken to be, namely true; and, since the people who use them satisfy other 
relevant conditions, we can say that those people have some knowledge under 
these concepts. But this is not knowledge that we share, since we do not share 
those concepts. 
(Williams, 1995, p 206) 
In their use of particular thick ethical concepts members of a society may express knowledge 
of the world to which they apply their concepts: in this sense they may have local / 
perspectival ethical knowledge. This kind of local knowledge entails no display of second 
order knowledge concerning the use of those particular thick concepts as opposed to some 
others; such knowledge would entail a stepping back from the initial position and values - 
ethical reflection. Nevertheless, it seems that we can have perspectival knowledge in ethics, 
"X is chaste", just as we do in science, "grass is green". Indeed we can have local 
convergence in our conceptions of what it means to be "chaste" or what it means for 
something to be "green". In science reflection can reinforce local knowledge; can this effect 
be extended to the ethical domain - what impact will reflection have on our local ethical 
knowledge? 
As explained above, Williams argues that in the scientific context the world- 
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guidedness of our knowledge extends to the reflective level. In science reflective explanation 
of our perspectival knowledge does not unsettle our knowledge, it justifies it by identifying 
its coherence with other knowledge on both the perspectival and absolute level. If we want 
to extend this process of reflective justification to the ethical domain we need to be able to 
identify a basis for second-order reflection on ethical perspectives, which is capable of 
somehow validating our local ethical knowledge. We might hope to apply the analogy with 
science directly by obtaining explanatory accounts of our ethical perspectives, which justify 
by explaining how our perspectival view relates to the world. In science explanation justifies 
by showing how perceptions relate to and give knowledge of the one physical reality. For 
second-order explanations of ethical perspectives we need to look, not just to the physical 
world, but, to the social world, and this means "some social world or other" (Williams, 1985, 
pp. 151). Clearly there are many social worlds, both actual and possible, and explanations, 
which are relative to some particular social world, can provide no answer to the essential 
question raised by ethical reflection: "is this the best kind of social world? " (Williams, 1985, 
p. 151). 
At the reflective level in ethics, we need accounts/theory that can deal with the 
question "is this a good way living in comparison with other ways? " We need a theory that 
is able to justify local ethical concepts, and perhaps explain why one local concept or ethical 
perspective is appropriate in particular circumstances and not in others. Given that an 
Cxplanatory theory can not address such issues, Williams argues that if we want to move to 
A reflective level in ethics we are forced to use "thin" concepts such as "right". Those most 
general and abstract of ethical concepts are capable of very wide application, but they "do not 
display world-guidedness" (Williams, 1985, p. 152). For reflective ethical theory to be 
Capable of justifying local ethical knowledge it would need to have some objectivity of its 
awn. Williams argues that because ethical beliefs at this reflective level are not world guided, 
we can not reasonably expect that they will track the truth, and we can not realistically 
anticipate their rational convergence on one determinate set of ideas. At the root of the 
distinction Williams draws between science and ethics is the contrast, as he sees it, between 
the relative universality of science and the fact that "the interests that thick ethical concepts 
gubserve are the interests of one human community (one `social world') or another" (Putnam, 
1990, p. 169). Williams recognises that in theory we might obtain some measure of 
objectivity at the reflective level in ethics through a convergence of ideas about human nature 
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- about our needs and motivations, which might yield the schema of an ethical life that would 
be the most satisfactory for humans in general. Indeed, he sees the project of giving ethics 
an objective grounding in knowledge of human nature as the "only intelligible form of ethical 
objectivity at the reflective level" (Williams, 1985, p. 153). However, he does not think that 
such a project is likely to ever succeed, and he believes that any such approach would always 
"radically underdetermine the ethical options" (Williams, 1985, p. 153) in any given situation. 
Because the world-guidedness of ethical beliefs breaks down at the reflective level 
we can not coherently expect ethical reflection to lead to convergence in thinking. And 
because, in ethics, we have nothing corresponding to science's ability to provide explanations 
of our perceptions which relate how the world seems from a particular perspective to how it 
is in itself, that is, how it is when viewed objectively or in other words when viewed in a way 
that is, so far as possible, independent of local/idiosyncratic perspectives, we have no basis 
for an objective theory of error in ethics: 
"An ethical theory ... might explain why it was reasonable for people to have 
these various ethical beliefs, it would not be the sort of theory that could 
explain why they did or did not have them. It could not do something that 
explanations of perception can do, which is to generate an adequate theory of 
error and to account generally for the tendency of people to have what, 
according to its principles, are wrong beliefs. " 
(Williams, 1985, p, 151) 
We can not have ethical knowledge at the reflective level, and therefore ethical reflection will 
not justify local ethical knowledge. Indeed, Williams suggests that ethical reflection may 
destroy knowledge held under thick ethical concepts by effectively placing the users of the 
Concept in the position of the observer unable, after reflection, to fully identify with the 
evaluative interests connected with a thick ethical concept. 
The objective public world plays a crucial role in Williams' model. It provides the 
independent stimuli to which the community of scientists reacts and about which they form 
Communicative relations. Williams thinks that in science, if not in ethics, it is reasonable to 
expect that the world's causal impact on the content of meaning and belief can guide 
Convergence "that could meaningfully be said to be a convergence on how things anyway 
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are" (Williams, 1985, p. 139). The world does not provide equal guidance in all domains, and 
clearly the strongest guidance is in respect of "our perceptual beliefs, the beliefs that are 
directly caused by what we see and hear and otherwise sense" that is those beliefs that must 
be "in the main true because their content is, in effect, determined by what typically causes 
them" (Davidson, 1999a, p. 19). 
We tentatively suggest that Williams' notion of "an absolute conception of reality" 
may be extended to the domains of economics and accounting, at least in so far as it is 
reasonable to conceive of those domains as world-guided and analogous to science. We 
might develop an absolute conception of the economic world that is "already there" in terms 
of those of our beliefs and theories that are, so far as possible, independent of local 
perspectives. No matter what our perspective, we may, for example, agree that in the 
economic domain certain factors or forces of production operate in relation and produce 
certain flows - of cash, other resources and products. These conceptions may command a 
high degree of agreement from participants and observers of the economic domain, 
irrespective of their interpretive perspective - how they represent the meaning of these factors 
and flows. Other beliefs and concepts will clearly not be part of the absolute conception of 
economic reality: We suggest that concepts like; profit, the appropriation of surplus value, 
and efficiency, are very much more local/perspectival. Accounting theorists have generally 
recognized that many of the objects with which accounting deals are highly perspectival and 
consist of beliefs and theories built upon other beliefs rather than on direct causal relations 
with the environment. Furthermore, they have appreciated the difficulties associated with the 
justification of such perspectival "knowledge". Solomons for example contends that 
accountants are on "safe ground" only when describing "external phenomena that have an 
independent existence of their own ... phenomena such as cash flows, contractual rights, 
market values, etc" (Solomons, 1978, p. 72). Those beliefs and theories about the economic 
realm that are open to maximal intersubjective agreement guided by "phenomena" (objects 
and events) in the world may be thought of as an approximation of the absolute conception 
of economic reality. 
If Williams' notion of an "absolute conception" does extend to the domain of 
economics, the elements included in the absolute conception of economic reality will 
underpin and moderate the development of those more perspectival economic concepts, 
which could be explained, and thereby justified, in its terms. And if it is valid to view 
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economics and financial reporting as scientific, we might ideally expect to find convergence 
in accounting inquiry - convergence that is best explained as convergence guided by how 
things are. In the following section of the chapter we look for convergence in the 
development of financial accounting, focusing particularly on the history of accounting for 
deferred tax in the UK. 
The kind of convergence that would suggest that it is valid to conceive of accounting 
as science, will not be sort that might best be explained by the accounting / economic 
historian. Such explanations of the socio-historical development of perspectival views will 
essentially stay on local, or perspectival, level. The ideal convergence will be best explained 
in terms that show how "convergence has been guided by the way things actually are" 
(Williams, 1985, p. 136). To support an extension of Williams notion of the absolute 
conception of reality to accounting we should look for convergence explainable in terms of 
how things are when viewed from more inclusive perspectives, rather than convergence 
driven by regulatory fiat. 
The history of accounting for deferred tax in the UK 
In the UK, companies are not taxed on their profit as reported in the annual report. Instead, 
a separate calculation is made of taxable profit. This starts with the accounting profit and 
makes adjustments for items that are not allowable or assessable for tax purposes. Some of 
these adjustments create permanent differences between the accounting and taxable profit 
figures. Other adjustments create temporary, `timing', differences, where gains or losses are 
recognized in the financial accounts and the calculation of taxable profits in different periods. 
Timing differences give rise to the issue of deferred tax. 
Whilst there are many sources of timing differences, two have been particularly 
important under UK tax regimes: Firstly, the costs of fixed assets have generally been 
allowed, via capital allowances, in the calculation of taxable profit ahead of their recognition 
As depreciation expense in financial accounts. For any particular fixed asset, the timing 
differences originated in this way will reverse in later years when depreciation charges will 
tend to exceed capital allowances given for the year. Secondly, the costs of pensions and 
Other post retirement benefits have been required to be recognized in accounts on an accruals 
Oasis, yet have been allowed in the calculation of taxable profit only on the basis of amounts 
paid. Companies which have unfunded schemes are required to accrue pension costs in their 
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accounts over the working lives of their employees, yet do not receive tax allowance in 
respect of these charges until the related payments are actually made. The timing difference 
originating in this way will reverse when pension contributions are paid and tax relief 
received. 
At issue is the question of how, if at all, the tax effects of timing differences, 'deferred 
tax', should be reflected in financial statements? There are three main alternatives: Firstly, 
the 'flow-through' method, which makes no provision for deferred tax. This method is 
Sometimes described as the 'nil provision' method, it recognizes no assets or liabilities in 
respect of the future tax effects of the reversal of timing differences and bases the tax charge 
in the accounts on the taxable profit arising in the period. Secondly, there is the 'full 
provision' method, which makes provision for the tax effects of all gains and losses which 
are recognized in the accounts and are expected to enter the calculation of taxable profits at 
Some point in the future. The third possibility is the'partial provision' method, under which 
deferred tax is provided for only in respect of the net amount by which it is probable that tax 
temporarily deferred or accelerated by timing differences will reverse in the foreseeable 
future without replacement. The partial provision method recognizes that for companies 
which are not expected to reduce the scale of their operations significantly, for the 
foreseeable future, the reversal of timing differences will be compensated for by the 
origination of new timing difference so that a certain element of tax -a hard core - will be 
deferred indefinitely. Under the partial provision method no provision would be made in the 
accounts for the hard core timing differences. Arguments for and against the flow-through, 
full provision and partial provision alternative treatments of deferred taxation have been put 
forward by many authors. For example, Rosenfield & Dent (1983) argue for the flow-through 
1nethod, Defliese (1983) and Schwarz (1983) defend full provision, and Chaney & Jeter 
1989) make a case for partial provision. 
The historical development of accounting standards for deferred tax in the UK is 
. Outlined Table 1, below: 
r 
fable 1. The development of accounting policy for deferred tax in the UK 
Document Accounting treatment 
SSAP 11 (ASC, 1975b) Full provision basis. 
'§-SAP 15 (ASC, 1978 revised 1982) Partial provision basis. 
UITF 6 (1992) & SSAP 15 revision Partial provision with the exception that full 
Accounting treatment 
Full provision basis. 
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(ASB, 1992) provision allowed in respect of post-retirement 
costs such as pensions. 
ASB Discussion paper (1995a), Full provision basis, with provision made for 
FRED 19 (ASB, 1999) & FRS 19 all timing differences, except for those 
(ASB, 2001) resulting from the revaluation of fixed assets, 
and allowing but not requiring discounting. 
Statement of standard accounting practice, SSAP 11 (1975) was developed, following 
exposure draft ED 11 (1973), in a period of growing inflation when tax law contained a 
number of provisions designed to offset the punitive effect of taxing inflated historical cost 
profits. Those provisions included 100% capital allowance on fixed assets acquisitions in the 
year of purchase and a stock appreciation relief, both of which gave rise to timing 
differences. The application of the full provision method advocated by SSAP 11 would have 
led to the recognition of large and growing deferred tax liabilities in many companies' 
accounts, which could not reasonably be expected to reverse, in aggregate terms, in the 
foreseeable future. Resistance by the preparers of financial statements to the implementation 
of SSAP 11 forced the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) to suspend the standard's 
implementation date before it became effective (see Hope & Briggs, 1982). After 
reconsideration of the issue, through ED 19 (1977), the ASC replaced SSAP 11 with SSAP 
15 (1978), which required the use of the partial provision method, with the conservative 
caveat that deferred tax assets could only be recognized where their reversal without 
replacement was assured beyond reasonable doubt. The main impact of SSAP 15 was that 
the amounts of deferred tax liabilities recognized in companies tended to be very much 
smaller than they would have been under SSAP 11. 
Tax law and business practices significantly changed in the period following the 
introduction of SSAP 15. The decline of inflation led to the phasing out of stock appreciation 
relief, and the rates used in the calculation of tax allowances on fixed asset acquisitions were 
brought more into line with depreciation charges. Timing differences from these sources, 
which normally gave rise to deferred tax liabilities, were therefore very much reduced. In the 
same period there was a trend towards increased use of unfunded pension schemes. The 
timing differences arising in respect of unfunded pension schemes reverse when payment is 
made, However, unless the scale of the scheme is reduced, the reversing differences will tend 
to be replaced by new originating differences. The partial provision basis, proscribed by 
SSAP 15, allowed deferred tax provision to be made for the tax effects of timing differences 
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only to the extent that the difference could be expected to reverse without replacement in the 
foreseeable future. On that basis, the deferred tax asset in respect of pension costs could 
generally not be recognized: In effect, tax relief in respect of accrued pension cost was not 
recognized in accounts. The Accounting Standards Board (ASB) came under pressure to 
review this aspect of SSAP 15. The 'problem' was addressed by the Urgent Issues Task Force 
(UITF) who proposed in UITF 6 (ASB, 1992d) that the recognition under full provision 
method of deferred tax assets in respect of pension cost and other post retirement benefits 
should be permitted; SSAP 15 was correspondingly amended in December 1992. 
The amended SSAP 15 permits the tax effects of different types of timing differences 
to be dealt with in different ways. Full provision is allowed in respect of pension cost timing 
differences which predominantly give rise to deferred tax assets, while partial provision is 
required for other timing differences which mainly entail deferred tax liabilities. The ASB 
themselves seem positively embarrassed by the glaring inconsistency introduced by the 
SSAP 15 amendment: "its practical effect is that what for most entities is their biggest 
deferred tax asset is recognised in full while deferred tax liabilities are only partially 
recognised. To a jaundiced observer this could well appear a somewhat cynical approach" 
(ASB, 1995a, para. 5.8.3). In search of a more satisfactory position, the ASB reopened the 
deferred tax debate by issuing a discussion paper (ASB, 1995a) which, on balance, favoured 
return to the full provision method for all timing differences. Most respondents to the 
discussion paper supported the retention of the partial provision method (ASB, 1999c, 
Appendix V, para. 19). Partial provision has, however, lost ground with standard setters 
internationally: The US Financial Accounting Standard SFAS No. 109 "Accounting for 
Income Taxes" (FASB, 1992), which requires full provision for deferred tax has become 
well established and influential. In 1996 the International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC) adopted a new standard on accounting for Income Taxes IAS No. 12 (IASC, 1996), 
that requires companies applying International Accounting Standards to make full provision 
for deferred tax. By 1999, the UK and the Republic of Ireland were the only countries still 
requiring the partial provision method (ASB, 1999c, appendix. v, para. 20), and in view the 
international trend the ASB has maintained its advocacy of full provision. Exposure draft 
FRED 19 (ASB, 1999c) indicated the Board's intention to proceed with the implementation 
of many of the proposals included in the 1995 discussion paper, including the requirement 
of full provision for deferred tax. One novel feature of the exposure draft was the support it 
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gave to the discounting of deferred tax provisions. 
Early in 2001 a new Financial Reporting Standard for deferred tax FRS 19 was 
issued. The new standard implemented the Boards previously expressed intentions: it 
required that a liability should be recognized whenever an obligation to pay tax arises 
because of past events. Effectively, this means that provision should be made in respect of 
all timing differences with the exception of those arising on the revaluation of fixed assets, 
where no obligation to pay tax exists until such time as the company decides to sell the asset 
and realize the gain. The full provision method will also apply to deferred tax assets, 
including those arising on pension costs. The new standard allows but does not require 
discounting of deferred tax balances. Timing differences on pension costs are effectively 
based on net present values therefore no discounting will be applicable in respect of the 
associated deferred tax assets. Thus, one implication of the new standard is that the increase 
in liabilities due to the switch to full provision will be offset by the recognition of the 
resulting balances at their net present values, while there will be no corresponding impact on 
existing deferred tax assets recognized under UITF 6. 
The development of accounting regulation for deferred tax in the UK has followed 
a cyclical pattern that has been highly responsive to socio-economic changes. There is no 
pattern of convergence obvious in the movement from full provision through various options 
and eventually back to full provision. This, of course, is not sufficient grounds for us to 
conclude that accounting are essentially unscientific: The course of science may be perverted 
by social and political pressures. It may simply be the case that in the past, the development 
of accounting for deferred tax in the UK has been so biased by successive political pressures 
that a convergence guided by "how things are" has been thwarted. Conceptual framework 
projects for financial reporting may be understood as attempts to raise accounting thought 
beyond the local idiosyncratic perspectives and pressures and onto a more reflective and 
inclusive level, that is, as an effort to move accounting thought in the direction of an absolute 
conception of "how things are" in economic terms. Solomons (1983,1986) argues that a 
conceptual framework for financial reporting would help defend accounting against 
politicization and thereby facilitate the development of a bias-free financial reporting which 
would "tell it like it really is". We now turn to examine the possibility that a conceptual 
framework might facilitate the development of a convergence in financial reporting guided 
by "how things are". We will continue to use the issue of accounting deferred tax a vehicle 
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for our analysis. 
Deferred tax -a test of the ASB's 'conceptual framework' 
The development of a conceptual framework to guide accounting policy-making can be seen 
as an attempt to identify and set out certain "absolute conceptions" of the commercial and 
accounting world, or at least approximations thereof. Ideally the framework will be produced 
in a context that is abstracted from the political pressures and economic interests that are 
bound to surround particular reporting issue. The concepts derived in the relative calm of a 
careful and measured development of a conceptual framework may then serve to discipline 
consideration of particular issues. It may promote objectivity and convergence, explainable 
in terms of the way things are, by providing a shield against the political pressure and 
Personal bias (see Solomons, 1978). 
We evaluate this view by examining the ASB's discussion paper "Accounting for tax" 
(ASB, 1995a) and the responses made to it by the Big Six accounting firms, in the context 
of certain elements of the ASB's' then developing conceptual framework project; the draft 
"Statement of Principles for financial reporting" (ASB, 1995b). The aim of the project was 
to clarify the `conceptual underpinnings' of the Boards work and to establish a `coherent 
frame of reference' for standard setting (ASB, 1999a, paras. l-4). Some aspects of the Board's 
draft Statement of Principles excited considerable opposition. However, we intend to draw 
mainly upon a relatively uncontroversial aspect of the draft - its definitions of assets and 
liabilities. The definitions proposed by the ASB in 1992 at the initial discussion paper stage 
of the project were in fact carried through the consultation process without any change to the 
recently issued final version of the Statement of Principles (ASB, 1999d). Those definitions 
are as follows; (i) "Assets are rights or other access to future economic benefits controlled 
by an entity as a result of past transactions or events. " (ASB, July 1992a, para. 7), and (ii) 
"Liabilities are an entity's obligations to transfer economic benefits as a result of past 
transactions or events" (ASB, July 1992a, para. 24). These definition were then available, to 
guide thinking about particular accounting issues, three years prior to the publication of the 
"Accounting for Tax" discussion paper (ASB, 1995a). 
Our primary focus is on how the crucial question - "do timing differences constitute 
assets and liabilities? " - was addressed by the ASB in its discussion paper (ASB, 1995a), and 
by respondents to the paper. We concentrate on this issue for two reasons. Firstly, definitions 
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of assets and liabilities are central to debates concerning alternative accounting treatments 
of deferred tax. For example, those who favour the "flow-through" method tend to take view 
-that tax liabilities arise only on taxable profits, deferred tax does not, on this view, represent 
3 liability, and therefore no provision should be made. Secondly, the ASB's draft Statement 
of Principles project, from the outset, gave a pivotal role to definitions of assets and liabilities 
by advocating that the determination of entity performance should essentially be made 
derivative of the measurement of assets and liabilities in the balance sheet'. Thus, the 
definition of assets and liabilities lies at the very heart of the ASB's attempt to provide 
gtandard setters with a "coherent frame of reference". This "balance sheet" approach has been 
retained in the final version of the Statement of Principles (see ASB, 1999d, para. 10). 
Furthermore, the provision of robust definitions - answers to some basic questions - has 
generally been considered to be one of the main purposes of any conceptual framework of 
financial reporting: "What is an asset? What is a liability? What belongs on the financial 
Statements and what in the footnotes? Just what is accounting trying to do, anyway? A 
Conceptual framework, so the idea went, would answer those questions up front, get them out 
of the way once and for all" (Gerboth, 1987, p. 2). 
If conceptual frameworks can be effective as a defence against politicization then 
purely we should find that the ASB's evolving Statement of Principles, and in particular its 
definitions of assets and liabilities, informed thinking on accounting for deferred tax and 
thereby reduced the scope for political leverage on the issue. If the definitions are not capable 
of providing a clear and robust answer to the question of whether the tax effects of timing 
differences should be regarded as an asset or liability in the financial statements, then one 
Might doubt whether they will provide useful guidance in any difficult case. Our aim, then, 
in this section of the chapter is to look for the development of agreement - convergence - 
within the recent debate in the UK on the issue of accounting for deferred tax; possibly 
Convergence facilitated by the ASB's Statement of Principles. 
The "Accounting for Tax" discussion paper (ASB, 1995a), explores accounting for 
tax "from first principles". It examines, in turn, the flow-through, full provision and partial 
provision bases. It discusses each of the three methods in terms of their relationship with the 
draft Statement of Principles, and explicitly considers whether the balance sheet amounts 
recorded by each method meet the draft Statement of Principles definitions of assets and 
liabilities. The Board favours the adoption of the full provision method, but is unable to 
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provide unequivocal guidance on how the balance sheet amounts arising should be 
understood: "Some (Board members) take the view ... that 
deferred tax represents a known 
increment or decrement of a future tax liability. Others take the view ... that 
it represents a 
'valuation adjustment' to other assets and liabilities at the balance sheet date" (ASB, 1995a, 
para. 4.7.8). The discussion paper devotes considerable space to comparing these alternative 
views. 
The Board explains that those who view deferred tax as an increment to future assets 
or liabilities do so on basis that: "as a result of the cumulative timing differences at the 
balance sheet date, future tax assessments (whatever their amount in absolute terms) will be 
higher or lower than they would have been if those timing differences had not arisen" (ASB 
1995a, para. 4.4.12). But at no point does the Board make it clear how immediate recognition 
of increments or decrements to future tax assessments can be reconciled with the draft 
Statement of Principles. In particular, it is never made clear on what basis it is thought that 
recognition can be given to increases or decreases in future assets or liabilities which do not 
themselves meet the criteria for recognition. The ASB is clearly aware that the fact that "the 
actual tax assessments of a future period are not liabilities at the balance sheet date" (ASB 
1995a, para. 4.4.12), presents a problem for this approach. Yet no recognizable attempt is 
made to directly test it against the draft Statement of Principles, and it is not rejected outright. 
Furthermore, it is not strictly correct to say that whatever the amount of tax assessments in 
future periods they will be higher or lower in absolute terms than they would have been if the 
timing differences had not occurred. A company which does not earn taxable profits in future 
periods will generally not incur future obligations to pay tax, and the timing differences 
brought forward would tend to have no impact upon that state of affairs. 
The appeal of the view of deferred tax as increment to future asset or liability, is 
perhaps associated with a residual attachment to the matching concept: "It is possible, and 
appropriate, to attribute tax effects to individual transactions, even though tax is not legally 
assessed on this basis. " (ASB, 1995a, para. 3.7.3). The Board's balance sheet driven Statement 
of Principles precludes any very frank or open admission of reliance on the matching 
principle: 
"Notwithstanding its origins as a means of matching income and expenditure 
with their effects, deferred tax is equally valid conceptually ... under models 
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of accounting, such as that in the Board's draft Statement of Principles, that 
start by identifying assets and liabilities. " 
(ASB, 1995a, para. 4.2.2) 
The Board has elsewhere made it clear that it recognises that `matching' can have only an 
epiphenomenal place within the balance sheet driven approach to accounting it favours: 
"Matching would continue to apply, but balances that were being carried forward in the 
balance sheet as assets and liabilities would be subject to a test as to their authenticity" (ASB, 
1996, p. 5). Despite the rhetoric, the Board, in the case of deferred tax, gives no real primacy 
to assets and liabilities: No clear direct test is made, against definitions, of the 'authenticity' 
of the balance sheet amounts resulting from the application of the matching principle. 
Instead, the matching principle, a mere supplement seems to play a significant part in 
sustaining the Board's preference for full provision. 
Some members of the Board favoured an alternative view of the nature of deferred 
tax, seeing it as a 'valuation adjustment' to the carrying value of the asset or liability in 
respect of which the timing difference has arisen. For example, an asset which is partially 
tax-exhausted by the receipt of accelerated capital allowances would be regarded as "worth" 
less to the enterprise than an otherwise identical asset with greater tax deductibility (ASB, 
1995a, para. 4.4.13). The 'valuation adjustments' might, in principle, be best reflected by the 
net-of-tax method whereby assets, liabilities, gains and losses are reported net of their tax 
effects. On consideration, the Board reject the net-of-tax alternative and suggest that it would 
be preferable to pool the tax-related 'valuation adjustments' to all assets and liabilities in the 
balance sheet under the single heading 'deferred tax'. Thus by a circuitous route we have a 
rationalization of a 'deferred tax' balance in the balance sheet - which presumably must be 
an asset or liability: Again, no direct test against definitions of the "authenticity" of the 
balance sheet amounts is offered. The 'valuation adjustment' approach relies upon the concept 
of 'worth' - where 'worth' is in effect the asset's book value less the amount of deferred tax 
arising in respect of it. This measure of 'worth' is not independent of deferred tax and bears 
no necessary relation to the valuation of the asset concerned in terms of the measurement 
bases discussed in chapter 5 of the draft Statement of Principles. It is not; 'value in use', 'net 
realisable value', or 'value to the business'. The concept of a net-of-tax measurement base 
('worth') is novel and as the Board itself notes it is effectively prohibited by United Kingdom 
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company law which requires assets to be recorded at cost or, in some cases, valuation. The 
lines of argument discussed by the ASB in support of full provision for deferred tax rely on 
bases not found in the Statement of Principles. 
The ASB is aware that provisions for deferred tax do not sit easily with its Statement 
of Principles and in particular its definitions of assets and liabilities. They confine explicit 
recognition of this problem to their discussion of the partial provision method. They note that 
"the arguments as to whether the balances recorded under the partial provision method 
represent assets or liabilities are essentially the same as those in respect of the full provision 
method" (ASB, 1995a, para. 5.4.2). They then go on to say that they find it difficult to 
reconcile the partial provision method to the draft Statement of Principles "which defines 
'assets' and 'liabilities' as respectively benefits and obligations arising from past events" 
(ASB, 1995a, para. 5.4.10). The problem they see with partial provision is that "it recognises 
the tax effect of future transactions before they have occurred and in many cases before the 
reporting entity is even committed to undertaking them" (ASB, 1995a, para. 5.8.2). The Board 
seem to be saying that amounts calculated under the partial provision method do not meet the 
definitions of assets and liabilities - which is curious given that such amounts are essentially 
part of the full provision amounts which they want to see recognized as assets or liabilities. 
Inconsistency and division within the Board concerning the relation of deferred tax and the 
Statement of Principles is reflected in a number of places in the discussion paper. Different 
Board members conclude that; "the definition of a liability supports the flow-through method 
(section 3.7.6), the partial provision method (section 1.4.2) and the full provision method 
(section 4.4.7)", (Touche Ross, 1995, p. 535). In sum, the Statement of Principles seems to 
have been of little help to the ASB in forging unforced agreement / convergence within the 
Board itself concerning the appropriate treatment of deferred tax. 
The 'Accounting for Tax' discussion paper attracted 144 responses, running to 604 
pages of comment. In the remainder of this section of the chapter we will examine the 
responses made by the UK National offices of the 'Big Six' accounting firms, which ran to 
77 pages. Our aim is to evaluate the degree of convergence / agreement within the views of 
this well informed group, and to assess the extent to which the ASB's developing Statement 
of Principles project seems to have informed their views and promoted consensus. We 
concentrate on the responses of the Big Six firms because, in our view, they may be expected 
to be particularly aware of the role the Statement of Principles might play in guiding thinking 
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on an issue such as accounting for deferred tax. In addition their economic interests are not 
obviously radically disparate or potentially compromised by the accounting for deferred tax 
issue: They appear to be relatively well positioned to take a knowledgeable and dispassionate 
view of the issues. 
Even the most cursory examination of the positions taken by the 'Big Six' firms, 
summarized in table 2 shown below, indicates the lack of consensus in their thinking. Each 
of the three basic approaches to accounting for deferred tax is advocated, by one firm or 
another. And a wide spectrum of rationales is applied to justify preferences. 
Table 2. Summary of'Big Six' comment on the AS B's 'Accounting For Tax' paper 
Firm Preferred method View on whether or not timing 
differences give rise to assets and 
liabilities. 
Arthur Full provision. Support hybrid view which regards timing 
Andersen differences originating in the financial 
statements as giving rise to assets and 
liabilities and timing differences arising in 
the tax computation as not giving rise to 
assets or liabilities but to 'valuation 
adjustments'. 
Coopers Partial provision as in Argue that partial provision can be 
& SSAP 15 as amended by reconciled with the ASB Statement of 
Lybrand UITF 6. Principles - if amounts provided are 
understood in terms of a contingent liability. 
Ernst & Partial provision with Argue that the only method that gives rise to 
Young withdrawal of the UITF 6 assets and liabilities fully consistent with 
amendment to SSAP 15, and the Statement of Principles is the flow- 
temporary suspension of through method. 
consideration of the issue. 
KPMG Partial provision with See the nature of deferred tax as a liability 
withdrawal of the UITF 6 rather than a valuation adjustment, and 
amendment to SSAP 15. argue that the partial provision basis can be 
reconciled with the draft Statement of 
Principles if recognition and measurement 
issues are clearly separated. 
Price Flow-through modified to Argue that deferred tax is of the nature of a 
Water- provide for deferred tax as a contingent asset or liability. 
house contingent liability. 
Touche Full provision. Follow the ASB's line and argue that 
Ross & deferred tax constitutes an asset or liability 
Co on the grounds that it effects an increment 
or decrement to future tax liabilities. 
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Arthur Andersen argue that neither of the two views of the nature of deferred tax in 
terms of which issues are principally analysed in the Discussion Paper (i. e., the increment or 
decrement of a future tax liability or a valuation adjustment to other assets and liabilities, 
perspectives), are fully appropriate in all cases. They contend that the particular 
characteristics of each timing difference should determine which view is appropriate. Arthur 
Andersen urge the ASB to have regard to the conceptual force of a hybrid approach under 
which certain timing differences would be accounted for as assets and liabilities and others 
as valuation adjustments. Arthur Andersen suggest that some of the difficulties encountered 
in resolving the accounting for deferred tax puzzle originate in constraints imposed by the 
Statement of Principles' three-category balance sheet, made up of only assets, liabilities and 
equity. Arthur Andersen imply that there is difficulty in fitting "provisions" made for 
deferred tax into this scheme: 
"More guidance would be helpful on how provisions, including deferred 
taxation, fit into the framework as a sub-set of liabilities and emphasising the 
difference between the nature of the deferred tax number created as part of the 
accounting allocation exercise and say a creditor. " 
(Arthur Andersen, 1995, p. 19) 
Arthur Andersen seem effectively to invite the ASB to rethink the essential logic of the 
Statement of Principles: The ASB's balance sheet orientation quite deliberately allows no 
place in financial statements for those residuals of matching and allocation exercises which 
do not meet the definition of liabilities in the way that, say, creditors do. 
Coopers & Lybrand prefer the partial provision method, which they argue can be 
reconciled with the ASB's draft Statement of Principles project, if the amounts of deferred 
tax are "regarded as contingent liabilities rather than actual ones" (Coopers & Lybrand, 1995, 
p. 138). A contingency, of course, is generally understood as a condition existing at the 
balance sheet date, where the outcome will be confirmed by uncertain future events (ASC, 
1980b, para. 1). Coopers & Lybrand offer no explanation of how deferred tax can be properly 
understood, in these terms, as a contingency. The ASB themselves hint, somewhat obliquely, 
that it may be appropriate to regard deferred tax as a contingent liability. The Board explains 
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that those who advocate the flow-through method take the view that: "it is incorrect to report 
a liability to tax that is contingent on certain future events (e. g. earning taxable profit), as is 
the case when deferred tax is provided for" (ASB, 1995a, para. 3.7.2). In fact, advocates of 
the flow-through method would argue that timing differences do not constitute liabilities 
(contingent or otherwise) at the balance sheet date because any future liability is dependent 
upon future events not merely confirmed by them - the future tax liability will not exist until 
future profits are earned: "earning future revenue wouldn't be merely ancillary to the 
obligation" (Rosenfield & Dent, 1983, p. 50). 
Ernst & Young, with a suggestion of irony, put forward the view that only the flow- 
through method produces balance sheet amounts that represent assets and liabilities as 
defined, "on any reasonable construction of the words", by the Statement of Principles. They 
argue that the "true conceptual basis" for the full provision basis is the matching principle 
(Ernst & Young, 1995, p. 194), and they describe the ASB's attempts to justify the full 
provision method in terms of the Statement of Principles assets and liabilities definitions as 
"unconvincing rationalisations". They attack both the 'increment and decrement to future 
liabilities' and the 'valuation adjustment' routes the ASB use to rationalise advocacy of the 
full provision method. They express their difficulty in comprehending how the "how the 
Boards' draft Statement of Principles allows the recognition of an increment or decrement in 
a future asset or liability that does not yet meet the criteria for recognition itself' (Ernst & 
Young, 1995, p. 194). And, in response to the 'valuation adjustment' line of reasoning they 
argue that while it may be true that a partially tax-exhausted asset must be worth less than 
one whose book amount is still fully tax deductible, a'valuation adjustment' made on that 
basis does not "represent an asset or liability as defined in the Board's draft Statement of 
Principles" (Ernst & Young, 1995, p. 195). 
KPMG favour the partial provision approach and argue that it can be more readily 
reconciled with the draft Statement of Principles than the ASB suggest. The Board maintain 
that it is difficult to reconcile partial provision with the draft Statement of Principles 
definitions of assets and liabilities because it recognises the tax effects of future transactions 
before they have occurred (ASB, 1995a, para. 5.8.2 and para. 1.3.6). KPMG argue that partial 
provision can be justified if it is interpreted in terms of separate recognition and measurement 
processes; "first, the liability definition is met and thus existence of the liability is 
acknowledged, or recognised; and secondly, that liability is measured at the amount that will 
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probably be paid" (KPMG, 1995, p. 317). KPMG suggest that future events will need to be 
taken into consideration only at the second stage, that of measurement, and thus the ASB's 
principal objection to partial provision is misconceived. However, KPMG offer no 
explanation of how deferred tax can properly be understood as meeting asset and liability 
definitions. This omission is understandable in context of their view of accounting for 
deferred tax as "primarily a matter of expense allocation and only secondarily a matter of 
ensuring that the resulting liability fits into the balance sheet focused framework" (KPMG, 
1995, p. 315). 
Price Waterhouse prefer the flow-through method arguing that it "match(es) tax 
charges to related past transactions and events which have a tax consequence" and produces 
balance sheet amounts which "can be explained and understood" (Price Waterhouse, 1995, 
p. 401). They advocate, however, a modification of the pure flow through in which provision 
would be made for timing differences arising on "one-off' transactions and other timing 
differences likely to crystallise in the foreseeable future. They state that such an approach 
"quite clearly accounts for all liabilities existing at the balance sheet date and those which 
are likely to arise within a short space of time thereafter" (Price Waterhouse, 1995, p. 404). 
However they do not make it clear why they consider it appropriate to account at the balance 
sheet date for liabilities which may arise some time after the year end - and which by 
implication do not exist at the balance sheet date. 
Touche Ross view deferred tax as an increment or decrement to tax payable on future 
profits, and support the ASB in advocacy of the full provision method. They recognize that 
until future profits have been earned "the principal liability to tax on those profits does not 
yet exist" nevertheless they insist that "a measurable increase or decrease in that future tax 
liability does exist, and is the result of past transactions. The method thus meets the 
requirement of the definition of assets and liability" (Touche Ross, 1995, p. 540). Touch Ross 
seem to be no more prepared than the ASB to provide a convincing explanation of how the 
recognition of possible increments or decrements to a future assets or liabilities, that do not 
themselves meet the criteria for recognition, can be reconciled with the draft Statement of 
Principles. 
Just as we found no evidence of convergence in the history of accounting for deferred 
tax in the UK, we find no evidence of convergence in the recent debate. Despite the draft 
Statement of Principles, the Big Six firms do not agree on the most appropriate treatment of 
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deferred tax. Indeed there is a remarkable lack of consistency in their application of the 
ASB's definitions to this topic and extensive disagreement on basic issues. In general our 
findings reflect Gerboth's analysis of the use of definitions developed by the FASB in debate 
on accounting for pension costs. He found, much as we have, that, whilst the definition of 
liabilities affected the vocabulary of the debate and the terms in which decisions were 
justified, "from all external indications, the substantive contribution of the definition was 
slight. All of the arguments raised, however they were expressed were those that a 
knowledgeable observer would have expected to be raised with or without the definition" 
(Gerboth, 1987, p. 2-3). In the following section we will consider the implications that might 
be drawn from the apparent failure of convergence in accounting thought and regulation in 
the UK concerning accounting for deferred tax. 
Explaining disagreement (and agreement) - science, ethics and accounting 
The distinction, Williams draws, between ethics and science does not depend on whether or 
not agreement, or convergence, is actually obtained. The distinction hinges on how we might 
best explain agreement or disagreement: "It is not that disagreement needs explanation and 
agreement does not, but that in different contexts disagreement requires different sorts of 
explanation, and so does agreement" (Williams, 1985, p. 133). In science we can coherently 
expect that agreement might be best explained as convergence guided by how things are, 
whilst any agreement that may occur in ethical thought is likely to be best explained in socio- 
cultural terms. 
There is, in fact, a considerable degree of international convergence in accounting 
standards for deferred tax: a convergence on the method of full provision with discounting. 
This is, in a sense, convergence for the sake of convergence, driven by the perceived value 
of international accounting consistency itself. The international dominance of full provision 
method, following the lead given on the issue by the FASB, in the US, through SFAS 
No. 109, is crucial to the ASB's rationale for proceeding towards full provision in the UK. The 
ASB's move certainly does not seem to reflect any strong view that the full provision method 
captures how things are any better than does the partial provision method. The Board can 
"see the logic for all three of the methods of accounting for tax under consideration" (ASB, 
1999c, appendix. V, para. 22), but they "do not believe that a good case can be made for 
standing up against the direction of international opinion" (ASB, 1999c, appendix. V, 
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para. 23). Essentially, the ASB believe that failure to conform would damage the credibility 
of UK financial reporting because, as the dominance of the full provision method is 
increasingly established, a marginalized partial provision alternative will become "less well 
understood and accepted" (ASB, 1999c, appendix. V, para. 24). The responses to the 1995 
'Accounting for tax' discussion paper indicate that, there is no ground-swell of opinion in the 
UK against SSAP 15 and partial provision, and certainly no natural consensus in favour of 
full provision. The ASB held a number of meetings with representatives of the preparer, user, 
and auditor groups and apparently succeeded in reconciling them to the need for international 
conformity: "each of these groups, whilst disappointed that there has not been international 
acceptance of the partial provision method, now accepts the rationale for change" (ASB, 
1999c, appendix. V, para. 25). 
A cynical view of the development of accounting standards for deferred taxation in 
the UK might be that they have blown in the wind of economic and fiscal change in response 
to sectional interest and political pressure. The full provision method was abandoned at a 
time when its use would have forced recognition of substantial liabilities - with consequent 
impact on profits after tax. The rehabilitation of the full provision method has coincided with 
changes in the UK tax regime and business practices, particularly concerning the use of 
unfunded pension schemes, that tend to give rise to substantial deferred tax "assets" which 
could not be reflected in the balance sheet under partial provision method. There is little to 
suggest that the evolution of accounting for deferred tax in the UK can reasonably be 
described, or best explained, as convergence on how things are. Accounting, at least in the 
instance of accounting for deferred tax in the UK, does not seem to exhibit the kind of 
convergence that we might hope to find in science. Furthermore, the development of 
accounting for deferred tax in the UK is not an atypical case. Accounting for tax in the US 
has also been shown to have been shaped by political and economic pressure (see Moonitz, 
1966; Zeff, 1978), as has financial accounting in respect of many other issues, including for 
example; accounting for stock option compensation (Zeff, 1997), accounting for goodwill 
(Nobes, 1992), accounting for Research and Development (Hope & Gray, 1982), and 
accounting for troubled debt restructuring (Pushkin & Pariser 1991). 
Robert Sterling (1979) suggests that there is little convergence or objectivity in 
accounting because it has taken law as its model, and has therefore become drawn into 
politics and matters of social choice. He argues that there is nothing essential to the subject 
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matter of accounting preventing it from being reformulated as science. As Sterling sees 
things, accounting may keep law as its model and thus become increasingly mired in politics 
or it can take the scientific path: "the law rather naturally shades off into consideration of 
politics. Thus we can also expect those interest groups to appeal to higher legislative 
authorities when they don't get their way with the FASB. ... The alternative is to adopt the 
method of science" (Sterling, 1976, p. 87). Sterling's call for a scientific accounting is 
motivated, above all, by his observation of the lack of convergence in accounting thought: 
"When we confront a problem, we almost invariably disagree about its proper solution" 
(Sterling, 1979, p. 3). He suggests that, if accounting is to move towards scientific status, it 
must abandon the "fantasy" of historic costs and arbitrary allocation processes and ground 
itself in the observable objects and events in the shared and accessible public world. "What 
I mean when I suggest that accounting move toward a science is simply that it take the first 
step by switching from calculating numerals to measuring (observing) and reporting some 
kind of verifiable magnitude, such as prices" (Sterling, 1993, p. 153, note. 25). For Sterling 
a scientific accounting, by being securely based in an observable public commercial reality, 
will obtain objectivity through intersubjectivity. He thinks that, for the most part, we can 
easily recognise the broad contours of our shared economic world, and that prices are part 
of that shared experience (whilst historic cost residuals of allocation processes are not). He 
recognizes, however, that measurement issues are much more problematic than those of 
recognition: 
"Although at the boundaries there are problems in deciding exactly which 
objects qualify as economic resources and obligations, it is quite clear that the 
subject matter of accounting practice includes such things as cash, claims to 
cash, stock-in-trade, machines, buildings, land, and the like. Unfortunately, 
that is the end of clarity: as soon as we move to a consideration of the amount 
of those things or events, we face a maze of murky ideas. " 
(Sterling, 1993, p. 125) 
He suggests that a move to exit value accounting would go a long way towards resolving the 
"murk" around accounting measurement by giving accounting a clear verifiable empirical 
base in prices which are part of the "phenomena of common experience" (Sterling, 1993, 
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p. 153, note. 24). 
Raymond Chambers has similarly advocated a more scientific approach to 
accounting. Like Sterling, he regards accounting practice as having lost its direct connection 
with commercial realities: "Much of the corpus of traditional accounting doctrine and 
practice rests on myths, propositions that are treated as not corrigible by recourse to 
observation and experiment" (Chambers, 1980, p. 167). He too recommends a move towards 
a more empirically grounded accounting. Chambers has argued that the weakness of the 
FASB conceptual framework project' lies in its failure to adequately conceptualise how 
things are in the commercial world: "the contents of the 'concepts statements' deal 
substantially with what lies within the lore of accountants, not with 'relationships in the world 
out there' which it is the business of accounting to depict" (Chambers, 1996, p. 127). As 
Chambers sees it, the confusion of prescription and description he finds in the FASB 
conceptual framework, is not inevitable; he thinks that in accounting we can and should have 
"reliable knowledge ... before prescription". Sterling and Chambers seem to believe that 
accounting can be ideally conceptualized as a primarily descriptive project; others would 
disagree. 
Stamp rejects Sterling's suggestion that accounting can become like science. He 
argues that accounting is fundamentally a normative enterprise. He likens accounting to law, 
arguing that both disciplines are essentially concerned with "resolving conflicts among 
people and organisations" (Stamp, 1981a, p. 216). Stamp sees science as dealing with the 
world as it any way is, "a world which would still exist without any scientist" (Stamp, 1981 b, 
p 20), whilst accounting, on the other hand is involved, in human effort to construct or 
modify a social world: "accounting standards are man-made efforts to control a man-made 
environment" (Stamp, 1981a, p 218). Stamp's conviction that accounting is an essentially 
normative, value laden, conflict resolution mechanism is shared by many critical accounting 
theorists (see e. g. Tinker, 1980). On such a view, all of our efforts to control, modify or 
maintain a social world, including accounting, inevitably involve choices, implicit or explicit, 
concerning the "values that are to be "maximized" (Williams, 1992, p. 103). Financial 
reporting then comes to be seen as "fundamentally an ethical problem" (Williams, 1992, 
p. 103), and accounting as an essentially a moral practice: "It is precisely because value 
choices underlie accounting practices (though often invisibly so) that accounting is a political 
as well as moral practice" (Francis, 1990, p. 7). From this perspective, the primary danger of 
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the scientific view of accounting is that it may foster "the illusion that accounting can be 
thought of in strictly technical terms" (Williams, 1992, p. 103), and lead us to overlook the 
implicit ethical choices involved in accounting practice. It would be a mistake to see the 
Sterling - Stamp debate as a contest between two philosophical extremes (see Power, 1986). 
They share a preoccupation with "stability and consensus in accounting practice" (Power, 
1994, p. 5). Sterling hopes that accounting knowledge might be founded upon intersubjective 
consensus guided by triangulation on the objective contours of commercial reality. Stamp, 
on the other hand, sees the jurisprudential model, of ongoing free debate within a developing 
tradition, as the only legitimate foundation for accounting consensus. 
The tension between the descriptive and normative aspects of accounting that 
underlies the accounting as science versus accounting as ethics debate may be illuminated 
in terms of the distinctions Williams draws between science and ethics. In table 3, shown 
below, we try to locate accounting in terms of the science / ethics dichotomy: 
Table 3: A comparison of science ethics and accounting. 
Science Ethics Accounting 
Aims to help us find our Aims to help us answer the Aims to help us find our 
way around a world in Socratic question "how way through the 
which we occupy no special should one live? social/cultural world in 
position. which we find ourselves. 
Aims to help us construct 
and find our way through Aims to help us reproduce 
the best type of social world and develop our world. 
for us. 
Concepts are not primarily Concepts are action Concepts are action 
action guiding. guiding; they are guiding; they are 
prescriptive. prescriptive. 
Concepts are world guided Concepts are world guided Concepts are world guided 
at local level; they are at local level; they are at local level; they are 
descriptive. descriptive. The proper descriptive. The proper 
application of the concept of application of the concept of 
chastity depends upon the profitability depends upon 
state of the world. the state of the world. 
We can have local We can have local We can have local 
knowledge under concepts; knowledge under concepts. knowledge under concepts; 
"grass is green". "X is chaste". "Company X is profitable". 
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Table 3 continued: A comparison of science ethics and accounting. 
Science 
We can coherently expect 
that the one physical world 
may guide the convergence 
of scientific understanding. 
- Convergence that can be 
best explained as 
convergence guided by the 
way things are. 
Ethics 
There are many actual and 
possible social/cultural 
worlds. Therefore notion of 
the convergence of ethical 
theory on an absolute 
conception of reality is not 
coherent. 
Accounting 
There are many actual and 
possible social/cultural 
worlds; therefore the notion 
of a convergence on an 
absolute conception of 
reality is not coherent. 
We can coherently hope that 
the world might guide us 
towards a view of the 
world- the absolute 
conception of reality - 
which is so far as possible 
free of local idiosyncrasies 
and thus maximally 
inclusive, and objective. 
Theory is world guided at a 
reflective level. 
Reflective / second-order 
theory can be an 
explanatory theory of local 
perspectives/knowledge; It 
can explain how a 
perspectival view relates to 
the world; It can explain 
why grass seems to be green 
to creatures like us. 
Scientific theory can 
incorporate a theory of 
error. 
Reflection can explain and 
thereby justify local 
knowledge. 
It is reasonable to expect 
some degree of local 
convergence - on the ethical 
concepts we need to help us 
find our way around the 
world we find ourselves in. 
Theory is not world guided 
at a reflective level. 
At a reflective level theory 
can not be explanatory; it 
can not explain the use of 
the concept chastity rather 
than some other concept. 
Theory can not incorporate 
a theory of error. 
Reflection can not explain 
and may destroy local 
knowledge. 
Some degree of local 
convergence on the 
accounting concepts we 
need to help us find our way 
around the particular 
economic world we find 
ourselves in might 
reasonably be anticipated. 
Theory is not world guided 
at a reflective level. 
At a reflective level theory 
can not be explanatory; it 
can not explain the use of 
the concept of profit rather 
than some other concept. 
Theory can not incorporate 
a theory of error. 
Reflection can not explain 
and may destroy local 
knowledge. 
The differences between science and ethics arise, in part, because both enterprises have very 
different aims. Science aims to provide explanation of experience, including some 
explanation of why the physical world presents itself as it does to creatures like us. Science 
thus helps us find our way around a world in which we occupy no special position -a world 
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which "anyway is". Ethics does not generally aim to explain experience at all, and certainly 
there is no world such that it could be the aim of ethical thought to explain why it presents 
as it does to creatures like us. Ethical thought aims to help us answer the Socratic question 
"how should one live? " and ethical theory aims to help us to "construct a world that will be 
our world, one in which we have a social, cultural, and personal life" (Williams, 1985, 
p. 111). Accounting embodies a tension between descriptive and normative objectives. It has 
the aim of describing or explaining (economic) experience, and in this respect has something 
in common with science. However where science describes or explains a world to which we 
stand in no special relation, accounting describes aspects of our social world -a world which 
we construct. Accounts help us find our way in the social world, but they do more; they act 
on it: they help us to construct, reproduce and modify our world. Accounting deeply affects 
how we live with one another, and is imbued with both explicit and implicit values. The 
value choices that run through accounting are absolutely integral to it. We can not reasonably 
expect or aspire to an accounting that avoids value choices and simply describes the 
economic world. The fundamental accounting acts of aggregation and classification 
inevitably acknowledge, use, and thereby tend to legitimise, certain meaningful and value 
laden social categories. For example, notions of property rights underpin the category of 
assets, and the category of liabilities is underpinned by notions of obligation. We can imagine 
different social worlds and different meaningful categories, but whatever categories we use 
we will inevitably privilege some value system or other. We suggest that certain key 
accounting concepts such as 'profit' are in essence thick ethical concepts, in which the 
descriptive and normative, fact and value are inextricably entangled. 
For science there is one physical world which may guide the convergence of scientific 
understanding, whilst for ethics there are many possible social worlds, (social worlds to 
which we stand in special relation as constructor or imaginer). Convergence in ethical 
thought guided by the way the world "anyway is" is therefore not possible. Accounting helps 
us to find our way about the social world - which means one particular social world - one of 
many, real or imagined, worlds. Ultimately, the ethical dimension to accounting thought 
ensures that there is no one world to guide convergence in accounting; politically driven 
views and choices about the "values to be maximised" will always tend to stand in the way 
of full agreement and allow the possibility of reversal in accounting thought. The history of 
policy reversal in accounting for deferred tax might be explained in these terms. Nonetheless 
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we do live in a particular social world, and our shared "reactions to its major features, 
including its values" (Davidson, 1991, p. 166), provide all the basis we need for objective 
knowledge of that world. 
Given that accounting apparently aims to describe certain of the most significant 
phenomena of our shared experience: "Producing and consuming goods, buying and selling, 
and receiving income and spending it ... activities engaging everyone's attention practically 
all the time" (Leontief, 1982, quoted by Sterling, 1993, p. 153, note. 24), one might anticipate 
easy agreement on accounting issues - local convergence. Yet, despite this background of 
shared experience, there is persistent disagreement in accounting debate. Our analysis of the 
recent UK accounting for deferred tax debate suggests that one reason why disagreement 
persists is that accounting theory in respect of such matters is so far removed from any direct 
relation with any causal stimuli provided by objects and events in the world. The commercial 
world we share gives the participants no strong lead on the issue, no clear stimuli to 
triangulate upon. Our examination of the competing views on the deferred tax issue indicates 
that a logic of matching and allocation is not far below the surface of the debate; and, as 
Sterling and Chambers suggest, such processes bear little relation to any publicly observable 
commercial realities. 
The ASB clearly intended that its Statement of Principles project would help move 
UK financial reporting away from those accounting ideas and practices that most obviously 
rest on'myths' and towards a clearer empirical basis in observable commercial realities. The 
balance sheet approach favoured by the ASB is specifically intended to prevent the inclusion, 
in balance sheet of 'fantasy' items, such as the residuals or products of allocation and 
matching processes, which bear no clear relation to observable objects and events in the 
world. The failure of the ASB's statement of Principles project to promote convergence in 
the accounting for deferred tax debate is in a sense a failure to carry through good intentions. 
We, perhaps, should not be surprised that the ASB's Statement of Principles project failed 
to bring any significant measure of consensus to the deferred tax debate. The definitions at 
the heart of the project have previously proven "notably unhelpful" in the context of real 
accounting argument (Gerboth, 1987, p. 2). Experience seems to bear out Dopuch and 
Sunder's view that accounting definitions "no matter how carefully worded, cannot bear the 
burden of the struggle for economic advantage between various interest groups" (Dopuch & 
Sunder, 1980, p. 16). They specifically predict that the Financial Accounting Standards 
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Board's definition of liabilities, upon which the ASB's definition is based, "will not help 
resolve the issue" of accounting for deferred tax (1980, p. 7). Our own analysis of the deferred 
tax debate suggests the failure of the definitions to help resolve fundamental questions in 
accounting can, in part, be accounted for by the indeterminacy of meaning, that is, by the 
impossibility of making meaning, as a product of difference, fully present in language. 
Meaning depends upon context but context is boundless therefore meaning is ultimately 
indeterminate: "no context permits saturation" (Derrida, 1979, p. 81, quoted by Culler, 1983, 
p. 123). We found that the definition of liabilities understood in relation to many other texts 
- notably the texts of 'matching', 'contingent liabilities', and 'provisions'. Definitions, far from 
resolving ambiguity, may be drawn on by competing interests as powerful but indeterminate 
rhetorical elements in accounting debate; their meaning is always contestable. The 
unconvincing contortions performed by the ASB in their efforts to make full provision 'fit' 
with their Statement of Principles definition of liabilities, seems to support the view that we 
should not expect accounting definitions to bear the burden of economic and political 
interests. In this case definitions seemed to be used to help legitimize an accounting policy 
choice that was in fact determined by other factors, including the perceived need for 
international consistency. 
In science, ethics, and accounting our concepts can be world-guided at the local level; 
the right application of concepts such as green, chastity, or profit depends upon the state of 
the world, and we can have local knowledge under such concepts. In each domain we may 
reasonably anticipate a degree of local convergence in knowledge. In science world-guidance 
can extend to the reflective level; we can properly strive to transcend our local perspectives 
on the world to gain an "absolute conception" of it which can explain and justify local 
knowledge. Progression towards an ideal conception of reality relies upon the possibility of 
second-order explanation. It requires that we might step back from (or transcend) our 
competing local perspectives to produce a more inclusive conception of the world which is 
capable of explaining the relations of itself and the more local perspectival representations 
it encompasses to the one world which produced them. Explanation, for example, of how it 
is that creatures like us can have the concept of "greenness", also justifies because it can 
show how our perception relates to the physical world and how it can provide knowledge and 
help us find our way around that world. 
The essence of the idea of the absolute conception of reality is that the world might 
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guide us towards a view of the world which is so far as possible free of local idiosyncrasies 
and thus maximally inclusive and thus objective. If the notion of the absolute conception is 
to be extended to accounting we need to be able to step back from our local accounting 
knowledge. We need to be able to explain our accounting concepts from some more inclusive 
position and show how they relate to the world and how they can give knowledge of that 
world, and thus help us find our way in it. Any explanation of accounting concepts like 
"profit", "assets" and the like will need to draw not only on the physical world but on a 
particular social world. Such explanation therefore will not be quite comparable with 
explanation in science, and in particular the degree of inclusiveness that might be coherently 
aspired to will be constrained by the social world. As a first step back from the local 
perspective of accounting, a first step in the direction of a more inclusive (if not absolute) 
conception, we might consider economic conceptions of the world. Some accounting 
concepts may be explained on the basis of economic conceptions of reality and thus to some 
extent be justified, whilst others may find no explanation in economic conceptions of reality 
and thus not be justified by reflection. For example, accounting matching and allocation 
concepts, and the balance sheet and income statement amounts they give rise to, may not be 
explainable or justifiable in terms of more inclusive economic conceptions of reality. Those 
local concepts that can not be explained in terms of the developing absolute conception of 
reality, or be made to cohere with it, will tend to be undercut and forced from use by 
reflection. Some other accounting concepts, for example, sales, purchases, assets and 
liabilities, may be either directly related to or explainable in terms of the inclusive common 
conceptions of economic reality, and therefore justified by reflection. The import of 
Chambers' criticism of the FASB conceptual framework, is effectively that it has failed as 
a reflective enterprise; that it has failed to justify the accounting conceptions it prescribes in 
terms of inclusive (widely accessible) conceptions of the economic reality. 
The extension of the idea of the pursuit of an ideal absolute conception of reality to 
the realm of accounting makes some sense if we can maintain a view of accounting as a 
neutral descriptive enterprise; if we can take the social world we find ourselves in as given. 
On this view, perspectival accounting knowledge may be justified by more inclusive 
conceptions of reality attained through reflection. Those theorists who suggest that 
accounting might appropriately be conceived of in terms of science, will of course tend to 
argue that accounting must carefully protect its neutrality. Solomons (1991) argues that if 
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accounting becomes a partisan advocate of any particular vision of the "social world that 
would be best for us", it will compromise its capacity to help us find our way around the 
world that we presently find ourselves in. However, the idea that reflection from more 
inclusive (if not actually absolute) positions might justify local accounting knowledge will 
make little sense if we see accounting as an essentially a normative enterprise that aims of 
help us answer the fundamental ethical question: "is this the best kind of social world? " 
Explanation of local ethical perspectives, based for example, on analysis of their origins in 
particular social worlds can not address such a question. In ethics world-guidance does not 
extend to the reflective level. Ethical reflection, therefore, can not be based on explanation, 
instead it must rely on thin concepts, such as "good", "right", "obligation", and the like, 
which are not world guided. Reflection can not justify local ethical knowledge in the way that 
it can justify local scientific knowledge. We will find no basis in ethical reflection for 
thinking that our local concepts are grounded in any absolute sense. Indeed, the process of 
reflection may encourage recognition of the absence of any 'absolute' basis for ethical 
knowledge, and thereby weaken identification with the evaluative interests involved in local 
ethical concepts. Reflection may thus destroy ethical knowledge. There are, as we have seen, 
good reasons why we might view accounting as an ethical practice. Certain of its key 
concepts clearly contain a prescriptive element; they embody notions of "the good way of 
living" and might reasonably be described as thick ethical concepts. If we accept that in a 
pre-reflective state users of such concepts might have knowledge under them, in so far as 
they correctly apply and make judgements using those concepts, then reflection may destroy 
accounting knowledge. Reflection may, for example, undermine one's capacity to take the 
category of profit, as an ethical prescription, for granted as part of our way of life. 
Reflection and the destruction of accounting knowledge: 
The drive towards reflective understanding of our culture and our practices seems more 
urgent than ever before and to reach into virtually every aspect of modem society: "There is 
no way back from reflectiveness" (Williams, 1985, p 163). Reflection tends to put traditional 
concepts, including accounting concepts, under pressure. Two distinct impacts of reflection 
on accounting may be anticipated; Firstly we might expect reflection to promote an increased 
rationalisation of accounting practice - associated with a diminution of the significance of the 
role of accounting myth and symbol. Secondly, we might anticipate that reflection will lead 
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to increasing recognition of the ethical dimension of accounting ethical practice; Reflection 
may, therefore, have the potential to destroy accounting knowledge by driving from use 
certain thick ethical concepts under which knowledge was previously held. 
Reflection can lead us to recognize just how far certain accounting descriptions miss 
describing the world in any absolute sense. Reflection may show that many traditional 
accounting concepts are not explained or justified by any economic, or deeper, conceptions 
of the world. In such cases unjustified concepts may need to be abandoned or modified if the 
credibility and action guiding force of the discipline is to be maintained, in a society that 
increasingly prizes the rational guidance of action. To some extent the ASB's Statement of 
Principles project can be understood as part of a project of accounting rationalisation. 
Through reflection the ASB has recognized, for example, that the traditional notion of profit 
as an outcome of a matching and allocation process based on historic costs is not well related 
to economic conceptions of income. The ASB has responded by advocating a balance sheet 
approach to accounting in which income and profit would be conceived in more clearly 
economic terms - based on a Hicksian view of income. The recognition, belated though it 
may be, that many of our traditional accounting concepts can not be justified, in any absolute 
terms, and that in fact they can not even be justified in terms of economic conceptions of the 
world, opens the question of how they can be best explained. The appreciation that 
accounting concepts and standards are often essentially an arbitrary expression of the 
preferences of significant interest groups, and engagement with the ethical dimension of 
accounting is then but a short step away. Reflection on the nature of accounting as a 
"descriptive" enterprise potentially begins to reveal its ethical dimension. 
In practice, however, the rationalisation accounting practice has tended to inhibit the 
acknowledgement of the ethical nature of accounting and ethical component of thick 
accounting concepts such as profit. The suppression of the ethical in accounting has 
paralleled the wider denial of the ethical component of management in modern society. 
Accounting has been understood to take ends as given and to be concerned only with the 
rational, effective and efficient, matching of means to ends. Accountants and more generally 
managers and bureaucrats have been widely assumed to be morally neutral characters: 
"They are seen by themselves, and by those who see them with the same eyes 
as their own, as uncontested figures, who purport to restrict themselves to the 
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realms in which rational agreement is possible - that is, of course from their 
point of view to the realm of fact, the realm of means, the realm of 
measurable effectiveness. " 
(MacIntyre, 1985, p. 30) 
Maclntyre suggests that this Weberian stance reflects the dominance in our culture of an 
'emotivist' doctrine, that holds that all judgments insofar as they are moral or evaluative in 
character, are no more than expressions of preference, attitude or feeling. Emotivism itself 
can be seen as a response to the apparent failure of the enlightenment project and its 
successors to find rational foundations for an objective morality; On an emotivist view reason 
must be silent on questions of value. The selection of appropriate ends in accounting and 
other realms is a matter of values, and the "conflict between rival values cannot be rationally 
settled. Instead one must simply choose - between parties, classes, nations, causes, ideals" 
(Maclntyre, 1985, p. 25-26). 
The value choices associated with the ends of accounting have traditionally been 
subject to relatively little reflection. The measurement of profit has simply been part of the 
commercial life, which accountants, preparers and users of accounting information, inhabited 
rather than consciously constructed, chose, or reflected upon in ethical terms. However, in 
more recent, and increasingly reflective, times, blindness to the ethical aspect of accounting 
- the fact that it privileges certain values and interests over others, the fact that it helps sustain 
certain ways of life and curtails other alternatives - has become increasingly difficult to 
sustain. The interminable nature of accounting debates, and the way that arguments shift in 
response to changing economic circumstances as they affect the interest of powerful groups, 
makes the contested and ethical nature of accounting quite plain. The increasingly open and 
widespread recognition of the apparently emotivist nature of accounting argument has 
fostered the rise of an unapologetic economic consequences style of accounting argument and 
lobbying behaviour (see Zeff, 1978,1997). Many accounting researchers have come to regard 
any appeal to accounting theory as an excuse or foil for the disguised expression of personal 
preference and interests (see for example Watts & Zimmerman, 1979). Positive accounting 
researchers, in particular, have taken the view that in accounting debate as "in moral 
argument the apparent assertion of principles functions as a mask for expressions of personal 
preference" (Maclntyre, 1985, p. 19). The flight to positive accounting research can be 
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interpreted as a response to the uncomfortable recognition of the political / ethical dimension 
of accounting, by researchers committed to the notion that normative/ethical issues can not 
be settled rationally (see Mattessich, 1993, pp. 262-263)8. From time to time, particularly 
contentious issues, such as accounting for stock option compensation (Zeff, 1997), bring the 
attention of a wider public to the contested and highly politicized nature of accounting 
choice. Nevertheless accountants themselves have been most intensely and regularly forced 
to recognize and reflect on the ethical nature of accounting than have accounting user groups 
or the public in general. 
Williams does not suggest that reflection necessarily obliterates 'thick' ethical 
concepts from memory, rather, he thinks that it can make it difficult for people to go on using 
them. Reflection can place us in the position of observer with regard to our pre-reflective 
beliefs, so that we see them, after reflection, as knowledge we can no longer share or use. Our 
suggestion is that the effect of the pressures of reflection on accounting have been such that 
accountants have been put into the position of observers with respect to accounting as 
knowledge - it is now knowledge that they can no longer share. Concepts such as 'profit', 
once taken for granted and embedded in a commercial way of life that implied no level of 
ethical reflection whatsoever, no search for the best way of life, but simply participation in 
our way of life, have been problematized by reflection. For the accountant forced to 
reflection by events, and potentially for a reflective wider public, judgements made in terms 
of thick accounting concepts may no longer constitute knowledge, because the ethical 
dimension of those judgements will cease to be seen as being open to truth or falsity'. Our 
suggestion that accountants no longer fully share in accounting as knowledge is in no way 
meant to imply that accountants have entirely lost any faith in accounting as a valuable 
systems steering mechanism. Rather, we mean to suggest that their faith in the usefulness of 
accounting is no longer underpinned by the belief that accounting gives us knowledge of the 
world. 
Not only will reflection not justify thick accounting concepts, it may positively 
discredit them by revealing them as expressions of arbitrary of will and preference. 
Reflection clearly has liberative potential; it may undermine oppressive traditions. Equally 
clear, however, are the dangers that the destruction of knowledge held under thick concepts 
may present to societies and institutions that have come to rely on that knowledge. The 
potential for social disruption if people become unwilling or unable use certain thick 
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concepts, say "profit", is obvious. A certain kind of action-guiding knowledge which people 
have used to find their way around their social world and to help shape it will no longer be 
available to them. In a modern society, increasingly reliant on thin ethical concepts that can 
not give us knowledge, it is not clear, where will we find the conviction to go on. Williams' 
argues that it is a mistake to think that ethical conviction needs to be founded on knowledge 
- "a mode of certainty" (Williams, 1985, p 169). And he suggests that `confidence' can be 
a viable basis for ethical conviction. Given society's drift away from thick ethical concepts, 
an increasing number of ethical challenges may need to be dealt with using thin ethical 
concepts alone. As we can not have knowledge under such concepts, we may need to rely on 
confidence to support their use. In addition, it seems likely that some thick ethical concepts 
will survive reflection10, and that new ones may emerge. While we can have knowledge under 
such concepts, they will inevitably come under pressure in a reflective society. Williams 
thinks that confidence can sustain our faith in thick evaluative concepts which we may retain 
but must now see are not simply given: 
"While we shall have the knowledge that comes with the deployment of our 
surviving thick concepts, we shall still not have any knowledge to the effect 
that we have a definitively desirable set of such concepts. ... So we are 
aware, when we think of it, of something that less reflective people were not 
aware of, that these concepts are not simply given, and this leaves space 
where confidence, again, is indeed, confidence in seeing the world in these 
evaluative terms. The thick concepts under which we can have some pieces 
of ethical knowledge are not themselves sustained by knowledge, but by 
confidence. " 
(Williams, 1995, p 208) 
The conceptual framework projects and standard setting work undertaken by the accounting 
profession since the late 1960's can be interpreted as an effort to generate the confidence and 
the moral conviction needed to maintain the utility of certain thick accounting concepts. In 
a context where accountants themselves have increasingly come to hold attitudes of private 
irony towards the accounting knowledge that they can not share in, the profession's public 
efforts seem to have helped to sustain the confidence of users and the wider public. Many 
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thick accounting concepts do seem to survive in society at large, and users of accounts do 
seem to be able to confidently hold and apply the knowledge available under those concepts. 
Nevertheless, in our increasingly plural and reflective society, there is bound to be growing 
appreciation of the contested value element of thick ethical concepts, of all sorts. The action 
guiding force of thick accounting concepts is thus liable to come under mounting and 
ultimately destructive pressure, unless our confidence in those concepts can be justified. 
Reflection reveals the ethical dimension to thick accounting concepts like 'profit': A 
dimension that our emotivist culture encourages us to see as beyond rational justification. In 
the following section of the chapter we draw on Habermas' discourse ethics to suggest how 
the moral or normative aspects of accounting might be objectively validated - and its 
normative force sustained. 
Restoring normative validity and force to accounting 
Williams has little to say about what might underpin the confidence that he sees as having 
such an important role to play in sustaining the action guiding force of norms in our modem 
pluralist society. In this section of the chapter we turn to Habermas for an account of how 
confidence in our normative claims might be redeemed, that is, how through discourse ethics 
we might recover moral objectivity in a posttraditional world. Like Davidson and Williams, 
Habermas associates objectivity with intersubjectivity, that is, with uncoerced 
consensus/convergence. He argues that we can have rational consensus/convergence in 
moral/normative matters. In this part of the chapter we introduce Habermas' discourse ethics 
and in broad terms explain its relevance for accounting and accounting standard setting. In 
doing so we will stress the affinities between Habermas' discourse ethics and the 
Davidsonian truth conditional semantics that we drew on in previous sections of this chapter. 
In the following parts of the chapter we discuss the application of discourse ethics to 
accounting standard setting and consider some of the implications of Habermas' 
reconstruction of discourse ethics for the role of conceptual frameworks in accounting". 
The essential claim at the core of the discourse ethics project is that moral objectivity 
needs no foundation other than discourse itself. Discourse ethics is an essentially procedural, 
rather than substantive, moral theory. It aims to reconstruct the moral point of view from 
which the validity of competing normative claims can be rationally and objectively judged. 
That reconstruction locates the decision procedure for the validation of norms in practical 
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discourse striving for consensus and it identifies a rule of argument that makes rational 
consensus on norms and the impartial testing of norms, possible. According to that rule, the 
principle of universalization (U), a norm is valid if: 
(U) All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's 
interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative 
possibilities for regulation). " 
(Habermas, 1983, p. 65) 
Habermas recognizes the contemporary plurality of conceptions of the good life; he does not 
think that philosophy, anymore than religion, can provide an objective or generally 
acceptable answer to the ethical question "how should I (we) live? " He does, however, want 
to show that we can have a narrower moral theory, a theory of justice, that will allow us to 
objectively (impartially and fairly) test the validity of competing normative claims. For 
Habermas, ethical questions can only be addressed from within the context of a particular life 
form and history. They involve deep issues of identity and self-realisation, and are often 
expressed in terms of goods and value preferences. In contrast, moral claims refer to 
behavioural expectations, the obligations and prohibitions that we expect to apply across 
society and be binding on everyone. They raise questions like; "which norms of action are 
justified? " A moral perspective will require participants to be aware and take notice of the 
value preferences and self-understandings of those affected by the norm, but the moral point 
of view will not allow any preferred identities to be prescribed, imposed, or set up as the ideal 
or goal. Habermas' deontological ethics then applies only to "practical questions that can be 
debated rationally, i. e., those that hold out the prospect of consensus. It deals not with value 
preferences but with the normative validity of norms of action" (Habermas, 1983, p. 105). On 
Habermas' analysis, the moral breaks away from the ethical as society evolves to become 
more plural, rational and reflective, that is, as the traditional anchorage of normative claims 
in particular forms of life and given ethical/lifeworld contexts is put under increasing stress. 
As the complexity and plurality of society grows in modernity, the level of 
interdependence among groups with very different self-understandings and life goals 
increases. In such conditions, the development by particular individuals and groups of the 
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forms of life that they value increasingly depends upon the existence of social co-operation 
and freedoms that can only be secured at the moral level. Secured, that is, at the generalizable 
level where broad rational, and therefore intersubjectively binding, social consensus is 
possible. Habermas' discourse ethics is an attempt to recover the motivating power of the 
normative in a post-traditional society where the social norms that we rely on to integrate and 
coordinate social life can no longer easily draw motivating force from shared self- 
understandings. Discourse ethics addresses modern society's need to find ways of generating 
and maintaining consensual social integration that can operate across different conceptions 
of the good life. 
Discourse ethics justifies a mode of social co-operation based on norms that are 
powerful because they are seen to be objective and fair; it privileges a consensual mode of 
conflict resolution and `social integration'. The prime alternative to such `social 
integration' is `systems integration', that is, integration as a consequence of action, as 
exemplified by the integration achieved through market operations. In late capitalist society 
financial reporting has tended to become little more than an element of the `system' through 
which the material world is reproduced and integrated via the steering media of money, 
mark ets and power. It has become colonized by the system, and in the process its moral 
/ normative dimension has become suppressed. The primary role for financial reports has 
come to be seen as the provision of information to markets to allow the efficient pricing 
and allocation of resources, and to facilitate the disciplining of management through the 
market for corporate control and the managerial labour market. Financial reporting then 
appears as an adjunct to a market based `systems integration' of society that has thus drifted 
beyond substantive normative control. Through discourse ethics, accounting might be 
reclaimed as a normative practice with real moral force, and thus be empowered to exercise 
some control, or at least moderating influence, on the system. At present the system seems 
to have substantially broken free and is turning back to colonise those aspects of our social 
lives that rely upon social integration - the lifeworld. Standards / norms of action in the 
domain of accounting and financial reporting involve issues of justice or fairness and appear, 
prima facie, to be open to the possibility of rational and consensual determination, at a 
generalizable level, through discourse. Through discourse ethics accounting may be drawn 
into the realm of normed co-operation underwritten by rational consent, and come to 
operate as a media through which the lifeworld might achieve some normative control of 
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the system. 
Habermas' reconstruction of what is implicit in everyday moral thinking ties the 
motivating force of moral claims to confidence that they can be redeemed with convincing 
reasons. And, his reconstruction of convincing, or rationally motivating, reason giving, based 
on the communicative practices intuitively adopted by competent participants in argument, 
yields the conclusion that any rationally motivating exchange of reasons concerning norms 
of action, must conform to the principle of universalization (U). That principle demands that 
the validity of a norm be tested `dialogically' through a process of real public argument in 
which all those affected are prepared to try and reciprocally share one and others' 
perspectives in an uncoerced effort to assess the fairness, for all, of the proposed norm. Under 
(U), the validity of a norm depends upon its acceptability to all in view of its consequences 
for each. Empathy is thus built into the rule, it "is intended to compel the universal exchange 
of roles that G. H. Mead called `ideal role taking"' (Habermas, 1983, p. 65). 
Habermas' discourse ethics moves beyond the philosophy of the subject and 
establishes and explicates the intersubjective basis of moral objectivity and knowledge. 
Discourse ethics clearly takes its "bearings from the basic intuition contained in Kant's 
categorical imperative" (Habermas, 1983, p. 63); It insists that valid norms have a universal 
quality, so that everyone could rationally will that they be binding on all. Habermas, 
however, significantly breaks with Kant by shifting the locus of moral cognition away from 
the solitary individual to the community in real practical discourse. The formulation of (U) 
"preclude(s) the monological application of the principle" (Habermas, 1983, p. 66), and 
clearly points to the necessity of some supra-individual foundation for the kind of empathy 
and intersubjective moral insight that might rationally validate a norm. The necessary insight 
can not be generated on the basis of individual perspectives, even if they are aggregated in 
some way: 
"I can be rationally convinced of the rightness of a norm only if I have 
grounds for considering you (and each affected person) to be just as rationally 
convinced. But you can be rationally convinced only if you likewise have 
grounds for considering my conviction a rational one. " 
(Rehg, 1997, pp. 214-215) 
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The obvious impasse here is resolved only if we locate the necessary insight and rational 
conviction, not in the individual subject, but rather in a jointly accessible public sphere. The 
rational validation of norms is then seen to take place not within the mind, but instead 
communicatively in the objectively accessible public world of discourse; that is, in language. 
On Habermas' view of things (U) effectively underlies all our moral claims; it is a 
universal moral principle (not merely a local product of late modernity). He offers a 
transcendental justification of discourse ethics12, designed to show that it is implicit in certain 
presuppositions of argument, which anyone who engages in argument must be committed to, 
insofar as their denial would entail performative contradiction: 
Every person who accepts the universal and necessary communicative 
presuppositions of argumentative speech and who knows what it means to 
justify a norm of action implicitly presupposes as valid the principle of 
universalization, whether in the form I gave it above or in an equivalent 
form. " 
(Habermas, 1983, p. 86) 
Habermas' transcendental-pragmatic justification of (U) does not constitute proof or ultimate 
justification of discourse ethics. Rather, it locates discourse ethics "among the reconstructive 
sciences concerned with the rational bases of knowing, speaking, and acting" (Habermas, 
1983, p. 98). It'provides a transcendental justification of the intersubjective basis of moral 
objectivity and knowledge, that reflects Davidson's transcendental justification of the 
intersubjective basis of all knowledge and objectivity in general. Habermas' discourse ethics 
extends a Davidsonian truth conditional semantics to the moral domain. For Habermas, 
understanding any utterance, including a moral claim, means understanding how the 
utterance's claim to validity could be redeemed with reasons: We understand the meaning 
of any speech act "when we know the conditions under which it can be accepted as valid" 
(Habermas, 1985a, p. 313). He treats normative claims to validity as "analogous to truth 
claims" (1983, p. 56), and associates understanding and meaning with intersubjective 
agreement: 
"We understand a speech act when we know what makes it acceptable. ... A 
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speech act may be called "acceptable" if it satisfies the conditions that are 
necessary in order that the hearer be allowed to take a "yes" position on the 
claim raised by the speaker. These conditions can not be satisfied one-sidedly, 
either relative to the speaker or to the hearer. They are rather conditions for 
the intersubjective recognition of a linguistic claim, which, in a way typical 
of a given class of speech acts grounds a specified agreement concerning 
obligations relevant to the sequel of interaction. " 
(Habermas, 1981a, pp. 297-298) 
This truth/validity conditional approach to meaning "gives center stage to the relation 
between sentence and state of affairs, between language and the world" (labermas, 1981 a, 
p. 276); for both Davidson and Habermas meaning can not be separated from context; context 
determines content: 
"Thus the interpreter cannot become clear about the semantic content of an 
expression independently of the action contexts in which participants react to 
the expression in question with a "yes" or a "no" or an abstention. And he 
does not understand these yes/no positions if he cannot make clear to himself 
the implicit reasons that move the participants to take the positions they do. " 
(Habermas, 1981a, pp. 115-116) 
For Habermas, understanding any utterance, including a moral claim, thus requires that the 
interpreter grasp the reasons that the speaker would use to defend its validity. Recognising 
reasons is not something that can be done in the attitude of the third person, it requires that 
the interpreter take a performative attitude; Understanding reasons, inevitably draws the 
interpreter into the process of assessing their validity. In taking such an evaluative stance, the 
interpreter can not avoid applying her own standards of judgement (Habermas, 1981 a, p. 116): 
"From the perspective of a participant, however one's own rationality 
standards must always claim general validity; this claim to general validity 
can be restricted only subsequently, from the perspective of a third person. In 
short, the interpretive reconstruction of reasons makes it necessary for us to 
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place "their" standards in relation to "ours, " so that in the case of a 
contradiction we either revise our preconceptions or relativize "their" 
standards or rationality against "ours. " 
(Habermas, 1985b, p. 204) 
The interpretive principle of charity then clearly underpins the Habermasian approach to 
meaning and understanding. The Habermasian model of rational interpretation can be viewed 
as essentially a "modification" of the rationalist analysis of meaning and interpretation 
offered by Davidson. Like Davidson, he argues that participants engaged in the process of 
reaching for understanding must operate on the assumption that that they share certain 
standards of communicative rationality and many basic beliefs and common convictions 
about the world, including their shared lifeworld. It is only against this background of shared 
belief - this conservative counterweight - that disagreement can be identified: 
"... the rational potential of speech is interwoven with the resources of any 
particular given lifeworld. To the extent that the lifeworld fulfils the resource 
function, it has the character of an intuitive, unshakeably certain, and holistic 
knowledge, which cannot be made problematic at will - and in this respect it 
does not represent "knowledge" in any strict sense of the word. This amalgam 
of background assumptions, solidarities, and skills bred through socialization 
constitutes a conservative counterweight against the risk of dissent inherent 
in processes of reaching understanding that work through validity claims. " 
(Habermas, 1985a, p. 326) 
The principle of charity constrains the participants, entering the communicative process of 
trying to establish what is true or morally right, to interpret the contributions of other 
participants, in accordance with their own beliefs and standards of judgement - so as to 
optimise agreement. The attribution of meaning is always constrained by the interpreter's 
appreciation of context and her evaluations of truth and falsity. 
Habermas recognises that the evaluative element integral to his model of interpretive 
understanding "places the usual type of objectivity of knowledge in question" (Habermas, 
1981a, p. 116). Nevertheless he argues that "objectivity of understanding" can be reconciled 
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with the "performative attitude of one who participates in a process of reaching 
understanding" (Habermas, 1981 a, p. 112). Like Davidson, Habermas takes the view that 
ultimately objectivity can have a foundation in intersubjectivity. He argues that the 
conditions for objective understanding exist within the "general structures of the processes 
of reaching understanding" (Habermas, 1981a, p. 123). That is, he sees the possibility of 
objectivity attained through reflection and critique as integral to the universal structures of 
communicative action. The adoption of the interpretive approach does not force the 
interpreter to abandon all "reflective self-control" - on the contrary the criteria for reflective 
self-control are derived from the rationality implicit in communication: 
"(T)he most general structures of communication that speaking and acting 
subjects have learned to master not only open up access to specific contexts 
which draw participants passively - so it may seem at first - under the spell 
of the merely particular. These same structures also simultaneously provide 
the critical means to transcend it; the means, if need be, to push beyond a de 
facto established consensus, to revise errors, correct misunderstandings, and 
the like. The same structures that make it possible to reach an understanding 
also provide for the possibility of reflective self-control of this process. " 
(Habermas, 1981 a, pp. 120-121) 
On Habermas' view, the general/universal structures of communicative action are procedural, 
rather than substantive. They are the procedural principles associated with the ideal of 
uncoerced consensus, which itself can claim a necessity and universality, because it is 
presupposed by any "effort to formulate, communicate, and vindicate a view" (Hoy, 1994, 
p. 176). As we have seen, for Habermas moral rightness, meaning, and validity and are all tied 
to uncoerced rational consensus: That is, to communicatively achieved, rather than 
instrumentally or strategically imposed, agreement on validity claims that are "in principle 
criticizable" (Habermas, 1981 a, p. 287). 
Taken together, the principle of charity, the ideal of uncoerced consensus, and the 
notion that "the possible correctives for confused communicative experiences are, so to 
speak, built into communicative action itself' (Habermas, 1981a, p. 123), lead to the 
conclusion that we can enter real practical discourse with a reasonable expectation of rational 
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convergence. At the generalizable / moral level, but not ethical, we can rationally hope for 
convergence guided by the critical potential of communicative action and by the way our 
lifeworld is: We can reasonably aspire to objectivity in moral questions, concerning issues 
of justice, fairness and the validity of normative claims". 
The application of discourse ethics to accounting standard setting 
Discourse ethics makes high demands: Ideally the disputants seeking to validate a norm, or 
decision, must engage in a full exchange of arguments which excludes no affected parties nor 
any relevant considerations. External and internal coercive pressures must be removed so that 
the parties, standing back from the pressures of action, can achieve a reflective detachment 
and participate in a reciprocal perspective sharing. The ideal is clearly essentially 
counterfactual: It will almost always be impossible to obtain complete participation in debate 
or complete rational consensus in judgment. In moral argument there will always be a 
"tension between facticity and validity" (Habermas, 1992, p. 23): We must recognize that 
every actual discourse is fallible yet hold onto (U) as a regulative ideal. In the case of 
argument concerning accounting standards / norms, for example, it will never be possible to 
identify, and include in debate, all the parties that might possibly be affected by an 
accounting regulation - if only because the effects of regulation are likely to persist into 
future `generations'. In addition, perfectly reasonable time and resource constraints will 
almost always place limits on the debate. It will, for example, normally be necessary to 
implement procedures designed to close discussion and secure a clear decision prior to the 
attainment of full consensus. In our discussion of deferred tax we saw that even the small 
group of experts making up the ASB were unable to reach full consensus - so that the ASB's 
decision on the issue was based on a majority vote. Other obvious practical problems 
associated with the implementation of discourse ethics include the difficulties associated with 
the interpretation of interests, the overcoming of power differentials, and the practicality of 
reciprocal perspective taking. 
The inevitable tension between the ideal and the reality of practical discourse does 
not destroy the validity or utility of the principles of discourse ethics: "the counterfactual idea 
that a norm deserves universal assent is by no means absorbed and neutralized by the facticity 
that attends the legal institutionalization of public discourse" (Habermas, 1994, p. 459). 
Indeed, our confidence in the rationality of a consensus must in large part be based on 
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assessment of the quality of the institutions generating the consensus. Confidence in the 
validity of a norm cannot properly be primarily based on its substantive supporting 
arguments nor on the fullness of the consensus backing it. Ultimately confidence in the 
validity of a norm must depend on the extent to which the consensus supporting it has been 
generated through procedures that meet the demands of discourse ethics. Confidence in the 
rationality of a consensus must rest on the quality, the depth and breadth, of the process of 
reciprocal perspective taking out of which the consensus emerges, which in turn depends on, 
and can only be assessed in terms of, the procedures adopted. Given the high demands of the 
principle of universalization (U), it is only likely to be approximated in certain contexts, 
including legal and political settings, where something like it is deliberately institutionalized. 
Accounting standard have, in effect, a quasi-legal status, and may obtain legitimacy 
from their `legality'. For Habermas, "the legitimacy of legality is due to the interlocking of 
two types of procedures, namely, of legal processes with processes of moral argumentation" 
(1988, p. 230). Accounting standards may thus obtain a 'legal' legitimacy when produced and 
applied through such mutually supporting procedures. That is, when validated through 
processes of moral argumentation that are supported by quasi-legal processes that create and 
protect the space and structures within which the processes of moral argumentation can 
operate. Both types of procedure are identifiable in existing accounting standard setting 
regimes. The quasi-legal component is institutionalized in those procedures for public 
consultation, including the publication of discussion papers and exposure drafts that, invite 
wide participation in debate. It is also present in procedures, such as majority voting, that 
may be used to bring debate to a conclusion in circumstances where full rational consensus 
can not be attained. The component of moral argumentation is found in the debate and 
analysis, the perspective sharing, and the generation of moral insight prior to the finalization 
of decisions/votes. That is; in the analysis of the content of comment letters received on 
proposals, in the public hearings and open debate on proposals, and in the process of 
reciprocal perspective taking achieved (in part) through the impartial consideration of 
arguments by the Board (acting as judge). In accounting standard setting we find some 
reflection of the sophisticated procedures employed by the courts in their efforts to instantiate 
the idealisations of impartiality in very difficult circumstances. We see, in particular, a 
parallel between the processes of accounting standard setting and the adversarial judge and 
jury system. That system itself can be seen as an attempt to break down the requirements of 
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rational discourse into two elements; the full exchange of best arguments and reciprocal 
perspective taking "artfully approximated by a division of labor (between disputants and 
jury)" (Rehg, 1997, p. 226). 
Accounting standard setters plainly seek to obtain for their output the legitimacy 
associated with legality and democracy in our society. They are concerned that accounting 
standards are seen to be the outcome of a `due process' that includes the wide exposure of 
proposals and active debate. Nevertheless, our examination of the deferred tax `debate' 
suggest that the actuality of standard setting procedures in the UK fails even to broadly 
approximate an institutionalization of (U). Indeed the actuality of UK standard setting falls 
so far short of the discourse ethics ideal that, in effect, the standards produced have no moral 
validity / legitimacy. Almost all of the respondents to exposure drafts are drawn from very 
narrow constituencies; accountants, preparers of accounts, and investors. The procedures of 
UK accounting standard setting do not succeed in drawing representatives of all affected 
groups into debate. External pressures and forces, other than the force of the better argument, 
play a significant role in the determination of standards. And the extent to which member of 
the ASB are capable of overcoming those pressures and their own biases, and acting 
impartially as `judges' in a effective simulation of reciprocal perspective taking is clearly 
limited. UK accounting standards seem to be determined by instrumental and strategic 
considerations and certainly not by the development of rational consensus / convergence. 
We have concentrated, in this section of the paper, on the moral dimension of 
accounting regulations; we do not mean to suggest that accounting regulations can properly 
be reduced to moral norms alone. There is clearly a technical-pragmatic, or instrumental, 
dimension to financial reporting and accounting regulation. The legitimacy of accounting 
regulations, as quasi-legal norms, involves more than the approximation of standard setting 
procedures to moral idealizations: "the more complex validity dimensions of legal norms 
prohibits one from assimilating the legitimacy of legal decisions to the validity of moral 
judgments" (Habermas, 1992, p. 233). Technical-pragmatic, and ethical (as distinct from 
moral) issues and discourses will also bear on the validity of accounting standards. 
Nevertheless, the moral dimension of accounting standards / norms requires that their 
legitimation be based on principles of impartiality and democracy. Ultimately the 
legitimation of accounting standards must be primarily secured through institutionalization 
of the broad based discourse principle: "that the only regulations and ways of acting that can 
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claim legitimacy are those to which all who are possibly affected could assent as participants 
in rational discourse" (Habermas, 1994, p. 459). 
Conclusion; objectivity and conceptual frameworks 
The Habermasian view of objectivity clearly resonates with Davidson and Williams' 
association of objectivity with intersubjectivity and convergence. Together, these views 
suggest that if objectivity is to be retained as a useful ideal in accounting it must be 
substantially reconceived. The dominant, but ultimately unintelligible, representationalist 
view that makes objectivity synonymous with truth as correspondence, must give way to a 
conception of objectivity as intersubjectivity or solidarity. As an ideal objectivity becomes 
"simply the desire for as much intersubjective agreement as possible, the desire to extend the 
reference of "us" as far as we can" (Rorty, 1991, p. 22-23). On this antirepresentationalist 
view, the pursuit of objectivity must be construed in terms of a "de-parochialization" of 
inquiry and a disciplined search for "rational consensus" or "unforced agreement", that is, 
as an ongoing critical process involving the collision of rival viewpoints. Objectivity can not 
require disinterestedness or emptiness; we are necessarily ethnocentric and "must work by 
our own lights" (Rorty, 1991, p. 38). However, it does require that we exercise sufficient 
detachment from our own commitments to motivate critical reflection upon them and to 
ensure their openness to the test of alternative perspectives. The possibility of progress, 
beyond our local perspective, to more objective concepts then lies not in the uncovering of 
predeterminate truths but in openness to the Other in debate. It requires that we maximise 
reciprocal perspective taking and empathy, which in turn demands that we adopt procedures 
that bring to our debate knowledge of the interests and values of all the parties affected by 
the issue being considered. 
From the, thoroughly intersubjective, perspective of discourse ethics, the demands 
of justice and solidarity, individual interests and the common good, appear as inextricably 
interrelated: "solidarity is simply the reverse side of justice" (Habermas, 1996, p. 29). The 
framework of norms developed through a communicative process that makes the interests of 
each individual the concern of all, sustains a cooperative lifeworid which provides 
indispensable resources and space for individual social development and self-realisation. The 
antirepresentationalist perspective forces us to recognise ourselves, our communities, and our 
institutions including financial accounting as in constant process of re-invention, through 
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discourse, labour, and struggle: "every conjunctural foundation, all vocabularies and all 
forms of practical reasoning become open to question" (Daly, 1994, p. 180). It thus forces us 
towards the political; ethics and politics take priority over epistemology. 
A conceptual framework project for financial accounting could help make accounting 
more open to critical reflection and intersubjective critique, and thereby more objective. Such 
a project might serve as a valuable catalyst for self-critical debate and reflection by helping 
to make the basic presuppositions and commitments of financial reporting clear and open for 
debate. A conceptual framework project might also provide a forum where voices not 
normally included in accounting debate might be welcomed and listened to. Only through 
the encouragement of open dialogue and critique can accountants hope to transcend their 
acculturation and develop more objective and socially useful accounts. Unfortunately, the 
ASB's Statement of Principles project does not seem to be designed to stimulate real 
intersubjective critical engagement. At least four factors indicate the misguided nature of the 
ASB's conceptual framework project: Firstly, it plainly clings onto a conception of 
"objectivity as correspondence" and a related rhetoric of representational faithfulness. For 
the ASB a transaction is faithfully represented in financial statements when "the way in 
which it is recognised, measured and presented in those statements corresponds closely to the 
effect of that transaction or event" (ASB, 1999a, para. 3.10). By hanging onto objectivity as 
correspondence the ASB is able to avoid facing up to the questions that would follow from 
clear recognition that there is no way that things are - independent of the community of 
minds: 
"If one reinterprets objectivity as intersubjectivity, or as solidarity, ... then one 
will drop the question of how to get in touch with "mind-independent and 
language-independent" reality. " One will replace it with questions like "what 
are the limits of our community? Are our encounters sufficiently free and 
open? Has what we have recently gained in solidarity cost us our ability to 
listen to outsiders who are suffering? To outsiders who have new ideas? " 
(Rorty, 1991, p. 13) 
Secondly, it is clear that the ASB primarily conceive of their conceptual framework project 
as an effort to set down, or fix, a framework which will guide (in a deductive fashion) future 
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decision making (see, ASB, 1999a, introduction, para. 1-4). Rather than see the framework 
project as part of an essentially ongoing process of self-reflection and intersubjective 
exchange, the ASB hope that their framework will enable the development of standards on 
a consistent basis "by reducing the need to debate fundamental issues" (ASB, 1999a, 
introduction, para. 3). Rather than see the framework project as a focus and provocation for 
continuing dialogue and debate, the Board fall into the mistake of presuming that a 
conceptual framework must either be "deductive or defective". The Board implicitly assume 
that to be operational in the required sense a conceptual framework must "provide a set of 
axioms from which the standard setters can logically derive standards without appeal to 
processes of debate" (Power, 1993, p. 47-48). By conceiving of their conceptual framework 
as standing "outside practice, i. e. as a fixed ahistorical construct from which accounting 
standards can be derived deductively" (Power, 1994, pp. 54-55), the Board fundamentally 
misconstrue the possibilities for a conceptual framework. We agree, with Power, that a 
conceptual framework should not be thought of as an: "ultimate foundation in any classical 
sense but a point of reference in the network of accounting standards and practices that serves 
to 'organize' thinking about them" (Power, 1994, p. 53). The ASB fail to see that the primary 
value of a conceptual framework project lies in the contribution it may make to ongoing 
dialogue and debate; openness rather than closure on a set of axioms should be the goal of 
a conceptual framework project. 
The third problem with the ASB's conceptual framework project is that it failed to 
incite broadly based intersubjective engagement. It has not made itself open to radically 
competing viewpoints, and has provoked very little involvement of the wider public in the 
accounting debate. Analysis of comment of the ASB's draft Statement of Principles (see, e. g., 
McKeman & O'Donnell, 1998) shows that participation in the debate instigated by the ASB's 
project was essentially confined to accountants, auditors, preparers of financial statements 
and representatives of investors. Finally, it draws its inspiration from narrow streams of 
thought - it is highly derivative of the FASB's conceptual framework project of the 1970's, 
and does little to expand the accounting imagination - it provides us with no "new candidates 
for belief and desire phrased in new vocabularies" (Rorty, 1991, p. 14). The ASB's project 
perpetuates an unexamined privileging of the position of the investor as user of financial 
statements. It allows no space or purchase to new ideas and gives no encouragement to other 
voices. Rather than enable progress in financial reporting it entrenches the status quo: 
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"We can only hope to transcend our acculturation if our culture contains (or 
thanks to disruptions from outside or internal revolt, comes to contain) splits 
which supply toeholds for new initiatives. Without such splits - without 
tensions which make people listen to unfamiliar ideas in the hope of finding 
means of overcoming those tensions - there is no such hope. " 
(Rorty, 1991, p. 13-14) 
The ASB's project provides UK accounting with no basis for growth, through transcendence 
of our acculturation. It can be viewed as an attempt to repel "disruption from the outside", 
and suppress "internal revolt" -a defense at the level of concepts against disorder, 
contradiction, and most of all against competing perspectives. The straightjacket of an expert 
search for "correspondence" continues to impede the expansion of the accounting 
imagination and the development of accounting objectivity. The accounting community does 
not yet seem to have found a way of "avoiding the disadvantages of ethnocentrism". We must 
find ways of expanding our communality if we are to expand the possibilities of accounting 
thought and knowledge: "There are no definite limits to how far dialogue can or will take us" 
(Davidson, 1991, p. 165). 
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Preamble to chapter 4: Validity in Accounting Standard Setting and the 
Presuppositions of External Financial Reporting 
In chapter 2 we used Davidson's work to justify the possibility of truth and objectivity in 
accounting. Our intention there was to defend the possibility of a rational accounting against 
those "totalized critiques" of reason which have featured prominently in the critical 
accounting literature in recent decades. In that chapter we defended accounting's potential 
for descriptive objectivity; its latent capacity to provide true accounts of the objective reality 
we share, and we take the view that in principle, at least, the rationality crisis facing 
accounting can be over come. We regard the possession of true descriptions / accounts of 
objects and events in the world as a necessary component of rationality. Only on the basis 
of knowledge of present conditions and relationships can we reasonably expect to be able to 
orchestrate action so as to achieve desired ends. Clearly, the rationality involved here is 
primarily an instrumental or purposive rationality, concerned with the effective and efficient 
relations between means and ends. 
We recognize, however, that the full emancipatory potential of financial reporting 
cannot properly be conceived of in narrowly instrumental terms, and we see the moral and 
descriptive dimensions of accounting as inextricably entangled. In chapter 3 we argued that 
the crisis of legitimacy that faces financial accounting might, in principle, be overcome 
through the application of Habermasian discourse ethics. We take the view that it is only 
through communicative rationality that the full emancipatory potential of financial reporting 
can be realized. Our emphasis in chapter 4 is on defending the role of communicative reason 
in the domain of financial reporting. The defence here is against those theorists, including 
those of emotivist and scientistic hue, who would be inclined to reduce rationality to 
instrumental rationality and objectivity to descriptive objectivity, and thereby place the 
normative beyond any rational determination and consequently beyond any rationally based 
objectivity. 
On the Habermasian view of the evolution of society, introduced in chapter 1, the 
transition to modernity is marked by a struggle between reason and the other of reason, 
represented by tradition. Modernity itself, in contrast, is characterized by a tension between 
the instrumental and communicative modes of reason. That tension in modernity is reflected 
in the contest between the systemic and the communicative integration / coordination of 
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society. As modernity progresses there is a tendency for the instrumental rationality of the 
system to turn back upon the lifeworld and supplant the communicative rationality upon 
which it relies. In modernity the moral dimension of accounting can no longer draw powerful 
motivating force from tradition, but in principle, as we argued in chapter 3, it can have a 
strong and objective basis in communicative rationality. Yet as modernity develops there is 
a tendency for institutions like financial accounting to be increasingly dominated by expertise 
and instrumental reason and for the moral issues and communicative reason to be 
progressively marginalized. If accounting is to fulfil its emancipatory promise and serve as 
a means by which the lifeworld may come to exercise some normative control over the 
colonizing depredations of the system, in capitalist modernity, it must itself secure its moral 
foundations in the lifeworld through communicative reason. 
The colonization of the lifeworld meets little resistance primarily because the 
rationalization of the lifeworld is associated with its "differentiation"; it is accompanied by 
the rise of expert cultures and the segmentation of the lifeworld into fields of knowledge and 
expertise - science and production, art and aesthetics, morality and law. Because the expertise 
and knowledge accumulated in the separate spheres is not integrated, and because the 
separate spheres develop their own technical vocabularies, there is no common 
consciousness, no synthesised position, from which colonisation can be effectively resisted. 
In this chapter we use Habermas' reconstruction of the moral point of view in communicative 
rationality to resist the collapse of reason in accounting to instrumental reason and of 
objectivity in accounting to descriptive objectivity. We defend the possibility of normative 
objectivity in accounting against those accounting theorists, exemplified for us by Shapiro 
(1997 & 1998), who seem to conceive of the moral dimension of financial reporting, in so 
far as they recognize it at all, as standing beyond any rational validation. We object to the 
view that somehow the moral and descriptive dimensions of accounting can be neatly 
separated and that the accountants' role can properly be understood in terms of an application 
of a neutral expertise and instrumental rationality; means in the service of ends that lie 
beyond rational adjudication. 
An important aim of this chapter is to consolidate the analysis of objectivity as 
intersubjectivity in accounting that we have outlined in previous chapters. This chapter is 
therefore entirely underwritten by our conviction that objectivity can have no other 
foundation than intersubjectivity and it contains a restatement of our commitment to a 
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Davidsonian view of the possibility of descriptive objectivity and to a Habermasian view of 
the possibility of normative objectivity. The main body of the chapter consists in the 
development of a critique of scientistic analysis of the presuppositions of external financial 
reporting and maxims of rational argument in accounting debate advanced by Shapiro (1997 
& 1998). We use Shapiro's instrumentalist conception of the limits of rationality in financial 
reporting as a counterpoint to our own view of the foundations of financial reporting and the 
possibility of validity in accounting standard setting. We thereby hope to contribute to a 
clarification of what is at stake in debates concerning truth, objectivity and validity in 
accounting and accounting standard setting. 
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Chapter 4: Validity in Accounting Standard Setting and the Presuppositions of 
External Financial Reporting 
Introduction 
This chapter defends the possibility of objectivity and rationality in accounting and 
accounting standard setting. The philosopher Donald Davidson's analysis of radical 
interpretation is used to defend the view that in accounting we can have cognitive objectivity, 
that is, knowledge of an objective publicly accessible world. And Jürgen Habermas' work 
on communicative rationality, and in particular his analysis of discourse ethics, is used to 
resist the collapse of reason in accounting to instrumental reason, and to defend the view that 
the normative component of accounting could, in the right conditions, attain an objective 
validity. For both Davidson and Habermas intersubjectivity and the power of reason is all the 
foundation we need, or can have, to ground claims to descriptive and normative objectivity. 
In two recent papers Shapiro (1997,1998) has set out his views on the 
presuppositions of external financial reporting and on the principles of rational argument in 
accounting debate. This chapter responds to Shapiro's recognition of the need for further 
debate on these issues and to his suggestion that those who disagree with the views he 
presents, ought to articulate and defend their own thinking on these matters (Shapiro, 1997, 
p. 183). We disagree with much of Shapiro's analysis, and find in the framework of 
presuppositions and maxims that he provides a natural counterpoint to our own views. 
Whilst we share Shapiro's interest in promoting a clarification of the philosophical 
bases of financial reporting, we have reservations concerning his view that the identification 
of our "common assumptions and definitions" will facilitate sensible debate. In our view, the 
search for definitions often leads in essentially fruitless circles. We should not expect always 
to be able to define our useful concepts in terms of other concepts. Davidson treats the 
concept of truth as a primitive, "beautifully transparent" in comparison with the much more 
problematic concepts such as meaning and interpretation which he wants to illuminate using 
a theory of truth, and he regards humanity's persistent efforts to define and analyse truth as 
"folly": 
"Let me suggest a diagnosis of our aporia about truth. We are still under the 
spell of the Socratic idea that we must keep asking for the essence of an idea, 
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a significant analysis in other terms, an answer to the question what makes 
this an act of piety, what makes this, or any, utterance, sentence, belief, or 
proposition true. We still fall for the freshman fallacy that demands that we 
define our terms as a prelude to saying anything further with or about them. " 
(Davidson, 1996, p. 275) 
Following Davidson's lead, in the analysis that follows we take the concept of truth to be 
vital to the possibility of objective knowledge but refuse to engage in any search for the 
meaning of "truth" in accounting'. Nor do we attempt to assemble any alternative synopsis 
of presuppositions and maxims to compete with Shapiro's. 
The chapter consists of four basic elements: In the first section we offer an 
antirepresentationalist view of the possibility of objective accounting knowledge. Secondly, 
Shapiro's essentially representationalist analysis of the presuppositions of external financial 
reporting is critically reviewed. In the third section of the chapter we critically comment on 
Shapiro's analysis of the role of argument in accounting debate. We object primarily to his 
preclusion of norms as the subject of rational argument. In the final part of the chapter we 
outline a Habermasian view of the ideal role of argument in accounting debate, and we argue 
that, ideally, objective accounting norms and standards can be established and validated 
through rational argument and debate. 
The intersubjective foundations of epistemological objectivity 
In this part of the chapter we outline our view of the foundations of accounting knowledge 
and objectivity. We see no reason to think that accounting knowledge constitutes, in any 
fundamental way, a special kind of knowledge. Therefore, we begin this section by sketching 
Davidson's persuasive analysis of the conditions of possibility of knowledge - of any kind. 
We then go on to comment, briefly, on the implications of Davidson's analysis and its 
application to accounting knowledge. The reader will find that this section repeats, with 
different emphasis, much of the discussion of Davidson's views contained in chapter 2 
of this thesis. Davidson argues that any explanation of the possibility of knowledge must 
account for the three distinct, but mutually interdependent, kinds of knowledge: knowledge 
of the world, knowledge of other minds, and knowledge of one's own mind. He suggests that 
we might think of these three varieties of knowledge in terms of a triangle, resting on a base 
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of communication - the relation between knowledge of one's own mind and knowledge of 
other minds. Davidson argues that; knowledge clearly pre-supposes belief; that having a 
belief requires that we can discriminate between true and false; and following Wittgenstein, 
he holds that the "source of the concept of objective truth is interpersonal communication" 
(Davidson, 1991, pp. 156-157). Davidson refuses to define truth, but he does recognize one 
"intuitive truth about truth", that is; "the truth of an utterance depends on just two things: 
what the words as spoken mean, and how the world is arranged" (Davidson, 1983, pp. 308- 
309). 
It seems that we cannot have knowledge without communication. But what makes 
communication itself possible? How is it possible for a speaker and interpreter to share an 
understanding of the meaning of the speaker's utterances? It seems that we need an account 
of the possibility of interpretation. The interpreter's task is clear; she must assign a 
propositional content to each of the speaker's utterances. Essentially, she must match a 
sentence of her own with each of the speaker's sentences. If she "gets things right", her own 
sentences will "provide the truth conditions of the speaker's sentences" (Davidson, 1991, 
p. 157) and yield the meaning of the speaker's utterances. But how can the interpreter 
construct and verify such a framework of truth conditions -a theory of truth and meaning - 
for the speaker's utterances? What evidence is available? The interpreter clearly has no direct 
access to the detailed propositional intentions or beliefs of the speaker - and to assume that 
she did would be to beg the question of interpretation. The interpreter does, however, have 
access to the speaker's utterances, and, Davidson suggests that it is reasonable to assume that 
she can detect which utterances the speaker holds to be true in particular circumstances. A 
speaker will hold an utterance to be true, or false, in part because of what it means, and in 
part because of what he believes to be the case. If the interpreter aims to establish meanings 
on the evidence of prompted assent or dissent (holding true or false) to utterances, she must 
deal with the problem of the entanglement of meaning and belief. 
The separation of meaning and belief in interpretation is made possible by the 
application of the principle of charity. The principle of charity has two components a 
principle of correspondence and a principle of coherence. The principle of correspondence 
directs the interpreter to proceed, so far as possible, on the basis that the speaker's utterances 
are a response to the same aspects of the world that she herself would respond to in similar 
circumstances. The intention is to constrain belief so as to allow a solution for meaning. 
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Whenever plausibly possible, the interpreter must assign sentences of her own (truth 
conditions) to the speaker's sentences that make him right - credit him with true beliefs - 
according to her own view of things. An interpreter cannot build an adequate interpretive 
theory of truth and meaning for the speaker's language by taking each sentence in isolation 
and deciding upon an appropriate matching sentence from her own language for it. Rather 
she must build a pattern that fits the evidence and respects the interlocking relations of 
rational entailment between sentences. The principle of coherence directs the interpreter to 
assume a degree of logical consistency in the speakers thinking, that is, to assume that the 
speaker shares her standards of rationality. An adequate interpretative theory of truth and 
meaning for a language is an account of how the speakers' utterances hold together in a 
coherent pattern which as a whole fits and makes sense of the speaker's interaction with his 
environment, as understood by the interpreter. 
It is clear that the process of correct interpretation, we have just sketched, relies on 
"an interpersonal standard of consistency and correspondence" (Davidson, 1991, p. 158). 
Davidson argues that this "interpersonal" standard is an "objective" standard: An interpreter 
and speaker will, no doubt, on occasion understand one another on the basis of mistaken 
beliefs, but such cases "cannot be the rule" (Davidson, 1983, p. 317). We can be sure "that 
our view of the world is, in its plainest features, largely correct" (Davidson, 1991, p. 158). To 
understand why we should see the interpersonal standard as objective, we need to go back 
to the triangular relation between knowledge of the world, knowledge of other minds, and 
knowledge of one's own mind. We began this section of the chapter by recognizing that all 
thought and all knowledge, including knowledge of one's own mind, presupposes beliefs, and 
that having beliefs presupposes a grasp of the concept of objective truth, which in turn 
depends upon interpersonal communication. We then considered the process of 
communication, construed as interpretation, and found that it required that the interpreter be 
able to find regularities in the (verbal) behaviour of the speaker that she could correlate with 
events and objects in her own world. This process of triangulation on shared stimuli, gives 
content / meaning to thought and speech, and provides us with assurance that we are in 
contact with an objective publicly accessible reality of objects and events. Only when the 
triangle is complete can we tell "whether a creature, in discriminating between stimuli, is 
discriminating between stimuli at the sensory surfaces or somewhere further out, or further 
in" (Davidson, 1991, pp. 159). We can now see why Davidson thinks that the interpersonal 
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standard of the community of minds can give us objective assurance that our view of the 
world must, in its most basic features, be largely correct: "The reason is that the stimuli that 
cause our most basic verbal responses also determine what those verbal responses mean, and 
the content of the beliefs that accompany them"(Davidson, 1991, p. 160). 
Most of our plainest beliefs must be true and their nature known to others because 
their truth conditions, and therefore their meaning, is constituted by the public objects and 
events in the world that cause them. Acceptance of the notion that: "the truth of an utterance 
depends on just two things: what the words as spoken mean, and how the world is arranged" 
(Davidson, 1983, pp. 308-309) does not commit us to a dualism of scheme and content, 
language and corresponding world. On the contrary it leads us to a closer focus on how the 
words as spoken are given meaning, and the realisation that our most basic statements and 
thoughts are given content by virtue of their causal relation with the world we share. 
Davidson's analysis of the conditions of possibility of the three varieties of knowledge, which 
we have sketched above, allows no room for possibility that our basic framework of belief 
can somehow be out of phase with the environment which determines its content. It has no 
room for the notion of an epistemological gap between the content of thought and the world. 
Davidson shows that the nature of correct interpretation guarantees that we are firmly 
in touch with reality. In touch, that is, not in the sense that our beliefs can be more or less 
adequate representations of reality, but rather in the sense that many of our simplest beliefs 
are necessarily causally related to our environment and true. This obviously does not mean 
or imply that all of our beliefs must be true; mistaken beliefs may sometimes be provoked 
by misleading sensations, and many of our beliefs derive their content entirely from their 
relations with other beliefs and have no direct causal relation with our environment. Any 
particular beliefs may be false, but the basic framework of plain beliefs we hold about the 
world and our place in it can not be mistaken "for it is this picture which informs the rest of 
our beliefs, whether they be true or false, and makes them intelligible" (Davidson, 1991, 
p. 160). 
Davidson finds a basis for objectivity in intersubjectivity, that is, in the relations 
between creatures reacting simultaneously to each other and stimuli from a shared world. In 
effect he finds a middle ground between subjectivity and absolute objectivity, between 
matters of taste and an objectivity based on the ideal of correspondence: That middle ground 
and "our only usable notion of `objectivity' is `agreement' rather than mirroring" (Rorty, 
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1980, p. 337). The objectivity of a particular piece of knowledge should then be understood 
in terms of the breadth and quality of agreement associated with it. For Davidson, the notion 
of an impersonal objectivity beyond the community of minds is delusional. It then becomes 
clear that if we want to improve our standards of objectivity, it is vital that we take steps to 
deepen, broaden, and secure the quality of interactions within community of minds. 
Davidson is not an antirealist; he clearly accepts the world as "out there" and does not 
doubt that most things in the world are causally independent of us. What he denies is that 
they are representationally independent of us; He insists that the world contains no 'truths' 
or 'facts' prior to language, waiting to be discovered. For an object to be representationally 
independent of us it would need to have certain intrinsic features, so that it would be more 
adequately described or represented by certain of our terms or conceptual schemes than by 
others. A representationally independent object would have a way that it is in itself - its own 
point of view. Many philosophers recognise that we have no way to distinguish the 
supposedly intrinsic features of an object from the merely extrinsic, or description relative, 
features. The antirepresentationalists respond to this fact by discarding "the intrinsic-extrinsic 
distinction, the claim that beliefs represent, and the whole question of representation 
independence or dependence" (Rorty, 1998, p. 86). 
Antirepresentationalists, like Rorty and Davidson, will certainly agree that, within the 
terms of a particular descriptive framework, the world may justify beliefs. They will, 
however, urge us to avoid the temptation "to confuse the platitude that the world may cause 
us to be justified in believing a sentence true, with the claim that the world splits itself up, 
on its own initiative, into sentence shaped chunks called'facts"' (Rorty, 1989, p. 5) that may 
make our beliefs true by corresponding to them. The antirepresentationalist will therefore 
hesitate to accept without qualification the apparently innocuous suggestion that statements 
such as "There are no chairs in this room" will be true or false in virtue of the way things are. 
They will hesitate because they see two ways of interpreting "in virtue of the way things are": 
The antirepresentationalist will not accept that any statement can be true "in virtue of the way 
things are" interpreted as "simply in virtue of the way things are, quite apart from how we 
describe them" (Rorty, 1998, pp. 86-87). But she will think any true statement, whether about 
the presence of chairs, the amount of cash in my pocket, or human rights, is true "in virtue 
of the way things are" understood as: "in virtue of the way our current descriptions of things 
are used and the causal interactions we have with those things" (Rorty, 1998, pp. 86-87). This 
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latter interpretation is in effect a variation on the "intuitive truth about truth" recognised by 
Davidson that: "the truth of an utterance depends on just two things: what the words as 
spoken mean, and how the world is arranged" (Davidson, 1983, pp. 308-309). Anyone who 
accepts that the world "divides up the way we divide it" (Searle, 1995, p. 160), rather than "on 
its own initiative", must surely agree that the truth of a statement depends on both "what the 
words as spoken mean, and how the world is arranged". But this raises an obvious question: 
can we distinguish the role of the words (scheme) and the role of the world (content) in 
determining the truth of our statement? Antirepresentationalist do not think that there is any 
way that we can make such a distinction, and they will urge us to drop the scheme and 
content model, and with it any "attempt to sort out propositions by whether they are "made" 
true by "the world" or by "us" (Rorty, 1998, p. 87). If we drop the distinction we will not be 
able to explain correspondence except by reintroducing something like the notion of the way 
the world divides itself up - the way the world is in itself. If we are not prepared to do that 
correspondence must go and along with it the notion of representations and representational 
faithfulness. An antirepresentationalist will see any attempt to keep correspondence without 
the notion that there is a way that the world divides itself up, as bound to fail. 
We will complete this section by very briefly outlining the salient implications of a 
Davidsonian antirepresentationalist view of things for accounting: Davidson's analysis gives 
us good reason for thinking that most of our plainest beliefs must be true, in touch with 
objective reality, and shared with others. This core of simple true belief, that is given content 
by its causal relation to the environment, provides the context that informs and makes 
intelligible our other beliefs. Financial accounting therefore is at its most intelligible when 
it strongly coheres with beliefs that have direct causal relation with the environment. And 
accounting is on strong ground when, for example, it deals with market values and 
transactions, and with assets and liabilities that have a real presence in the environment that 
is corroborated by their existence in other belief systems. When accounting is on this strong 
ground, particular accounting statements may be objectively true or false. Financial 
accounting drifts towards unintelligibility when the indirect connections it can have with the 
core of plain true beliefs that are causally related to the environment are stretched to breaking 
by certain accounting practices. Cost allocation and matching exercises, for example, produce 
accounting values, including depreciated historic cost carrying values for fixed assets, that 
are patently out of touch with the commercial environment and indeed seem to bear little 
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relation, if any, to any other system of beliefs. Davidson's analysis also gives us grounds for 
thinking that an intelligible account, whether about the amount of cash in my pocket, or the 
trading activity of a commercial organisation, can be true or false "in virtue of the way things 
are". In antirepresentationalist terms, we may conceive of an account as being true or false 
in virtue of the meaning of the account and how the world is arranged, provided that we 
recognise that the meaning of the account as causally, rather than representationally, related 
to things in the world. That is, our accounts may be true or false "in virtue of the way our 
current descriptions of things are used and the causal interactions we have with those things" 
(Rorty, 1998, pp. 86-87). 
The presuppositions of external financial reporting 
In this part of the chapter we critically review the representationalist analysis of the 
presuppositions of external financial reporting presented by Shapiro (1997,1998). Shapiro 
argues that every "community needs some common assumptions and definitions in order to 
conduct a constructive and intelligible debate about issues that are significant to its members" 
(1997, p. 167). In the hope of clarifying what is at stake in disputes over "rationality, 
objectivity and `truth' in external financial reporting" (1997, p. 165), and of facilitating 
rational debate in accounting, Shapiro sets out what he believes to be the primary 
philosophical presuppositions of external financial reporting. The assumptions identified by 
Shapiro are clearly inspired by the thinking of the philosopher John Searle, and in particular 
they closely follow Searle's analysis of the "presuppositions of our contemporary world 
view" (Searle, 1995, pp. 150-151). Much of our disagreement with Shapiro's thinking has its 
roots in what we see as weaknesses in the analysis put forward by Searle. In specifying those 
weaknesses we have drawn on Rorty's criticism of the representationalist position presented 
by Searle. We hope that our critique of Shapiro's essentially representationalist view of the 
possibility of objectivity and truth in accounting will help to clarify and reinforce our own 
antirepresentationalist view. 
The five presuppositions of external financial reporting identified by Shapiro (1997, 
p. 167) are set out below in Table 1: 
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Table 1. Five presuppositions of external financial reporting offered by Shapiro 
P1 External realism: External reality exists independently of financial statements that 
represent it. Social phenomena are ontologically subjective but just as real as 
ontologically objective physical phenomena. 
P2 Correspondence theory of truth: A financial representation is true if it corresponds 
(at least approximately) to the underlying economic reality that it purports to 
represent. 
P3 Conceptual relativism of financial reporting schemes: All systems of representation, 
such as conceptual frameworks, are human creations and thus socially constructed. 
Different systems of representations can be used to represent the same reality, and 
one system may or may not be better than another. The Objectives of financial 
reporting are based on normative values that cannot be verified or empirically 
validated. 
P4 Subjective judgement (epistemological subjectivity): Accountants' judgements about 
what constitutes valid descriptions of economic reality are influenced by many 
factors - cultural, economic, political, psychological, and so on. Absolute 
epistemological objectivity is not possible because all accounting judgements are 
made from a point of view, subject to various measurement biases, motivated by 
personal factors, and within a certain historical context. 
P5 Commitment to rationalism (epistemological objectivity): Knowing is 
epistemologically objective to the extent that a community can agree on the criteria 
for evaluating the justification or evidence for assertions. The idea that knowledge 
consists in having true representations for which we can give certain sorts of 
justification or evidence is the basis of Western rational science, the notion of due 
process in standard-setting, and the demand for attestation services. Absolute 
epistemological objectivity is rejected in favour of a pragmatic, intersubjective, and 
consensus view. 
Shapiro claims that this inventory of presuppositions is, at least implicitly, "generally 
accepted" (1997, p. 167). He argues that it underlies many of the beliefs and attitudes we have 
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concerning financial reporting, is embedded in various conceptual frameworks for financial 
reporting, and underpins much of financial accounting and auditing practice. We will argue 
that Shapiro's presuppositions of external financial reporting represent an incoherent 
amalgam of two, essentially incompatible, philosophical positions: John Searle's "realism" 
and Richard Rorty's pragmatism. We begin our critique of Shapiro's analysis by examining 
each of these supposed presuppositions of external financial reporting in turn. 
P1: External realism (ontological objectivity) 
Shapiro thinks that realism in financial reporting may usefully be conceived of as a purely 
ontological philosophical thesis lacking any semantic or epistemic content. Such realism 
asserts "that some reality exists 'out there' independently of any observer's perceptions, but 
it does not make any epistemological claim about how or how well an observer might come 
to know or perceive" (Shapiro, 1997, p. 168). Shapiro follows Searle in referring to this 
ontological realism as external realism. As an ontological thesis, realism "says that there 
exists a reality totally independent of our representations" (Searle, 1995, p. 155), but it allows 
us to say nothing about the features of that reality: 
"Realism does not say how things are but only that there is a way that they 
are. And `things' in the previous ... sentence(s) does not mean material 
objects or even objects. It is, like the `it' in `It is raining', not a referring 
expression. " 
(Searle, 1995, p. 155) 
Both Shapiro and Searle emphasise that, in itself, realism does not imply that it makes sense 
to think that we can have any epistemic access to reality, nor does it imply a correspondence 
theory of truth. Realism "is not a theory of truth, it is not a theory of knowledge, and it is not 
a theory of language" (Searle, 1995, p. 155). 
As a purely ontological thesis we find realism uninteresting but unobjectionable; it 
is a form of realism that Rorty suggests "no one has ever attacked" (Rorty, 1997, p. 160). We 
are however suspicious of any articulation of a purely ontological realism as we agree with 
Davidson (1990, p. 305) that no positive sense can be made of talk of the real as independent 
of our representations and beliefs, except in so far as it paves the way for epistemic claims. 
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Indeed, Rorty is able to identify epistemic claims even in Searle's carefully described 
ontological realism: ý Searle insists that realism does not imply "that there is one best 
vocabulary for describing reality" or "that reality itself must determine how it should be 
described" (Searle, 1995, p. 155). Nevertheless, he is not always quite able to resist the 
temptation to see systems of representation in terms of their adequacy to reality. And in so 
far as he suggests that "some of these systems (of representation) can be used more or less 
adequately, to represent (features of representation-independent reality)" (Searle, 1995, 
p. 167), he clearly implies that some representations are more or less faithful to reality than 
others. Despite Searle's insistence that there is no way that the world is in itself, he 
occasionally seems to suggest that we might somehow find "enough of a representation- 
independent way the world is to make some systems of representation less, and others more, 
adequate to represent reality" (Rorty, 1997, p. 162). 
Searle's realism arguably allows space for covert epistemic claims to creep in. 
Shapiro's external realism, on the other hand, allows blatant epistemic claims; it simply isn't 
a purely ontological thesis. Searle's external realism consists in the notion "that there is a way 
that things are that is logically independent of all human representations" (Searle, 1995, 
p. 155, emphasis added). The version of "external realism" which Shapiro suggests we should 
accept, as a presupposition of external financial reporting, significantly modifies Searle's 
formulation of the thesis. For Shapiro's external realism is the thesis that there is a way that 
things are that is independent of financial representations: "external reality exists 
independently of the financial statements that represent it" (Shapiro, 1997, p. 167). Searle 
defends the thesis that there is a reality independent of human representations, that is, an 
"ontologically objective" reality. He sees this "brute reality" as the base upon which we 
impose and develop our ontologically subjective "social reality": 
"The ontological subjectivity of the socially constructed reality requires an 
ontologically objective reality out of which it is constructed.... Because the 
logical form of the creation of socially constructed reality consists in iterations 
of the structure X counts as Y in C, the iterations must bottom out in an X 
element that is not itself an institutional construction. Otherwise you would 
get infinite regress or circularity. 
(Searle, 1995, p. 191) 
144 
Chapter 4: Validity in Accounting Standard Setting and the Presuppositions of External Financial Reporting 
For Searle, a representation dependent social construct like money presupposes the existence 
of a representation independent reality upon which the social is constructed; it presupposes 
external realism. However, whilst the "physical realization" of money - "a bit of paper or blip 
on a computer disk" - is for Searle part of an external reality, money as a social construct is 
ontologically subjective and not part of external reality (see Searle, 1995, p. 56). Shapiro's 
external reality is not a reality external to all human representation, but merely the reality 
external to financial representation. It therefore includes much of our ontologically subjective 
social world - the world that is dependent on our representations. Shapiro's external reality 
can contain stock option compensation. Searle's external reality would not contain any such, 
ontologically subjective, social constructs. 
Searle tries hard to maintain the notion that "realism does not say how things are but 
only that there is a way that they are" (Searle, 1995, p. 155). He insists that external realism 
does not imply that there is "privileged vocabulary" for describing external reality). Searle's 
external reality imposes no descriptive scheme on us: "ontologically objective reality does 
not have a point of view" (Searle, 1995, p. 176). Such claims do not hold for Shapiro's 
external reality, which includes both ontologically objective reality and ontologically 
subjective reality. Ontologically subjective reality exists under representations; it has "a point 
of view". The socially constructed economic reality of "assets", "liabilities", "stock options", 
and the like, exists only relative to certain conceptual schemes. If we want to describe the 
features of the economic reality we are constrained to recognise the privileged descriptive 
schemes that are built into that reality. The ontology and epistemology of the social are 
deeply entangled. We can not talk about money or marriage, or a particular debt or particular 
marriage without implicitly drawing on the conceptual frameworks, which are constitutive 
of those social realities. Shapiro's external realism allows representation-dependent epistemic 
claims to be made about the content of reality (how things are). It allows the claim that reality 
includes certain economic features, including stock option compensation, which are not 
represented in financial statements. 
The fact that Shapiro's external realism is not a purely ontological thesis becomes 
obvious when we examine his assertion that critics who reject his external realism will have 
difficulty explaining the existence of business practices which are not reflected in accounts: 
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"Critics who reject external realism will find it difficult to explain how 
certain business practices - such as the granting of employee stock options - 
can exist even though present-day financial reporting practices do not 
formally recognise them. " 
(Shapiro, 1997, p. 168) 
The genesis of this assertion, we suggest, may be found in Searle's response to antirealism 
(see Searle, 1995, pp. 177-193). Searle sometimes writes as if antirealist philosophers, who 
"do not believe in `mind independent reality' must deny that there were mountains before 
people had the idea of `mountain' in their minds or the word `mountain' in their language" 
(Rorty, 1998, p. 72). The "antirealist", is in fact unlikely to want to engage with Searle's 
challenge: "it is pointless to ask whether there really are mountains or whether it is merely 
convenient to talk about them" (Rorty, 1998, p. 72). Any similarity, however, between 
Searle's comments on mountains and Shapiro's on stock option compensation is superficial. 
Searle's external realism does not in itself say anything about how things are. For Searle 
reality in itself does not have a privileged vocabulary that includes mountains. The notion of 
mountains can only arise through our creation of descriptive schemes that include mountains. 
From Searle's perspective, it is only once we fit the descriptive schemes we have created to 
reality and find that there really are mountains there that it can make any sense to challenge 
the antirealist, who agrees that there are mountains, to explain the status of mountains prior 
to our human recognition of them. If our descriptive schemes did not include mountains them 
the challenge to the antirealist could not arise. Accepting that stock option compensation is 
not part of the descriptive scheme of financial reporting, we must consider how it is possible 
for Shapiro to consider that the existence of stock option compensation can present a 
challenge to the critics of his external realism. Clearly, Shapiro's urge to challenge the critic 
is made possible by the fact that the concept of stock option compensation is part of the 
privileged conceptual scheme already built into the object domain of external reality prior 
to any account being given. Shapiro's external realism imposes a conceptual scheme on 
reality, a scheme that includes stock option compensation. Shapiro's external realism is not 
a purely ontological thesis. 
Any critic rejecting Shapiro's external realism, that is someone who does not believe 
in financial statement independent reality, would not actually be troubled by the challenge 
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that Shapiro seems to think stock option compensation represents. Such a person would 
simply not recognise stock option compensation. It would of course be rather difficult to 
conceive of such a person as anything other than mad. A challenge would arise for this critic 
only if a new accounting standard was introduced giving financial statement recognition to 
stock option compensation. The challenge then for such a mad critic would be to explain the 
status to stock option compensation prior to its recognition in accounts. The common-or- 
garden antirealist, someone who just wants to deny mind independent reality and confine 
reality to the scope of human knowledge, might have difficulty in explaining the existence 
of mountains prior to any human representation of mountains - if they thought that an issue 
worth engaging with. However they would not have any problem in explaining the existence 
of stock option compensation and other features of economic reality that are not recognised 
in financial statements. Stock option compensation is clearly a mind dependent social 
construct, with a clear existence within human knowledge outside accounts. 
In any case, we doubt the validity of Shapiro's "external realism" thesis: it simply 
does not seem to us that it is correct to say that our socially constructed economic reality 
exists independently of the financial representations of it. On the contrary, we suggest that 
accounting and economic concepts and the realities they constitute are inextricably 
intertwined. In one sense of course it is sensible to think that a company's financial report 
does indeed give an account of an economic reality that is external to the account given. Just 
as "Talk of money and marriages is talk of publicly accessible reality, and such phenomena 
are "representation independent" in the sense that this twenty dollar bill or this marriage 
between Sam and Sally exists independently of your or my representations of it" (Searle, 
1995, p. 190), there is clearly a sense in which an individual company's commercial activities 
are independent of the financial account given of those activities. "But marriages and money, 
unlike mountains and atoms, do not exist independently of all representations" (Searle, 1995, 
p. 190). Money, marriages and economic reality are not part of the "external reality" which 
Searle argues exists external to "our systems of representation" not just external to particular 
representations of it. The antirealist critic breaks with Searle by insisting that mountains and 
atoms are also representation dependent. However, both Searle and his antirealist critic, could 
(and surely would) agree that the economic reality of any company's commercial activities 
exists only by virtue of our representations and that accounting concepts play some part in 
sustaining the representational complex which supports economic reality. 
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We do not want to claim that realism, in the purely ontological form proposed by 
Searle, and apparently intended by Shapiro, is false. However, we can see no way in which 
its recognition could contribute to a clarification of what is at stake in debates concerning 
financial reporting. Indeed, we regard it as positively unhelpful because it seems, above all, 
to lay a foundation for the mistaken idea that truth can be intelligibly conceived in terms of 
the correspondence of representation and reality: 
"it is futile either to reject or accept the slogan that the real and the true are 
`independent of our beliefs. ' The only positive sense we can make of this 
phrase, the only use that derives from the intentions of those who prize it, 
derives from the idea of correspondence, and this is an idea without content. " 
(Davidson, 1990, p. 305) 
We agree with Davidson that the motive for realist talk, even when it is couched carefully 
in terms of ontological realism, is generally ultimately, if covertly, epistemic. We are 
therefore suspicious of any talk of realism in the context of financial reporting, even 
ontological realism. It prepares the ground for the vacuous idea of truth in accounting as 
correspondence of financial representation and economic reality. Furthermore, Shapiro's 
extension of the notion of external reality to refer to both the ontologically objective and the 
ontologically subjective domains is particularly dangerous because it may encourage the 
reification of our social constructed economic reality. By supporting the "phantom 
objectivity" (Lukäcs, 1923/1971, p. 83) of the ontologically subjective economic reality, it 
may help sustain the exploitative social relations which underpin that reality. 
P2: Correspondence theory of truth (representational faithfulness) 
Shapiro suggests that the correspondence theory of truth is a presupposition of external 
financial reporting: "a financial representation is true if it corresponds (at least 
approximately) to the underlying economic reality that it purports to represent" (Shapiro, 
1997, p. 167). Again it seems Shapiro's position is supported by Searle's analysis of the 
presuppositions of our worldview. Searle defends a substantial conception of the 
correspondence theory of truth according to which: 
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"there really are nonlinguistic facts in the world and statements are true 
because they really do stand in certain relations to these facts, relations that 
we variously describe as fitting, matching, stating, or corresponding to the 
facts. " 
(Searle, 1995, p. 209) 
For Searle the truth or falsity of a statement is fixed by how the world is, independently of 
how we represent it: "Statements are made true by how things are in the world that is 
independent of the statement" (Searle, 1995, p. 219). Correspondence theorists, like Searle, 
seek then to explain what it is for whole statements to be true in terms of their 
correspondence with something else - usually referred to as facts. To give content to the 
notion of correspondence, they need to give some explanation of how we can specify and talk 
about those "things" that make our statements true. Many philosophers, from Strawson 
(1950) to Davidson (1990) have argued that no satisfactory account of facts, as nonlinguistic 
entities existing in the world, can be given. Critics like Strawson point out that the only way 
we have of individuating and identifying a particular fact is by using the same language we 
use to individuate and identify its corresponding sentence. Facts are not extralinguistic 
entities, they are "what statements (when true) state" (Strawson, 1950/1964, p. 38). Therefore 
true statements and their corresponding facts are not independent entities: Correspondence 
theories of truth essentially fail to provide independent entities to which truth vehicles 
(whether statements, sentences or utterances) can be said to correspond (see Davidson, 1990, 
pp. 303-305). Rorty suggests that Searle's realist-correspondentists position breaks-down on 
precisely this point; he can give no satisfactory explanation of "in what sense a `way the 
world is' can be `independent' of a description of the world? " (Rorty, 1997, p. 161). Rorty 
thinks that any such explanation would have to "find a use for `a way the world is' that is 
glossable by neither `in itself nor'under a description"` (Rorty, 1997, pp. 161-162), and he 
suggests that no such explanation can be found. At one time Searle accepted the force of the 
Strawson / Davidson critique of correspondence (see Searle, 1995, p. 204). Recently, 
however, he has taken the view that the statement of a true sentence is a satisfactory way of 
specifying the "thing" that makes a sentence true - "that which stands outside the statement 
but which makes it true" (Searle, 1995, p. 21 1). Together with Strawson, Davidson and Rorty, 
we can see no sense in which the statement of a true sentence can take us beyond language 
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to how things are in the world prior to our descriptions; we cannot see how a fact, defined 
as "the statement of a true sentence", can be extralinguistic. We nevertheless accept the 
intuition that whether or not what is claimed about the world is true must depend upon the 
world. We therefore agree with Putnam that "to say that truth is `correspondence to reality' 
is not false but empty" (Putnam, 1992, p. 10). Empty that is, as long as nothing is said about 
what the correspondence is. And, unfortunately, the Strawson / Davidson critique of the 
correspondence theory of truth leaves us with no reason to think anything meaningful can be 
said about the nature of "correspondence". No one seems to be "able to say in a nontrivial 
way what sort of `thing' it is that makes a sentence (or other truth bearer) true" (Davidson, 
1997, pp. 110). The notion that truth is a matter of correspondence to facts will remain empty 
until such time as someone can "come up with an intelligible and illuminating way of 
individuating the entities to which true utterances or beliefs correspond, along with an 
acceptable semantics for talk about such entities" (Davidson, 1999a, p. 17)'. 
A rhetoric of correspondence apparently permeates financial reporting. Nevertheless, 
the correspondence theory of truth can not be a real substantial presupposition of financial 
reporting, because the notion that truth consists in a relation of correspondence between 
representation and the (nonlinguistic) facts is essentially unintelligible. We suggest that 
accounting theorists ought to avoid any talk of correspondence and facts, which seems 
inevitably to foster confusion. The notion of correspondence may be empty/unintelligible, 
but it is not innocuous: Our deepest objection to the kind of realist-correspondentist view put 
forward by Searle and others, is that it gives us no grounds for well founded confidence that 
our beliefs are securely in touch with reality. Indeed, it allows the possibility that all our 
beliefs, thoughts and theories, including those most firmly established and best researched, 
may be mistaken: "We could be totally mistaken about how the world is in every detail" 
(Searle, 1995, p. 155). In contrast, Davidson's analysis of the conditions of possibility of 
knowledge, which we sketched in the first part of this chapter, gives us good reason for 
thinking that most of our basic beliefs are true and in touch with objective reality. 
P3: Conceptual relativism of financial reporting schemes 
Conceptual relativity for Searle basically consists in the assertion that: "All representations 
of reality are made relative to some more or less arbitrarily selected set of concepts" (Searle, 
1995, p. 161). Shapiro essentially applies Searle's version of the conceptual relativity thesis 
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to financial reporting. He argues that that in accounting many "Different systems of 
representations can be used to represent the same reality, and one system may or may not be 
better than another" (Shapiro, 1997, p. 167). Any full-blooded relativism, that for example 
made reality itself relative to our conceptual schemes, would of course be fundamentally 
incompatible with the idea of an uninterpreted reality that is as it is independently of our 
representational schemes. Therefore, given their commitment to external realism, Searle's and 
Shapiro's invocation of relativism is perhaps best understood as a rhetorical device intended 
to draw attention to their view that any interpretation of reality is bound by the conceptual 
scheme employed by the interpreter; "we do not make `worlds'; we make descriptions that 
the actual world may fit or fail to fit" (Searle, 1995, p. 166). Conceptual relativity, for Searle 
and Shapiro, then implies that true descriptions are always made relative to some more or less 
arbitrarily selected system of concepts for describing the world. It is, however, important to 
see that this relativity of truth amounts to no more than the obvious fact that the truth or 
falsity of any sentence is relative to the language in which it is expressed. The conceptual 
relativity of truth for Searle and Shapiro can not mean that "the same statement (not the same 
sentence, but the same statement) could be true of the world in one conceptual system but 
false of the world in another conceptual system" (Searle, 1995, pp. 166-167). 
Searle rejects naive metaphysical realism°; in particular, he rejects the idea that there 
is a correct conceptual scheme for describing reality. He argues, rather, that things can be 
represented under an indefinitely large number of alternative descriptive schemes, points of 
view or aspects: "representation, and a fortiori all truthful representation, is always under 
certain aspects and not others" (Searle, 1995, pp. 175). He maintains that there is no way 
things are in themselves, and warns us that "it will be impossible to get the coincidence 
between truth and reality after which so many traditional philosophers seem to hanker" 
(Searle. 1995, p. 176). His conceptual relativism, therefore only allows the possibility that one 
scheme of representation may be better than another, provided the term "better" is understood 
in strictly pragmatic terms: One scheme may be "better for some purpose" than another. Any 
suggestion that some systems of representation might somehow better reflect, or more 
adequately grasp reality, than others, would be incompatible with Searle's external realism 
as a purely ontological thesis and with the notion that "reality does not have a point of view" 
(Searle, 1995, pp. 176). Nor could such a suggestion be squared with the conviction that there 
is; no "one best vocabulary for describing reality" (Searle, 1995, p. 155); no "privileged 
151 
Chapter 4: Validity in Accounting Standard Setting and the Presuppositions of External Financial Reporting 
conceptual scheme" (Searle, 1995, p. 164). Nevertheless, if Searle's dualism of descriptions 
we make (scheme) and world (content) is adopted, and it is accepted that the world may fit 
(correspond to) some descriptions and fail to fit others, it surely must become difficult to 
resist the temptation to think that some descriptions are more adequate to reality than others. 
If that temptation is succumbed to, the pursuit of full and correct descriptions of the one 
reality must begin to appear to be a reasonable goal, and any practical distinction between 
Searle's realism and naive metaphysical realism dissolves. Searle himself occasionally seems 
to be tempted to recognise some descriptive schemes as more adequate to reality than others. 
He claims, for example, that "It is a well-known fact that certain models, e. g., Aristotelian 
physics and the Mercator projection, are mistaken about or distort certain features of the 
world" (Searle, 1995, p. 167). 
In his discussion of the possibility that some systems of financial representation 
might be "better" than others Shapiro mainly confines his remarks to what we have called 
a pragmatic understanding of "better", where the "better" scheme is the one which is 
somehow more fitting to our interests and objectives. He does, however, seem in places to 
lapse into the suggestion that some systems of financial representation may be better than 
others; in the sense that they may more adequately grasp reality. He suggests, for example, 
that in financial reporting; "Disagreement and other difficulties with definitions may suggest 
that the definitions describe some features of external reality better than others" (Shapiro, 
1997, p. 171). For Shapiro there does seem to be a way that economic reality is in itself, and 
it includes stock options - whether or not they are included in the in the financial descriptions 
we make. It seems that, for Shapiro, truth and reality can be made to coincide in accounting; 
and including stock option compensation in our scheme of financial representations would 
be a step towards more adequate, complete and faithful representation of reality. 
Searle's conceptual relativism to allow the world scope to impose itself upon our 
conceptual schemes only from within those schemes: On this view, the world itself has no 
structure, which it can impress on our concepts. Most, even very modest, realists would want 
to maintain a stronger sense of the world-guidedness of our descriptions, than Searle's 
external realism allows. They would argue that the world must in itself "make some 
boundaries more salient than others" (Farrell, 1996, p. 167). A vision of a world that "divides 
up the way we divide it" (Searle, 1995, p. 160), a world with no structure in itself prior to the 
introduction of the system of concepts that we have "more or less arbitrarily selected" for 
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describing it, is clearly very difficult to consistently reconcile with realism and the 
correspondence theory of truth. Neither Searle nor Shapiro is able to strictly maintain any 
such reconciliation, and, in relaxing their commitment to conceptual relativity, both drift 
towards a naive metaphysical realism. 
Our basic objection to the thesis of conceptual relativism is that, in anything other 
than the banal sense that the truth of a sentence must be relative to the language in which the 
sentence occurs, the thesis is ultimately unintelligible: "Conceptual relativism is a heady and 
exotic doctrine, or would be if we could make good sense of it. The trouble is, as so often in 
philosophy, it is hard to improve intelligibility while retaining the excitement" (Davidson, 
1974a, p. 183). In his discussion of conceptual relativism, Shapiro seems to imply that the 
work of Davidson and Rorty would support the presupposition of conceptual relativity: 
"(A)ccounting judgements are made through the lens of conceptual schemes, 
and to that extent they are constrained by the inherent limitations of those 
schemes. Many philosophers hold the belief that no one can completely shed 
their conceptual schemes and attain what may be called a God's-eye view from 
which one may objectively compare alternative schemes (e. g. Davidson, 1984; 
Rorty, 1991). " 
(Shapiro, 1997, pp. 172-173) 
Davidson and Rorty certainly do reject the notion of a Gods-eye-view, however it would be 
a mistake to think that either embraces conceptual relativism. Indeed, Davidson is anxious 
to discourage talk of conceptual relativism and "the very idea of a conceptual scheme" 
(Davidson, 1974a) as something that might organise, fit, or construct reality. He strongly 
rejects the dualist, scheme and content, view which Searle and Shapiro seem to be committed 
to, of a world of facts which can somehow fit (or fail to fit) our descriptions and which can 
make them true (or false): 
"I want to urge that this ... dualism of scheme and content, of organizing 
system and something waiting to be organized, cannot be made intelligible 
and defensible. " 
(Davidson, 1974, p, 189) 
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Davidson rejects the correspondence theory of truth and with it the notion of the mind or 
language as holding a mirror to reality. He equally clearly rejects any suggestion that the 
specular relation might work in the opposite direction so that our representations are 
somehow projected upon and articulate the world. Davidson argues that our representations 
must generally be sensitive to the way the world any way is; the way it articulates itself (see 
Farrell, 1996, p. 78). 
Davidson of course recognises that we address the world through language - our 
conceptual scheme, and he accepts that if different languages could not be intertranslated 
they would constitute different conceptual schemes, and that we might then sensibly talk 
about conceptual relativity. Searle uses the example of weight to illustrate his notion of 
different conceptual schemes; Weight in pounds and kilograms supposedly operate in 
different conceptual schemes: "the claim that I weigh 160 pounds is consistent with the claim 
that I weigh 73 in kilograms. External realism allows for an infinite number of true 
descriptions of the same reality made relative to different conceptual schemes" (Searle, 1995, 
p. 165). Clearly, translation between pounds and kilograms is possible - there is no "genuine 
inconsistency" (Searle, 1995, p. 167), we therefore have some difficulty in making any real 
sense of the notion that we are dealing here with different conceptual schemes. Davidson 
(1974a) argues that we can never make much sense of failure of intertranslatability, and 
consequently we cannot make good sense of the notion of different conceptual schemes or 
of conceptual relativism. Rorty lends no more support to conceptual relativism than 
Davidson'. 
Confined to the notion that alternative vocabularies and systems of representation can 
be used to represent the same reality, conceptual relativism is innocuous if banal. 
Nevertheless, we recommend that accounting theorists should avoid any talk of conceptual 
relativism: The problem is that those who entertain the notion of conceptual relativism are 
often unable to resist the allure of more exotic and less intelligible variants of the doctrine. 
Shapiro succumbs to this temptation when quoting, with apparent approval, Morgan's view 
that "Accountants ... are subjective `constructors of reality"' (Morgan, 1988, p. 477, quoted 
by Shapiro, 1997, p. 172), he endorses the view that alternative schemes construct alternative 
realities. Shapiro offers no explanation of how this relativity of reality can be reconciled with 
the presupposition of external realism and the correspondence theory of truth; we suggest that 
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no such reconciliation is possible'. 
P4: Subjective judgement (epistemological subjectivity) 
Shapiro seems to want to encourage us to recognise an inherent subjectivity of accounting 
judgement: 
"Absolute epistemological objectivity is not possible because all accounting 
judgements are made from a point of view, subject to various measurement 
biases, motivated by personal factors, and within a certain historical context. " 
(Shapiro, 1997, p. 167) 
From Searle's realist-correspondentist perspective, judgements are `objective' when their 
truth or falsity can be decided by the facts of the matter; and `subjective' when "their truth 
or falsity cannot be settled 'objectively, ' because the truth or falsity is not a simple matter of 
fact but depends on certain attitudes, feelings, and points of view of the makers and hearers 
of the judgement" (Searle, 1995, p. 8). Given Shapiro's advocacy of external realism and the 
correspondence theory of truth, we might have anticipated that he would be committed to the 
possibility of epistemological objectivity in accounting; at least as an ideal. Otherwise it 
would be hard to see any point to his talk of realism and correspondence. And indeed he does 
seem to indicate, relatively plainly, that he believes that financial statements may be 
objective; that is, in a realist-correspondentist sense, true or false in virtue of the facts of the 
matter: 
"Once the basic financial statement elements are defined it is neither arbitrary 
nor a matter of opinion as to whether features of external reality do in fact 
satisfy the definitions. " 
(Shapiro, 1997, pp. 170-171) 
Furthermore, the "transcendental" argument advanced by Searle (1995, pp. 183-294) in 
support of the external realism, embraced by Shapiro, purports to show that the normal 
intelligibility of a large class of utterances requires a publicly accessible reality of phenomena 
that are both ontologically and epistemically objective. Searle's effort to justify external 
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realism is clearly motivated by his desire to defend the possibility of epistemological 
objectivity: "the rejection of realism, the denial of ontological objectivity, is an essential 
component of the attacks on epistemic objectivity, rationality, truth, and intelligence in 
contemporary intellectual life" (Searle, 1995, p. 197). The presupposition of the 
epistemological subjectivity of accounting sits uneasily with Shapiro's other commitments. 
Given those commitments we would have expected him to emphasise the possibility of 
epistemological objectivity in accounting and perhaps agree with Searle that: "Facts about 
money can be epistemically objective even if the existence of money is socially constructed, 
and, therefore, to that extent, ontologically subjective" (1995, pp. 190-191). The 
presupposition of the epistemological subjectivity in accounting is attractive to those scheme 
and content dualists who see accounting as a representational scheme that constructs its own 
reality. We should not be surprised to find that such theorists see "the idea of objectivity in 
accounting is largely a myth" (Morgan, 1988, p. 477). As we have seen, Shapiro is clearly 
drawn by views such as those expressed by Morgan, and this may explain his view on the 
subjectivity of accounting judgement. 
It may be that we are reading too much into Shapiro's presupposition of the 
epistemological subjectivity of financial reporting; Perhaps he means to suggest no more than 
the platitude that `absolute', understood as `complete', objectivity is unattainable. The 
contrast between epistemically objective and epistemically subjective judgement is however, 
surely, always essentially a "matter of degree" (Searle, 1995, p. 8). We suggest that it would 
be difficult to find any accountant (academic or practitioner) who would want to dispute the 
notion that in accounting, as in most other areas of contemporary life, the attainment of 
"complete epistemic objectivity is difficult, sometimes impossible" (Searle, 1995, p. 151). But 
this would seem to give scant justification for suggesting that financial reporting rests on a 
presupposition of epistemologically subjectivity. Surely financial reporting is predicated 
upon the presupposition that a significant degree of "objectivity" is attainable in accounting; 
The very existence of accounting practice seems to rely on the assumption that we can have 
accounting knowledge; And knowledge for a realist-correspondentist like Searle (and 
Shapiro? ) is by definition objective: 
"Having knowledge consists in having true representations for which we can 
give certain sorts of justification or evidence. Knowledge is thus by definition 
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objective in the epistemic sense, because the criteria for knowledge are not 
arbitrary and they are impersonal. " 
(Searle, 1995, p. 151) 
The statement that absolute epistemic objectivity is unattainable is in itself unobjectionable, 
so long as the emphasis is kept on the word "absolute". The problem with the presupposition 
of "subjective judgement (epistemological subjectivity)" (Shapiro, 1997, p. 167) is that it is 
liable to be (mis)understood, at least by the unwary, as an advocacy of the view that 
objectivity in accounting is unattainable, that is, as support for the view that "objectivity in 
accounting is largely a myth" (Morgan, 1988, p. 477). We read the work of both Searle and 
Davidson as defences of the possibility of epistemic objectivity, and find particularly 
persuasive Davidson's defence of possibility that we can have knowledge of the objective 
public world we share. Accounting theorist should, perhaps, avoid talk that could be 
construed as a dismissal of the possibility of epistemic objectivity in accounting. 
P5: Commitment to rationalism (epistemological objectivity) 
For a realist-correspondentist, like Searle, judgements are epistemically objective in so far 
as "the facts in the world that make them true or false are independent of anybody's attitudes 
or feelings about them" (Searle, 1995, p. 8). On Searle's representationalist view of things 
epistemic objectivity is understood in terms of accurate or true representation. Such a view 
stands in stark opposition to the antirepresentationalism of philosophers like Davidson and 
Rorty, outlined in the first part of this chapter, that recognises that intersubjectivity is all the 
foundation we need, or can have, for objectivity. Shapiro's fifth presupposition of external 
financial reporting "epistemological objectivity" seems to be caught somewhere between 
these two fundamentally antithetical views of objectivity. 
In stating his fifth presupposition, Shapiro echoes Searle's representationalist view 
that having "knowledge consists in having true representations for which we can give certain 
sorts of justification or evidence" (Searle, 1995, p. 151, and Shapiro, 1997, p. 167). 
Antirepresentationalist would, of course, like us to stopped talking about representations 
altogether: "it is good to be rid of representations, and with them the correspondence theory 
of truth, for it is thinking that there are representations which engenders thoughts of 
relativism"(Davidson, 1988, pp. 165-166, quoted by Rorty, 1998, p. 48). If there are no 
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"things" for our true sentences to correspond to, there can be nothing for them to represent. 
Despite Shapiro's apparent commitment to representations and correspondence, he rejects 
the representationalist view of epistemological objectivity - "absolute epistemological 
objectivity" - in favour of a conception of objectivity as intersubjectivity. With 
presupposition five Shapiro abandons Searle's realism for Rorty's pragmatism, and suggests 
that we should recognise that financial reporting presupposes "a pragmatic, intersubjective, 
and consensus view" of objectivity (Shapiro, 1997, p. 167). In keeping with this pragmatic 
turn, Shapiro endorses Rorty's suggestion that "there is nothing to be said about either truth 
or rationality apart from descriptions of familiar procedures of justification which a given 
society - ours - uses in one or another area of inquiry" (Rorty, 1991, p. 23, quoted by Shapiro, 
1997, p. 173). 
These pragmatic views of truth and objectivity are plainly inimical to the realist- 
correspondentist position put forward by Shapiro in presuppositions one and two. Those who 
hold a correspondence theory of truth (with the apparent exception of Shapiro) clearly do 
think that there is more to be said about truth than mere description of our ways of 
manufacturing justification8. Above all else, it is Searle's commitment to a correspondence 
theory of truth that distinguishes his representationalist position from Rorty's 
antirepresentationalism: 
"The question at issue between representationalists like Searle and 
antirepresentationalist like me is merely this: Can we pair off parts of the 
world with parts of beliefs or sentences, so as to be able to say that the 
relations between the latter match the relations between the former? Can true 
beliefs or sentences be treated on the model of realistic portraiture? " 
(Rorty, 1998, p. 74) 
For Rorty the "the substitution of objectivity-as-intersubjectivity for objectivity-as-accurate- 
representation is the key pragmatic move" (1998, p. 83). Shapiro is prepared to make that 
move and to encourage us to conceive of truth, in Rortian terms, as "what is good for us to 
believe" (Shapiro, 1998, p. 657). However, Shapiro's talk of realism and correspondence 
suggests that he remains caught within the realism/idealism, scheme/content, problematics 
which antirepresentationalist like Rorty want to leave behind. 
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The representationalist conception of objectivity as correspondence or true 
representation is, as previously explained, essentially incoherent. We therefore welcome 
Shapiro's recognition that objectivity must be founded upon intersubjectivity. The notion of 
objectivity-as-solidarity is, however, surely unlikely to be taken seriously in accounting 
debate until we stop talking about `correspondence' and `true representations', and thereby 
free ourselves of the illusion of objectivity-as-accurate-representation. Shapiro's advocacy 
of external realism and his attempts to resuscitate the correspondence theory of truth in 
accounting can only impede proper recognition of the necessarily intersubjective basis of 
objectivity. 
The Presuppositions - Summary 
The presuppositions of financial reporting articulated by Shapiro are inconsistent, one with 
the other. Such inconsistency can do little to facilitate rational debate in accounting. The 
main problems we see with the formulation of the presuppositions of external financial 
reporting offered by Shapiro are as follows: (i) We see no point to the presupposition of 
external realism except insofar as it paves the way for misguided epistemological claims - 
this presupposition should be dropped without replacement. (ii) The correspondence theory 
of truth is unintelligible - it must be dropped. We follow Davidson in thinking that we can 
well do without a stipulative definition of truth - we should not look for alternative 
definitions of truth in accounting. (iii) In any full-blooded form conceptual relativity is 
difficult to make any sense of, and it hardly seems worth stating the obvious fact that the 
truth of any sentence is relative to the language in which it occurs. We suggest that the 
presupposition of conceptual relativism should be dropped, and that accounting theorists 
should carefully avoid terminology liable to encourage the unintelligible view that reality or 
the truth of statements (as opposed to sentences) might be scheme relative. (iv) We agree 
with Shapiro that absolute epistemological objectivity is not possible in accounting. 
Accounting does, however, deal with publicly accessible phenomena and does seem to 
presuppose the possibility that some high degree of epistemological objectivity can be 
achieved (albeit objectivity based on intersubjectivity). We suggest that accounting theorists 
should avoid any terminology that implies that accounting is somehow incorrigibly 
subjective, or that objectivity in accounting is a myth - the statement of a presupposition of 
"epistemological subjectivity" may foster such misconceptions. We find in Shapiro's 
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presupposition of epistemological objectivity a welcome turn towards an 
antirepresentationalist position that recognises that the only ultimate foundation for 
objectivity is intersubjectivity. In our discussion above we have stressed that such a position 
cannot be married with a commitment to a correspondence theory of truth. 
We have not meant, in anything that we have said above, to cast any doubt on the 
view that "truthfulness", "fairness" and "objectivity" are absolutely vital qualities in financial 
reporting. The value of philosophical theorising about such matters is, perhaps, altogether 
more dubious: 
"If we antirepresentationalist and anticorrespondentists ever win our argument 
with Searle, that will give historians and physicists no reason to behave 
differently than they presently do. Nor, I suspect, will their morale or their 
efficiency improve if Searle and his fellow representationalists should win. 
Honesty, care, truthfulness, and other moral and social virtues are just not that 
closely connected to what we philosophy professors eventually decide to be 
the least problematic way of describing the relationship between human 
inquiry and the rest of the universe. " 
(Rorty, 1998, p. 75) 
Nevertheless, we do believe the acceptance of an antirepresentationalist view of accounting 
ought to have significant implications for how we conceive of the role of rational argument 
in accounting debate. We turn to that issue in the next part of this chapter. 
Rational argument in accounting debate 
Antirepresentationalism acknowledges the inevitable contingency of language and the human 
condition (see Rorty, 1989); it recognises our referential categories as the product of 
historical discursive struggle and allows no scope for the validation of our referential 
schemes by test against predeterminate reality. It denies the possibility of a paradigm-free 
"final vocabulary" with privileged access to reality; "there is no chance that someone can 
take up a vantage point for comparing conceptual schemes (e. g. the astrologers and the astro- 
physicists) by temporarily shedding his own" (Davidson, 1974a, p. 185). For the 
antirepresentationalist questions about the accuracy with which our representations reflect 
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reality tend to be supplanted by questions about the usefulness of our referential frameworks 
and their political/ethical justification. From this perspective it then becomes vital that we 
pay close attention to how the accounting, recognised as an "ethical, historically contingent, 
and socially constructed" (Shapiro, 1998, p. 657) practice, is developed through debate and 
argument. Shapiro has made a welcome contribution to this project by providing an analysis 
of the conditions and maxims for rational debate concerning alternative accounting practices. 
In our view, however, Shapiro misconceives proper role of argument in accounting debate 
and thereby underestimates its potential. Once we have explained our critical assessment of 
Shapiro's analysis, we will outline our own Habermasian view the role and potential of 
argument in accounting debate. 
Shapiro's (conditional)-normative model of rational argument 
We have summarised, in Table 2, the three conditions for rational and objective debate over 
alternative accounting practices, put forward by Shapiro in his 1997 paper. Shapiro develops 
his analysis of the conditions for rational debate in accounting more fully in his 1998 paper, 
and Table 3, briefly sets out the maxims for critical discussion he advances in that paper. 
Table 2. Three conditions for rational and objective debate over alternative accounting 
practices, proposed by Shapiro (1997, p. 166). 
Cl Participant in a debate must give justification or evidence for their assertions and 
respond to counter-arguments. 
C2 Participants must ... assert only what they know not to be false and avoid asserting 
something for which they lack evidence. 
C3 Participants must be able to evaluate the extent to which a particular financial 
reporting practice may achieve an explicitly stated financial reporting objective, 
independently of the opinions or attitudes they have toward the particular reporting 
objective in question. 
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Table 3. Maxims for critical discussion proposed by Shapiro, (1998) (adapted from Van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1987) 
MI Parties must not prevent each other from advancing or casting doubt on standpoints. 
M2 Whoever advances a standpoint must defend it if asked to do so. 
M3 An attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has really been 
advanced by the protagonist. 
M4 A standpoint may be defended only by advancement of arguments related to that 
standpoint. 
M5 A person can be held to the premises he leaves implicit. 
M6 A standpoint must be regarded as conclusively defended if the defence takes place 
by means of arguments belonging to the common starting point. 
M7 A standpoint must be regarded as conclusively defended if the defence takes place 
by means of arguments in which a commonly accepted scheme of argumentation 
is correctly applied. 
M8 A failed defence must result in the protagonist withdrawing his standpoint and a 
successful defence must result in the antagonist withdrawing his doubt about the 
standpoint. 
We will attempt to justify our critique of Shapiro's model of rational argument in accounting 
by concentrating on certain salient issues and in particular his conception of the limits of 
argument. We will have little to say about most of the detail of the maxims he proposes. In 
our view the vital thing to understand about Shapiro's prescription for rational argument 
concerning alternative accounting practices, is that it places the norms and values upon which 
alternative accounting schemes are based beyond the scope of rational argument. For 
Shapiro, norms are not open to objective validation and "... because the objectives of 
financial reporting are based on norms that cannot be validated or empirically verified, 
reasonable people can disagree about those objectives" (Shapiro, 1997, p. 183). 
Shapiro's denial of the possibility that norms might be validated by rational argument 
is made the more surprising by the fact that he opens his 1998 paper with a quote from an 
essay in which Habermas (1983) sets out precisely to show how norms can be objectively 
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validated through rational debate. Shapiro seems to reject the basic import of the 
Habermasian analysis. He appreciates that accounting practice is always historically 
contingent and built upon norms and values. However, he does not draw the obvious 
Habermasian implication that accounting practice can ultimately only be legitimated through 
the objective validation of those underlying norms in rational debate. Instead, because he 
assumes that accounting norms can not be objectively validated, he concludes that the 
accounting practice built on those norms can have no objective basis or legitimacy; "because 
all financial reporting schemes are socially constructed and based on norms that cannot be 
empirically refuted or verified ... they lack an objective basis or absolute foundation to 
legitimise them" (Shapiro, 1998, p. 641). 
Shapiro rightly sees that norms invariably undergird our historically contingent 
accounting schemes and practice; they "are embedded not only in user-oriented financial 
reporting objectives... , but also in qualitative characteristics of accounting information such 
as relevance and reliability ... , and definitions of basic financial statement elements" 
(Shapiro, 1998, p. 655). Nevertheless, despite his recognition of their vital significance he 
does not want to make these norms the focus of rational argument. For Shapiro the embedded 
norms are part of the "common starting point that makes a critical accounting discussion 
possible" (Shapiro, 1998, p. 655). In Shapiro's view of things, the dominant norms and the 
accounting objectives and prized qualitative characteristics of accounting that follow from 
them, set the bounds of acceptable rational argument concerning alternative accounting 
practices: They are not to be the subject of that argument but its starting point. Shapiro 
recognises that the norms underpinning accounting practice are historically contingent and 
socially contested, he appreciates that "these norms and the language games they prescribe 
and proscribe ... are sites of much conflict" (Shapiro, 1998, p. 647), yet his model of rational 
accounting argument has no place for that contest. 
Shapiro's maxims of rational argument are, in effect, his suggestions for how debate 
should be focused and disciplined. Maxim 6, for example, stipulates that: "A standpoint must 
be regarded as conclusively defended if the defence takes place by means of arguments 
belonging to the common starting point" (Shapiro, 1998, p. 644). A key element of the 
discipline he proposes is the exclusion of "irrelevant" and the "unacceptable" arguments. The 
"operational definition" of acceptable and relevant argument, he suggests, will be guided by 
the common starting point including "the stakeholder objectives of financial reporting, and 
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the other norms they entail" (Shapiro, 1998, p. 647). To illustrate the distinction between 
acceptable and unacceptable argument Shapiro considers the position of argument from 
"economic consequence" in context of the concept of neutrality. He argues that the concept 
of neutrality is predicated on the normative assertion that the role financial reporting is to 
facilitate economic and business decision-making, and he recognises that, as such, it has a 
"partisan role" (Shapiro, 1998, p. 649). Nevertheless, he happily suggest that the concept of 
neutrality renders "indirect economic consequences that result from stakeholder responses" 
(Shapiro, 1998, p. 649) irrelevant to rational accounting debate; "such economic 
consequences arguments commit the argumentum ad consequentiam fallacy" (Shapiro, 1998, 
p. 649). For Shapiro, the close relation of the concept of neutrality to the presently existing 
normative base of financial reporting seems to place it beyond rational contention; it has a 
privileged position as a starting point for rational debate in accounting. 
Shapiro recognises, but makes no apology for the fact that his "normative model of 
rational argumentation imposes (and even condones) a certain kind of "violence" on the 
heterogeneity of language games that seek to occupy the accounting debates" (Shapiro, 1998, 
p. 660). His stance is stolidly conservative; he seems to see the status quo as imposing 
"obligations" on the participants in accounting debate: 
"Although financial reporting objectives lack an absolute or universal 
foundation, a given set of explicit objectives imposes social obligations on all 
participants (including rule making bodies) in the accounting standard setting 
process. For example, user oriented financial reporting objectives obligate 
standard setters to establish and improve standards for the benefit of external 
users. " 
(Shapiro, 1998, p. 642) 
He provides no explanation or justification of why we should think that the dominant norms 
and associated objectives and prized qualitative characteristics of accounting impose 
obligations on the participants. Nor does he give any explanation of the nature of the 
supposed obligation. Our own view is that norms carry the obligatory force that they do, only 
by virtue of their validity. Shapiro seems to think that norms can't be validated, yet he clearly 
thinks these obligations are somehow strong enough to justify the stifling curtailment of 
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argument - the "violence" - that he recognises his normative model of rational argument 
would impose. 
Shapiro's approach to rational argument complements the "conditional-normative" 
approach to financial reporting developed by Mattessich (1995). Mattessich recognises the 
growing interest in the ethical and normative aspects of accounting, and he agrees with 
Shapiro that the value judgements and associated norms that underlie accounting theory and 
practice can have no objective basis, and are not open to validation: they "are neither 
objective nor accessible to empirical refutation or verification" (Mattessich, 1995, p. 264). He 
suggests we should conceive of accounting as an applied science, and that the normative 
dimension of accounting might best be accommodated by the adoption of what he calls a 
conditional-normative methodology. That methodology would recognise that our accounting 
models rest on value judgements and norms; indeed it would insist on their explicit 
recognition and disclosure, and require that we acknowledge that the preferred norms have 
been chosen from "many possible alternatives" (Mattessich, 1995, p. 265). The elected norms 
and value judgements would then be incorporated as premises in the development of 
purpose-oriented accounting models. The contribution of the accounting researcher/theorist 
would then be to empirically research and appropriately theorise the relationship between 
various norms, values, and purposes and accounting means. Mattessich sees the conditional- 
normative methodology as a significant break with positive accounting theory, which allows 
no normative elements in its premises and essentially leaves the user to tie together purposes 
and accounting means. The essence of any applied science, as Mattessich sees it, is in the 
development of a set of theoretical solutions for a range of alternative objectives: 
"Only then can the user - be she or he a medical practitioner, engineer, lawyer 
or accountant - take the theory and apply it to actual practice without getting 
her/himself involved in cumbersome inferences of means-end relations" 
(Mattessich, 1995, p. 266). 
Both Mattessich and Shapiro treat the norms underlying accounting practice as lying beyond 
critical analysis - beyond reason. For both, the selection of ends in accounting, is a matter of 
simple choice, an expression of preference and power; reason is reserved for the evaluation 
of means: 
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"Once the objectives are explicitly stated, a conditional normative approach 
makes it possible for one to evaluate the extent to which a proposed financial 
reporting practice (the means) may achieve the objectives. " 
(Shapiro, 1997, p. 170) 
Shapiro contributes to the development of conditional-normative approach to accounting 
theory by giving more emphasis to the role of argument in the identification and selection of 
appropriate means, than does Mattessich who is content to emphasise the identification of 
appropriate means through logical analysis and empirical verification. Mattessich's approach 
is to frankly urge the need for the rigorous application of instrumental reason. Shapiro 
recommends an instrumental reason but in terms perhaps more superficially palatable to a 
liberal audience. He repeatedly suggests that the conditions of argument he prescribes are 
somehow appropriate for "critical" debate, and he explains that his conditional normative 
model is based on "the premise that the goal of a critical accounting discussion should be to 
reach conclusions by means of reasoned argument" (Shapiro, 1998, p. 642). However, it is 
not at all clear how we are expected to understand the term "critical" in this context. The 
conditions for argument that Shapiro prescribes, and in particular the distinction they 
maintain between the acceptable and unacceptable argument in terms of respect for the 
common starting point, are in our view essentially inimical to critical discussion. Shapiro's 
conditions for rational argument set the ground for debate between experts - who know and 
respect the "common starting point" (Maxim 6), and "commonly accepted scheme of 
argumentation" (Maximum 7). It provides for the exclusion of those critical elements, which 
would seek to disrupt the status quo. 
We have two main objections to the conditional-normative approach that Shapiro 
seeks to develop/advance. Firstly, it relies heavily on the'myth' of managerial effectiveness; 
Mattessich's accountant will supposedly have in his dispensary a battery of effective 
accounting means to match a wide range of purposes. One "very simple, yet probably 
devastating" problem with this "prediction and control view of accounting science" is that 
"we can't predict" (Williams, 1992, p. 100). And there are good reasons why we should 
recognise that accounting research will never yield the kind of knowledge, that is, a stock of 
law-like generalizations with good predictive power, that would seem to be necessary to 
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operationalize Mattessich's vision (See Maclntyre 1985, ch. 8). It would be a mistake, 
however, to think of the conditional-normative approach as misconceived but harmless. The 
masquerade of managerial effectiveness and hence justified authority is one of the central 
moral fictions of our times - "and perhaps the most culturally powerful of them all" 
(Maclntyre, 1985, pp. 76). We see Shapiro's attempt to find a place for "rational" argument 
in the identification of means, as a new twist to the masquerade. 
Our second objection to the conditional-normative approach is that it maintains the 
notion of accountants as primarily concerned with finding/producing the most effective and 
efficient means to match the desired/chosen ends. The ends are simply taken as premises for 
model development - they are not open to rational examination and hence lie beyond the 
scope of the accountant's implicitly neutral analysis of means-ends relations. The accountant 
need only be concerned with the effectiveness of her models, and she can maintain a claim 
of moral neutrality. The difficulty with this view is that the claim to effectiveness is not 
morally neutral, rather it is closely associated with the domination of the mode of 
manipulation in our societies; which treats human beings as means - rather than ends: 
"Managers themselves and most writers about management conceive of 
themselves as morally neutral characters whose skills enable them to devise 
the most efficient means of achieving whatever end is proposed. ... 
Nonetheless there are strong grounds for rejecting the view that effectiveness 
is a morally neutral value. For the whole concept of effectiveness is ... 
inseparable from a mode of human existence in which the contrivance of 
means is in central part the manipulation of human beings into compliant 
patterns of behaviour; and it is by appeal to his own effectiveness in this 
respect that the manager claims authority within the manipulative mode. " 
(Maclntyre, 1985, p. 74) 
The dominance of the manipulative mode in our societies may not be matched by any real 
effective planned manipulation. This however does not mean that "the activities of purported 
experts do not have effects and that we do not suffer from those effects and suffer gravely" 
(Maclntyre, 1985, pp. 106-107). Writing and theorising in the conditional-normative mould 
is liable to serve to perpetuate the mode of manipulation. 
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The validation of norms 
To conclude this chapter, we will briefly sketch a more optimistic view of the potential role 
of argument in accounting debate. This view is based upon Habermas' reconstruction of the 
potential for communicative rationality implicit in the intuitions that underpin everyday 
communicative practice; his "discourse ethics" (Habermas, 1983). Habermas reacts against 
Weber and the early Frankfurt school's pessimistic identification of rationality with means- 
ends rationality, described respectively as 'goal-rationality' and 'instrumental reason'. He 
argues that both lose sight of the potential for communicative rationality that he sees as a 
basic competence of the human species. He thinks that language contains within itself an 
impetus towards the development of rationally-based shared understanding and social 
coordination. And it is this potential, implicit in the intuitions of everyday life, that Habermas 
seeks to reconstruct and explicate. Habermas' discourse ethics originates, then, as a response 
to just the kind of "value scepticism growing out of the scientistic contraction of reason to 
scientific and technical domains" (Rehg, 1997, p. 21), which characterises the morally 
disarming, conditional-normative, approach to accounting - as applied science - advocated 
by Mattessich and Shapiro9: 
"Moral philosophy does have an enlightening or clarificatory role to play vis- 
a-vis the confusions that it has created in the minds of the educated, that is, 
to the extent to which value scepticism and legal positivism have established 
themselves as professional ideologies and have infiltrated everyday 
consciousness by way of the educational system. Together scepticism and 
positivism have misinterpreted and thus neutralized the intuitions people 
acquire in a quasi-natural manner through socialization. Under extreme 
conditions they can contribute to the moral disarmament of academics already 
in the grip of cultivated scepticism. " 
(Habermas, 1983, p. 98) 
Habermas' basic purpose is to justify and promote a communicative rationality capable of 
redeeming the enlightenment promise and delivering a more free and equal society. That is, 
a rationality that can be applied not just to "means" but to "ends"; a rationality that can be 
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used to validate or challenge norms of action: 
"Against the pessimistic vision of an impermeable instrumentality - totalized 
society - Habermas' model of rationalization encloses the counterfactual basis 
for the possibility of reconstituting a public sphere in which citizens can 
engage in the discussion of ends. " 
(Power & Laughlin, 1996, p. 444) 
Habermas' central concern has been to analyse the human capacity to create to a more 
"rational" society. He finds the promise of emancipation in modernity's potential for 
rationality and thus welcomes the transition from traditional to modern society. Whilst the 
transition to modernity is marked by the struggle between reason and its Other - the "sacred", 
modernity itself, as Habermas sees it, is characterized by tension between two modes of 
reason, instrumental reason and communicative reason. The full emancipatory potential of 
modernity can be realized only through communicative reason, yet distortions associated 
with the development of modernity are liable to impede the growth of communicative 
rationality. In the following paragraphs, we provide a rudimentary sketch of the processes 
of rationalisation that Habermas sees as characterising the development of modern Western 
society - insofar as they the impact on accounting. This sketch will facilitate subsequent 
discussion of the nature of Habermas' model of communicative rationality, its potential 
application in accounting debate, and the associated benefits and difficulties. 
As society becomes increasingly pluralistic and complex the need grows for ever- 
more sophisticated mechanisms of integration. Ways need to be found of resolving conflict 
across the whole of society in circumstances where acceptable norms of action can no longer 
be motivated by appeal to the value preferences and self-understandings associated with 
particular, religious or metaphysical, worldviews or group related conceptions of the "good 
life". In such circumstances, where society can no longer be effectively stabilised around 
shared traditions and taken for granted authorities that place many issues and assumptions 
beyond consideration, there is an inevitable pressure to find explicit agreement on a widening 
range of issues on the basis of diminishing common ground. That pressure, Habennas argues, 
gives impetus to processes of rationalisation affecting society as both "lifeworld" and the 
"system". 
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For Habermas the lifeworld is the "background assumptions" (Habermas, 1981 a, 
p. 335), norms, and shared expectations and understandings, through which we make sense 
of experience and coordinate social action. It is the "scaffolding" which forms the "horizon" 
of communicative understanding (Habermas, 1981 a p. 70). It is all those social, cultural, and 
personal, aspects of life that can only be integrated and reproduced through communicative 
action. The term "system", in contrast, refers to society conceived of in terms of the different 
sub-systems (e. g., economic, legal, educational), each with its ends and means, which 
together sustain the material reproduction of life and are coordinated through the functional 
interconnection of the consequences of action. The distinction between lifeworld and system 
is essentially one of interpretative perspective. As system, society is viewed from an external 
and objectifying viewpoint. Whilst as lifeworld, society is understood as it is lived by the 
participant, that is, the viewpoint is internal and performative. The two perspectives allow 
us to separate two dimensions under which the integration of society can be analyzed: 
"Whereas social integration presents itself as part of the symbolic 
reproduction of the lifeworld - which depends not only on the reproduction 
of memberships (or solidarities) but also on cultural traditions and 
socialization processes - functional integration amounts to a material 
reproduction of the lifeworld that can be conceived as system maintenance. 
The transition from one problem area to the other is tied to a change of 
methodological attitude and conceptual apparatus. " 
(Habermas, 198lb, pp. 232-233) 
The coordination, integration, and regulation of almost all aspects of traditional society were 
based upon the lifeworld of kinship and tradition. The rationalisation of the lifeworld in the 
transition to modernity is marked by a shift from social integration based on sacred symbol 
and myth, to a social integration structured by a consensus on norms motivated by shared 
understandings achieved through communicative action. As the development of society 
proceeds, facilitated by the rationalisation of the lifeworld including the development of 
modern law, there is a tendency towards the differentiation and decoupling of the lifeworld 
and system. The increasing complexity of the material reproduction of life reveals the limits 
and burdens of social integration based on the lifeworld and the media of language. There is 
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then, necessarily, increasing reliance on systems integration, achieved as an unintended 
consequence of action, through, for example, markets and bureaucratic functioning. The 
system of material reproduction eventually acquires a high degree of autonomy, so that it 
tends to slip beyond symbolic/normative social control. Instead of being guided by norms 
and shared understandings developed through the communication in the lifeworld, the system 
is steered by media of power and money. Furthermore, irresolvable tensions within the 
system, and particularly within the system of capitalism, tend inevitably to drive it to intrude 
upon, and damage, the lifeworld: 
"(T)he systemic imperatives of autonomous subsystems penetrate into the 
lifeworld and through monetarization and bureaucratization, force an 
assimilation of communicative action to formally organized domains of 
action - even in areas where the action coordinating mechanism of reaching 
understanding is functionally necessary. " 
(Habermas, 1981b, p. 403). 
There is, then, a contradiction in the process of modernisation: The rationalisation of the 
lifeworld is liberating insofar as it opposes deference to traditional authorities and promotes 
the public use of reason in the communicative evaluation of norms. However, rationalisation 
of the lifeworld, facilitates the development of sub-systems which, acquiring quasi- 
autonomy, impose their own methods and logic, instrumental reason, on the lifeworld which 
relies for its reproduction on communicative reason: 
"The rationalization of the lifeworld makes possible a kind of systematic 
integration that enters into competition with the integrating principle of 
reaching understanding and, under certain condition, has a disintegrative 
effect on the lifeworld. " 
(Habermas, 198 1 a, pp. 342-343) 
This "colonization" of the lifeworld by the system in capitalist modernity makes clients of 
citizens and consumers of workers, and thereby inhibits the development of the kind of 
collective will formation that could overcome the injustices of the capitalist system. 
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Habermas sees a special potential for resistance to the colonization of the lifeworld in the 
"new resistance and withdrawal movements", like environmentalism, that share an opposition 
to the capitalist growth on which the welfare-state compromise, that suppresses class conflict 
and the development of class consciousness, is based (see Habermas, 1981b, pp. 391-393). 
Resistance to the colonization of the lifeworld is also hampered by the "differentiation" that 
is associated with the rationalization of the lifeworld. The segmentation of the lifeworld into 
separate fields; science and production, art and aesthetics, morality and law, each dominated 
by experts, fragments political consciousness and thereby impedes the development of any 
synthesized position from which colonization can be recognized and effectively resisted. The 
conditional-normative conception of accounting as applied science embraces this process of 
fragmentation and encourages us to see accounting as a distinct field of technical expertise 
clearly differentiable from any moral/normative issues. The expert elites empowered by the 
process of differentiation typically strive to sustain their positions by propagating the myth 
of technical validity/effectiveness and by isolating themselves and their expertise from non- 
technical normative issues. Nevertheless, expertise remains open to challenge, and in the case 
of accounting the rhetoric of effectiveness regularly collides with real, and very public, 
failures of accountability: "it increasingly encounters legitimacy problems not just from its 
own apparent technical failure to deliver expected forms of corporate control but also from 
non-economic discourses of need and effectiveness which it cannot easily absorb" (Power 
& Laughlin, 1996, p. 446). 
The retention of any lifeworld, or normative, hold on the differentiated system, is 
obstructed by the fact that each sub-systems will develop its own semantics and "grammar 
for interpreting the world" (Habermas, 1992, p. 346). Communication between the lifeworld 
and system then becomes problematic. Functional sub-systems, like accounting, will 
typically not speak the language of norms. Habermas insists, however, that it is unrealistic 
to think that "one can separate the professional knowledge of specialists from values and 
moral points of view", on the contrary they are deeply interlocked: 
"As soon as specialized knowledge is brought to politically relevant 
problems, its unavoidably normative character becomes apparent, setting off 
controversies that polarize the experts themselves. This by itself shows that 
problems of functional coordination, when handled politically, are 
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intertwined with the moral and ethical dimensions of social integration. 
(Habermas, 1992, p. 351) 
He argues then that it is counterproductive, from both the cognitive and legitimacy 
viewpoints, for the system to be allowed to become divorced from will-formation in the 
public sphere. And he suggests that this mediation of public sphere and system may be 
effected through the medium of law. The language of law may act as a "transformer" between 
the ordinary language of the lifeworld and the specialised language of systems. Ideally 
normative/political issues should be raised and debated in the public sphere - where a public 
will can be formed, and influence deliberative bodies (legislatures and quasi-legislatures such 
as the accounting standard setting bodies). In this way, ideally, the public will may be 
expressed in law, a language that the semi-autonomous systems (administrative, economic, 
educational, and others) can understand: 
"The language of law brings ordinary communication from the public and 
private spheres and puts it in a form in which these messages can also be 
received by the special codes of autopoietic systems - and vice versa. Without 
this transformer, ordinary language could not circulate throughout society. 
(Habermas, 1992, p. 354) 
Law can potentially tie together the public sphere (lifeworld) and system. Indeed, from the 
perspective of bourgeois ideology, systems can only be regarded as legitimate insofar as they 
are accountable and responsive to the public sphere - they must respond to the public will. 
There are real difficulties associated with the actualisation of such an ideal; not least in 
respect of those quasi-governmental institutions, such as the accounting standard setting 
bodies, that lack strongly developed and effective communicative ties with the public sphere. 
The effectiveness and legitimacy of the mediation of accounting expertise and the public 
sphere is, of course, a central concern of the critical accounting project: 
"(M)uch of what passes for the "applied turn" in critical theory focuses upon 
the legitimacy of particular forms of expertise and on Habermas' question of 
how "expert cultures can be mediated with everyday practice" (1981b, 
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pp. 397-398). This brings critical theory face to face with existing 
preoccupations with corporate governance and the problem of making expert 
insiders accountable to outside `stakeholders'. " 
(Power & Laughlin, 1996, p. 446) 
Two difficulties seem to us to be particularly salient in the case of accounting. Firstly, the 
influence of the public sphere is always procedurally mediated; "public influence is 
transformed into communicative power only after it passes through the filters of the 
institutionalized procedures of democratic opinion-and-will-formation and enters through 
parliamentary debates into legitimate law making" (Habermas, 1992, p. 371). Yet the 
institutions of accounting regulation are not directly linked to effective democratic or 
parliamentary processes. Secondly, because the functional demands of material reproduction 
of society require a degree of system autonomy, the influence of the public sphere on 
functionally differentiated systems such as the economic, financial and accounting systems, 
can only be indirect: 
"Civil society can directly transform only itself, and it can have at most an 
indirect effect on the self-transformation of the political system; generally, it 
has an influence only on the personnel and programming of this system. But 
in no way does it occupy the position of a macrosubject supposed to bring 
society as a whole under control and simultaneously act for it. " 
(Habermas, 1992, p. 372) 
Furthermore, in many contexts "the law is combined with the media of power and money in 
such a way that it takes on the role of a steering medium itself' (Habermas, 1981b, p. 365). 
Most commercial and administrative law, and accounting regulation as quasi-law, is of this 
type; it serves as a means of organising media-controlled sub-systems that are already 
substantially autonomous of the lifeworld and communicative action integrated through 
mutual understanding. Such law/regulation deals with formally organised domains of action 
that are in effect constituted by law. We must then be content with procedural legitimation 
of such regulations/law; "substantive justification is not only not possible, but is also, from 
the viewpoint of the lifeworld, meaningless" (Habermas, 1981b, p. 365). Habermas contrasts 
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law as steering medium, with those regulative, as distinct from constitutive, legal institutions 
(and by extension accounting regulations) that are superimposed on areas of life that are 
already communicatively structured. It is with this second category of juridification that the 
potential for colonisation of the lifeworld arises. Much of accounting regulation falls in this 
category; it is superimposed on communicatively structured relationships of accountability, 
and upon norms (e. g., truthfulness, prudence, and fairness) that are part of the pre-existing 
order of the lifeworld. There is a potential for accounting regulation to not merely 
supplement aspects of the social order but rather to convert them over to the medium of 
quasi-legal regulation. It is this kind of colonisation of areas of life that are functionally 
dependent on social integration that Habermas' wants to help us resist: 
"The point is to protect areas of life that are functionally dependent on social 
integration through values, norms, and consensus formation, to preserve them 
from falling prey to the systemic imperatives of economic and administrative 
subsystems growing with dynamics of their own, and to defend them from 
becoming converted over, through the steering medium of the law, to a 
principle of sociation that is, for them, dysfunctional. " 
(Habermas, 1981b, pp. 372-373) 
It is with respect to this second category that issues of normative evaluation arise; a 
procedural justification will no longer suffice: "They need substantive justification" 
(Habermas, 1981b, p. 365). Habermas argues that, in our modem pluralist society, the 
legitimation of norms must be based upon procedures of rational will and consensus 
formation, that is, on the institutionalisation of the "discourse principle" (D) that: 
"that the only regulations and ways of acting that can claim legitimacy are 
those to which all who are possibly affected could assent as participants in 
rational discourse. 
(Habermas, 1994, p. 459) 
In late capitalist society the normative/moral dimension of accounting/financial reporting has 
become suppressed. That suppression of the moral damages the commercial lifeworld and 
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robs accounting of the force of moral obligation. Accounting and financial reporting is then 
forced to rely on legal sanction - which invites creative avoidance. The force of normative 
obligation depends upon the perceived validity of the norm. Habermas has tried to show how 
in post-traditional society norms can be validated; such validation must rely on rational 
consensus achieved through discourse/argument. Through discourse ethics, financial 
reporting/accounting may be reclaimed as a normative practice with real moral force, and 
thus be empowered to exercise a communicative-normative influence on functional 
subsystems that are otherwise steered by media of money and power and regulation/law as 
medium. 
A Habermasian discourse ethics approach to accounting argument contrasts sharply 
with the conception of the role of argument in accounting debate advanced by Shapiro (1997, 
1998). To help clarify the contrast we will briefly outline certain features of the Habermasian 
approach. We begin with the most significant point of contrast, which is simply that whereas 
Shapiro takes norms for granted as a starting point of debate, Habermas believes that it is 
possible to objectively validate norms. His basic aim is to reconstruct the moral point of view 
from which the validity of competing normative claims can be rationally and objectively 
judged. Habermas' approach is to trace out the implications of our everyday moral thinking 
and judging. He contrasts moral norms with simple imperatives, and argues that moral 
norms, as distinct phenomena, characteristically have an internal force that does not rely on 
external threat, reward or will. He argues that the moral authority or normative force of a 
behavioural expectation is always associated with a claim to an impersonal or general 
validity that can be supported with convincing reasons: 
"There is apparently an inner connection between, on the one hand, the 
authority of generally accepted norms or commands, ... and, on the other hand 
the impersonality of their claim. Such norms claim that they exist by right and 
that if necessary, they can be shown to exist by right. This means that 
indignation and reproaches directed against the violation of a norm must in 
the last analysis be based on a cognitive foundation. ... To say that I ought to 
do something means that I have good reasons for doing it. " 
(Habermas, 1983, pp. 49-50) 
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On this view of moral phenomena, the moral authority or motivating force, of a normative 
expectation relies on confidence that its claim to validity can be redeemed - that good reasons 
can be given in support of it. In which case, clearly, the reconstruction of the force of 
normative validity calls for an account of convincing or rationally motivating reason giving. 
Habermas' responds to this challenge by making a formal-pragmatic analysis of the 
communicative practices intuitively adopted by competent participants in argumentation 
concerning moral validity claims. His conclusion is that any rationally motivating exchange 
of reasons must conform to what he calls the principle of universalization (U), according to 
which every valid norm must meets the following condition: 
(U) All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's 
interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative 
possibilities for regulation). " 
(Habermas, 1983, p. 65) 
The principle of universalization reconstructs the objective moral point of view as a rule of 
argument that makes rationally binding consensus in moral discourse possible: It is "a 
bridging principle that makes agreement in moral argumentation possible" (Habermas, 1983, 
p. 57), even in a modem society characterised by a "pluralism of ultimate value orientations" 
(Habermas, 1983, p. 76). At its most basic, the idea behind (U) is that provided the 
participants in argument about hypothetical norms are prepared to work to gain an 
understanding of their own and each others real interests and perspective, and have equal 
opportunity to argue for and against the proposed norms, any uncoerced consensus that 
emerges must express a generalised interest, and thus have an impersonal or general validity 
or objectivity (that can be supported with convincing reasons): 
"The moral principle is so conceived as to exclude as invalid any norm that 
could not meet with the qualified assent of all who are or might be affected 
by it. This bridging principle, which makes consensus possible, ensures that 
only those norms are accepted as valid that express a general will. " 
(Habermas, 1983, p. 63) 
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Habermas insists that (U) can be justified as a universal moral principle, rather than 
merely a "generalization of moral intuitions peculiar to our own Western culture" (Habermas, 
1983, p. 76). He suggests (but does not formally work through himself) a transcendental 
justification of the principle, designed to convince that (U) is implied by certain 
presuppositions of argument which we are all committed to, insofar as we can not deny them 
without involving ourselves in performative contradictions. The justification of (U) originates 
in the fact that Habermas' reconstruction of what is implicit in everyday moral thinking ties 
the motivating force of moral claims to confidence that they can be redeemed with 
convincing reasons. Indeed from the Habermasian perspective, developed in The Theory of 
Communicative Action, the very meaning of a moral claim can only be grasped through the 
give and take of reason giving, in practical discourse - that is in the performative attitude: 
"In order to understand an utterance in the paradigm case of a speech act 
oriented to reaching understanding, the interpreter has to be familiar with the 
conditions of its validity; he has to know under what conditions the validity 
claim linked with it is acceptable, that is, would have to be acknowledged by 
a hearer. " 
(Habermas, 1981 a, p. 115) 
On this view, we understand the meaning of any validity claim, including a moral claim, only 
by understanding the pragmatics of its possible redemption, that is, by appreciating how it 
can be supported with convincing reason giving, in argument. Therefore, anyone who 
understands the validity claims they make (implicitly or explicitly) must understand how 
those claims can be redeemed in argument, and such understanding requires an implicit 
recognition of the presuppositions of argument - from which, Habermas argues, the principle 
of universalization directly follows: 
"Every person who accepts the universal and necessary communicative 
presuppositions of argumentative speech and who knows what it means to 
justify a norm of action implicitly presupposes as valid the principle of 
universalization, whether in the form I gave it above or in an equivalent 
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form. " 
(Habermas, 1983, p. 86) 
In The Theory of communicative Action, Habermas describes his reconstruction of the 
conditions of argumentation, (that is, communicative action oriented toward the achievement 
of rationally motivated consensus), that every competent speaker who believes that she is 
engaged in argument must presuppose are adequately fulfilled, as "an ideal speech situation". 
The participants in argumentation must, for example, presuppose that all coercion - other 
than "the force of the better argument" - is excluded from their communication. The detail, 
and existence, of the presupposition of discourse can be demonstrated through systematic 
analysis of the performative contradictions entailed by their denial; The object of the analysis 
being to reconstruct the pragmatic rules of discourse which are implicitly used and already 
intuitively known. Following Habermas, Alexy (1973) identifies the following pragmatic 
rules of rational discourse, as quoted by Habermas (1983, p. 89): 
(1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a 
discourse. 
(2) a Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. 
b Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into discourse. 
c Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs. 
(3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion from exercising 
his rights as laid down in (1) and (2). 
Participants in discourse who suppose that any consensus they have reached is rationally 
motivated must presume these rules have been sufficiently met. However the nature of the 
rules is such that the participants could never be fully certain that the rules have in fact been 
fulfilled; there is always some room to doubt the rationality of consensus. The rules are, in 
a sense, counterfactuals, regulative ideals, that we can use as a foundation for the evaluation 
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of our argumentative practice and our institutions. The rules, however, are not merely ideals; 
they are fundamentally constitutive of any real communicative action oriented towards 
consensus. Habermas sees such communicative action as the fundamental social action, and 
thus takes us all, as social animals, to be implicitly committed to these rules as 
"transcendentally necessary presuppositions, no matter how mired they are in contingent 
motives and compulsions" (Hoy, 1994, p. 181). Habermas argues that from these rules and 
our shared sense of what it means to justify a norm of action, we can derive the principle of 
universalization (U): 
"If every person entering a process of argumentation must, among other 
things, make presuppositions whose content can be expressed in rules (3.1) 
to (3.3) and if we understand what it means to discuss hypothetically whether 
norms of action ought to be adopted, then everyone who seriously tries to 
discursively redeem normative claims to validity intuitively accepts 
procedural conditions that amount to implicitly acknowledging (U). 
(Habermas, 1983, p. 93) 
For a full outline and critical discussion of the derivation of (U) see Rehg, (1997, ch. 3)10. 
The application of (U) in real practical discourse yields the broad-based principle of 
discourse (D). Habermas' reconstruction of the moral point of view yields just one rule of 
argument for the impartial testing of norms, one rule that makes rational consensus on norms 
possible; the principle of universalization (U). The institutional implications of that rule are 
however complex. Ideally procedures for the testing/validation of proposed norms, (including 
accounting norms), should be such that: (i) All those potentially affected by the norm under 
consideration are included in the debate; steps must be taken to ensure that no affected parties 
are excluded from the exchange of arguments; Shapiro's maxims do not make this crucial 
point explicit. (ii) A full exchange of arguments is facilitated, and no relevant considerations 
excluded. Shapiro's maxims emphasise the need to constrain discourse, so that only 
arguments which respect the privileged vocabulary of the "the common starting point" are 
permitted. Habermas recognises that we must operate on the basis that we share a (life)world 
with those we communicate with, and that it is only against a shared background that we can 
recognise disagreements. His emphasis, however, is quite the opposite of Shapiro's, he insists 
180 
Chapter 4: Validity in Accounting Standard Setting and the Presuppositions of External Financial Reporting 
that participants in debate must bring their particular perspective to the argument - they 
should not be constrained to any particular vocabulary (or language game). For Habermas, 
the rational justification of a norm requires that it be shown to have acceptable consequences 
for the interests of each individual affected by it, and the testing process demands that the 
needs, wants, values and self-understandings of those affected, including their conceptions 
of the good life, be brought into moral discourse as content: 
"If the actors do not bring with them, and into their discourse, their individual 
life-histories, their identities, their needs and wants, their traditions, 
memberships, and so forth, practical discourse would at once be robbed of all 
content. " 
(Habermas, 1982, p. 255) 
(iii) Habermas' discourse ethics requires that all external and internal coercive pressures must 
be removed. Here we have some level of agreement; Shapiro also recognises that coercion 
must be eliminated; his maxim No. I requires that parties must not prevent one another from 
participating in the give and take of argument. However Shapiro's recommendation that 
debate be constrained by the "common starting point" does, as he himself recognises, do a 
kind of "violence" to debate. Finally (iv) the principle of universalization (U) demands that 
the validity of a norm be tested "dialogically". That is, it must tested through a process of real 
public argument in which all those affected are prepared to try and reciprocally share one and 
others' perspectives, in an effort to assess the fairness, for all, of the proposed norm. 
"I have formulated (U) in a way that precluded the monological application 
of the principle. First, (U) regulates only argumentation among a plurality of 
participants; second, it suggests the perspective of real-life argumentation, in 
which all affected are admitted as participants. In this respect my 
universalization principle differs from the one John Rawls proposes. ... Like 
Kant, Rawls operationalizes the standpoint of impartiality in such a way that 
every individual can undertake to justify basic norms on his own. " 
(Habermas, 1983, p. 66) 
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Discourse ethics locates the decision procedure for reaching valid norms in practical 
discourse striving for consensus, as distinct from compromise: "Participants in a practical 
discourse strive to clarify a common interest, whereas in negotiating a compromise they try 
to strike a balance between conflicting particular interests" (Habermas, 1983, p. 72). 
Shapiro's, essentially monological, approach does not encourage any reciprocal perspective. 
Shapiro's monological interests based approach is most flagrantly obvious in his citation of 
Demski's (1973) work which following Arrow (1963) work in information economics, 
emphasises the impossibility of finding acceptable (Pareto optimal) accounting standard 
compromises given the divergent interests of affected parties. 
"Moreover, the diverse goals and preferences of multiple stakeholders 
virtually guarantee that a change in external financial reporting rules will 
benefit some stakeholders and harm others, such that it is impossible to 
prescribe a set of accounting standards to satisfy all stakeholder needs and 
preferences (cf. Demski, 1973; Dopuch & Sunder, 1980). Accordingly, social 
welfare metanarratives cannot legitimise accounting rule changes. " 
(Shapiro, 1998, p. 641) 
While Shapiro remains focused on the unencumbered contracting individuals with more or 
less arbitrarily chosen interests, Habermas' approach is thoroughly intersubjectivistic. The 
discourse ethics approach is not a search for compromise, or for the best substantive 
argument, but for rational consensus driven by empathy. Where Habermas sees discourse 
ethics as transcendentally justified by the presuppositions of discourse/argument itself, 
Shapiro sees the normative model of argument he offers as simply a "contract, explicit or not, 
between players" (Shapiro, 1998, p. 643). 
The discourse ethics ideal is fundamentally counterfactual; no institutionalization of 
(U) will be perfect. (U) is essentially a regulative ideal. Confidence in the validity/rationality 
of accounting norms must ultimately rest on the extent to which the procedures through 
which the norm is developed and validated, approximate the discourse ethics ideal; that is, 
it must depend on the quality of reciprocal perspective taking achieved. If accounting 
regulation is to harness any normative force, in our post-traditional society, our accounting 
standard setting procedures must be designed to approximate the ideal of discourse ethics. 
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Following Habermas' lead we see the foundations for the possibility of emancipation laid 
down in modernity's triumph over tradition, that is, in reason's triumph over the Other of 
reason: that which is immune to reason. In capitalist modernity, however, the development 
of rationality tends to become pathological: The instrumental rationality and spontaneous 
functioning on which the systems based integration and material reproduction of society 
relies tends to colonise those aspects of life that depend on symbolic reproduction through 
communicative action. In chapter 1 we argued that the rationalisation of financial accounting, 
associated with the modernization of society, reflects the pathological tendencies inherent to 
the capitalist system and in particular its tendency to crisis. We found accounting in the 
process of becoming little more than an instrumental adjunct to a systems based integration 
of society founded on the automatic operation of markets. Indeed we argued that 
contradictions and in particular the tendency to rationality crisis within advanced capitalism 
undermines financial accounting's capacity to fulfil even this limited role. The fuller 
emancipatory potential of communicative reason in modernity is certainly not realised in 
contemporary financial accounting; the potential of financial reporting to put a 
communicatively based normative check on the system is undermined by the fact that it itself 
has been colonised and evades effective normative control. 
In chapters 2 to 4, we argued that, in principle at least, financial accounting can 
overcome the tendencies to rationality and legitimacy crisis that afflict it in contemporary 
capitalism. We argued that it has the capacity to be truly emancipatory by providing us with 
knowledge of the objective world we share and by facilitating a measure of objective 
normative control on the essentially systems based material reproduction of society in 
advanced modernity. The view we have presented in previous chapters looks for the 
emancipatory potential of modernity and financial accounting in the tension between 
instrumental and communicative reason. In chapter 2 we were hostile to those contemporary 
discourses within accounting theory that seem to want to dismiss the possibility of rationality 
in accounting by casting doubt on the possibility of accounting truth and objectivity. Our 
stance in chapter 2 echoes Habermas' robust resistance to the post-structuralist/post-modern 
challenge to rationality, that is, his resistance to any invocation/reinvigoration of the Other 
of reason. 
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In chapter 5, which follows, we acknowledge the validity of the 
poststructuralist/postmodern critique of reason's exclusion of its Other. We admit that the 
perspective of reason is narrowed by the tendency of both instrumental and communicative 
reason to exclude those claims that are not open to discursive articulation and analysis. 
Furthermore, we accept that the Habermasian analysis of reason's potential is over optimistic, 
and in particular we recognize that, despite his efforts to overcome the philosophy of 
consciousness, his discourse theory ultimately relies on an inadequate model of the subject. 
The logic of the post-structuralism/post-modernism critique of reason's closure need not 
however be read paranoiacally as leading inevitably to the crowning of unreason and the 
banishment of reason. A more balanced and positive reading of the post-structuralist/post- 
modernist position will see it as tending to usefully destabilize the closure of reason and 
allow the claim of the Other some admittance / recognition. We take the view that the 
incitation of alterity, which is typical of post-structuralist/post-modern practices and 
discourses, is a vital complement to any emancipatory politics, and more specifically 
accounting standard setting, that might be based on discourse theory and communicative 
reason. The Habermasian model clearly needs to be supplemented by a post- 
structuralist/psychoanalytic sensitivity to Alterity and the unconscious; defined as, that which 
is immune to discursive retrieval and communicative reason. We find the imaginative 
resources for that supplement in the work of the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, and in 
particular in his conceptualization of the subject. We explore the Lacanian psychoanalytic 
framework by applying it to the commercial firm and, building upon existing conceptions of 
the firm as moral agent inspired by the work of Donald Davidson, developing a conception 
of the firm as a split subject; divided between conscious and unconscious. Following Lacan, 
we argue that the firm as subject of the unconscious bears a moral responsibility to subjectify 
its own cause; it must assume responsibility for itself and its desire; it must transcend its own 
fantasy. We contend that it is only through the assumption of this responsibility for its own 
cause in the desire of the Other, that any subject, including the firm as Lacanian subject, can 
come to terms with the Other and clearly recognise and respond to its absolute responsibility 
for the Other. 
We recognize that the increase of moral rationality potentially obtained by stepping 
back to the moral point of view of discourse theory, from which we can distinguish matters 
of justice from those of the good life and objectively assess the validity of competing 
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normative claims, is achieved at the price of stripping norms of the motivating force that 
traditionally they might draw from their connection with powerful ethical conceptions of the 
good life: 
At this stage, moral judgement becomes dissociated from the local 
conventions and historical coloration of a particular form of life. It can no 
longer appeal to the naive validity of the context of the lifeworld. Moral 
answers retain only the rationally motivating force of insights. Along with the 
naive self-certainty of their lifeworld background they lose the thrust and 
efficacy of empirical motives for action. 
(Habermas, 1983, pp. 106-109) 
We conclude chapter 5 by suggesting that this motivational deficit, that attends the 
detachment of the Habermasian universalist moral point of view from any ethics of the good 
life, might be compensated for by the development of a universalist ethics of absolute 
responsibility for the Other from which morality might draw new motivational force. Lacan's 
analysis of the development of the subject points the way towards the potential realisation 
of an ethic of absolute responsibility for the Other, through the transcendence of fantasy. 
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"Wo Es war, soll Ich werden" 
Introduction 
In this chapter we suggest that the Habermasian conception of the subject as moral agent of 
communicative action/reason needs to be supplemented by a post-structuralist/psychoanalytic 
appreciation of those dimensions of subjectivity which are not transparent, that is, those 
dimensions that are not open to discursive retrieval. We use some of the insights of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis to build upon existing conceptions of the firm as moral agent, which have 
been inspired by the work of Donald Davidson. The object of this chapter is to contribute to 
the enrichment of notions of the firm as a moral agent. 
We begin with a review of alternative accounting conceptions of the financial 
"reporting entity". Specification of the reporting entity is pivotal to financial reporting; in the 
privileging of any particular accounting point of view alternatives are suppressed. Definition 
of the reporting entity has political implications, in so far as alternative conceptions of the 
reporting entity may emphasise on the one hand the interests of shareholders or on the other 
the interests of a wider community. We develop our analysis by critically examining the 
position taken by the UK Accounting Standards Board (ASB), on the reporting entity issue, 
in the development of its recently finalised conceptual framework for financial reporting, its 
"Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting" (Statement of Principles) (ASB, 1995b, 
1999a, 1999d). The practical significance of the issue is illustrated by reference to the issue 
of accounting for stock option compensation. Our analysis reveals that alternative and 
essentially incompatible conceptions of the reporting entity seem to coexist in tension in the 
ASB draft Statement of Principles, and generally in financial reporting theory and practice. 
We contend that the equivocation on this issue can in part be attributed to the existence of 
a real split in the nature of the firm. 
We go on to broaden our consideration of the nature of the firm: We briefly consider 
the literature of the moral agent that originates with Peter French's work, initially inspired 
by Donald Davidson analysis of agency. We try to make a contribution to the conception of 
the firm as moral agent, by showing how it can be enriched with some of the post- 
structuralist/psychoanalytic insights offered in Jacques Lacan's work. We explore the nature 
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of the firm as a split or divided subject using a Lacanian psychoanalytic framework, and 
contend that the firm may usefully be conceived of as divided between the conscious and the 
unconscious. We argue that the firm, as subject of the unconscious, bears a moral 
responsibility to subjectify its own cause, and assume responsibility for itself and its desire. 
We conclude the chapter by turning to Habermasian conception of the subject of 
discourse ethics. We indicate the inadequacy of Habermas' conception of an essentially 
transparent subject, and suggest that it needs to be supplemented with a post- 
structuralist/psychoanalytic sensitivity to alterity. We conclude the chapter by suggesting that 
the motivational deficit which attends the rationalistic abstraction of the universalist moral 
point of view, of discourse ethics, may be compensated for by the development of an a new, 
universalist ethics: An ethics of difference and absolute responsibility for the Other. 
The reporting entity 
The "accounting point of view" has long been recognised by accounting theorists as a matter 
of central importance to financial accounting theory and practice. The question is; from 
which perspective should business records be maintained and accounts prepared? The most 
obvious alternatives are (i) the proprietary view point of the owner, and alternatively (ii) the 
viewpoint of the business entity itself as an operating unit. 
The proprietary perspective makes the "owner", that is shareholders, (more or less 
broadly defined to include or exclude preference shares depending upon the version of 
proprietary theory being considered), the centre of attention; the focus of accounting. The 
accounting equation A-L=P (assets minus liabilities equals proprietors' interest) reflects 
the essence of the proprietary view. From this perspective the reporting entity tends to be 
regarded as coextensive with its proprietors; "Assets belong to the proprietor and liabilities 
are obligations of the proprietor" (Kam, 1986, p. 303). The business undertaking is regarded 
as a means by which owners seek to achieve their purpose of increasing their wealth. The 
objective of accounting in this context becomes the measurement and analysis of the 
proprietor's net worth; "... the proprietary theory may be said to be ... balance sheet oriented. 
Assets are valued and balance sheets are prepared to measure the changes in the proprietary 
interest or wealth", (Belkaoui 1985, p. 224). Consequently, supporters of the proprietary 
theory tend to regard current values as more relevant than historical costs, (see Kam, 1986, 
p. 303). The proprietary approach to accounting dates from before the rise of limited 
187 
Chapter 5: The Reporting Entity as Divided Subject 
companies, and to a time when most business was conducted by partnerships and sole trader 
proprietors. The proprietary perspective loses some pertinence when business activity is 
carried out through corporations which are legally separate from their owners, and which 
hold assets and assume obligations on their own account. For example in the case of limited 
liability companies it is difficult to regard the notion that the company's obligations are 
liabilities of the proprietor as meaningful. However this is not to say that the proprietary view 
is incompatible with the recognition that the corporation is a separate legal entity. Even sole 
traders recognise the need to keep business and private records separate. The key issue is 
from which perspective should the business records be maintained. From the proprietary 
point of view income is viewed as the increase in the owners' wealth arising from the 
business over a period: "Revenue is the increase in proprietorship; expense is the decrease 
in proprietorship" (Kam, 1986, p. 303). The influence of this view is widely reflected in 
accounting terminology and practice. For example, in the treatment, under UK Companies 
Act profit and loss account formats (CA 1985, Sch. 4 part.! ), of wages, interest, and corporate 
taxes as expenses in the derivation of profit, the measurement of shareholders' income 
appears as the privileged object of the profit and loss account. 
The main alternative to the proprietary perspective is to define the reporting entity in 
operational terms. We will describe this approach as the entity perspective. There are two 
distinct elements to entity theory. Firstly it holds that debt and equity can not be 
meaningfully distinguished (see Clark, 1993). This notion has been given impetus in recent 
years by the proliferation of financial instruments that blur traditional distinctions between 
debt and equity, (see FASB, 1990, para. 219-222). Consequently, a critical feature of the 
entity perspective is that profits ought to be determined by reference to all capital providers; 
that is, before deduction of interest. Secondly, the entity perspective makes the `business' 
itself as an economic operating unit the focus of accounting attention, as a distinct entity 
separate from its owners. 
"It is the "business" whose financial history the bookkeeper and accountant 
are trying to record and analyze; the books and accounts are the record of "the 
business"; the periodic statements of operations and financial condition are 
the reports of "the business". " 
(Paton, 1922, p. 473) 
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The entity theory is most clearly applicable to the corporate form of business enterprise, 
where there is a clear legal separation between the corporation and providers of capital. From 
the entity perspective the business entity owns the assets of the enterprise and is responsible 
for the claims of shareholders and creditors alike as providers of funds and the source of the 
assets: The accounting equation becomes Assets = Equities. 
Under the proprietary concept, the measurement of the proprietor's net worth in the 
business is the primary accounting objective, and therefore the balance sheet is of central 
importance. In entity theory, because the entity is the centre of attention, proprietor's net 
worth becomes a less meaningful concept. Emphasis moves to the determination of income, 
and the income statement: 
"Because the business unit is held responsible for meeting the claims of the 
equity holders, the entity theory is said to be "income-centred" and 
consequently income statement oriented. Accountability to the equity holders 
is accomplished by measuring the operating and financial performance of the 
firm. " 
(Belkaoui, 1985, p. 225) 
The entity concept recognises a division between management and owners, who are 
outsiders to the entity. And in this context a stewardship role for accounting is given 
prominence. Balance sheet centred, valuation based, income measurement necessarily entails 
managerial estimation and is consequently open to manipulation in conditions of asymmetric 
information. In contrast, income statement based approaches to income determination 
measure income by matching against realised revenue the costs of generating that revenue. 
Valuation is avoided, the need for managerial estimation is reduced, and revenue is 
recognised only when relatively certainly earned. Income statement based "matching" 
approaches to income determination are therefore arguably better suited than the valuation 
approaches, for the purpose of monitoring managerial stewardship, entity performance and 
discharge of responsibility to providers of funds. The influence of the entity view is also 
widely reflected in accounting terminology and practice. For example, traditional definitions 
of revenue in terms of an enterprise's products sold in a period, and expenses as assets 
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consumed in generating those revenues "are consistent with the entity theory's preoccupation 
with an index of performance and accountability to equity holders, " (Belkaoui 1985, p. 226). 
From a proprietary perspective the boundary of the reporting entity is drawn in terms 
of the proprietors' ownership of resources. From an entity perspective the reporting entity is 
the business itself, with a boundary generally defined in terms of effective operating control. 
The preparation of consolidated accounts for groups, defined in UK Companies Acts in 
terms of control, is consistent with entity theory. 
Entity theory initially emphasised responsibilities of the business enterprises to 
providers of capital (debt or equity). However, the informational or decision usefulness 
perspective on accounting, which conceives of accounting as providing information, for 
decision making purposes, to a range of users outside the business enterprise is compatible 
with an entity perspective. The enterprise perspective retains entity theory's conception of 
the reporting entity as a separate business enterprise but expands recognition of the 
enterprise's responsibilities. The Corporate Report (ASC, 1975a) reflects such a perspective 
in arguing that economic entities have a wide ranging duty of public accountability: 
"We consider the responsibility to report publicly (later referred to as public 
accountability) is separate from and broader than the legal obligation to report 
and arises from the custodial role played in the community by economic 
entities. Just as directors of limited companies are recognised as having a 
stewardship relationship with shareholders who have invested their funds, so 
many other relationships exist, both of a financial and non-financial nature. 
For example, economic entities compete for resources of manpower, 
management and organisational skills, materials and energy, and they utilise 
community owned assets and facilities. They have a responsibility for the 
present and future livelihoods of employees, and because of the inter- 
dependence of all social groups, they are involved in the maintenance of 
standards of life and the creation of wealth for and on behalf of the 
community. " 
(ASC, 1975a, para. 1.3, p. 15) 
In the following section of this chapter we examine the principles concerning the reporting 
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entity, that is the accounting point of view, as set out in the ASB's draft Statement of 
Principles. 
The reporting entity and the ASB's Statement of Principles 
Our purpose in examining how the ASB deal with the reporting entity issue in their draft 
Statement of Principles (ASB, 1995b) is primarily to reveal the difficulties of consistently 
specify a reporting entity in unequivocal terms. The draft Statement of Principles is a vehicle 
for our analysis; it is not the main focus of our interest in this chapter. The revised draft of 
the Statement of Principles (ASB, 1999a) advocates fundamentally the same approach to 
financial reporting as is found in the 1995 draft, and carries forward in more cautious terms, 
but substantially unaltered, the provisions contained in the 1995 draft which are most 
pertinent to our analysis. We will therefore primarily make reference to, and where 
appropriate quote, the initial draft Statement of Principles (ASB, 1995b), upon which public 
comment has been published - which we will also refer to. 
The draft Statement of Principles (ASB, 1995b) contains seven chapters, including 
a final chapter which specifically addresses the definition of the "the reporting entity". The 
issue provokes relatively little explicit comment from respondents to the draft Statement of 
Principles. This relative neglect perhaps reflects the fact that the ASB's treatment of this 
issue is equivocal and does not make absolutely clear the real challenge it presents to a 
preconception, clearly held by some respondents, that the reporting entity is the operating 
entity. 
Many aspects of the ASB's draft Statement of Principles strongly reflect a proprietary 
perspective. The proprietary accounting equation, A-L=P is reflected in the draft's 
definition of `ownership interest' as: "the residual amount found by deducting all of the 
entity's liabilities from all of the entity's assets" (ASB, 1995b, para. 3.39). The draft 
Statement of Principles has a balance sheet orientation typical of the proprietary perspective. 
It defines gains and losses as increases or decreases in ownership interest, other than those 
relating to contributions from, or distributions to, owners (ASB, 1995b, para. 3.47; ASB, 
1999a, para. 4.40). The determination of entity performance is made a derivative of the 
measurement of assets and liabilities. Less than 5% of the one hundred and seventy five 
published responses to the exposure draft Statement of Principles were explicitly supportive 
of its balance sheet orientation. And more than 45% of commentators were explicitly 
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opposed to it - preferring the retention of an income statement orientated matching approach 
to income determination, (for further analysis see McKernan & O'Donnell, 1998). 
Consistent with its balance sheet orientation the draft Statement of Principles argues 
that "practice should develop by evolving in the direction of greater use of current values to 
the extent that this is consistent with the constraints of reliability and cost" (ASB, 1995b, 
para. 5.38)'. Less than 10% of the one hundred and seventy five published responses to the 
exposure draft Statement of Principles were explicitly supportive of evolution in the direction 
of greater use of current values, whilst 70% of commentators were explicitly opposed to it, 
(for further analysis see McKernan & O'Donnell, 1998). The draft Statement of Principles' 
proposals with respect to measurement can not, however, be considered as wholly congruent 
with a proprietary perspective. Unlike the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland 
study, Making Corporate Reports Valuable (ICAS, 1988), the draft Statement of Principles 
does not propose "realisable value" accounting, which is arguably most consistent with a 
proprietary perspective / balance sheet orientation. "Value to the business", generally leading 
to the use of "replacement cost", is the measurement basis preferred by the ASB. Such a 
measurement basis is clearly more appropriate to an income statement based approach to 
income determination, entailing the matching against realised revenue of the replacement 
cost of the assets consumed in the generation of that revenue. This incoherence in the draft 
Statement of Principles' advocated measurement system might be understood as reflecting 
an underlying tension between the proprietary and entity points of view (see Ernst & Young, 
1996b, pp. 269-270). 
The draft Statement of Principles proposes the abandonment of the traditional rule 
that only realised profits appear in the profit and loss statement. It would require that the 
profit and loss account, and the statement of total recognised gains and losses, report the 
gains and losses that arise in the period, irrespective of when they are realised, (ASB, 1995b, 
para. 6.25)Z. Such a move would be consistent with a proprietary perspective. The proprietary 
conception of income in terms of change in owners' wealth, tends to imply that all changes 
in wealth, whether or not realised by an external transaction, ought to be included in income. 
Less than 5% of the one hundred and seventy five published responses to the exposure draft 
Statement of Principles were explicitly supportive of proposals to abandon the traditional 
realisation principles, whilst 42% of commentators were explicitly opposed, (for further 
analysis see McKernan & O'Donnell, 1998). 
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The proprietary view is concerned with the owners' wealth, that is, his or her capacity 
to consume. To measure the increase in capacity to consume, it is necessary to make 
adjustment for instability in the monetary unit of measurement. The proprietary perspective 
is consistent with `financial', rather than `operating', capital maintenance adjustments. 
Financial capital maintenance focuses on the consumption power of owners and adjusts 
income for the maintenance of the owners' consumption capacity, by applying a general price 
index, generally reflective of the owners' consumption, to the opening capital amount. 
Operating capital maintenance, on the other hand, concentrates on the business enterprise's 
ability to maintain the level of its physical operations, and makes provision for capital 
maintenance in terms of specific price changes. The draft Statement of Principles advocates 
a real-terms capital maintenance system: 
"A real terms capital maintenance system improves the relevance of 
information because it shows current operating margins as well as the extent 
to which holding gains and losses reflect the effect of general inflation, so that 
users of real terms financial statements are able to select the particular 
information they require. " 
(ASB, 1995b, para. 5.37, p. 92) 
A real-terms system in effect gives information for both a financial and operating capital 
maintenance perspectives3. However the ultimate measure of "real" income is based upon 
financial capital maintenance. If general inflation is less than specific inflation on the 
company's operating assets, distribution of the Statement of Principles' measure of "total real 
recognised gains", which includes holding gains (realised and unrealised), would erode the 
enterprise's operating capacity. The Statement of Principles' real-terms system mixes the 
proprietary and entity perspectives, whilst ultimately favouring the proprietary view. 
The draft Statement of Principles formulates the objective of financial statements in 
what seem, prima facie, to be wide ranging "decision-usefulness" terms, consistent with an 
entity perspective: 
"The objective of financial statements is to provide information about the 
financial position, performance and financial adaptability of an enterprise that 
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is useful to a wide range of users for assessing the stewardship of 
management and for making economic decisions. " 
(ASB, 1995b, para. 1.1; see also ASB, 1999a, para. l. 6) 
In fact, this objective might be regarded as consistent with what we have described as an 
"enterprise" conception of the reporting entity, that is an entity perspective with a wide- 
ranging recognition of reporting responsibilities. The practical significance of this objective 
is, however, quickly cut short by the Statement of Principles' declaration that: 
"Financial statements that meet the needs of providers of risk capital to the 
enterprise will also meet most of the needs of other users that financial 
statements can satisfy. " ' 
(ASB, 1995b, p. 1.6; see also ASB, 1999a, para. 1.12) 
This assertion, which is not supported by either explanation or evidence, is recognised by 
many commentators as obviously dubious (see Page, M. J., 1996, p. 583; & Pannell Kerr 
Forster, 1996, p. 587). Mumford objects to the assertion in the following terms: 
"Holders of quoted shares are not likely to be typical of users generally: 
unlike employees, they may be assumed to have diversified portfolios, very 
low transaction costs and little long-term commitment to the company - and 
unlike all other user groups their securities can easily be traded in a uniquely 
information-rich environment in which transactors may, with some safety, 
"free-ride" on the knowledge of others impounded in market. " 
(Mumford, 1996, p. 552) 
The ASB seem intent on promoting a view of financial reporting as primarily serving the 
needs of shareholders - an essentially proprietary perspective: "The wide range of users is 
collapsed down to the providers of risk capital - shareholders" (Ernst & Young, 1996b, 
p. 273). Again, we seem to have a tension between an entity/enterprise perspective and the 
proprietary view. 
Chapter 7 of the draft Statement of Principles, entitled "the reporting entity", prima 
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facie, supports the entity perspective on the reporting entity. It identifies control rather than 
ownership as the primary factor setting the boundaries of the reporting entity: a reporting 
"entity must be a cohesive economic unit, usually resulting from a unified control structure" 
(ASB, 1995b para. 7.2; see also ASB, 1999a, para. 2.3). Chapter 7 proceeds to a discussion 
of the proprietary and entity perspectives in the context of group accounts. Whilst 
recognising that "control provides the basis for determining which investments should be 
consolidated" (ASB, 1995b, para. 7.22), the ASB suggest that both perspectives have a role 
to play in group accounts: "deciding which perspective to use as a basis for accounting for 
subsidiaries depends on the relative usefulness of the information each provides" (ASB, 
1995b, para. 7.21). 
Less than 10% of the one hundred and seventy five published responses to the 
exposure draft Statement of Principles explicitly mention the draft Statement of Principles' 
discussion of "the reporting entity". No commentators explicitly applaud the ASB's proposal 
on this issue. Among those few commentators dealing with Chapter 7 "the reporting entity", 
there is something of a consensus that the draft Statement of Principles fails to significantly 
clarify, or advance, thinking. The comments below are representative: 
Table 1. A selection of comments on ch. 7 of ASB's draft Statement of Principles 
"The Board's principle is that "the financial statements should include consolidated 
information relating to all the activities controlled by an entity and account for other 
investments according to the level of influence exercised over them". The rest of 
Chapter 7 is actually a summary of current accounting practice and methods and as 
such has no place in a "Statement of Principles". 
(TT Group PLC, 1996, p. 673) 
"We have struggled to find many financial reporting principles in this chapter (chapter 
7: the reporting entity). Much is either academic discussion (para. 7.18 is a good 
example of this) or a description/justification of current practices (e. g., merger and 
acquisition accounting) or planned standards (goodwill, associates and joint ventures). " 
(Coopers & Lybrand, 1996, p. 218) 
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Table 1 (continued). A selection of comments on ch. 7 of ASB's draft Statement of 
Principles 
"Chapter 7 (the reporting entity) includes few principles. ... Rather, the chapter is a 
summary of existing standards (FRS 2,6 and 7) and proposed standards (goodwill, 
associates and joint ventures). " 
(Deloitte & Touche, 1996, p254) 
"We do not see the need for an extended discussion on the reporting entity as presently 
contained in Chapter 7 (the reporting entity). In many respects, this chapter is a 
discussion on consolidation, equity accounting and proportional consolidation, topics, 
which are dealt with adequately elsewhere, in for example FRS2 and FRED 11. ... We 
recommend, ... that much of this 
discussion is deleted from the Statement of 
Principles. " 
(Arthur Andersen, 1996, p. 57) 
"The issues raised by this chapter (chapter 7: the reporting entity) do not seem to be 
contentious. " 
(Bass plc, 1996, p. 88) 
The relative lack of response to the draft ASB on the issue of the "reporting entity" 
may be due to the fact the Chapter 7 of the draft does not obviously challenge the status quo. 
Other aspects of the draft which point towards the proprietary perspective, without making 
the connection explicit, are, as discussed above, generally fiercely resisted (e. g., the proposed 
balance sheet orientation and the proposed abandonment of the realisation principle). Even 
Professor Chris Nobes, a sophisticated and informed analyst, seems to have difficulty in 
recognising the depth of the ASB's commitment to a proprietary perspective. He indicates 
that the chapter 7 "is not quite clear" to him and asks whether the ASB might simplify it by 
"taking an entity view throughout? " (Nobes, 1996, p. 576). It is perhaps little wonder then that 
almost no preparers or users of accounts comment on Chapter 7. 
Only in one isolated place, paragraph 3.52, does the draft Statement of Principles 
make explicit and crystal clear a preference for an extreme proprietary perspective, which 
takes the reporting entity as coextensive with its pre-existing owners. Paragraph 3.52 does 
not occur, as might have been expected in chapter 7, which purports to deal with principles 
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concerning specification of the reporting entity, rather it occurs in the context of a discussion 
of the practicalities of accounting for stock options. We will discuss paragraph 3.52 in the 
following section of this chapter. 
Accounting for stock option compensation and the accounting point of view 
In preceding sections of the chapter we have noted that conceptions of the reporting entity 
have important implications for design of an accounting system. For example, and perhaps 
most obviously, a proprietary perspective may lead us towards measurement of financial 
capital maintenance whilst an entity perspective might lead to measurement of operating 
capital maintenance. 
In this section of the chapter we want to further illustrate the importance of 
alternative perspectives on the reporting entity by reference to a particular accounting issue 
- accounting for stock option compensation. Perspectives on the reporting entity are 
recognised to be crucial to debate on this issues. We will therefore look to the ASB's draft 
Statement of Principles for guidance concerning accounting for stock option compensation, 
paying particular attention to the "reporting entity" issue. 
The draft Statement of Principles makes financial statements essentially depend 
entirely on three balance sheet elements: "assets", "liabilities", and "ownership interest". 
Ownership interest is defined as "the residual amount found by deducting all of the entity's 
liabilities from all of the entity's assets, " (ASB, 1995b, para. 3.39). The Statement of 
Principles makes it clear that "any item that does not fall within one of the definitions of 
elements should not be included in financial statements" (ASB, 1995b, 3.2, p. 52). Therefore 
it is clearly necessary to consider stock option compensation in terms of these fundamental 
financial statement elements. Clearly it can be argued that the grant of stock options give rise 
to an asset: 
"... the asset initially recognized for non-vested employee stock options is 
prepaid compensation, which represents the value already conveyed to 
employees for services to be received in the future. Later, compensation cost 
is incurred as the benefits embodied in that asset are used up; that is, as the 
employees render service during the vesting period. " 
(FASB, 1993, para. 62) 
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The FASB make a strong defence of this view against common criticism of it (see FASB, 
1993, paras. 63-65). As the definition of assets is not the focus of this chapter we will accept 
this view without debate6. If we accept the ASB's view that "the interrelationship between 
the elements has the consequence that the recognition of one element (for example an asset) 
automatically requires the recognition of another element" (ASB, 1995b, para. 3.4), we must 
ask - what is the nature of the corresponding element arising when stock options, as prepaid 
compensation, are recognised as an asset? This is a crucial question because measurement 
of the related compensation expense will depend upon whether we regard stock options as 
giving rise to a liability or to equity': 
"... whether an employee stock option -a call option written by the employer 
corporation on its own stock - is considered to be an equity instrument or a 
liability is significant in determining the date at which the final measure of 
the related compensation expense should be computed. If an employee stock 
option is an equity instrument, the final measurement date for compensation 
expense will be the date at which the option is deemed to be "issued" because 
changes in the values of equity instruments after issuance are not gains or 
losses to be recognized in the issuer's financial statements. ... Neither 
subsequent exercise of the option nor its expiry without exercise would affect 
the amount of compensation expense recognized. However, if granting an 
employee stock option is deemed to give rise to a liability, the final 
measurement date effectively would be the date on which the option is 
exercised (or expires) because changes in the amount or value of a liability 
after its incurrence do affect a debtor's net income. " 
(FASB, 1990, para. 69) 
Liabilities are defined in the ASB's draft Statement of Principles: "obligations of an entity 
to transfer economic benefits as a result of past transactions or events" (ASB, 1995b, 
para. 3.21; ASB, 1999a, para. 4.24). Specification of "the entity" is clearly crucial to the 
definition of liabilities8. 
Advocates of an entity perspective will regard the reporting entity to be the enterprise 
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itself, that is, as an economic unit separate and distinct from its proprietors. From this 
perspective the equity interests in the enterprise are claims on the enterprise's net assets, they 
are not themselves assets of the enterprise. Therefore, from, this perspective a call option 
written on the enterprise's shares does not meet the definition of a liability; the enterprise has 
no obligation to transfer economic benefits. In fact, if the option is eventually exercised the 
enterprise will receive assets (the exercise price) in a non-reciprocal transaction. Because, 
under this view, the accounting enterprise is sharply distinguished from the proprietors of the 
equity interest in the enterprise, a transaction that benefits one group of proprietors at the 
expense of another group can not give rise to a gain or loss to the enterprise itself; "... An 
enterprise can not gain or lose on transactions in its own equity instruments" (FASB, 1990, 
para. 125). If an entity perspective is taken an option can not fit the definitions of a liability. 
In this case, and almost by default, it must be regarded as an equity instrument, part of the 
residual element "ownership interest" determined by the deduction of "all of the entity's 
liabilities from all of the entity's assets" (ASB, 1995b, para. 3.39; ASB, 1999a, para. 4.38). 
If the option is regarded as an equity instrument, the increment to ownership interest, and the 
corresponding asset of prepaid compensation that in due course will be reflected in the 
income statement, should be finally measured by reference to the value of the option when 
it is issued. When the option should be regarded as being issued is another matter; the grant 
date, vesting date, service date and the service expiration date are all possibilities9. 
From a proprietary perspective the reporting entity is not regarded as separate and 
distinct from its owners. On the contrary, it is essentially taken to be coextensive with its 
owners10, and more specifically, in the context of stock options, with its pre-existing owners 
(see FASB, 1990, para. 131). Advocates of a proprietary perspective will note that stock 
options represent an obligation upon the enterprise to issue shares at a price that may be less 
than their market price at the date of the transaction. Such an obligation has the potential to 
transfer wealth (economic benefits) from the pre-existing shareholders to the option holders. 
From a proprietary perspective, stock options can then be regarded as meeting the definition 
of a liability of the reporting entity in so far as they potentially oblige the transfer of 
economic benefits from the reporting entity (defined to be coextensive with the pre-existing 
shareholders) to the option holders. From an extreme proprietary perspective: 
"... an obligation to deliver a financial instrument to another entity on terms 
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that may be less than the market price on the date of the delivery creates a 
liability even if the financial instrument to be transferred is the enterprise's 
own stock. If the terms of a future issuance of stock have the potential to be 
unfavourable to the enterprise's preexisting stockholders, the terms are 
deemed to be potentially unfavourable to the enterprise itself and thus to have 
the potential of affecting the reported financial performance of the 
enterprise. " 
(FASB, 1990, para. 128) 
If the proprietary / pre-existing proprietor perspective is taken, options have the 
character of a liability. Because changes in the amount of a liability after its incurrence affect 
a creditor's net income, the final measurement date for the liability will be the exercise or 
expiry date of the option. Measurement of the liability will be revised until such time as it 
is discharged, so that the amount of the measured compensation expense will finally be 
determined by reference to the value of the option at the exercise or expiry date (by the 
exercise price and market price at that). The entity and proprietary perspectives lead to 
different conclusions on whether stock options are liabilities or equity; As liabilities the 
compensation expense should finally be measured at the exercise or expiry date, whilst as 
equity the compensation expense should be measured at the issue date. 
Accounting for stock option compensation has been the most highly contentious and 
politicised issue in accounting regulation in recent years, (see Zeff, 1997; Young, 1997; 
Street et al, 1997; Fraser et. al., 1998). In December 1994, under extreme pressure, the FASB 
dropped its proposal that US companies be required to charge the value of share option 
compensation as an expense in their profit and loss accounts. A compromise was reached 
which provided, instead, for footnote disclosure of the impact of options on net profit and 
EPS (See FASB, 1995). The chairman of the FASB, Dennis Beresford, indicated at the time 
of the climb-down, that he believed that the view that share options have value, are an 
expense, and ought to be charged against income, would eventually be accepted. For the 
present "It was a case of the leader getting too far ahead of the followers" (quoted by 
Peterson, 1995, p. 3). 
In the wake of the highly politicised debate on the stock option issue in the US, the 
matter was considered in the UK by the ASB's "Urgent Issues Task Force" (UITF). The 
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UITF statement issued by the ASB recommended footnote disclosure, on the grounds that 
"it is not presently practicable ... to specify an appropriate valuation method 
for options as 
a benefit in kind" (ASB, 1994, para. 9). The UITF recommendations are clearly less than fully 
satisfactory: 
"The UITF's proposals are flawed because they are voluntary and 
cumbersome. They are like giving a user a trial balance and leaving him to 
prepare the final accounts. The UITF should return to measurement. A 
simple workable method now is more useful than a theoretically more 
sophisticated method in the indefinite and remote future. " 
(Westwick, 1994, p. 88) 
The UITF recommendations do not close the door on treating stock-based compensation as 
an expense at some future date when a satisfactory (politically acceptable) valuation approach 
is determined. We believe that, in time, accounting standard setters in both the UK and US 
will want to return to the issue. 
Accounting for stock option compensation is clearly the sort of difficult and 
contentious issue where guidance from a coherent conceptual framework might be hoped to 
be of most crucial value. We might expect a conceptual framework to serve both as a bulwark 
against interest group pressure, and as a practical guide to the resolution of such technically 
complex matters (see Solomons, 1978 & Mozes, 1998). The FASB felt itself unable to 
proceed with its consideration of accounting for stock option compensation without first 
reconsidering its view on certain fundamental conceptual issues (see FASB, 1990, para. 14). 
And it only returned to the topic in 1992 after deciding not to pursue possible changes to its 
conceptual definition of assets and liabilities. 
In previous sections of this chapter we have explained that the ASB's draft Statement 
of Principles does not give clear guidance on the reporting entity question. The draft contains 
apparent expressions of support for an entity perspective. The advocacy of financial 
statements which are "useful to a wide range of users" (ASB, 1995b, para. 1.1; ASB, 1999a, 
para. l. 6), and the principle in chapter 7 that "an entity must be a cohesive economic unit, 
usually resulting from a unified control structure" (ASB, 1995b, para. 7.2; ASB, 1999a, 
para. 2.3), both seem to imply an entity perspective. Other elements of the draft Statement of 
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Principles, including fundamental aspects of the accounting model proposed, seem to imply 
a proprietary view. In our view in its discussion of principles the draft Statement of Principles 
is fundamentally equivocal on the reporting entity issue. Only in a discussion of accounting 
for stock options as a practical issue, which a number of commentators noted might have 
been more fittingly included in a specific accounting standard, are the ASB emphatically 
driven off the "reporting entity" fence. As explained above, the stock options issue is one 
which forces the adoption, at least implicitly, of a view on the specification of the reporting 
entity; The Board take an extreme proprietary view which equates the reporting entity with 
its pre-existing owners: 
"If the contribution received is less than the fair value of rights granted in 
exchange the transaction will result in a loss for the pre-existing shareholders 
and a windfall gain for the new investor. Since the ownership interest as a 
whole is co-extensive with the assets and liabilities of the entity, a gain or loss 
to the existing holders as a body resulting from an adjustment to their rights 
in the entity is a gain or loss to the entity. " 
(ASB, 1995b, para. 3.52; see also ASB, 1999a, para. 4.46) 
Some commentators (see Mumford, 1996 & Forker, 1996) take the view that 
para. 3.52 reveals the ASB's essential advocacy of the proprietary perspective. We do not 
share that view. As we have explained above we consider that the Statement of Principles is 
fundamentally ambivalent on the reporting entity question. We regard para. 3.52 as a forced 
choice - given that the Board clearly desired that the Statement of Principles might be 
capable of giving some guidance on the stock options issue. The choice they make does, of 
course, reveal their sympathy with the proprietary perspective and their privileging of the 
interests of "owners"". 
Those, relatively few, commentators who note and comment on paragraph 3.52 are 
typically bemused or resistant to it. The comments shown below in Table 2 are representative 
of those dealing with para. 3.52: 
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Table 2. Selection of comments on para. 3.52 
"Paragraph 3.52 contains a discussion of the situation inter alia where the ownership 
interest in an enterprise is increased by an issue of securities to a new investor. It suggests 
that where the securities issued to the new investor are issued at an undervalue, the 
reporting entity has incurred a loss; this cannot be correct - if there is a loss it is one 
suffered by the previously existing shareholders, just as the gain is made by the new 
shareholder. The suggested distinction between such an issue, and an issue by way of 
rights at an undervalue, is irrelevant in terms of the position of the reporting entity itself. " 
(The Law Society, 1996, p. 504) 
"We are unable to see how adjusting the rights of any particular class of shareholder 
affects the value of the business to existing shareholders as a body (last sentence of 
paragraph 3.52, page 65): altering ownership rights between different types of 
shareholder should have no impact on the value of the total ownership interest in the 
entity. " 
(Institutional Fund Managers' Association, 1996, p. 449) 
"We find this (the last sentence of paragraph 3.52) peculiar. The entity has made no loss 
(other than an opportunity loss). Are we to bring all opportunity losses into account? 
(KPMG, 1996, p. 472) 
"We do not understand the last sentence of paragraph 3.52. We cannot think of an 
example of a gain to the existing shareholders as a body resulting from an adjustment to 
their rights in the entity. If the board has a specific example in mind, it would be useful 
if you gave this to illustrate the point. Otherwise we are sceptical that such a gain could 
be a gain to the entity. " 
(Pannell Kerr Forster, 1996, p. 588) 
The proprietary perspective certainly does not have unqualified support in the wider 
accounting community of preparers and users of accounts, (see, Moores & Steadman, 1986). 
In our view a tension between the proprietary and entity views also runs deep in the thinking 
of accounting standard setters and in particular the ASB. 
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Identity thinking and the reporting entity 
The ASB is promoting a balance sheet / valuation orientated accounting model. That model 
has a conceptual coherence that its primary rival, the income statement orientated realisation 
and matching model, can not claim. We have argued elsewhere (McKernan & O'Donnell, 
1998) that the Statement of Principles project can be regarded as an attempt to reinforce at 
the conceptual level a world view threatened by its own immanent contradictions. Financial 
accounting as "identity thinking" (Adorno, 1966), works to subsume the plurality of the 
particular within a unitary systems of concepts. However the concepts through which we 
grasp the world are always inadequate to their object, their hold always imperfect, less than 
total, and there is always a residual which can come to threaten the coherence of any system 
of concepts. Conceptual frameworks for financial reporting contain an immanent tendency 
to failure because conceptual coherence will tend to be challenged by the real pluralities 
moving beyond its grasp. "What is, is more than it is" (Adorno, 1966, p. 161). In our view the 
inadequate grasp of financial accounting's restricted system of concepts upon their objects, 
is revealed by the ASB's equivocation concerning specification of the reporting entity. The 
proprietary perspective is conceptually consistent with the ASB's preferred balance sheet 
orientation. However in its draft Statement of Principles the Board are unable to consistently 
sustain a proprietary perspective. Other aspects of the social reality of the entity force their 
way to recognition. These include, the legal separation of proprietor and enterprise, the legal 
definition of holding company - subsidiary relationship in terms of control, and most 
powerful of all the widespread social recognition of business enterprises as significant active 
agents / subjects in our societies, quite separate from their proprietors. 
In subsequent sections of this chapter we use a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective 
to explore the nature of the firm as a social subject, and to elucidate the tension between 
`proprietary' and `entity' aspects which we would argue runs deep in the nature of the firm. 
We will argue that the commercial firm may be conceived as a relationally dependent subject. 
And, just as the individual can become a more effective political/moral agent by recognizing 
its relational dependence on the Other, so too can the commercial firm. We will develop our 
analysis primarily using a Lacanian model of subjectivity. Before turning to Lacan, we will, 
however, locate our conception of the firm as moral agent/subject by outlining key aspects 
of the existing theory and literature of the firm as moral agent. 
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Corporate moral agency 
That existing theory of the firm as moral agent originates in the work of Peter French (1979), 
which is in turn inspired by the philosopher Donald Davidson's analysis of agency. Davidson 
breaks with the conception of language as medium of representation (of the reality) or of 
expression (of the self), and he thus leaves behind any notion that either reality or the 
self/subject have any essential nature or core waiting to be represented or expressed. He thus 
breaks with the traditional picture in which subjects "are not simply networks of beliefs and 
desires but rather beings which have those beliefs and desires" (Rorty, 1989, p. 10). Davidson 
describes a subjectivity that has no essential core, and is conceptually located in the public 
space of language. He allows no priority to the subjective; The Davidsonian subject exists 
only in relation to the other and the objective world: "The objective and the inter-subjective 
are thus essential to anything we call subjectivity, and constitute the context in which it takes 
form" (Davidson, 1991, p. 165). 
The moral status of the firm is a crucial issue in business ethics "... our notions about 
the nature of corporations must inevitably shape our positions on crucial questions relating 
to corporate social responsibility and the most effective means of exerting social control over 
corporations" (Metzger & Dalton, 1996, p. 490). The debate concerning the ontological moral 
status of the firm has been long running. For a recent reviews of the debate see Moore (1999) 
or Metzger & Dalton (1996). 
To many readers it may seem to be intuitively clear that the corporation can have no 
moral status at all. Indeed, the nexus of contracts view of the firm which has achieved some 
dominance in legal and financial spheres "effectually excludes corporations per se from the 
class moral persons" (French, 1979, p. 207). In this view, the firm, as no more than a legal 
fiction serving as a locus for contract has no capacity for social or moral obligations and 
responsibilities. French cites Jensen and Meckling (1976) as a particularly flagrant example 
of this view. The ideological bias of the nexus of contracts view is quite blatant: "If the 
corporation is nothing but a nexus of contracts, why should the contractors be denied the 
freedom to design their contracts as they desire? " (Metzger & Dalton, 1996, p. 492). On the 
other hand, many will agree, with French (1979,1984,1995), that corporations are possibly 
the most important moral agents of our times, holding enormous potential both for good and 
bad. French argues that our ways of thinking about moral agency have not kept pace with the 
invasion of our society by corporations. He suggests that the intellectual legacy of "atomistic 
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individualist liberalism" has encouraged the "anthropological bigotry" (Danley, 1980) which 
has made it difficult for us to reformulate our thinking to accommodate the moral agency of 
the firm. In this chapter we want to respond to the challenge set by French and contribute to 
the enrichment our ways of thinking about the moral status of the corporation, by bringing 
a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective to bear on the issue. 
French argues that the firm qualifies as `agent' or `actor' by virtue of its possession 
of three basic capacities, which are common to all agents. Firstly "it has purposes, plans, 
goals and interests that motivate some of its behavior". Secondly it has "the ability to make 
rational decisions and to consider rational arguments". And finally it has "the facility to 
respond to events and ethical criticism by altering intentions and patterns of behavior that are 
harmful (or offensive) to others or detrimental to their own interests" (French, 1995, p. 12). 
For French the firm's capacity to "make rational decisions" and "to respond to events and 
ethical criticism" resides in its possession of a "corporate internal decision" (CID) structure. 
Whilst the firm may not normally be able to function without the participation of human 
beings its agency is not identical with theirs; it has the capacity for intentional action: 
"For a corporation to be treated as a Davidsonian agent it must be the case 
that some things that happen, some events, are describable in a way that 
makes certain sentences true, sentences that say that some of the things a 
corporation does were intended by the corporation itself. That is not 
accomplished if attributing intentions to a corporation is only a shorthand way 
of attributing intentions to the biological persons who comprise e. g. its board 
of directors. If that were to turn out to be the case then on metaphysical if not 
logical grounds there would be no way to distinguish between corporations 
and mobs. I shall argue, however, that a Corporation's Internal Decision 
Structure (its CID Structure) is the requisite redescription device that licenses 
the predication of corporate intentionality. " 
(French, 1979, p. 211) 
French's (1979) view of the CID structure can be criticised as being overly formal. It seems 
to imply that the decisions made by managers which do not conform with the CID structure 
can not be corporate actions, (see Danley, 1980, p. 185). We believe that by conceiving of the 
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firm as Lacanian subject, split between conscious and unconscious, French's idea of CID 
structures may be enriched. In particular the informal / unconscious elements of decision 
processes might be given fuller acknowledgement. Clearly each firm, as agent, has 
explicit/overt, we might say conscious, motivating "purposes, plans, goals and interests", 
found for example in the firm's constitution, mission statements, and so on. We suggest that 
the operation of desire in the unconscious is likely to have just as important effects on the 
firm's behaviour as any consciously specified goals and purposes. 
An element of continuity, `sameness', is vital to the constitution of any subject. We 
regard the firm as a special form of organisation, one with at least minimal continuity over 
time (as distinct from a mob). The firm has a history, a "memory", some continuity of 
elements, and a formal place in the symbolic order. It evidences an important degree of 
"identity and sameness over time" (French, 1995, p. 329). Just as Singer (1984) argues that 
corporate conscience should be thought of as an emergent property of complex cognitive 
systems, and just as the child develops / emerges as a moral subject, we will argue that the 
firm as Lacanian subject emerges through processes described by Lacan as alienation and 
separation. 
Much of the resistance to the conception of the firm as a moral agent/subject can be 
attributed, in our view, to the intellectual grip of methodological individualism and to 
inadequate biologistic conceptions of the nature of the human-being as subject. New 
perspectives on the individual person tend to emphasise the fragmented/multiple nature of 
the individual (Elster, 1986). Kerlin's resistance to the notion of the firm as moral agent is 
typical: 
it... we are more likely to achieve good and avoid evil by refusing to reify 
abstractions or personify relationships. ... we make a serious practical and 
ethical mistake in treating the group or the organization as a moral agent in 
its own right. Where a group is a force for evil we should change its 
membership or at the limit break it up. Moral blame or punishment must 
ultimately go to the people who have deliberately set the viruses loose or 
failed to control them or willingly submitted to them. 
(Kerlin, 1997, p. 1437) 
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Kerlin's view is consistent with the notion of the firm as machine (Ladd, 1970; Danley, 1980; 
Morgan, 1986), with the implication that it is set up, and more or less controlled, by 
individuals who must ultimately bear responsibility for its actions. It reflects the 
individualistic principle, defended by Lewis, that "... it is the individual who is the sole 
bearer of responsibility" (Lewis, 1948/1991, p. 32). We do not find the `firm as machine' 
metaphor persuasive, with Singer (1994, p. 201) we regard the firm as much more akin to a 
living system than to machine. And we are persuaded by French's view of the firm as capable 
of intentional action. Firms have rationality, purposes, interests, and we would argue 
`desires', which are distinct from and transcend those of the human beings upon which the 
firm depends. ' Velasquez's (1983) critique of French's position follows a similarly 
individualistic line. He concedes that French may be right to argue that we may infer 
intentions from corporate policies and procedures "and that these intentions may be attributed 
to the corporation" (Velasquez, 1983/1991, p. 120). However, he argues that the corporation 
can not act intentionally, because "... corporations do not originate acts in the manner 
required by attributions of responsibility - namely, by directly moving one's own body" 
(Velasquez, 1983/1991, p. 1 18). Ranken (1987) focuses on corporate motivation and argues 
that a moral agent it must be motivated to develop traits of character associated with moral 
responsibility. She suggests that the firm is incapable of such motive, "... it has no inner 
springs of change analogous to the motives of natural persons" (Ranken 1987, p. 634). This 
argument seems to be simply another version of the individualist case against corporate 
moral agency, albeit focussed on motivation rather than intention and action. It seems clear 
that French's basic argument applies as much to motivation as it does to intention and action. 
Corporate motive, for example the institution of policies of corporate change, clearly 
originates, as does corporate intentionality in the actions of individuals, however the firm 
transcends its origins and "... accomplishes a subordination and synthesis of the intentions 
and acts of various biological persons" (French, 1979, p. 212). 
In his recent writings, French seems to have retreated from any claim that the firm is 
a moral `person' to the more modest position that it is moral agent (French, 1995, p. 10). Such 
distinctions between moral person-hood and moral agency are also advanced by other authors 
(see Ozar, 1985; Manning, 1984,1988). Goodpaster and Mathews (1982) clearly regard the 
projection of person-hood and conscience to the firm as essentially a "useful" analogy. The 
Lacanian post-structuralist perspective is thoroughly anti-biologistic, the Lacanian subject 
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is `de-centred'; it is not located within the body. We will argue that the firm may qualify as 
a Lacanian subject, and we suggest that, in some respects, this might be a helpful way of 
thinking about the development of the firm as an emergent moral agent. 
The firm as Lacanian split subject 
We now offer an outline sketch of the firm as a split Lacanian subject. Our reading of Lacan 
is guided by Fink's critical interpretation of "the Lacanian subject" (Fink, 1995). It may 
perhaps seem inappropriate to apply a psychoanalytic framework to an institution such as a 
commercial firm. Yet it is quite normal to relate to institutions as if they were a single person, 
albeit one constituted by many bodies, and with the reservation that the institution and its 
`personality' are a `symbolic fiction' (See, Zizek, 1997, p. 140). Our treatment of the firm as 
subject, may appear less problematic if it appreciate that Lacanian subject is essentially a 
product of the symbolic order, an effect of language: 
"The subject is born in so far as the signifier emerges in the field of the Other. 
But, by this very fact, the subject - which was previously nothing if not a 
subject coming into being - solidifies into being. " 
(Lacan, 1964a, p. 199 
The Lacanian subject is not "flesh and blood", not a substance, prior to its emergence as an 
effect of the signifier it is "nothing" 12 . 
We will make use of Lacan's schema L to help elucidate his theorisation of the 
subject. Lacan employs various schemata in his writings. They are all attempts to represent 
his theories diagrammatically, and all consist of a number of points connected by vectors. 
The simplified form of the schema L, (Lacan, 1957-58, p. 193), is as follows: 
/A 
The symbols a and a' designate, indiscriminately, the ego and its counterpart, its specular 
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image, the little other (autre), the other that is not radically other. It is by identification with 
its image, whether in a real mirror or in the mirror of the imitative gestures of those around 
it, that the child begins to construct its ego in the mirror stage of development, and that the 
imaginary order is founded. The symbol A represents the big Other of the symbolic order, 
and S represent the subject, the subject of the unconscious". Whereas the ego exists as an 
object in the imaginary order, in relation to the little other, the Lacanian subject of the 
unconscious exists as a relation to the radical Other of the symbolic order14. The schema L 
represents both the intrasubjective structure of the subject and the intersubjective structure 
of relations through which the subject comes into being (see Evans, 1996, p. 170). The 
Lacanian subject is not simply located at the point marked S, in schema L. Rather, it is 
decentred, it "is stretched over the four comers of the schema" (Lacan, 1957-58, p. 194). The 
Lacanian subject is "split" or "divided" between ego and unconscious: between the false- 
being of the conscious self and the automatic operation of the signifying chain of language 
in the unconscious. Schema L emphasises the opposition between the symbolic and the 
imaginary; the subject's symbolic relation to the Other is continually impeded by the 
imaginary axis, the ego's relation with its counterpart. 
It is our contention that the commercial firm can usefully be conceived of as a "split 
subject", divided, and with two radically separate avatars: ego and unconscious. The 
false-being of the ego is sustained by a refusal of unconscious thought, "I think where I 
am not" (Lacan, 1957, p. 166). We suggest that the conscious discourse of the firm, as it 
represents itself, in its annual report and elsewhere, constitutes a narcissistic ego 
discourse, which the firm, as subject of the unconscious, has no interest in. 
The ego and the mirror stage of development: 
The Lacanian subject is not the thinking Cartesian subject; it is not the ego. The ego is, 
however, one element of the schema within which Lacan locates the subject, and it is a 
convenient starting point for our analysis: A convenient place for us to begin relating 
elements of the Lacanian theory of the subject to the commercial firm as subject. The 
Lacanian ego is formed in the process of the child's identification with its own specular 
image in the mirror stage of development's. The infant can recognise itself before it has 
command of its bodily movements. In its own reflection, then, it finds an image of coherence 
and unity, which contrasts with a real lack of co-ordination in its body. The infant's "joy is 
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due to his imaginary triumph in anticipating a degree of muscular co-ordination which he has 
not yet actually achieved" (Lacan, 1953, p. 15). The contrast provokes an aggressive tension 
in the infant, experienced as a rivalry with its own image. The tension is resolved through the 
child's identification with its image, its counterpart. It is this process of primary identification 
that produces the ego. The ego then, is formed through identification with something 
external, something alien and opposed to the subject; the subject is structured `as a rival with 
himself (Lacan, 1948, p. 22). Both the ego and the imaginary order itself, rest on alienation: 
"I is an other" (Lacan, 1948, p. 23). 
The Lacanian ego is effectively a crystallisation of ideal images, a reified 
agglomeration with which the child comes to identify. The primary ideal image is of a unified 
coherence in contrast with a real confusion of sensations and impulses. However, as the child 
develops, new images will become sedimented upon the old, and various ideal images will 
fuse to form the child's sense of self. The primary source of those images will be the 
reflections of itself that the child finds in its parents' "eyes". Those images will be 
internalised, ratified, and invested with value for the child, by virtue of the parents' reactions 
to them. They will be structured by language, which has both symbolic and imaginary 
aspects; Whilst the signifier is the basis of the symbolic order, the signified is part of the 
imaginary order. So that the child may come to "see" or recognise herself through the 
parental Other, as representative of the symbolic order, as "good" or "bad", "clever" or 
"stupid", and so on. For Lacan recognition in the imaginary is always misrecognition. With 
its entry to the imaginary order in the ego, the child fundamentally misrecognizes itself as 
unified and autonomous; self-knowledge (me-connaissance) becomes synonymous with 
misunderstanding (meconnaissance). In the formation of the ego in the mirror stage the 
subject is alienated from its symbolic determination in the discourse of the Other, the 
unconscious. The imaginary order is founded upon illusion; primarily the illusion of unity: 
"The illusion of unity, in which a human being is always looking forward to 
self-mastery, entails a constant danger of sliding back again into chaos from 
which we started; it hangs over the abyss of a dizzy Assent in which one can 
perhaps see the very essence of Anxiety. " 
(Lacan, 1953, p. 15) 
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Financial accounting is dominated by the specular metaphor. Clearly financial 
accounts may be seen as one of the reflecting surfaces in which the commercial firm as 
reporting entity comes to misrecognize itself. The financial accounts are part of the imaginary 
register where the firm as subject becomes alienated from itself: alienated from its symbolic 
determinants. The financial accounts are of course not the only "mirror" in which the firm 
may come to misrecognize itself as a unified entity; Financial analysts' reports, and the stock 
market itself constitute possibly more significant reflecting surfaces for the modern firm. 
Arguably the primary ratification of the firm's ego image is the valuation put upon the firm 
by its owners and the market - its share price. The firm's existence in the imaginary order 
will be linguistically structured under the influence of the symbolic order, the big Other, as 
represented by, for example, shareholders, analysts, company law, interest groups, and the 
market. The firm may come to recognise itself in the imaginary as "lean", "sleepy", 
"innovative", "predatory", "socially-responsible", and so on. Above all the firm will succumb 
to the primary illusion of unity; in its reflection in its accounts, the firm will misrecognize 
itself as unified entity. 
The object of Lacanian analysis is not to provide the analysand with a true "image" 
of her self; The ego is always a distortion, a seat of illusion and misunderstanding. Rather, 
analysis seeks to dislodge the alienating fixations of the imaginary order. Whilst structured 
linguistically, the ego essentially exists in the imaginary order and as such it tends to have 
a certain fixity. In the symbolic order of language slippage and displacement are of the 
essence. Lacanian psychoanalysis seeks to employ the symbolic to put the imaginary in 
motion, to cross the imaginary "plane of identification" (Lacan, 1964a, p. 273), by 
transforming images into words. In considering the firm as ego, then, the object is not to 
identify the firm's true image: its "economic reality". Rather, the firm as ego in the imaginary 
order is essentially an alienating fixation, resistant to change and the dialectic of desire and 
an impediment to the full development of the firm's determination as subject in the relation 
to the symbolic order. 
Thus far we have said little about the development of the Lacanian subject, as distinct 
from the ego. We will now turn to the processes through which the subject of the 
unconscious comes into being; The processes of alienation, separation and further separation. 
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Alienation: 
Schema L makes it clear that "Otherness", that which is alien to the subject, is central to the 
structuration of the subject. Lacan's concept of alienation describes a process of submission 
to the Other as language. The child chooses to express itself in a foreign tongue - its mOther 
tongue. The child's choice is forced; If it does not submit to language it can not come into 
being as a subject. Yet in submitting to language, in presenting itself and its need through the 
distorting medium of language the child is alienated; it chooses its own disappearance. In the 
same moment that the firm as subject appears in language it fades behind language: "if it 
appears on one side as meaning, produced by the signifier, it appears on the other as 
aphanasis" (Lacan, 1964a, p. 210). This alienation in language is, however, a necessary first 
step towards subjectivity. Through submission the child becomes a subject of language. 
Before alienation and submission there is no subject. Alienation institutes a location, a space 
in language, where a subject might be expected to be; it establishes the pure possibility of 
being. The space, however, is empty. Alienation institutes the symbolic order anew for each 
subject. But in that moment the subject slips behind the signifier and is "eclipsed" by 
language (Lacan, 1964b, p. 270), his or her only trace is as a place-marker in the symbolic 
order. 
Just as the child's place in the symbolic order "is already inscribed at birth, if only 
by virtue of his/(her) proper name" (Lacan, 1957, p. 148), by its parents, a place is prepared 
for the firm by its proprietors. The firm's entry to the symbolic order may be marked by its 
legal constitution, whether by partnership agreement or in company law as a registered 
company. The firm is given a name and is recognised as a legal person, it can contract with 
other parties, and it must express and give accounts of itself in language of the Other. In a 
sense, the firm "chooses" to express itself in the language of the Other - the language of 
business, of law and contract. The choice, of course, is a forced one, a "your money or your 
life! " situation (Lacan, 1964a, p. 212). In its entry to the symbolic order the firm is alienated 
and becomes subjected to the signifier. 
Separation: 
In the process of alienation the subject confronts the Other as language and in doing so 
`disappears'. Alienation confers no being on the subject; it merely allows the possibility of 
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being. The "subject is actualized" (Lacan, 1964b, p. 271), that is, the divided subject comes 
into being, only through a second confrontation with the Other, the Other as desire16. The 
process of separation hinges upon the mother's" desire, she must reveal herself as 
incomplete, desiring, as lacking". The child comes to be as a subject through desire, which 
arises in subordination to the mOther's desire; "man's desire is the desire of the Other" 
(Lacan, 1960, p. 312). The child desires to be the object of the mOther's desire, and tries to 
fill the whole space of her lack with his own lack of being, and thus restore a lost original 
relation of wholeness with the mother. That original relation of unity is dangerous to the 
child, as it is maintainable only by denial of the possibility of the child's subjectivity. The 
mOther's desire threatens to engulf the child. However, the tendency towards 
superimposition of the mOther's desire on the child is not fully realised. Firstly, there is an 
"incompatibility between desire and speech" (Lacan, 1958a, p. 275), so that the child striving 
to read between the lines and catch the traces of desire in what the Other says19 will always 
fail to fully grasp or decipher "the enigma of the adult's desire" (Lacan, 1964a, p. 214). The 
mOther's desire is always ambiguous and constantly in motion, it is always "the desire for 
something else" (Lacan, 1957, p. 167). And, secondly, even if the mOther's desire were 
known, the child would rarely be in a position to meet it. Other interests: the father, other 
children, her work, will command some of the space of her desire. Separation arises in the 
child's forced and painful recognition that it can not be the mOther's sole object of desire. 
Separation, then, may be understood as the outcome of a thwarted attempt by the subject to 
make two lacks coincide. 
In separation the child is protected from engulfment by the introduction of a third 
term, the something-other-than-the-child desired by the mOther, which draws her away. 
Lacan refers to this other term as the name-of-the-father, the signifier of the Other's desire, 
the primordial signifier, and as the phallus (as signifier of desire). The child obtains some 
protection from the Other's desire through the operation of the paternal metaphor, that is, 
through the articulation of desire with language in the symbolic order. A name is substituted 
for the Other's desire. By its mediation in language the Other's desire is thus made less 
threatening, neutralized, and the child is able to escape subjection to it. Through separation 
a breach is made in the unity of mOther-child20 which affords the child some space of its own 
where it can come into being21 as a subject, as something more than a mere place holder in 
the symbolic order. When separation breaches the unity of mOther-child it leaves a remainder 
214 
Chapter 5: The Reporting Entity as Divided Subject 
which Lacan refers to as `object a', a last trace, a reminder, of lost unity. 
The child's desire to be the sole object of the Other's desire "the desire of the Other" 
(Lacan, 1960, p. 312) is thwarted in separation. However, the desire of the Other remains the 
driving force of the child's desire. The child's desire is also caused by that part of the 
mOther's desire that aims beyond the child, it is the desire of the Other which causes any 
object to be desirable: "The object of man's desire ... is essentially an object desired 
by 
someone else" (Lacan, 1953, p. 12). Object a is the object of desire, the one object that always 
arouses or causes the subject's desire; it is the Other's desire. In fantasy, the subject can 
express and explore the way it wants to be related to object a22, that is, how it wants to 
position itself in relation to the desire of the Other. And by manipulating object a in fantasy 
the subject can orchestrate for itself an excitementjouissance 23 that becomes a substitute for 
lost mother-child unity. By virtue of separation, the alienated / divided subject, by clinging 
to object a in fantasy, can avoid recognising its division24 and obtain something of being, as 
distinct from existence as a mere placeholder in the symbolic order. 
Just as the child is brought into the world by virtue of its parents' desire, the firm 
arises because of the desire of the proprietors, as primary representatives of the Other. 
Further, we suggest that as the child wants to be the object of its mOther's desire, the firm 
wants to be the object of its proprietors' desire, it wants to fill the space of their lack. 
Language protects the firm from engulfment by the proprietors' desire; Just as the child can 
not fully grasp the mOther's desire for "something else", because language can not fully 
capture desire, the firm can not fully grasp the desire of its proprietors. Furthermore, just as 
the child is incapable of filling the space of its mOther's lack so the firm is incapable of 
filling the space of its proprietors' desire. The proprietors look beyond the firm, to other 
firms in which they have an interest, and to society, for some satisfaction of their desires. A 
process of separation takes place as the firm recognises that it can not make its own lack (of 
being) coincide with the proprietors' lack. In the process of separation the proprietor's desire 
begins to be mediated by language and substituted by a third term, the name-of-the-father, 
the primordial signifier which anchors the neurotic29 firm in the symbolic order. We suggest 
that for many firms, the signifier of the Other's desire, the name-of-the-father, seems to be 
"the-markets26. In this process of separation the proprietor's desire begins to be mediated 
through language. Through the introduction of a third term the initial unity of proprietor-firm, 
typical of the origin of most firms, is breached, and the is firm given some space of its own 
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where it might become a subject. 
As the child clings to object a, remainder of real unity with its mother, we suggest 
that the firm will cleave to a reminder of unity with its proprietors, its object a, the Other's 
desire. Object a is the object which sets desire in motion, the object around which the drives27 
circle and fantasy is structured. It is through fantasy that the subject "sustains (it)self as 
desiring" (Lacan, 1964a, p. 185), and can maintain an illusion of unity and wholeness. The 
specific object which plays the part of object a; will vary from subject to subject. However, 
in our society it is clear that money commonly becomes the object of desire, the object that 
promises to fill the space of our lack. In fantasy the subject will orchestrate its relations with 
object a, and manipulate it, so as to produce an excitement, jouissance, compensating for the 
loss of real unity. The subject may adopt a number of basic positions in relation to object a, 
the desire of the Other. Two dimensions of those possibilities are particularly notable (see 
Bracher, 1993, pp. 19-45). Firstly, corresponding with Freud's distinction between the 
anaclitic (outward-leaning) and narcissistic libido, the subject may desire either to have or 
to be object a. Secondly, and corresponding with Freud's distinction between the active and 
passive aims of the libido, the subject may take the position of the active desiring subject or 
may place him/herself as the passive object of the Other's desire and means for the Other's 
jouissance. 
An active anaclitic fantasy might involve the possession of money as a means for 
one's own jouissance. Here we might think of those firms that seem to find some satisfaction 
in amassing great stores of liquidity. A passive anaclitic fantasy positions the subject as 
being the object that the Other desires to have as a means to jouissance. This is essentially 
a masochistic fantasy. Here we may think of those firms that seem to become fixated upon 
their market/monetary value, their share price. The passive narcissistic fantasy is the fantasy 
of being the object of the Other's love, it is the fantasy of being special, a chosen people, 
race, etc. Here we might think of those firms which apparently become intoxicated with their 
"superiority" as the biggest, the best and so on, in such cases money may be the measure of 
that which makes them more valuable than other firms. Finally, the active narcissistic fantasy 
involves the attraction to object a in another and trying to identify or unite with it. Here we 
might think of certain firms that orchestrate the production of jouissance around acquisition 
strategies. For many firms profit itself may be object a. Lacan himself, in Seminar XVI 
(Lacan, 1969-70), equates object a with Marx's concept of surplus value. The 
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proprietor/capitalist as Other appropriates surplus value, so that the employees as subjects, 
and we suggest the firm as subject, find themselves in the position of being instruments of 
the Other's jouissance: "the subject finds him or herself in the unenviable situation of 
working for the Other's enjoyment, sacrificing him or herself for the Other's jouissance - 
precisely what the neurotic most abhors" (Fink, 1995, p. 96). 
Further separation - traversing the fundamental fantasy: 
Through separation the child can produce in fantasy a kind of being for itself. However, in 
fantasy the Other's desire, as object a, dominates and eclipses the neurotic subject, which 
fades behind the "object cause". Lacan suggests that it is only through a process of further 
separation that the neurotic subject might move beyond domination by the Other, beyond the 
false being of the ego and the "aphanatic" (fading) being of fantasy; The subject must 
traverse its fundamental fantasy. In separation, through the operation of the paternal 
metaphor, the Other's desire is named, and brought into the realm of signification. However 
that name is relatively static and restricted in its power of designation, it is not fully separated 
from the desire of the Other. The object of the process of further separation is to put the 
Other's desire fully into motion in language. In the process of further separation the Other's 
desire is increasingly signified, it is "unpacked" and brought into the full play of language. 
In this process the subject gains access to the signifier of the Other's desire, and ideally the 
subject may finally subjectify, that is, assume responsibility for, the Other's desire - as its 
own cause. 
The Lacanian subject is "an effect of language" (Lacan, 1964b, p. 265). It is a 
precipitate of meanings, and in particular the meanings generated by the relations between 
certain master signifiers, associated with the-name-of-the-father, and all other signifiers. It 
is "what the signifier represents, and the latter cannot represent anything except to another 
signifier: to which the subject who listens is thus reduced" (Lacan, 1964b, p. 265). The master 
signifiers are those terms, closely linked with the name-of-the-father, which put an end to the 
chain of associations in language, for the subject, they represent blockages or dead-ends in 
language. Cut off from the play of language, they have a relative fixity and their significance 
or meaning for the subject is opaque; they are nonsensical. This opacity does not mean that 
the neurotic subject is unable to understand or use the terms concerned in ordinary speech. 
It pertains, rather, to the meaning of the master signifiers for the subject in the constitution 
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of the subject - what they meanfor him or her. The neurotic split-subject is essentially 
eclipsed by meaning; "I identify myself in language, but only by losing myself in it like an 
object" (Lacan, 1953b, p. 86). The neurotic, or castrated, subject, is the subject that is 
represented, the subject "constituted by the message" (Lacan, 1960, p. 305), by the message 
"which the sender receives back from the receiver in an inverted form" (Lacan, 1953b, p. 85). 
The fixity of the master signifiers "freezes" the subject determined in relation to them 
(Lacan, 1964b, p. 269). Movement beyond neurosis, further separation, requires the 
dialecticization of the master signifiers. Their isolation must be broken. They must be 
brought into relationship with other signifiers28, and thereby given meaning for the subject. 
In the forging of the new linkages between the master signifier and other signifiers, in the 
making of new meaning, the subject as precipitation, as distinct from the subject as 
precipitate, flashes into being. This subject arising in the precipitation of meaning is no more 
than "metaphor's creative spark" as "it flashes between two signifiers" (Lacan, 1957, p. 157). 
Lacan contrasts the action of metaphorization and assimilation. In assimilation there is an 
automatic working of the symbolic order, things fit into the signifying chain without 
fundamental disruption, sense is made of things, things are understood, in a way which 
provides us with a comforting, but false, sense of being "I think therefore I am". Assimilation 
is characteristic of the alienated subject petrified by language: 
"The signifier, producing itself in the field of the Other, makes manifest the 
subject of its signification. But it functions as a signifier only to reduce the 
subject in question to being no more than a signifier, to petrify the subject in 
the same moment in which it calls the subject to function, to speak, as 
subject. " 
(Lacan, 1964a, p. 207) 
This petrified subject "is one who asks no questions about himself' (Soler, 1995, p. 48). 
Metaphorization, in contrast, produces something new; new meaning. Metaphorization 
unsettles the existing order in the symbolic by making new connections between signifiers. 
The production of new meaning through metaphor is more than the automatic functioning 
of the symbolic, it draws on the real and brings forth fleetingly the "subject in the real" 
(Lacan, 1964b, p. 265), that is, the subject as precipitation. This subject appears as an 
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evanescent interruption of the automatic functioning of language in the unconscious, as an 
irruption of the "I" in the place dominated, in the split subject, by "it", by the Other as; 
language, desire, demand, and jouissance. The "I" concerned here is not the reified I of 
conscious discourse, it is not the ego. Rather, it is an I that takes responsibility for the 
operation of the unconscious, for the linkages made there between signifiers and the 
meanings created, including the meanings which constitute the subject as precipitate of 
meaning. 
For Lacan the emergence of the subject as precipitation through further separation, 
that is the movement beyond the split subject dominated by the "it", is an ethical imperative; 
it is "a duty in the moral sense" (Lacan, 1955, p. 128). A duty which Lacan sees as implied 
by Freud's motto "Wo Es war, soll Ich werdeni29, which for Lacan translates as a "there 
where it was it is my duty that I should come to being" (Lacan, 1955, p. 129). The object of 
analysis then is to help the subject on an ethically dictated path beyond the split, to help the 
subject to put "I" in place of "it" in the unconscious; that is to assume responsibility for the 
making of new meaning in the unconscious. The aim or end of analysis can then be 
understood as the acceptance of responsibility for, or a subjectification of, the particular 
Otherness, which structures the possibility of one's being: "the realization by the subject of 
his history in his relation to a future" (Lacan, 1953b, p. 88). One must become the subject of 
one's own history30, "Wo Es war, soll Ich werden". 
In separation the Other's desire is named and begins to be mediated through 
language. In further separation the signifier/name of the Other's desire is dialecticized, 
subject to further signiferization, and broken away from the Other's desire, so that finally the 
subject may take responsibility for his or her own cause - the desire of the Other - by 
subjectifying the Other's desire. Further separation, then, entails the reformulation of the 
subject's relations to the Other as language and as desire (object a). It will therefore disturb 
the subject's symptomatic production of jouissance, and the semblance of being, obtained 
in fantasy. If the subject is to achieve further separation it must traverse its fundamental 
fantasy, it must give up its castration, its position as subjected by the Other, and it must 
renounce satisfactions earned through that submission. 
The castrated firm as subject, is the firm that constantly represents itself to the Other, 
the firm that constantly seeks attention and approval; from its owners, from the market, from 
financial analysts, from its industry regulators, and so on. The more it represents itself the 
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more it fades, "disappears beneath the signifier" (Lacan, 1964b, p. 265), the more castrated 
it becomes. We suggested, rather speculatively, that the name of the Other's desire for many 
firms, their name-of-the-father, might be "the-market". Closely linked with that name we 
would expect to find a cluster of master signifiers with respect to which the firm as castrated 
subject is determined as a sedimentation of meaning. Those master signifiers might typically 
include "growth", "profit", "competitiveness", "quality", "innovation", and so on. If the firm 
is to traverse its fundamental fantasy, the master signifiers that hold it frozen/petrified, must 
be set in motion, by being subjected to a process of increasing signiferization, they must be 
dialecticized31. For example; if we subject `profit' to further signification we might speak of 
it as a measure of response to demand - profit is a measure of the success with which 
companies have directed their resources to meet unsatisfied demand. From demand we may 
begin to speak of need - and when we speak of human need we may move to speak of rights, 
legal and moral, which arise in society, and so on. In language the Other's desire can be put 
in motion and forced to give way before the signification of the Other's desire32. The Other's 
desire, the cause of the firm as subject's desire, may thus be put in motion so that it moves 
out from proprietor to society. Through this process of increasing signification, the firm as 
subject may come to take responsibility for, subjectify, the Other's desire - its own cause. To 
achieve further separation the firm will need to sacrifice its castration - give up the 
submissive compensations habitually obtained in fantasy. We regard the movement beyond 
neurosis and the split, as a moral duty; the firm as subject must come to put "I" in place of 
"it" in the unconscious; it must assume responsibility for the making of new meaning in the 
unconscious, through metaphorization, and must subjectify its history". 
The Habermasian subject of discourse ethics 
In this section of the chapter we will argue that the Habermasian subject of discourse ethics 
stands in need of theoretical supplement from post-structuralism/psychoanalysis. We have 
argued in previous chapter for the institutionalization of Habermasian discourse ethics as a 
regulative ideal: It is certainly not our intention in this chapter to dismantle the case we have 
tried to build for the application of communicative reason in accounting policy making. We 
want to urge the necessity of engaging post-structuralist/post-modemist sensitivity to Alterity 
as a supplement to communicative reason, not as an alternative to reason. 
For Habermas the task of moral theory is to reconstruct, articulate and elaborate the 
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implications of, the normative presuppositions of social interaction that are intuitively 
grasped by competent social subjects/actors. He contends that the motivating force of moral 
claims depends upon confidence that they can be justified with convincing reasons. He 
argues that a reconstruction of convincing reason giving yields the insight that rationally 
motivating reasons for acceptance of a norm must conform to the principle of 
universalization (U), according to which a norm is valid if: 
(U) All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's 
interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative 
possibilities for regulation). " 
(Habermas, 1983, p. 65) 
(U) is the cornerstone of Habermas' discourse ethics, it ties the legitimation of norms to real 
discourse leading to a rational consensus. It requires that all those affected know their own 
real interests, and are willing and able to engage in debate with the objective of reaching 
mutual understanding. It requires an uncoerced debate in which each participant has freedom 
and the capacity to express their own interests and in which each party makes a real effort to 
understand the others by trying to share their perspective on the issue. The basic idea is that 
any normative consensus arising through such a process must encapsulate a general interest. 
Habermas' discourse ethics suggests, then, that behavioural expectations can have 
normative or moral force (as distinct from the force associated with legal or other 
imperatives) only among subjects who hold themselves accountable and autonomous, and 
only insofar as its validity can be justified to them with convincing reasons. (U) seems to 
demand a certain self-transparency from the subjects: "To the extent that we want to treat him 
as a subject at all, we must assume the other opposite us could say why he behaves in a given 
situation this way and not that" (Habermas, 1986, p. 123 quoted by Rehg, 1997, p. 35). 
Discourse ethics is, clearly, a thoroughly dialogistic model of normative legitimation. 
Nevertheless, it might seem that all that discourse ethics requires is that each individual 
subject affected, brings his or her own, more-or-less arbitrarily and privately chosen, values 
and interests to the debate/dialogue and is prepared to engage with other similar monads in 
an effort to find mutually beneficial compromises and constraining rules of action. This 
221 
Chapter 5: The Reporting Entity as Divided Subject 
would be a misconstrual of Habermas' view: He is vitally concerned to move beyond the 
philosophy of consciousness - the paradigm of the essentially rational conscious individual 
subject. He wants to locate (moral) cognition in the intersubjective, that is, in communicative 
action - in language. Habermas recognizes that individual identities, self-understandings, 
values, and interests (all the contents of moral discourse) are socially developed and 
embedded in social networks of mutual recognition. A central function of morality is then 
the protection of the web of relations within which fragile identities can develop and thrive: 
"Since moralities are tailored to suit the fragility of human beings 
individuated through socialization, they must always solve two tasks at once. 
They must emphasize the inviolability of the individual by postulating equal 
respect for the dignity of each individual. But they must also protect the web 
of intersubjective relations of mutual recognition by which these individuals 
survive as members of a community. " 
(Habermas, 1983, p. 200) 
Habermas certainly takes us to the brink of a transcendence of the philosophy of 
consciousness but he seems unwilling to take the final step. (U) takes us beyond 
individualism by insisting that rational moral conviction must be formed in relation to the 
intersubjective process of a real debate in which there is full reciprocal perspective taking 
leading to consensus. However, ultimately (U) locates moral conviction in the individual: "it 
still assumes that each individual is the ultimate site of rational conviction or insight, the 
common space of exchange not withstanding" (Rehg, 1997, p. 234). 
Despite its counterfactual and essentially paradoxical nature, the full reciprocal 
perspective taking demanded by (U) does provide a valuable regulative ideal against which 
real processes of normative legitimation can be measured. However, the "facticity" of real 
discourse points towards the need for a fuller decentring of normative legitimation. Real 
perspective sharing is always less than complete, and moreover as society becomes more 
complex and differentiated it becomes increasingly unreasonable to assume that individuals 
can have full appreciation of any debate. That is, it becomes increasingly difficult to sustain 
the idea that the individual can form rational conviction or insight. In holding on to a residue 
of monadic individualism, (U) fails to recognize the real need for decentred cooperative 
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formation of rational conviction. Confidence in the legitimacy of norms would then generally 
need to be based not upon the individual's appraisal of arguments, but rather on the quality 
of the argumentative procedures, and it would inevitably entail reliance on trust: 
"If real processes of discourse are decentred ... such that individual conviction 
becomes impossible; if rational consensus is cooperative even to the degree 
of requiring a decentred, "cooperative insight, " then it would seem that 
something like trust must inhabit the heart of rational conviction. " 
(Rehg, 1997, p. 233) 
Habermas recognizes that subjects are individuated through language, but his 
discourse ethics seems to require that individuals emerge from the process of individuation 
as relatively unified, transparent, and autonomous subjects. Discourse ethics essentially 
requires that subjects; (i) have real interests, (ii) know their interests are able to express them 
in terms of some relatively fixed vocabulary, and (iii) have the power and inclination to 
further their interests in argument. (U) relies on a metaphysics of presence - "the self- 
presence of the cogito, consciousness, subjectivity, the co-presence of the other and of self, 
intersubjectivity" (Derrida, 1967/1976, p. 12), that when viewed from a post-structuralist 
perspective will seem quite untenable. The ideal of complete reciprocal perspective sharing 
reflects the vain dream of personal and political transparency; "the Rousseauist dream ... of 
a transparent society, visible and legible in each of its parts" (Foucault, 1980, p. 152). A post- 
structuralist analysis will emphasize that as we are not transparent to ourselves we should not 
expect other individuals or the community to be transparent. 
The post-structuralist, say Lacanian, subject is always in flux - in process of 
construction and reconstruction - always decentred. For Lacan the unity of the subject is 
always a fiction, an illusion: "One can never be sure of one's self, one's desires, one's 
psychic borders" (McAfee, 2000, p. 115). The Lacanian subject, as we have seen, is 
essentially divided, it is constituted and located in the relational tensions between conscious 
and unconscious, self and other; Its identity is founded upon alterity and differentiation. The 
Lacanian subject's relation to the other is complex, it includes the threat of negation and it 
is only through breaking with the Other that the Lacanian subject can come into being. 
However ultimately the Lacanian/post-structuralist view emphasizes the enormity of our debt 
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to the Other - without alterity there could be no subject. In the Lacanian split subject's 
indebtedness to the Other there is the promise of a new ethics of community. The split 
subject need not always be at odds with alterity, rather: 
"she can come to terms with her strangeness, and thus reconfigure her 
relationship with others. This entails becoming cognizant of her own alterity. 
... a subject-in-process can embrace alterity as a precondition 
for subjectivity. 
Insofar as the unconscious and the strangers around us are constitutive of our 
own identity (identity being a product of difference), we each need others. " 
(McAfee, 2000, p. 132) 
In coming to terms with our division and alterity we may move towards a more profound 
recognition of our essential dependence on the Other and our responsibility to the Other. Far 
from disabling our effective political agency, the recognition of our own history in the 
language and desire of the Other can form the basis for the social trust which we have argued 
above is vital if something like discourse ethics is to be retained as persuasive regulative 
ideal. Indeed, we suggest that recognition of our heterogeneity (our lack of 
sovereignty/autonomy) and the fragility and thoroughly relational nature of our identities is 
a precondition for our becoming effective political agents. 
The post-structuralist/post-modern supplement communicative reason 
In the transition from traditional to modem society, morality is increasingly decoupled from 
ethical discourse, conceptions of the good life and related self-understandings, and from the 
associated motivational resources. The moral point of view becomes intellectualistically 
located in rational discourse and, detached from powerful action motivating resources; 
morality faces a "motivational deficit" (Habermas, 1996, p. 35). The distinction we are 
making here between ethics and morality is important: We are using the term "morality" in 
a Habermasian sense, to refer to the norms, the obligations and prohibitions, that we can 
expect to be binding on all across society, and to questions of how we can justify such norms. 
The moral, then, operates horizontally; it refer to those matters on which rational consensus 
can be obtained: 
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"Thus a person takes the moral point of view when he deliberates like a 
democratic legislator on whether the practice that would result from general 
observance of a hypothetical proposed norm could be accepted by all those 
possibly affected viewed as potential co-legislators. " 
(Habermas, 1996, p. 30) 
In our increasingly complex modern pluralistic society, the need for powerful consensual 
normative integration and coordination is surely self-evident - the alternatives are coercion 
or chaos. In the context of our discussion here, two senses of the term "ethical" can be 
usefully distinguished. Firstly it refers to those questions and discourses of "the good life", 
often religiously based that have traditionally motivated morality - e. g., with promises of 
personal salvation. Such ethical discourse always operates vertically, that is, it always works 
within particular life histories and traditions. The diversity of ethical conceptions within 
modern pluralist society undermines the capacity of the ethical to motivate norms, which 
need to operate horizontally - across all of society. 
Lacanian and other post-structuralist/post-modern conceptions of the (split) subject, 
point towards the need for an alternative conceptualization of "ethics"; an ethics of difference 
and Alterity, as opposed to an ethics of unity, sameness, and the good life. Bauman (1989, 
1993) argues that Levinas' work represents the most adequate attempt to think through the 
ethical implications of post-structuralism/post-modernity. Levinas gives an account of the 
subject as "ethical" to its very foundation. For Levinas it is the "ethical" relation of absolute 
responsibility for the Other that originates, and defines the space of, each subject's being: 
"Responsibility in fact is not a simple attribute of subjectivity, as if the latter already existed 
in itself, before the ethical relationship" (Levinas, 1985, p. 96). This ethical relation of 
responsibility operates at a pre/non-discursive level, and indeed may be damaged by any 
attempt to discursively rationalize it. Rather than see ethics as primarily a societal product 
(conventionalism) and society as man's saviour from natural barbarity, Levinas' ethics of 
responsibility encourages us to see the ethical impulse as ontologically foundational for the 
subject. And it suggests that alienating social circumstances can undermine the immediacy 
of the ethical impulse to respond to the Other. From this perspective we may see society, and 
in particular modern rationality (instrumental and communicative), as potentially corrosive 
to the ethical impulse. Such practices block our response to the other by putting distance or 
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barriers between the subject and the Other. Bauman argues that it is this manufacture of an 
ethical distance in modernity which made possible the horrors of the Holocaust; the most 
remarkable feature of which, for Bauman, was that through rationality, an abhorrent project 
was able to overcome "the animal pity by which all normal men are affected in the presence 
of physical suffering" (Arendt, 1963, p. 106, quoted by Bauman, 1989, p. 20). 
We suggest that a universal ethics of difference and responsibility for the Other, as 
distinct from any tradition bound ethics of the good life, has the potential to motivate and 
supplement the moral, in even a highly pluralist society. And we agree with Bauman that 
modern society is characterized by certain external blocks on the recognition of responsibility 
to the Other; Blocks which need to be overcome if the promise of an ethics of difference is 
to be realized. Foremost amongst the systemic blocks to the realisation of man's social being- 
for-the-other are the relations of domination and alienation imposed by capitalism and the 
ideology of commodity fetishism which impedes recognition of reality of those relations. The 
nascent subject's relation to fantasy presents, however, an even more fundamental barrier to 
the recognition of absolute responsibility for the Other. Taking a Lacanian perspective, we 
suggest that the subject's ethical responsibility for the Other can only come clearly into view, 
for the subject, as it traverse its fundamental fantasy. It is only by moving through the process 
of "further separation" that the split subject can move beyond domination by the Other, and 
that relations of subject and Other, characterized/haunted by a threat of negation, can be 
pacified and become the basis for the actualization of an ethic of responsibility for the Other. 
Transcendence of the fundamental fantasy requires that the subject come to terms with 
Alterity; it must subjectify its own cause in the desire of the Other by recognising and taking 
responsibility for its relations to the Other which are constitutive of its very being. This 
process requires that the subject confront the fragility and thoroughly divided and relational 
nature of its being, and demands that it face up to its essential dependence on the Other. 
Insofar as it forces a break with the illusions of unity, sovereignty and autonomy, the 
transcendence of the fundamental fantasy is a vital/necessary step in any subject's 
development as an effective post-modem political/moral agent. Through the recognition and 
subjectifization of our split/divided subjectivity we may progress towards; (i) an ethics based 
on difference and responsibility for the Other, and (ii) a morality founded upon the 
institutionalization of the regulative ideal of discourse ethics stripped of monadic 
individualism and sustained by a fuller recognition of the relational nature of subjectivity and 
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of the necessity of our reliance on the Other - the necessity of trust. 
Diana Coole (1996) makes a strong case that the incitation of alterity, typical of post- 
structuralist/post-modern practices and discourses, is an essential supplement to any 
emancipatory politics, based on a morality of communicative reason. Coole suggests that 
Habermas shows hostility towards the discourse of post-structuralism/post-modernity in, for 
example, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Habermas, 1985a), primarily because 
those discourses rely on an appeal to the Other, in which he can find no emancipatory 
potential. Central to Habermas' work is the thesis that both his predecessors in critical theory 
(including Horkheimer and Adorno) and the post-structuralists/post-modernists, have, in their 
own ways, failed to grasp the emancipatory potential of reason. For Habermas, the early 
critical theorists follow Weber in making the mistake of equating reason with purposive- 
instrumental reason, while the post-modernists, according to Habermas, forsake reason 
altogether. Both miss the emancipatory potential of communicative reason orientated to the 
cooperative disclosure of the world, to transform that world through reflexive critique. For 
Habermas modernity is characterized by the tension between two modes of rationality 
instrumental and communicative reason, "lifeworld and system, emancipation and 
reification" (Coole, 1996, p. 224). He sees the struggle between reason and its Other - the 
sacred, that which is immune to reason - as essentially occurring in the transition from 
traditional to modern society. In that transition, the Other of reason is overcome through the 
"linguistification of the sacred", and the conditions are set for the fulfillment of modernity's 
emancipatory promise. Coole suggests Habermas' hostility to post-modernist discourse can 
be traced to its invocation/reinvigoration of the Other, the beyond of reason/discursive 
analysis: "his entire project is predicated for its emancipatory claims on the exclusion of that 
alterity to which postmodernism appeals" (Coole, 1996, p. 224). Alterity is effectively excised 
from his account of the modem lifeworld and subject. The lifeworld is defined in essentially 
linguistic terms and is thus, in principle, entirely open to the possibility of communicative 
critique and rationality. And, the Habermasian subject is given an analogous transparency: 
"Habermas gives subjects privileged communicative access to their inner selves such that, 
despite communicative blockages, there is in principle nothing immune to rational self- 
communication" (Coole, 1996, p. 226-227). His vision of emancipation through 
communicative rationality allows little room for recognition of the Other of rationality - the 
non-systemic, non-rational, pre-and-non-discursive, forces and processes at work within even 
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modem society, and within the subject. He overstates the potential of rationality by 
substantially overlooking the non-systematic unconscious; those elements that can not be 
discursively retrieved or validated. 
The post-structuralist/post-modernist invocation of Alterity subverts modernism's 
rationalist project not by means of a retreat to irrationality but rather by revealing the 
limitations of and violence done by rationality (both instrumental and communicative) when 
it "it aims to make everything knowable, communicable, transparent" (Passerin d' Entreves, 
1996, p. 26). In their initcement of alterity, the post-modernists want to destabilize the rational 
by opening it up to the excluded voice of the Other, that is, they intend to awake us to 
processes of exclusion and suppression working within rationality's rendering of things 
knowable. The post-modernists' provocations and the absolute ethical claim of the Other 
operate together within those circuits of power and alterity that are resistant/immune to 
discursive redemption/analysis. However, we need not see the post-structuralism/post- 
modernism project as an attempt to overthrow reason and put unreason in its place. It is more 
helpful to see it as an attempt to destabilize reason's closure, that is, as an enterprise that 
worries reason along its boundaries, and allows the claim of the Other to be glimpsed (but 
not rationally dissected). It is this subversive role that makes post-structuralism/post- 
modernism political: 
"From this perspective it is not just purposive-instrumental reason that 
colonizes and subjugates, but a metaphysical will to lucidity as such. 
Irruptions of alterity are a means of opening spaces through which the 
unnameable and hence uncolonizable might be glimpsed, as a strategy 
subversive of reason's closures, not a leap into the irrational. " 
(Coole, 1996, pp. 238-239) 
The post-modem ethics of difference points to the possibility of a reinvigoration of 
moral motivation. While moral claims must continue to draw force from their "rationality" 
that force can be underwritten by the ethical impulse - that is the feeling/intuition of absolute 
obligation to the Other; The sense of being bound, not by a trained conscience, but simply 
by the presence of the Other. That is, bound by a responsibility/obligation for the Other that 
can not be understood -a claim that operates below the level of discourse and rationality in 
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which moral claims circulate. It is the immediacy of the ethical relation of absolute 
responsibility that gives it motivational, action-guiding, force. And, whilst this ethics of 
responsibility is clearly opposed to the cognitive discourse of morality, we suggest that its 
force may be harnessed to the moral. The ethical imperative may drive action in response to 
interpreted moral claims by force of the uninterpreted and always unfulfilled claim of the 
Other, recognized by "its gnawing sense of unfulfilledness, by its endemic dissatisfaction 
with itself' (Bauman, 1993, p. 80). We are absolutely not suggesting that the ethical can be 
subsumed within the moral. On the contrary if the ethical claim is to maintain its force it 
must remain outside discourse: "The transcendence of the other - the infinite dimension of 
the obligation in Levinas' terms - is neutralized when obligation is subject to discourse" 
(Furrow, 1996, p. 162). Rather, we are suggesting that the Levinasian foundational ethic of 
being-for-the-Other provides us with an account of ethical agency which can put force behind 
moral responsibility, yet provide a basis for the ethical transcendence of the moral point of 
view, (the point of view of discursive rationality): 
"This capacity to be shocked by others suffering, and resistance to settling 
ersatz explanations of it, accounts for our capacity to transcend the limitations 
of a moral point of view, and provides us with a recharacterized sense of 
universal moral agency ... The virtue of such a position is that it allows us to 
conceptualize an ethics and politics that depends only minimally on shared 
beliefs. " 
(Furrow, 1995, p. xx) 
The Lacanian model suggests that through the transcendence of the fundamental fantasy the 
subject may emerge as an ethical subject-for-the-Other and as an effective political/moral 
agent. This post-modem moral agent will be reconciled to her own alterity and division. She 
will be deeply aware of her dependence on the Other and, recognizing the fragility of her own 
relational identity, she will appreciate that only within a just and relatively stable framework 
of social relations can self and Other thrive and effectively pursue their ethical projects of 
self-realization. She will therefore be committed to development and maintenance and of a 
just normative framework. In a modem pluralism norms tend to lose any motivating 
connection with an ethic of the good life34 and must, in the first instance be motivated by 
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their rational validity. This post-modern agent-for-the-Other will thus have a commitment 
to universally binding moral norms validated through communicative reason but her moral 
motivation and commitment of will not rely on just the abstraction of the moral point of 
view. It will be impelled by an acceptance of an absolute ethical responsibility-for-the-other, 
expressed as a commitment to maintenance and protection of the relational space within 
which self and other may realize themselves. 
This subject's real commitment to the validation of norms through the communicative 
reason, will be tempered by an awareness of her own alterity and division, she will recognise 
the limits of reason and be concerned to minimise the violence done by the always premature 
closure of reason. Nevertheless, just this breach with monadic individualism, this fuller 
recognition of the relational and ultimately exogenous nature of subjectivity, associated with 
the post-modern/Lacanian subjectivity, is vital if the regulative ideal of discourse ethics is 
to be made plausible. Real progress towards the realisation of the ideal of rational will 
formation in the public sphere of the Other will require a reliance on a measure of trust that 





"Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, 
And sorry I could not travel both 
And be one traveller, long I stood 
And looked down one as far as I could 
To where it bent in the undergrowth; " 
(Robert Frost, "The Road Not Taken", 1916, p. 129) 
This thesis set out to defend the emancipatory potential of accounting. Our efforts to 
sustain that defence took us on an intellectual journey that ranged from the analytic 
philosophy of Donald Davidson through Jürgen Habermas' critical theory to the post- 
structuralist psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan. In this conclusion we will look back on the 
road taken and emphasise the continuities and logical development of the route. We will 
also take some space here to very briefly comment on certain roads not taken by this 
thesis. This thesis developed through a process of auto-critique: At each of the main 
phases of the intellectual progress charted here, the position presented has been subject to 
a measure of critical reflection, weaknesses identified, and ways beyond the weaknesses 
offered. Self-critique has therefore been integral to the development of the views 
presented in previous chapters; in this conclusion we will review the main points of that 
critique but will not attempt to reconstitute it in detail nor will we, at this stage, undertake 
any systematic new critique. 
The development of the thesis was an essentially constructive process. Our auto- 
critique led not to the undermining or destruction of the views previously presented, but 
generally to a recognition that they needed to be supplemented in some way. From the 
outset we associated accounting's emancipatory potential with its capacity to provide 
knowledge of the objective publicly accessible world we share. Initially we addressed 
financial accounting as an essentially descriptive enterprise. This does not mean that we 
somehow failed to appreciate that accounting has a moral aspect; but rather that we 
implicitly assumed that the descriptive and normative dimensions of accounting could be 
cleanly divided and dealt with separately. Taking that division for granted we proceeded 
to make a case for the possibility of descriptive objectivity in accounting, by inference 
from the account given by Davidson's of the possibility of knowledge of any type. We 
initially use our Davidsonian justification of the possibility that we can have accounting 
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knowledge of the objective public world we share as a basis for responding to those 
theorists who cast doubt on the possibility of any objectivity in accounting. In particular, 
we use Davidson to resist the logic of accounting theorists, like Ruth Hines, who would 
encourage us to drop altogether what they see as the "mundane" notion of "an objective, 
shared and intersubjectively accessible world" (Hines, 1991, p. 317). Our Davidsonian 
view of the possibility of descriptive objectivity in accounting remains at the very heart of 
our thesis as it develops in subsequent chapters; it is by no means naive and at no stage do 
we abandon it. At all stages of the development of our views we follow Davidson in 
arguing that intersubjectivity is all the foundation we need, or can have, for objectivity. 
Nevertheless as our analysis proceeds we come to recognise that the Davidsonian 
perspective on accounting objectivity needs to be supplemented by an approach that more 
explicitly engages with the moral dimension. 
In chapter 3 we used an analysis of the debate surrounding the development of 
accounting for deferred tax as a vehicle to further our examination of the nature of 
financial accounting and the problem of objectivity in accounting. Two conclusion of our 
consideration of the deferred tax debate are particularly notable: Firstly, we observed that 
the descriptive objectivity of accounting for issues like deferred tax may be low because 
in such cases accounting concepts employed lack clear objective referents in the 
intersubjectively accessible world. The absence of clear objective referents for many 
accounting concepts allows massive scope for failure of intersubjective descriptive 
consensus, that is, failure of objectivity. We recognised that this issue has been identified 
by other observers of accounting, including Sterling and Chambers, who have called for 
accounting to become more rational, less bound by myth and tradition, and more like 
science; that is, more closely tied to an objective reality. Secondly we analysed 
accounting in terms of the science ethics dichotomy drawn by Bernard Williams and 
concluded accounting is not quite like science; more specifically we recognized that in 
accounting the descriptive and the normative are deeply and inextricably entangled. That 
recognition impelled our recourse to Habermasian discourse ethics. Given our acceptance 
that the moral and descriptive can not be neatly separated in accounting, we were forced 
to recognize that it can not be sensible to conceive of accounting and accounting 
objectivity in purely descriptive terms. 
We use Habermas' discourse theory to justify the view that, at least potentially, 
we can have normative objectivity in accounting. We progress from an implicit and 
relatively unsophisticated conception of financial accounting as a process that can 
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reasonably be addressed as an essentially descriptive enterprise, to a view of it as a 
process within which the descriptive and normative dimension are inextricably entangled. 
This recasting of our view of financial accounting compels us to re-conceptualize the 
problem of objectivity in accounting and drives us to supplement our Davidsonian 
analysis of the possibility of descriptive objectivity in accounting with a Habermasian 
approach to the possibility of normative objectivity. The move to Habermas' theory of 
discourse ethics is essentially supplementary; at no stage do we relinquish our 
Davidsonian view of the promise of descriptive objectivity in accounting. On the 
contrary, our view is that normative objectivity is a necessary complement to descriptive 
objectivity in accounting: an objectively validated normative position provides the 
objective viewpoint and concepts in terms of which we can have objective descriptive 
knowledge of the world. 
We stress that we do not argue that we can have objective adjudication between 
value-preferences or between competing conceptions of the "good life". We agree that 
evaluative questions can only be addressed from within particular forms of life; they are 
simply not open to objective validation. We are therefore certainly not suggesting that we 
might somehow be able to objectively adjudicate between the value systems of say 
Christianity and Hinduism. Furthermore we recognise that accounting norms may be 
deeply affected by the evaluative system within which they are embedded. However, we 
follow Habermas in arguing that in modernity a set of moral/normative questions can be 
broken away from determination by the evaluative and addressed objectively. Habermas 
argues that in traditional society the ethical sphere appears as a totality in which the 
norms of action and question of justice are determined by answers given to the evaluative 
questions, and consequently the norms in such a society are not open to objective 
validation. However, in the transition from traditional society to modernity the ethical 
sphere breaks into two components, the evaluative and the moral, so that in modern 
pluralist society a set of moral, questions becomes detached from the evaluative. The 
moral questions are defined as those very questions that admit of a generalizability of 
interests and are therefore open to the possibility of objective validation through rational 
argument. Moreover, Habermas suggests that these moral questions have a priority, over 
the evaluative/ethical questions, because their resolution allows the integration and 
coordination of society and thus sets the social conditions within which particular forms 
of life may flourish and the ethical questions they raise be addressed. Habermas shows 
how moral norms of action can be objectively validated through communicative reason, 
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that is, through the institutionalisation of what he calls "discourse ethics". We argued that 
accounting regulation falls within this moral sphere and is open to objective validation 
through rational argument and in particular the application of discourse ethics. It is in this 
application of communicative reason that we see the fuller/second dimension of 
accounting's emancipatory potential. Accounting regulation established through the 
institutionalisation of discourse ethics may truly contribute to a communicative 
integration of society and help to put a normative check on the colonising depredations of 
the system upon the lifeworld - within which we have our being as relational subjects. 
We discussed the continuity of the Habermasian and Davidsonian perspectives in 
chapter 3. We will not repeat that discussion here except to note that crucially both rely 
on a truth/validity semantics and on the interpretive principle of charity. We see the 
Habermasian analysis as essentially an extension to the normative domain of the 
Davidsonian view of objectivity as intersubjectivity. We should like to re-emphasise that 
our Habermasian view of the possibility of normative objectivity complements rather than 
supersedes the Davidsonian analysis of the possibility of descriptive objectivity. 
We located our optimistic defence of accounting's emancipatory potential in terms 
of Habermas' analysis of the evolution of society. The analysis we present in chapter 1, of 
the ASB's developing conceptual framework for financial reporting project and the 
debate surrounding their work, shows accounting in process of transition from the 
traditional towards modernity. It is in modernity's potential for rationality that we see the 
possibility of emancipation. In chapter 2 we drew on Davidson's work to defend 
objectivity and rationality against those "totalized critiques" of reason which have 
featured prominently in the critical accounting literature in recent decades, and which we 
see as undercutting the possibility of rational critique. Modernity, however, is 
characterised by the tension between two modes of reason, instrumental reason and 
communicative reason, which reflects a tension between systemic and communicative 
integration/coordination of society. We argue in chapter 3 that, given the entanglement of 
the descriptive and normative in financial accounting, the full emancipatory potential of 
modernity can only be realised in the case of accounting through the application of 
communicative reason. In chapter 4 we used Habermas' analysis of discourse ethics to 
defend the possibility of communicative reason and objectivity in accounting against 
those accounting theorists who would like to reduce reason in accounting to instrumental 
reason and accounting objectivity to descriptive objectivity. 
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We have tried to defend the positive dimension of modernity's triumph over the 
traditional; that is, we have stressed the emancipatory potential in the triumph of reason 
over the Other of reason. We are, however, aware of the possible distortions associated 
with the development of modernity and we have argued that the crisis tendencies 
immanent to capitalist modernity can be traced in modern financial accounting. We have , 
however, argued that those tendencies can be overcome through reason and most 
particularly through the application of communicative reason, construed in Habermasian 
terms of non-coercive intersubjectivity, that is, reciprocal perspective taking oriented to 
the achievement of mutual understanding and attainment of rational consensus. And we 
have emphasised that such communicative reason can only be attained through the 
deliberate institutionalisation of democratic processes and the ideals of discourse ethics, 
in all spheres of society - including accounting regulation. 
We argue throughout that objectivity is essentially a matter of degree, and that the 
more objective position is that which is more inclusive; that which is open to the greater 
degree of intersubjective agreement; that which is less local and narrowly perspectival. 
We recognize a problem with the Habermasian moral point of view of discourse ethics. 
The problem is that it perspectival, it is the point of view of reason, all be it 
communicative reason. It excludes what we have called the other of reason, that is, all 
that can not be consciously articulated, and brought to discourse/argument; it excludes the 
unconscious. Whilst we have resisted any totalized critique of reason (see chapter 2), we 
accept the validity of the poststructuralist/postmodern critique of reason's exclusion of its 
Other. We recognise that both instrumental and communicative reason perpetrate this 
exclusion. 
In the final chapter of the thesis we turned to Lacan's post-structuralist, 
psychoanalytic theory for supplement to the Habermasian perspective of reason. We 
accept that the Habermasian analysis of reason's potential is overoptimistic. In particular, 
we appreciate that, despite his efforts to overcome the philosophy of consciousness, 
Habermas ultimately retains an inadequate model of the subject of discourse ethics. We 
recognise that the Habermasian model needs to be augmented by a sensitivity to Alterity 
and the unconscious; defined as, that which is immune to discursive retrieval and 
communicative reason. We argue that the post-structuralist / psycho-analytic incitation of 
the Other of reason should not be seen as leading to the replacement of reason by 
unreason but rather as means by which the premature closure of reason might be 
identified and resisted. That is, we see it as a means by which the narrowness of the 
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perspective of reason can be challenged. We therefore argued that, whilst we must hold 
onto reason and strive to develop our institutional capacity for instrumental and 
communicative reason, through which we impose some measure of normative control on 
the system, we must supplement reason with an openness to the (inarticulate) claims of 
the Other. Only through reason and in particular through communicative reason can we 
hope to tame the system of capitalism, yet we must not let reason become a straight- 
jacket; we must learn to resist reason's "will to lucidity". We must allow the Other of 
reason to be reflected in our deliberative processes. This means that our institutions must 
be open to the irruption of the unconscious and the inarticulate, they must allow new 
metaphors and meaning to be forged and help us move beyond the automatic functioning 
of language, that is beyond our castration or eclipse in language. We need institutions that 
help us to ask questions about ourselves and help us to move beyond our petrification in 
the spontaneous working of language. We need institutions that will challenge us to 
reformulate our relations to the Other, to recast our interests and transcend our fantasies. 
All this means that we must be prepared to institutionalise instability, we must admit 
other voices to our debates and we must not insist that they speak "our language" we must 
welcome disruption. In chapter 3 we criticised the Accounting Standard Board's 
conceptual framework project for its failure to do all these things and most especially we 
criticised its premature closure. As modernity matures and the stifling grip of unreason, in 
the shape of tradition and the sacred, recedes into history, we hope that we may become 
more confident in the application of a communicative reason, that does not demand 
closure but rather provides real "toeholds for new initiatives" (Rorty, 1991, p. 13-14). 
On any journey one is bound to take certain paths and not others. We recognise 
that we can not be fully aware of all the paths that other, differently disposed, travellers 
might have preferred. We certainly will not attempt to go down new paths at this stage. 
However, we are conscious of two issues that, given time, we would have liked to pursue. 
Firstly, we recognize that we have not presented any carefully constructed, detailed, 
argument to support our claim that financial accounting can, in Habermasian terms, be 
properly conceived of as falling within the moral domain. The moral sphere, as distinct 
from say the evaluative, includes those normative questions that could be settled 
discursively in terms of the generalizability of interests. Some accounting theorists would 
argue that the ineradicable conflict of class interest that underlies capitalism and the 
tendency to crisis that we analysed in chapter 1 mean that an accounting for capitalism 
ultimately is not open to validation in terms of the generalizability of interests through 
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communicative reason (See Puxty, 1986; Dillard, 1991). To these theorists accounting is 
"shaped above all by a systematic tendency to privilege the interests of capital relative to 
labour" (Willmott, 1990, p. 325). They would argue that within the systematically 
distorted system of capitalism accounting's claim to serve the public interest will always 
be essentially false; it serves the private interests of capital. Our own view is perhaps a 
little less radical; we take the view that even in our capitalist society law and regulation, 
including accounting regulation, produced in accordance with the principles of discourse 
theory has the potential to put a real public interest check on the capitalist system. The 
possibility of social progress lies not in the destruction of capitalism but in its disciplining 
and modification through communicative reason: "The intention is to tame the capitalist 
economic system, that is, to "restructure" it socially and economically" (liabermas, 1998, 
p. 19). 
Which questions fall within the moral sphere and can be settled in terms of 
generalizability of interests, can ultimately only be decided by the outcome of real 
practical discourse/debate governed by the principles of discourse theory. Outside of such 
a process we have no way to prove that accounting regulations fall within the moral 
sphere. We recognize that those theorists who are inclined to insist that, under capitalism, 
financial accounting will always be systematically distorted are liable to find our views 
rather naive and idealistic; perhaps dangerously so. We appreciate of course that financial 
accounting is historically rooted in the functions of capitalism, we simply don't accept 
that it must remain so. We place faith in the disruptive / liberative potential of democracy 
and communicative reason, and take the view that through those institutions accounting 
might help the lifeworld impose some communicatively based moral discipline upon the 
system of capitalism. We recognize, however, that we might have done more to address 
the concerns of those who see financial accounting under capitalism as inevitably in thrall 
to capital; as inevitably privileging private interests over public. 
Secondly, we have not discussed, in any detail, the practical impediments to the 
realisation of the discourse ethics ideal. We have preferred to concentrate on what we see 
as the main theoretical problem of the Habermasian analysis, that is, his effective 
exclusion of Alterity from the account he gives of the modern lifeworld and the subject of 
discourse ethics. We argued that the post-structuralist outlook of the psychoanalyst 
Jacques Lacan might be drawn on to supplement the Habermasian perspective and in 
particular provide some antidote to its neglect of the Other of reason. Nevertheless, we 
acknowledge that we have not thoroughly discussed and explored the practical 
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impediments to the realisation of the ideals of discourse theory. We accept that the 
examination of the real forces and vested interests that might block the development of an 
emancipatory accounting, including the systematic power imbalances and distortions of 
communications associated with capitalism, is rather a neglected avenue in this thesis; a 
road not taken. 
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1. The instance of rationalisation we describe and the threat it poses to the lifeworld of 
the "everyday consciousness" (of preparers and users of accounts), is typical of the 
wider experience of the process of rationalisation leading to colonisation: 
"the differentiation of science, morality, and art, which is 
characteristic of Occidental rationalism, results not only in a growing 
autonomy for sectors dealt with by specialists, but also in the splitting 
off of these sectors from a stream of tradition continuing on in 
everyday practice in a quasi-natural fashion. ... Everyday 
consciousness sees itself thrown back on traditions whose claims to 
validity have already been suspended; where it does escape the spell 
of traditionalism, it is hopelessly splintered. In place of "false 
consciousness" we today have a "fragmented consciousness" that 
blocks enlightenment by the mechanism of reification. It is only with 
this that the conditions for a colonisation of the lifeworld are met. 
When stripped of their ideological veils, the imperatives of 
autonomous subsystems make their way into the lifeworld from the 
outside - like colonial masters coming into tribal society - and force 
a process of assimilation upon it. " 
(Habermas, 1981b, p. 355) 
2. The ASB avoid the use of the term "conceptual Framework", however, in terms of 
content and purposes their "Statement of Principles For Financial Reporting" 
exposure draft (ASB, 1995b), can be seen as a conceptual framework underpinning 
and guiding the development of financial reporting: 
'... the Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting ... addresses the 
concepts underlying the information presented in financial statements. 
The objective of this Statement of Principles is to provide a 
framework for the consistent and logical formulation of individual 
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accounting standards. The framework also provides a basis on which 
others can exercise judgement in resolving accounting issues. " 
(ASB, 1993, para. 4) 
The exposure draft contains all the elements, which have become de rigueur in a 
conceptual framework for financial reporting. 
3. The Study Group on Business Income (1952, p. 23) suggest that the matching 
approach to accounting came to dominate practice from the early years of the 20th 
century because of; (i) fears that the current value approach might encourage the 
premature taxation of unrealised gains, (ii) the growing separation of ownership and 
control which rendered the relatively high level of subjectivity involved in the current 
value approach increasingly problematic, and (iii) the restriction of distributable 
income, under the matching approach, to realised profits gave creditors a measure of 
protection from perhaps overly optimistic distribution plans. Whatever the reasons, 
we suggest that they "need to be openly discussed before reverting to the earlier 
model" (Grinyer, 1996, p. 327). 
4. Miller et al (1994, pp. 140-141) outline reasons why current value approaches have 
tended to be unpopular with both auditors and preparers. They suggest that auditors 
find them unattractive because exposure to audit risk may be increased by the need 
to carry the audit beyond documented historic transaction costs into the unfamiliar 
territory of valuation. And preparers find them unattractive because of the costs of 
implementation, the volatility that valuations may induce in reported earnings, the 
loss of control over reported results, and the fact that reported income from 
operations will tend to be lower than under a historical cost system because the cost 
of goods sold and depreciation expense tend to be higher under a current value 
system in times of rising prices. 
5. The FASB (1996) proposals effectively allow reported earnings to continue to be 
transaction and cost based whilst providing for unrealised gains and losses to be 
recognised, outside earnings, as a component of comprehensive income. They thus 
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accommodate the entrenched body of resistance to any suggestions that unrealised 
gains and losses might be included in reported earnings (see Swieringa, 1997, p. 85). 
6. The ASB superseded the ASC as the UK's private accounting standard setting body 
in August 1990, following a review of UK standard setting, under the Chairmanship 
of Sir Ron Dearing (1988), which was prompted, in part by the loss of confidence in 
the ASC provoked by the SSAP16 debacle. The ASB is a prescribed standard setting 
body for the purposes of UK Companies Acts. Where accounts do not comply with 
applicable accounting standards the courts may order the preparation of revised 
accounts. 
7. Our descriptive analysis of the comments is coarse. For example the classification 
"accountants" includes accounting firms ranging from the big six to sole practitioners 
and the professional bodies. 
8. The mental accounting experiments have been replicated and extended to various 
groups including business managers (Mowen & Mowen, 1986), consumers (Peterson 
et al, 1986) and students (Singer et al 1986). The mental accounts concept has been 
used, by Thaler (1980,1985) and Hirst et al. (1994), as a foundation element in a 
developing positive theory of consumer behaviour. It has been employed in 
management accounting research (Lipe, 1993) and in auditing research (Shields et al., 
1987). And considerable use has been made of the concept of mental accounts in 
finance research, and in particular in the modelling and study of investment behaviour 
(Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Shefrin & Statman, 1985). 
9. 
10. 
Summers & Carroll's (1987) finding (cited by Thaler 1990) that the marginal 
propensity for consumption of capital gains in the stock market was close to zero, 
suggests that unrealised capital gains tend to be categorised as mental asset account 
items. 
Landsberger's (1966) analysis of the consumption behaviour of Israeli families which 
received restitution payments after World War II, (cited by Thaler 1990), revealed 
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that the families which received the largest compensation payments had marginal 
propensity for consumption of the windfall of about 23%, suggesting that even cash 
receipts are liable to be coded to mental asset accounts if the amount is large. 
Interestingly the families which received the smallest payments had marginal 
propensity for consumption of the windfall of more than 200%, 
11. Hatsopoulos et al's., (1989) finding (cited by Thaler, 1990) that the marginal 
propensity for consumption of cash generated for stockholders by takeovers is around 
59%, suggesting that gains realised on the disposal of an asset are categorised as 
income account items. 
12. See Johnson, (1996) for analogous, and much fuller, discussion of the metaphorical 
relation between the economic and moral domains and the relative groundedness of 
the moral domain in the nature of bodily experience and the kind of experiences that 
make it possible for human beings to survive and flourish. 
13. Accounting's failures were highly publicised, with studies of creative accounting even 
featuring in the "best sellers lists" (Griffiths, 1986; Smith, 1992). 
14. Analysis of the savings and loans crisis revealed that by failing to present information 
on the current value of assets and liabilities many "savings institutions published 
financial statements that concealed their weaknesses instead of revealing them" 
(Miller, 1994, p. 141). 
15. The informational or decision usefulness approach does not seem to have ever 
achieved full acceptance. Armstrong (1977) reports that a 1976 survey of the attitudes 
of various parties involved in financial accounting found that only 37% of 
respondents were able to agree with the Trueblood report (AICPA, 1973) that the 
"basic objective of financial statements is to provide information useful for making 
economic decisions. " 
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Shapiro, (1997, p. 168) suggests that we may usefully conceive of realism as a purely 
ontological thesis lacking any semantic or epistemic content. We agree with 
Davidson that the motive for realist talk, even when it is couched carefully in terms 
of ontological realism, is generally ultimately, if covertly, epistemic: 
"it is futile either to reject or accept the slogan that the real and the 
true are "independent of our beliefs. " The only positive sense we can 
make of this phrase, the only use that derives from the intentions of 
those who prize it, derives from the idea of correspondence, and this 
is an idea without content. " 
(Davidson, 1990a, p. 305) 
It comes as no surprise, then, to find following fast on Shapiro's talk of realism as a 
purely ontological thesis, the vacuous suggestion that truth as correspondence should 
be counted as one of the presupposition of external financial reporting. 
2. The overriding financial reporting requirement in UK law is that financial statements 
give a'true and fair view' (Companies Act, 1985, s. 226). Whilst truth and fairness' 
is not defined in Companies Acts, legal opinion suggests that the courts are likely to 
regard adherence to codified accounting standards as strong prima facie evidence that 
financial statements give a 'true and fair view' (e. g. see McGee, 1991 and Arden, 
1993). However, in the foreword to Accounting Standards the ASB recognises 'truth 
and fairness' in representationalist terms as a quality independent of compliance with 
standards: 
"because accounting standards are formulated with the objective of 
ensuring that the information resulting from ý their application 
faithfully represents the underlying commercial activity, the Board 
envisages that only in exceptional circumstances will departure from 
the requirements of an accounting standard be necessary in order for 
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financial statements to give a true and fair view. " 
(ASB, 1993, para. 18) 
3. Endorsement of the ideal of faithful representation in accounting does not, of course, 
entail acceptance of the adequacy of present accounting practice or representational 
categories. One may support the ideal yet consider the mirror of accounting 
hopelessly distorted: Certain Marxists would argue that accounts of exchange-values 
serve to obscure use-values and the true nature of social relations, and yet envisage 
an undistorted accounting which would serve to illuminate real relations of 
production and use-values. Nor does advocacy of representational faithfulness as an 
ideal necessarily imply that it is considered to be attainable. In accounting 
representational faithfulness is often advocated, on pragmatic grounds, as a necessary 
but unattainable ideal (see Solomons, 1991a). Such self-contradictory positions 
reflect a classic paradox: 
"The champions of an absolutist, correspondence theory of truth 
defend their positions on pragmatic grounds: it has desirable 
consequences, is necessary to the preservation of essential values. We 
need not believe in the possibility of actually attaining truth, the 
argument runs, but we must believe that there is a truth -a way things 
are, a true meaning of a text or utterance - or else research and 
analysis lose all point; human enquiry has no goal. The proponents of 
a pragmatist view reply that, whatever the consequences of their 
relativism, we must live with them because this is the truth, the way 
things are: truth is relative, dependent on a conceptual framework. 
Both attempts to maintain a position give rise to a deconstructive 
movement in which the logic of the argument used to defend a 
position contradicts the position affirmed. " 
(Culler, 1983, p. 155) 
Solomons himself finds the deconstructive moment in Tinker's (1991) rejection of the 
very idea of 'faithful representation': 
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If signs are "arbitrary" and are "independent" of what is being 
signified, then we are all beating the air, including the philosophers 
who makes such a statement, for his signs are also independent of the 
reality that he is vainly trying to depict. 
(Solomons, 1991b, p. 312) 
4. Correspondence theorists want to explain what it is for whole sentences (or beliefs) 
to be true in terms of their correspondence with something else - facts: "... truth is a 
matter of correspondence to facts" (Searle, 1995, p. 199). Davidson uses a line of 
argument, initially advanced by Frege (1892) to show that "... if a statement 
corresponds to one fact, it corresponds to all" (Davidson, 1969, p. 42), in which case 
we can not explain truth in terms of correspondence to facts. 
The argument trys to show that any sentential operator, such as: 's 
corresponds to the fact that... ', which allows the substitution of co-extensive terms 
within the sentences being operated on, is truth functional, that is, all that matters is 
the truth value of the sentences connected. Consider the statement "'Naples is farther 
north than Red Bluff' corresponds to the fact that Naples is farther north than Red 
Bluff. If Naples is the largest Italian city within thirty miles of Ischia, then the fact 
that Naples is farther north than Red Bluff is the same fact as that the largest Italian 
city within thirty miles of Ischia is farther north than Red Bluff. It is clearly 
reasonable to allow the substitution of coextensive singular terms in this context. 
Therefore, from 
1. "'Naples is farther north than Red IIluff' corresponds to the 
fact that Naples is farther north than Red Bluff 
We can infer, 
2. "'Naples is farther north than Red Bluff' corresponds to the 
fact that the largest Italian city within thirty miles of Ischia is 
farther north than Red Bluff. ' 
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If we also accept that we can always substitute logically equivalent sentences, that 
is 
sentences which can not possibly differ in truth value, we can go on to infer, 
from I 
that: 
3. "'Naples is farther north than Red Bluff" corresponds to the 
fact that London is in England. " 
The argument begins by noting that the following sentence is logically equivalent to 
"Naples is farther north than Red Bluff': 
4. x (x =x and Naples is farther north than Red Bluff) = x(x = x) 
This sentence asserts the equivalence of two sets. On the right-hand side is the set of 
self-identical things, everything. On the left-hand side is the set of things that are self- 
identical and are such that Naples is farther north than Red Bluff. If the sentence 
'Naples is farther north than Red Bluff is true (false) then the sentence 'x (x =x and 
Naples is farther north than Red Bluff) = x(x = x)' is true (false). 
If we substitute'x (x =x and Naples is farther north than Red Bluff) = x(x = 
x)' for its logical equivalent 'Naples is farther north than Red Bluff in I we have the 
following: 
5. "'Naples is farther north than Red Bluff' corresponds to the 
fact that x (x =x and Naples is farther north than Red Bluff) 
= x(x = x)". 
If we accept substitution of coextensive singular terms in this context, which 
we suggested above was reasonable, we might substitute another term for 'x (x =x 
and Naples is farther north than Red Bluff)'. As Naples is indeed further north than 
Red Bluff, the term'x (x =x and Naples is farther north than Red Bluff)' names the 
set which includes all self-identical things, everything. We could therefore take any 
true statement such as 'London is in England' and create a term such as 'x (x =x and 
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London is in England)', which is coextensive with 'x (x =x and Naples is farther 
north than Red Bluff)'. By substitution of coextensive terms in 5 we have: 
6. "'Naples is farther north than Red Bluff' corresponds to the 
fact that x (x =x and London is in England) = x(x = x)". 
The sentence'x (x =x and London is in England) = x(x = x)' is logically equivalent 
to the sentence'London is in England'. Therefore, by substitution, we end with: 
7. "'Naples is farther north than Red Bluff' corresponds to the 
fact that London is in England". 
5. 
All that the sentences 'Naples is farther north than Red Bluff and 'London is in 
England' needed to have in common, to allow the transformation from I to 7, was 
their truth-value. The suspicion is confirmed that "... if a statement corresponds to one 
fact, it corresponds to all", and "we may read the result of our argument as showing 
that there is exactly one fact ... The Great Fact" (Davidson, 1969, p. 42). Davidson 
concludes that given that 'corresponds to The Great Fact' can apparently not be told 
apart from 'is true' it is obvious that we can have no explanation of truth in terms of 
correspondence. Searle, on the other hand, argues that Davidson's argument, 
commonly known as the slingshot argument, should be understood as showing the 
falsity of its presuppositions - in particular the presupposition that 'logically 
equivalent sentences can be substituted salva veritate in (such) contexts" (Searle, 
1995, p. 223). 
Pursuit of this debate is beyond the scope of this thesis. For further basic 
explanation of the slingshot argument see Evnine (1991, pp. 180-182), and for 
evaluation of the argument see Neale (1995) and Neale and Dever (1997). Davidson 
repeats his essential commitment to the slingshot argument in various places 
including (1990a, pp. 302-305), and recently (1999b, p. 89). 
Manicas (1993), for example, in presenting a 'scientific realist' (See Bhasker, 1986) 
view of accounting, stresses that it is vital to recognise that reality constrains the 
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development of our theories: 
"... our claims to knowledge are about a reality which is "out there". 
... The something out there cannot 
determine our theory ... , but the 
something out there does pose constraints on what our theory can say 
that something is. 
(Manicas, 1993, p. 155) 
6. Bernard Williams also trace the inadequacy of Putnam's internal realism directly to 
its commitment to a dubious dualism of scheme and content, the internal and 
external: 
"If we ... insist that the only standpoint 
is "inside" human experience, 
we are still, in fact using the idea of a boundary: we are claiming that 
there is a boundary, and that everything intelligible is on this side of 
it. Once we are stuck in that formulation, people who say such 
sensible things as that the world has certain characteristics that affect 
our experience - help to form our sciences, for instance - are read as 
trying to push the world and its characteristics back to the outside of 
this boundary.... An internal realism must be inside something, but 
what we have learned is that there is nothing for it to be inside. " 
(Williams, 1991, p. 13) 
7. We focus on Hines' work as we see it as among the most influential, dualist 
accounting theory, of its type. Hines (1991, p. 314, note. 2) herself provides a useful 
but "by no means comprehensive" listing of papers which share fundamental aspects 
of her dualist view of accounting. 
8. There seem to be some inconsistencies in the view developed by Hines. We have 
greatest difficulty in making sense, within her terms, of her suggestions that we might 
usefully make a distinction between those features of reality which pre-exist our 
representations those which we create. Such a suggestion appears in her discussion 
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of the FASB's use of the accounting as'mirror' or'map-making' analogies: 
"The analogies are often inappropriate because the referent is a 
physical phenomenon such as physical terrain, which unlike a 
business enterprise, pre-exists accounts and significations of it. " 
(Hines, 1991, p. 320) 
She makes a similar distinction in the 1988 paper: 
"There is a reality: there's something there alright. Do not think for a 
moment that we imagine the world! Oh no, not at all! The bricks are 
there, and the people, and those containers - no doubt about it. But the 
organization, and most of the minute particles in the bricks, and 
revenue, well, we create them. " 
(Hines, 1988, p. 253) 
Our difficulty is that we can not see any place for such distinctions within what is 
otherwise apparently an essentially anti-representationalist position. Given Hines' 
rejection of correspondence and her preferred Rortian view of truth as "what it is 
better for us to believe" (Hines, 1991, p. 328), we would have expected her to follow 
Rorty in denying: 
"... that it is explanatorily useful to pick and choose among the 
contents of our minds or our language and say that this or that item 
"corresponds to" or "represents" the environment in a way that some 
other item does not. On an anti-representationalist view, it is one 
thing to say that a prehensile thumb, or an ability to use the word 
'atom' as physicists do, is useful for coping with the environment. It 
is another thing to attempt to explain this utility by reference to 
representationalist notions, such as the notion that the reality referred 
to by the "quark" was "determinate" before the word "quark" came 
along (whereas that referred to by, for example, "foundation grant" 
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only jelled once the relevant social practices emerged). " 
(Rorty, 1991, p. 5) 
9. Hines' clearly relativist view of truth seems to be influenced by both Foucaultian and 
pragmatist thought. She cites with apparent approval Foucault's view that "truth" and 
"knowledge" are socially constructed "products of interests and power relations" 
(Hines, 1988, p. 259, note 6). And, she advocates a classic pragmatist view when she 
suggests that "a socially desirable stance for researchers is to see truth as "what it is 
better for us to believe" rather than as the "accurate representation of reality" (Hines, 
1991, p. 328). The common theme is relativist; There is no absolute truth, however 
we may have a use for truth as a construct, operating within, or relative to, our 
particular conceptual schemes; truth for us as what is better for us to believe. 
Hines' comments on truth tend towards the paradoxical and cryptic: "there is 
no such thing as the truth, but there is such a thing as stretching the truth too far" 
(Hines, 1988, pp. 253). She makes no effort, for example, to explain or develop her 
synoptic view that truth is "what it is better for us to believe"; And surely the notion 
of "better" calls for some development. Putnam suggests that the thinking of William 
James' from which Hines' preferred definition seems to be derived has commonly 
been misunderstood (1992a, p. 8). He argues that James did not mean, or indeed say, 
that a belief was 'true' when its effects are good, and he reminds us that James 
actually wrote: 
"The true" to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of 
our thinking, just as "the right" is only the expedient in the way of our 
behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long 
run and on the whole of course, for what meets expediently all the 
experience in sight won't necessarily meet all further experiences 
equally satisfactorily. Experience, as we know, has ways of boiling 
over, and making us correct our present formulas. " 
(James, 1907, p. 106) 
Putnam draws our attention to the phrase "expedient in almost any fashion", and 
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argues that on analysis of James writings, it emerges that: 
"different types of statements correspond to different types of 
"expediency"; there is no suggestion that an arbitrary statement is true 
if it is expedient in any way at all (even "in the long run"). For 
example, the view that a statement is true if it will make people 
subjectively happy to believe it - is explicitly rejected by him. In the 
case of paradigm "factual" statements, including scientific ones, a sort 
of expediency that James repeatedly mentions is usefulness for 
prediction, while other desiderata - conservation of past doctrine, 
simplicity, and coherence... are said to apply statements of all types. " 
(Putnam, 1992a, p. 9-10) 
In addition, and perhaps unsurprisingly given the above, Hines fails to explicate or 
problematise the "us" in "what it is better for us to believe". Presumably she takes it 
for granted that her reader will understand that "us" should be 'unpacked' along the 
lines of "we postmodern bourgeois liberals" (see Rorty, 1983). 
10. The dualist view set out by Hines does not seem to allow any possibility that we 
might actually be securely in touch with an objective world. However, she recognises 
that, generally, it is only in "academic discourse" that we have been able to face up 
to the supposedly tenuous condition of our 'reality'. She attributes the wider 
incorrigibility of "the assumption of an objective, shared and intersubjectively 
accessible world" (Hines, 1991, p. 317), to the essential cultural relativity of all 
reasoning: 
Breaching the assumptions and reasoning of one's own culture 
represents a highly problematic task, because the tools for doing so 
- the assumptions and reasoning that will be perceived as convincing 
by members of one's culture - are the very target of the intended 
breaching. 
(Hines, 1991 p. 317) 
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Hines' position is thoroughly relativist, knowledge, truth and reason are all relative: 
She insists on "the essential culture and value-dependency of logic, reasoning and 
rationality" (Hines, 1991, p. 313). 
11. It would be a mistake to conceive of Davidson work as an attempt to develop a 
unified theory of truth reconciling the intuitions which motivate the correspondence 
and coherence theories; he rejects both: 
"I do not aim to reconcile the two positions. I find the epistemic 
views untenable, and the realist views ultimately unintelligible. " 
(Davidson, 1990a, p. 298) 
12. Wittgenstein's naturalistic view of language, which Davidson's analysis grows out of, 
is explained and interestingly applied to accounting by Lyas (1993). 
13. In considering how it is possible for sentences to have meaning some philosophers 
begin with the intuition that words only seem to have meaning in social context. That 
is meaning seems to depend on the speaker's intention. Such philosophers tend to 
believe that meaning can be reduced to the content of mental states. Grice for 
example suggests that meaning can be reduced to a speaker's intention to induce a 
belief in an audience through their recognition of that intention: "to ask what A meant 
is to ask for a specification of the intended effect" (Grice, 1957, p. 46). Davidson 
rejects any such approach. He argues that "neither language nor thinking can be fully 
explained in terms of the other, and neither has conceptual priority" (Davidson, 1975, 
p. 156): For Davidson, thoughts acquire their content and sentences their meaning 
together, through interpretation, and in relation to their context. 
Davidson wants to show how empirically verifiable interpretive theories of 
truth can be constructed which do not assume at the outset too much of what the 
theory sets out to describe, that is, without "smuggling into the foundations of the 
theory concepts too closely allied to the concept of meaning" (Davidson, 1984, 
p. xiii). The challenge is to explain how adequate theory can be constructed on the 
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basis of evidence plausibly available to an interpreter with no prior knowledge of 
either the language or the detailed content the speaker's thoughts: Davidson thinks 
that we can construct adequate but purely extensional theories of meaning. 
Davidson draws on the tradition of formal semantics, which tries to show how 
the meanings of sentences are systematically constructed from the meanings of their 
parts. Frege (1892) suggests that for each meaningful part of a language two distinct 
properties can be identified; intensions and extensions. He refers to these properties 
respectively as Sinn and Bedeutung, usually translated as sense and reference. The 
extension of a singular term is the object it 'stands for' or designates, and the 
extension of a predicate is the objects which'fall under' it. A key Fregian insight was 
the realisation that the truth-value of a sentence is systematically dependent upon the 
references of its parts, what they'stand for' in the world, and the relations between the 
parts. It follows that the extension of a sentence, for Frege its truth-value, ought not 
to be sensitive to the substitution of co-extensive terms. The terms 'morning star' and 
'evening star' are co-extensive; they refer to the same planet. Therefore the truth-value 
of the sentence 'the morning star is the second planet from the sun' will not be 
changed if we substitute the co-extensive term and produce 'the evening star is the 
second planet from the sun'. There is however a problem; It appears that many natural 
language contexts are in fact non-extensional: If, for example, Kenneth believes that 
the morning star is the second planet from the sun, but does not know that the terms 
'morning star' and 'evening star' refer to the same object. Then while the sentence 
'Kenneth believes that the morning star is the second planet from the sun' will be true, 
the sentence 'Kenneth believes that the evening star is the second planet from the sun' 
will be false. The truth-value of sentences in contexts such as'believes that' or'means 
that' appear to be sensitive to the substitution of co-extensive terms. Frege's way of 
dealing with this problem was to introduce another notion into the theory of meaning 
- sense. 
The intension, or sense, of an expression is not the object referred to, but the 
way it is referred to; The intension is a way of presenting a reference, and clearly the 
same reference may be presented in different ways. The intension of a name is a 
concept under which falls one extension, the intension of a predicate is the function 
which associates it with its extension, and the intension of a sentence we might think 
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14. 
of as the thought it expresses; the proposition which specifies the conditions which 
would need to be satisfied for the sentence to be true. Intensions are clearly more 
'finely-grained' than extensions. The following expressions are all ways of referring 
to the planet Venus; 'the morning star', 'the evening star', 'the second planet from the 
sun'. These three expressions do not however, have the same sense or meaning. It 
seems clear that the statement 'the morning star is the morning star', does not have the 
same meaning as'the morning star is the second planet from the sun'. If the meaning 
of a sentence were simply what it referred to, its truth value, then "all sentences alike 
in truth-value must be synonymous - an intolerable result" (Davidson, 1967, p. 19). 
An adequate theory of meaning obviously must yield the fine-grain of intensions, it 
must respect the intensionality of meaning. 
However, If a theory of meaning for a language is to be developed on the 
basis of evidence plausibly available to the 'radical interpreter' it can not be based on 
obscure entities such as senses, propositions or meanings, it can "make no use of 
meanings, whether of sentences or of words" (Davidson, 1967, p. 24). Davidson 
thinks that an adequate theory of meaning can be expressed in a purely extensional 
metalanguage, that is, in a language restricted to contexts in which the extensions of 
sentences are insensitive to the substitution of co-extensive terms. 
Davidson endorses no stipulative definition of truth: 
"We should not say that truth is correspondence, coherence, 
warranted assertability, ideally justified assertability, what is accepted 
in the conversation of the right people, what science will end up 
maintaining, what explains the convergence on single theories in 
science, or the success of our ordinary beliefs. " 
(Davidson, 1990a, p. 309) 
Indeed, he regards the search for definition of truth as "folly" (Davidson, 1996). I Ie 
takes the concept of truth as a primitive, and tries to show how the extension of the 
predicate "is true" can be fixed for a language by an interpreter. It is such empirical 
theories of truth, rather than any definition of truth, which he sees as the essential 
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core of "the scheme we all necessarily employ for understanding, criticizing, 
explaining, and predicting thought and action" (Davidson, 1990a, p. 282). 
Nevertheless, some of the terminology used by Davidson in certain early 
papers encouraged the mistaken view that he was offering a definition of truth as 
correspondence and /or coherence. In an important paper entitled "A Coherence 
Theory of Truth and Knowledge" (1983), Davidson sets out an argument which he 
says shows "that coherence yields correspondence". At that time Davidson thought 
that the fact that the development of the type of recursive characterisation of truth for 
a language, which he sees as central to interpretation, required that the words be put 
into relation with objects "was enough to give some grip for the idea of 
correspondence" (1990a). In other words, he considered that the semantic conception 
of truth developed by Tarski of truth "deserve(d) to be called a correspondence theory 
because of the part played by the concept of satisfaction" (Davidson, 1969, p. 48). 
Satisfaction is a relation between words and objects, not a relation between sentences 
and facts. And clearly, relations between words and objects can not explain the truth 
of sentences. Davidson recognizes that a Tarski-style theory does not give an 
explanation of truth, which is something that correspondence theories of truth, have 
always been conceived of as providing (see Davidson, 1990b, p. 135): "... 'Dolores 
loves Dagmar' would be satisfied by Dolores and Dagmar" however "the fact that 
verifies 'Dolores loves Dagmar' should somehow include the loving. This 'somehow' 
has always been the nemesis of theories of truth based on facts" (1969, p. 48). 
Davidson has not changed the essential elements of his analysis in any way, but he 
has come to regret expressing his ideas in such a way that he could be misconstrued 
as advocating either a coherence or a correspondence theory of truth: 
I would now change the title of "A Coherence Theory", and I would 
not describe the project as describing how coherence yields 
correspondence. ... The mistake 
is in a way only a misnomer, but 
terminological infelicities have a way of breeding conceptual 
confusion, and so it is here. ... I also regret having called my view a 
coherence theory. My emphasis on coherence was probably just a 
way of making a negative point, that 'all that counts as evidence or 
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justification for a belief must come from the same totality of belief to 
which it belongs. "' 
(Davidson, 1990b, pp. 134-135) 
15. Tarski sought to provide a definition of truth-in-L such that for each sentence of the 
language L, it would entail an equivalence, expressed in a metalanguage, in which the 
sentence is named on the left side and used on the right side. Thus if we consider the 
sentence "snow is white", an adequate theory of truth ought to imply the equivalence: 
'Snow is white' is true in English if, and only if, snow is white. 
Such equivalences are referred to as T sentences. Their general pattern, variously 
referred to as "convention T", "schema T", or "form T", is as follows: 
S is true-in-L if, and only if, p 
where S is the name of a sentence of the object language L and p is the correct 
translation of that sentence into the metalanguage. Tarski's aim was to provide a 
recursive definition of truth which would 'do justice' to our intuitions about truth and 
in particular the Aristotelian intuition that: "to say of what is that it is not, or of what 
is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, 
is true" (quoted Tarski, 1944, p. 343). He proposed convention (T) as the appropriate 
test of any definition of truth: 
"we wish to use the term "true" in such a way that all equivalences of 
the form (T) can be asserted, and we shall call a definition of truth 
"adequate" if all these equivalences follow from it. " 
(Tarski, 1944, p. 344) 
Because there is aT sentence corresponding to each sentence of the language for 
which a theory of truth is being explicated, the totality of T sentences fixes the 
extension of the truth predicate, that is convention T "fixes the domain of truth". 
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16. 
Davidson sees convention T as providing the vital link between the intuitively 
obvious truths about truth and formal semantics: "Without convention T, we would 
have no reason to believe that truth is what Tarski has shown us how to characterize" 
(Davidson, 1973b, p. 66). 
We might expect that a theory of meaning for an object language L ought to consist 
of a way of directly mapping meaningful expressions in L onto meanings expressed 
in a metalanguage, entailing for all sentences of L, a sentence of the form's means 
that p, where 's' is a metalanguage name for the object language sentence, and p' is 
a metalanguage sentence giving the meaning of the object language sentence. And we 
might hope to develop such a theory through verification of the sentences it entails. 
Davidson sees no hope for this approach, because it seems that it must take 
intensions, the thoughts and propositions expressed by sentences, as foundational, 
thereby assuming too much of what the theory sets out to describe: 
"In a way, nothing could be easier: just write 's means that p', and 
imagine p replaced by a sentence. ... 
It looks as though we are in 
trouble ... however, for it is reasonable to expect that in wrestling 
with the logic of the apparently non-extensional 'means that' we will 
encounter problems as hard as, or perhaps identical with, the 
problems our theory is out to solve. " 
(Davidson, 1967, p. 22) 
Davidson suggests that we should abandon the troublesomely intensional 'means that, 
and along with it any notion of an interpretative theory capable of giving the meaning 
of a sentence by directly associating it with obscure intensional entities such as 
propositions. He thinks that we need to look for a way of developing a theory of 
meaning for a language in strictly extensional language, avoiding any contexts where 
the extensions of sentences are sensitive to the substitution of co-extensive terms. lie 
proposes that a Tarskian theory of truth may serve that purpose: 
"The only way I know to deal with this difficulty is simple, and 
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radical. Anxiety that we are enmeshed in the intensional springs from 
using the words 'means that' as a filling between description of 
sentence and sentence, but it may be that the success of our venture 
depends not on the filling but on what it fills. The theory will have 
done its work if it provides, for every sentence s in the language 
under study, a matching sentence (to replace )7) that, in some way yet 
to be made clear, 'gives the meaning' of s. One obvious candidate for 
matching sentence is just s itself, if the object language is contained 
in the metalanguage; otherwise a translation of s in the metalanguage. 
As a final bold step, let us try treating the position occupied by p' 
extensionally: to implement this, sweep away the obscure 'means 
that', provide the sentence that replaces p' with a proper sentential 
connective, and supply the description that replaces 's' with its own 
predicate. The plausible result is: 
(T) s is T if and only if p. 
... it is clear that the sentences to which the predicate 'is T applies will 
be just the true sentences of L, for the condition we have placed on 
satisfactory theories of meaning is in essence Tarski's convention T 
that tests the adequacy of a formal semantical definition of truth. " 
(Davidson. 1967, pp. 22-23) 
In place of the intensional 'means that' in the sentence 's means that p', Davidson 
proposes the extensional, truth-functional, sentential connective 'if and only if. And, 
if we use a sentential connective we need a sentence on the left-hand side, what we 
have is s, which is not a sentence but a metalanguage name for an object language 
sentence; A sentence is easily made by attaching a predicate T. We then have s is T 
if and only ifp. 
Davidson wants to use Tarski's theory of truth, which shows how the truth of 
a sentence systematically depends on the semantic properties of its parts, to yield a 
theory of meaning which shows "how the meanings of sentences depend upon the 
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meanings of words" (Davidson, 1967, p. 23). He proposes an inversion of Tarski 
approach; While Tarski defined truth by assuming translation, Davidson suggests that 
by taking truth as basic we can derive an account of interpretation. He certainly does 
not want to suggest that the truth conditions of a sentence directly yield its meaning. 
Rather he intends to show how we can have interpretive theories of meaning which 
will allow the meaning of words and sentences to be drawn indirectly from the whole 
structure of T-sentences entailed by the truth theory for the language: 
"If sentences depend for their meaning on their structure, and we 
understand the meaning of each item in the structure only as an 
abstraction from the totality of sentences in which it features, then we 
can give the meaning of any sentence (or word) only by giving the 
meaning of every sentence (and word) in the language. Frege said that 
only in the context of a sentence does a word have meaning; in the 
same vein he might have added that only in the context of a language 
does a sentence (and therefore a word) have meaning. " 
(Davidson, 1967, p. 22) 
We have already seen that for Davidson adequate theories of meaning need to be 
empirically verifiable on the basis of evidence plausibly available to someone with 
no prior knowledge of the semantics of object language. In Tarski's work an adequate 
definition of truth entails T-sentences taken to be true because the sentence used on 
the right-hand side of the biconditional is either identical with, or assumed to be a 
translation of, the sentence mentioned on the left-hand side for which truth conditions 
are being given. Davidson's does not see how translation without prior knowledge of 
the object language, can be verified. We cannot start by assuming that we can 
recognize correct translation "without pre-empting the point of radical interpretation" 
(Davidson, 1973a, p. 134). If T-theories are to be put to empirical test we require: 
"... a way of judging the acceptability of T-sentences that is not 
syntactical, and makes no use of the concepts of translation, meaning, 
or synonymy, but is such that acceptable T-sentences will in fact 
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yield interpretations. " 
(Davidson, 1974b, p. 15 0) 
17. 
If Convention T is to "go empirical" it must be modified in such a way that no appeal 
is made to the notion of translation. Recall that Convention T requires that an 
adequate theory of truth, expressed in a metalanguage, for object language L will 
entail, for every sentence s, of L, an equivalence, expressed in the metalanguage, of 
the form: 's is true-in-L if, and only if, p', where s is the name of an object language 
sentence, and p is a correct translation of the sentence. Davidson suggest a 
modification of Convention T so that an acceptable theory of truth will be one which 
entails, for every sentences of the object language, a sentence of the form: "s is true 
if and only if p, where p' is replaced by any sentence that is true if and only if s is" 
(Davidson, 1973a, p. 134). Instead of requiring that the sentence used on the right- 
hand side is a translation of the sentence named on the left-hand side we have the 
weaker requirement that the sentence used on the right is true if and only if the 
sentence named on the left is true. 
It may not seem as if Davidson's modified Convention T demands enough of 
T-sentences to provide a basis for the emergence of interpretation and meaning; "And 
of course this would be the case if we took T-sentences in isolation" (Davidson, 
1973a, p. 134). Considering T-sentences in isolation and provided we are sure of their 
truth, the modified Convention-T gives no direct basis for considering a theory which 
entails "'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white', any more correct than a 
theory which entails "'Snow is white' is true if and only if grass is green". Davidson's 
claim is that meaning will emerge from the whole complex of T-sentenccs: "the hope 
is that by putting certain appropriate formal and empirical restrictions on the theory 
as a whole, individual T-sentences will in fact serve to yield interpretations" 
(Davidson, 1973a, p. 134). 
The object of Davidson's reformulation of Convention T was to give us T-sentences 
that are verifiable on evidence plausibly available to the radical interpreter; evidence 
that they are true. If it is not to beg the question, the evidence can not assume 
knowledge of meanings, and it cannot consist of detailed descriptions of beliefs, the 
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attribution of which must rely on much the same evidence as will the identification 
of meaning. Davidson thinks that all the evidence we need to verify the truth of 
modified T-sentences can come in the form of observations that at certain times and 
under certain circumstances, speakers of the object language hold particular sentences 
to be true. The identification of an attitude of holding or accepting a sentence as true, 
is of course the identification of a belief. However, it does not demand that we be 
able to make fine discriminations between beliefs: "It is an attitude an interpreter may 
plausibly be taken to be able to identify before he can interpret, since he may know 
that a person intends to express a truth in uttering a sentence without having any idea 
what truth" (Davidson, 1973a, p. 135). It is not immediately obvious that we are 
justified in taking such observations as evidence for the truth of T-sentences. Our aim 
is to verify T-sentences of the form: 
(T) 'Es schneit' is true-in-German when spoken by x at time t if 
and only if it is snowing near x at time t. 
Our observations, however, give us evidence in the form: 
(E) Kurt belongs to the German speech community and Kurt 
holds true 'Es schneit' on Saturday at noon and it is snowing 
near Kurt on Saturday at noon. 
Davidson acknowledges that (E) is not conclusive evidence for (T), the speaker may 
be mistaken in his belief. However he thinks that we must operate by what he calls 
the principle of charity and accept that (E) is prima facie evidence that (T) is true: 
I propose that we take the fact that speakers of a language hold a 
sentence to be true (under observed circumstances) as prima facie 
evidence that the sentence is true under those circumstances. For 
example, positive instances of 'Speakers (of German) hold "Es 
schneit" is true when, and only when, it is snowing' should be taken 
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to confirm not only the generalization, but also the T-sentence, "'Es 
schneit" is true (in German) for a speaker x at time t if and only if it 
is snowing at t (and near x). " 
(Davidson, 1974b, p. 152) 
In Davidson's view it is only by the adoption of a principle of charity that the radical 
interpreter can overcome the apparent interpretive impasse presented by the 
interdependence of belief and meaning. A speaker who accepts a sentence as true will 
do so in consideration of both what she believes and what she takes the sentence to 
mean. In all but the simplest of cases we can not hope to know what a speaker means 
by a sentence unless we already know some of the speaker's beliefs, and we can not 
hope to infer beliefs, except in the most basic of cases, unless we already know the 
meaning of some words for the speaker. 
A speaker's verbal behaviour is a joint product of meaning and belief. There 
seems to be no way of solving for both of these factors at once. However given 
sufficient independent evidence about one of these factors, and assurance of the 
speaker's sincerity, we might reasonably expect to be able to solve for the other factor 
with relative ease. The principle of charity operates by "restraining the degrees of 
freedom allowed belief' (Davidson, 1983, p. 316), while solving for meaning. The 
principle of charity directs the radical interpreter to "read some of his own standards 
of truth into the pattern of sentences held true by the speaker" (Davidson, 1983, 
p. 315), and to assume that the speaker shares his standards of rationality. 
Interpretation must then proceed in such a way as to maximise agreement between 
speaker and interpreter on matters of belief, that is, on the basis that the speaker's 
words express beliefs with which the interpreter is largely in agreement. In this way 
the interpreter can achieve enough of a fix on the speaker's beliefs to allow 
interpretation of the speaker's utterances. The interpreter need not assume that she 
agrees with the speaker in all things, some explicable disagreement is to be expected 
given variation in epistemic standpoints. However the interpreter must avoid 
attributing inexplicable, bizarre, beliefs to the speaker. Davidson considers the 
principle of charity justified by the fact that we simply cannot have interpretation 
unless we can find substantial agreement: 
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"What justifies the procedure is the fact that disagreement and 
agreement alike are intelligible only against a background of massive 
agreement. ... If we cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and 
other behaviour of a creature as revealing a set of beliefs largely 
consistent and true by our own standards, we have no reason to count 
that creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything. 
(Davidson, 1973a, p. 136-137) 
18. 
Davidson thinks that by virtue of the principle of charity, the notion of truth can be 
taken as a basis for the production of interpretive theory of meaning. Part of the 
appeal of his approach is that all that is required as foundation for such theory is 
observation of the speaker's acceptance or rejection of various sentences and the 
conditions in the world, understood in the interpreter's own terms, which correlate 
with the speakers attitudes to sentences. On that basis, the radical interpreter can 
construct an empirical theory, linking the speaker's sentences with sentences of her 
own. The developing theory will provide a basis for the prediction of the speaker's 
future pattern of the assent and dissent to sentences. And the success or otherwise of 
those predictions will facilitate the ongoing refinement of the theory. 
The Davidsonian radical interpreter must match sentences of her own with the 
speaker's utterances, to derive an interpretive theory of truth for the speaker. 
Davidson accepts that if interpretation is approached in the way he suggests we 
should not expect that one uniquely right theory will be found to fit the speaker's 
behaviour. He regards this indeterminacy as the "semantic counterpart of Quinc's 
indeterminacy of translation". Davidson accepts Quine's view that no amount of 
behavioural evidence can fix meaning; it is always possible to fit alternative 
incompatible translations to the behavioural data (Quine 1969; Davidson, 1979). 
Davidson's approach, however, and in particular his advocacy of the adoption of the 
principle of charity on an across-the-board basis, allows much less room for 
indeterminacy than Quine contemplates, (see Davidson, 1979, p. 235). For Davidson, 
indeterminacy of meaning does not signify the failure of theory to capture significant 
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distinctions, on the contrary: "it marks the fact that certain apparent distinctions are 
not significant. If there is indeterminacy, it is because when all the evidence is in, 
alternative ways of stating the facts remain open" (Davidson, 1979, p. 235). Such 
indeterminacy is obviously not of real concern. Davidson tries to clarify this point 
using the analogy of measurement in physical sciences: 
"A rough comparison may help give the idea. A theory of 
measurement for temperature leads to the assignment to objects of 
numbers that measure their temperature. Such theories put formal 
constraints on the assignments, and also must be tied empirically to 
qualitatively observable phenomena. The numbers assigned are not 
uniquely determined by the constraints. But the pattern of 
assignments is significant. (Fahrenheit and Centigrade temperature 
are linear transformations of each other; the assignment of numbers 
is unique up to a linear transformation. ) In much the same way, I 
suggest that what is invariant as between different acceptable theories 
of truth is meaning. The meaning (interpretation) of a sentence is 
given by assigning the sentence a semantic location in the pattern of 
sentences that comprise the language. Different theories of truth may 
assign different truth conditions to the same sentence (this is the 
semantic analogue of Quine's indeterminacy of translation), while the 
theories are (nearly enough) in agreement on the roles of the 
sentences in the language. " 
(Davidson, 1977, p. 225) 
Just as we might assign temperature in terms of centigrade of Fahrenheit scales, we 
can assign meanings in accordance with different theories of truth, different truth 
conditions. The indeterminacy allowed will not be significant, provided pattern of 
sentential roles is maintained by the constraints, principally those entailed by the 
principle of charity, put upon theory development: 
"Because there are many different but equally acceptable ways of 
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interpreting an agent, we may say, if we please that interpretation or 
translation is indeterminate, or that there is no fact of the matter as to 
what someone means by his or her words. In the same vein, we could 
speak of the indeterminacy of weight or temperature. But we 
normally accentuate the positive by being clear about what is 
invariant from one assignment of numbers to the next, for it is what 
is invariant that is empirically significant. " 
(Davidson, 1991, p. 161) 
Callinicos argues that Davidson's approach effectively defuses the issue of 
indeterminacy, and he sees this as the key contribution of his work: "Davidson's 
contribution to the philosophy of language has been in large part to offer a way out 
of the indeterminacy of translation, ... " (Callinicos, 1987, p. 
105). 
Davidson, returns to the physical measurement analogy in various places 
(e. g., 1991, p. 164). In an interesting comment, with clear implications for accounting, 
Davidson makes it clear that in his view numbers have a degree of objectivity: 
"The analogy I proposed between measurement in the physical 
sciences and the assignment of contents to the words and thoughts of 
others is imperfect in an essential respect. In the case of ordinary 
measurement, we use the numbers to keep track of the facts that 
interest us. In the case of the propositional attitudes we use our 
sentences. But there is this difference: we can mutually specify the 
properties of the numbers. The numbers, like the objects we apply 
them to, lie, as it were, halfway between ourselves and others. This 
is what it means to say they are objective, that they are objects. It 
cannot be this way with our sentences. You and I cannot come to 
agree on the relevant properties of our sentences as a preliminary to 
using them to interpret others, for the process of coming to such an 
agreement involves interpretation of the very sort we thought to 
prepare for. " 
(Davidson, 1997, pp. 121-122) 
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Rorty is "shocked" by the above passage, which he sees as "flirting" with dubious 
ontological distinctions, the subjective and the objective (Rorty, 1997, p. 151). 
Davidson's acceptance of Quine's views on the inscrutability of reference and 
the indeterminacy of translation, (See Quine 1969; Davidson, 1979), underlie his 
refusal to allow intensions, meanings, or beliefs any foundational role in his theory 
of meaning, that is, his commitment to a purely extensional theory of meaning: 
"... if meaning and belief are interlocked as I suggested, then the idea 
that each belief has a definite object, and the idea that each word and 
sentence has definite meaning, cannot be invoked in describing the 
goal of a successful theory. For even if, contrary to what may 
reasonably be expected, there were no indeterminacy at all, entities 
such as meanings and objects of belief would be of no independent 
interest. We could, of course, invent such entities with a clear 
conscience if we were sure there were no permissible variant theories. 
But if we knew this, we would know how to state our theories 
without mention of the objects. " 
(Davidson, 1974b, pp. 153) 
19. Davidson's modified T-sentences give the truth conditions of the object language 
sentences to which they refer. If truth-values were the only consideration "'Snow is 
white' is true if and only if grass is green", would be perfectly reasonable T-sentcnce. 
Taken in isolation, Davidsonian T-sentences can not be presumed to give the 
meaning of the named object language sentence: In isolation, they give an interpreter 
no clear basis for distinguishing between the predictive success of a T-sentcnce such 
as "'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white" where the used sentence 
seems to reflect the meaning of the named sentence, and a T-sentence like "'Snow is 
white' is true if and only if grass is green", which would have equal predictive success 
but in which there is clearly no reflection of the meaning of the named sentence. 
Davidson suggests that "we may be confident perhaps that no satisfactory 
theory of truth will produce such anomalous T-sentences" (Davidson, 1973a, p. 137). 
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He thinks that the gap between truth and meaning can be bridged by the principle of 
charity. For certain types of sentence evidence about the circumstances in which they 
are held true by a speaker would seem to provide a good basis for interpretation. We 
can reasonably anticipate a speaker's attitude to the sentence "It is snowing here and 
now. " to vary depending upon the prevailing conditions, and through that variation 
we may have access to the meaning. More problematic, however are those sentences, 
such as "Snow is white. " which we would expect to be held true by informed 
speakers, no matter what the circumstances. For these sentence variation in the 
conditions in which they are held true will provide no access to meaning. Davidson 
thinks that the problem can be overcome if we extend the principle of charity to the 
assumption that the speaker's utterances are rationally / logically interrelated. That is 
we must extend the principle of charity from the correspondence to coherence: 
"Making sense of the utterances and behaviour of others, even their 
most aberrant behaviour, requires us to find a great deal of reason and 
truth in them. To see too much unreason on the part of others is 
simply to undermine our ability to understand what it is they are so 
unreasonable about" 
(Davidson, 1974b, pp. 152-153) 
An adequate theory of truth in the Tarski-Davidson style must show how the truth 
conditions of sentences depend upon the semantic features of the words used and the 
effects of their combination. The T-sentences entailed by such a theory of truth are 
therefore locked together in relationship by virtue of the component parts that they 
share. A T-sentence such as "'snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white' will 
be the product of a theory which attributes semantic features to the elements of the 
sentence, which will be applied in the production of other T-sentences such as "'salt 
is white" is true if and only if salt is white' , or "'snow is cold" is true if and only if 
snow is cold'. Meaning is provided by T-sentences only as part of a whole truth 
theory constrained by the principle of charity. 
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"... in radical interpretation we cannot assume that a T-sentence 
satisfies the translation criterion. What we have been overlooking, 
however, is that we have supplied an alternative criterion: this 
criterion is that the totality of T-sentences should ... optimally fit 
evidence about sentences held true by native speakers. The present 
idea is that what Tarski assumed outright for each T-sentence can be 
indirectly elicited by a holistic constraint. If that constraint is 
adequate, each T-sentence will in fact yield an acceptable 
interpretation. " 
(Davidson, 1973a, p. 139) 
Davidson hopes that as the theory develops under the pressure of experience as a 
whole, and taking account of the interrelations of various sentences, its theorems will 
yield the meaning, and not just the truth conditions, of the object language sentences. 
20. Our capacity to understand new sentences seems obviously to depend on them having 
been compiled in familiar ways using words we already know (sec Davidson, 1965). 
It follows then that a satisfactory theory of meaning for a language must give an 
account of how the meaning of sentences depends on the meanings of words and the 
effects of their combination in accordance with the conventions of the language. This 
seems to imply that the concept of reference must have some important place in any 
theory of meaning. And it might seem to suggest that we might usefully take an 
atomistic or 'building block' approach to a theory of meaning and start by trying to 
connect words with the non-linguistic objects, events, or actions to which they refer. 
Davidson considers such an approach hopeless. We can have no direct explanation 
of the semantic features of individual words on the basis of non-linguistic 
phenomena: 
"If the name 'Kilimanjaro' refers to Kilimanjaro, then no doubt there 
is some relation between English (or Swahili) speakers, the word and 
the mountain. But it is inconceivable that one should be able to 
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explain this relation without first explaining the role of the word in 
sentences; and if this is so there is no chance of explaining reference 
in non-linguistic terms. " 
(Davidson, 1977, p. 220) 
We can not hope to use a notion of reference as the foundation for a theory of 
meaning: "we must give up the concept of reference as basic to an empirical theory 
of language" (Davidson, 1977, p. 221). An alternative approach to a theory of 
meaning would begin at the point where we can observe the connection between 
language and the extra-linguistic interests and activities that it serves. That 
connection appears at the level of sentences. Such an approach would allow no 
foundational role to reference, yet as we have seen, an account of the semantic 
features of the parts of sentences seems to be a necessary part of an adequate theory 
of meaning. Davidson suggests that this dilemma can be dissolved if we accept a 
distinction between explanation within theory and of theory. Within theory the 
meaning of a sentence may be specified by reference to a postulated sentence 
structure and concepts such as reference. However when we want to interpret or 
explain the theory as a whole we turn to the relation at the sentential level of human 
interests and activities and language. He draws an analogy with science where we 
may explain observed phenomena by means of a postulated theory of unobserved 
phenomena and relations - the microscopic level, whilst theory is developed and 
tested by reference to observed phenomena - the macroscopic level. For Davidson 
"words, meanings of words, reference, and satisfaction are posits we need to 
implement a theory" (Davidson, 1977, p. 222). Yet they need, and can have, no direct 
empirical basis, they are given content indirectly when sentences arc: 
"The building-block theory, and theories that try to give a rich content 
to each sentence directly on the basis of non-semantic evidence ... try 
to move too far too fast. The present thought is rather to expect to 
find a minimum of information about the correctness of the theory at 
each single point; it is the potential infinity of points that makes the 
difference. A strong theory weakly supported, but at enough points, 
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may yield all the information we need about the atoms and molecules 
- in this case, the words and sentences. " 
(Davidson, 1977, p. 225) 
Thus whilst Davidson attacks the notions of reference, and the meaning of words, as 
foundations for a theory of language he certainly does not resist the suggestion that 
we may sensibly employ such notions within an adequate holistically constructed 
theory of meaning for a language: 
"Once we have the theory, though, we can explain the truth of 
sentences on the basis of their structure and the semantic properties 
of the parts. " 
(Davidson, 1990a, p. 300) 
21. Davidson thinks that "all understanding of speech involves radical interpretation" 
(Davidson, 1973a, p. 125). Where an interpretive theory of truth for a language has 
been established, it will not necessarily be obvious in use, especially where the 
speaker and interpreter share the same language. Nonetheless understanding is always 
ultimately underpinned by radical interpretation. His theory of content extends to our 
understanding of our own beliefs and utterances, even they are given content through 
radical interpretation; Their meaning is an effect of interpretation, and: 
"the agent has only to reflect on what a belief is to appreciate that 
most of his basic beliefs are true, and among his beliefs, those which 
are most securely held and that cohere with the main body of his 
beliefs are most apt to be true. " 
(Davidson, 1983, p. 319) 
Davidson's approach fends off generalised skepticism, all coherent beliefs are 
justified to some extent, and the whole structure of belief can't be false - it doesn't tell 
us what counts as sufficient justification for any particular belief. 
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22. Davidson expresses these ideas particularly clearly in the following passage, in which 
he describes the process of teaching someone a language: 
"... until the triangle is completed connecting two creatures, and each 
creature with common features of the world, there can be no answer 
to the question whether a creature, in discriminating between stimuli, 
is discriminating between stimuli at the sensory surfaces or 
somewhere further out, or further in. Without this sharing of reactions 
to common stimuli, thought and speech would have no particular 
content - that is, no content at all. It takes two points of view to give 
a location to the cause of a thought, and thus to define its content. We 
may think of this as a form of triangulation: each of two people is 
reacting differently to sensory stimuli streaming in from a certain 
direction. If we project the incoming lines outward, their intersection 
is the common cause. If the two people now note each other's 
reactions (in the case of language, verbal reactions), each can 
correlate these observed reactions with his or her stimuli from the 
world. The common cause can now determine the contents of an 
utterance and a thought. The triangle which gives content to thought 
and speech is complete. But it takes two to triangulate. Two, or, of 
course, more. " 
(Davidson, 1991, pp. 159-160) 
23. Richard Rorty has been a leading champion of Davidson's work over many years. 
However in his eagerness to co-opt Davidson to his Pragmatist camp he 
underestimates Davidson's commitment to the idea that the world directly determines 
certain of our beliefs: 
"Rorty wants to explain away my claim that most of our simplest and 
most basic beliefs are true as'saying that most of anybody's beliefs 
must coincide with most of our beliefs' (1995, p. 286) or that 'the 
pattern truth makes is the pattern that justification to us makes' (ibid. ) 
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I agree with these claims, but do not agree that they give my reason 
for holding that most of our beliefs are true. The beliefs I have in 
mind are our perceptual beliefs, the beliefs that are directly caused by 
what we see and hear and otherwise sense. These I hold to be in the 
main true because their content is, in effect, determined by what 
typically causes them. ... The point is that I believe in the ordinary 
notion of truth: there really are people, mountains, camels and stars 
out there, just as we think there are, and those objects and events 
frequently have the characteristics we think we perceive them to 
have. Our concepts are ours, but that doesn't mean they don't truly as 
well as usefully describe an objective reality. " 
(Davidson, 1999a, p. 19) 
24. Davidson offers more than one version of his basic argument as to why it can not be 
the case that in general a speaker and interpreter understand one another on the basis 
of erroneous beliefs. The basic theme of the argument always hinges upon Davidson's 
view of the causal relation of belief and the world. In one interesting version of the 
argument he uses the device of a fictitious omniscient interpreter to try and clarify his 
position: 
"Why couldn't it be that the speaker and interpreter understand one 
another on the basis of shared but erroneous beliefs? This can, and no 
doubt often does, happen. But it cannot be the rule. For imagine for 
a moment an interpreter who is omniscient about the world, and about 
what does and would cause a speaker to assent to any sentence in his 
potentially unlimited repertoire. The omniscient interpreter, using the 
same method as the fallible interpreter, finds the fallible speaker 
largely consistent and correct, the fallible speaker is seen to be largely 
correct and consistent by objective standards. We may also if we 
want, let the omniscient interpreter turn his attention to the fallible 
interpreter of the fallible speaker. It turns out that the fallible 
interpreter can be wrong about some things, but not in general; and 
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so he cannot share universal error with the agent he is interpreting. 
Once we agree to the general method of interpretation I have 
sketched, it becomes impossible correctly to hold that anyone could 
be mostly wrong about how things are. " 
(Davidson, 1983, p. 317) 
If the omniscient interpreter were to take the stance of interpreter, it would need to 
find the speaker's beliefs substantially in agreement with its own, and because the 
interpreter's beliefs, in this cases, are defined to be true the speaker's beliefs must also 
be substantially true. This argument relies on Davidson's view that beliefs and 
utterances can only be given content through radical interpretation. If it were possible 
to determine the content of beliefs and utterances apart from the context of 
interpretation, that is the world we share, the omniscient being would not need to take 
the interpretive stance and could find that the speaker's beliefs were substantially 
different from its own - and in error. 
25. The method of radical interpretation requires us to go directly to the objects and 
events in the world in order to determine the content of mental states and utterances, 
it allows no epistemological intermediary between the meaning of our beliefs and 
utterances and the world; "if I am right, we can't in general first identify beliefs and 
meanings and then ask what caused them. The causality plays an indispensable role 
in determining the content of what we say and believe" (Davidson, 1983, p. 317). 
Thus, whilst experience remains causally fundamental, it is denied an evidential or 
epistemological role, and no sense can be made of the skeptic's worry that our senses 
might be systematically deceived. Davidson is able to side-step the challenge of 
skepticism by showing why we have a reason for thinking most of our beliefs are true 
which is not itself a form of evidence: 
"Neurath, Carnap and Hempel were right, I believe, in abandoning the 
search for a basic sort of evidence on which our knowledge of the 
world could rest. None is available, and none is needed. What they 
perhaps failed to appreciate is why it is not needed. It is not needed 
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because the causal relations between our beliefs and speech and the 
world also supply the interpretation of our language and of our 
beliefs. In this rather special sense, 'experience' is the source of all 
knowledge. But this is a sense that does not encourage us to find a 
mental or inferential bridge between external events and ordinary 
beliefs. The bridge is there all right -a causal bridge that involves the 
sense organs. the error lies as Neurath saw in trying to turn this causal 
bridge into an epistemological one, with sense data, uninterpreted 
givens, or unwritable sentences constituting its impossible spans. " 
(Davidson, 1982, p. 332)) 
26. The crucial Davidsonian notion that "communication begins where causes converge" 
(Davidson, 1983, p. 317), has clear ancestry in Wittgenstein's claim that "if language 
is to be a form of communication, there must be agreement not only in definitions ... 
but also in judgments" (1967, para. 242, quoted by Lyas, 1993, p. 164). 
27. Davidson never tires of repeating his commitment to an extensional theory of 
meaning and a publicly knowable world: 
"Our thoughts are' inner' and 'subjective' in that we know what they 
are in a way no one else can. But though possession of a thought is 
necessarily individual, what gives it content is not. The thoughts we 
form and entertain are located conceptually in the world we inhabit, 
with others. Even our thoughts about our own mental states occupy 
the same conceptual space and are located on the same public map. 
(Davidson, 1991, p. 165) 
28. Clearly Davidson analysis of the conditions of possibility of knowledge applies 
equally to the 'social' and the 'natural' worlds: 
"If I did not know what others think I would have no thoughts of my 
own and so would not know what I think. If I did not know what I 
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think, I would lack the ability to gauge the thoughts of others. 
Gauging the thoughts of others requires that I live in the same world 
as them, sharing many reactions to its major features, including its 
values. " 
(Davidson, 1991, p. 166) 
The features of the world which cause our knowledge include its social features 
including its value systems. Davidson would agree with Manicas that "Social reality 
is both subjectively created and objectively real" (Manicas, 1993, p. 157). For 
Davidson, of course, intersubjectivity provides our only standard of objectivity. 
29. Davidson's analysis emphasises the triangular interdependence of the three types of 
knowledge: He follows Wittgenstein in thinking that all knowledge depends on 
communication. Before a base line is established in communication it makes no sense 
to say that a person has a thought or that her utterances have propositional content. 
Knowledge of other minds is then clearly vital to all thought and knowledge. We can 
have knowledge of other minds only if we have knowledge of the world; Davidson's 
analysis of interpretation shows that the process of triangulation which is so vital to 
thought, demands that speaker and interpreter recognise that they stand in relation to 
a shared world. In addition, because communication is necessary for propositional 
thought, we can not have knowledge of the content of our own minds unless we have 
knowledge of the world and knowledge of other minds. And, the attribution of 
thoughts to others requires that we match their utterances with thoughts of our own; 
We can't attribute thoughts to others unless we have and know our own thoughts. 
30 An adequate conceptual scheme that "fit the facts" would presumably be one that was 
true. Dualist thinking has nothing intelligible to add to the concept of truth which we 
have seen arises and has application only through communication. Davidson's directs 
us back, to all we have, interpretation - and Tarski like formulations of the notion of 
truth. 
"The trouble is that the notion of fitting the totality of experience like 
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the notion of fitting the facts, or of being true to the facts, adds 
nothing to the simple concept of being true. ... 
Nothing, however, no 
thing, makes sentences or theories true: not experience, not surface 
irritations, not the world, can make our sentences true. That 
experience takes a certain course, that our skin is warmed or 
punctured, that the universe is finite, these facts, if we like to talk that 
way, make sentences and theories true. But this point is put better 
without mention of facts. The sentence'my skin is warm' is true if and 
only if my skin is warm. Here there is no reference to a fact, a world, 
an experience, or a piece of evidence. " 
(Davidson 1974a, pp. 193-194) 
31. Belkaoui suggests that the Sapir and Whorf linguistic relativity hypothesis, "which 
emphasises the role of language as a mediator and shaper of the environment" 
(Belkaoui, 1978, p. 97), may be applied to accounting as the "language of business". 
He suggests that according to the hypothesis the features of accounting as a language 
will: "... shape the perception and thoughts of those who have assimilated the 
accounting discipline. Accounting as a language predisposes "users" to a given 
method of perception and behaviour" (1978, p. 97). 
32. By the'linguistic turn' we mean those various trends in thought which seem to look 
to language as the philosophical limit of knowledge and truth: the notion that there 
is nothing beyond the text, no facts beyond language and no reality other than that 
presented in language. 
33. Callinicos (1989, p. 76) draws a direct comparison between the Saussurian tradition's 
insistence on the mediation of reality through language, and Kant's view: 
"... that we could not know things in themselves, but only sense- 
impressions organized by the categories of the understanding inherent 
in the structure of transcendental subjectivity underlying experience. 
The difference is that Derrida sets difference in place of the 
276 
Notes to chapter 2: Accounting Knowledge 
unknowable Ding-an-sich and, resolving the subject into the play of 
presence and absence, sets the categories themselves in motion. " 
(Callinicos, 1989, pp. 76-77) 
Norris (1991) also emphasises the dualist nature of Saussurian thought: 
"Meanings are bound up, according to Saussure, in a system of 
relationship and difference that effectively determines our habits of 
thought. ... In this view, our 
knowledge of things is insensibly 
structured by the systems of code and convention which alone enable 
us to classify and organize the chaotic flow of experience. " 
(Norris, 1991, pp. 4-5) 
34. The influence of structuralist and poststructuralist perspectives on accounting thought 
has provoked considerable resistance. The debate concerning the importation of 
Foucaultian perspectives has been especially vigorous: See Ncimark (1990) for a 
particularly trenchant appraisal of the influence of the Foucaultian perspective the 
critical accounting literature. 
35. Gadamer conceives of our horizons as constantly evolving, particularly through those 
interpretive encounters that challenge us to risk our prejudices. The framework of any 
living tradition will be in constant process of development: 
"We started by saying that a hermeneutical situation is determined by 
the prejudices that we bring with us. They constitute, then, the 
horizon of a particular present, for they represent that beyond which 
it is impossible to see. ... the horizon of the present is continually in 
the process of being formed because we are continually having to test 
all our prejudices. An important part of this testing occurs in 
encountering the past and in understanding the tradition from which 
we come. ... In a tradition this process of fusion is continually going 
on, for there old and new are always combining into something of 
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living value, without either being explicitly foregrounded from the 
other. " 
(Gadamer, 1960, p. 306) 
Indeed, Gadamer is very explicit in his rejection of any the notion that our horizons 
are fixed or closed: 
".. the closed horizon that is supposed to enclose a culture is an 
abstraction. The historical movement of human life consists in the 
fact that it is never absolutely bound to any one standpoint, and hence 
can never have a truly closed horizon. The horizon is, rather 
something into which we move and that moves with us. Horizons 
change for a person who is moving. thus the horizon of the past, out 
of which all human life lives and which exists in the form of tradition, 
is always in motion. " 
(Gadamcr, 1960, p. 304) 
Bernstein (1983, p. 167) is then correct to note that Gadamer is critical of the Myth 
of Framework, understood as "the myth that we forever are enclosed in our own 
horizon". Interpretation for Gadamer entails the fusion of horizons. This vision of 
evolving horizons does not, however, fundamentally change Gadamer's most basic 
of views - the notion that all our understandings are developed on a pre-structured 
framework of pre-understandings; we are fundamentally constrained by the 
framework of our pre-understandings, that is by our ongoing tradition. 
36. For Gadamer, tradition is "essentially verbal in character" (Gadamer, 1960, p. 389), 
and language is the mediator through the world comes into being for us: 
"Language is not just one of man's possessions in the world; rathcr on 
it depends the fact that man has a world at all. ... language has no 
independent life apart from the world that comes to language within 
it. Not only is the world only insofar as it comes into language, but 
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language, too has its real being only in the fact that the world is 
presented in it. ... this world 
is verbal in nature. ... man's being 
in the 
world is primordially linguistic. " 
(Gadamer, 1960, p. 443) 
37. Gadamer's primary interest is in the understanding / interpretation of texts, works of 
art, and our relation to our historical tradition. However, he sees the hermeneutical 
problem as universal. The parties to any communication whether across time or 
cultural distance operate within the horizons of their own historical being, 
understanding then, always entails a fusion of horizons. 
38. See Bernstein (1983) for an analysis of Gadamer's somewhat obscure comments on 
the question of truth. Essentially, Gadamer's view of understanding as mediated 
through tradition entails a relativist conception of truth: 
"In effect, I am suggesting that Gadamer is appealing to a concept of 
truth that (pragmatically speaking) amounts to what can be 
argumentatively validated by the community of interpreters who open 
themselves to what tradition "says to us. " This does not mean that 
there is some transcendental or ahistorical perspective from which we 
can evaluate competing claims to truth. we judge and evaluate such 
claims by the standards and practices that have been hammered out 
in the course of history. " 
(Bernstein, 1983 p. 154) 
For Gadamer, interpretations are always open to revision as the tradition evolves; and 
the correctness of any interpretation can be judged only in the context of the state of 
the tradition from which it springs: 
"The historical life of a tradition depends on being constantly 
assimilated and interpreted. An interpretation that was correct in itself 
would be a foolish ideal that mistook the nature of tradition. Every 
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interpretation has to adapt itself to the hermeneutical situation to 
which it belongs. " 
(Gadamer, 1960, p. 397) 
39. Lavoie seems to suggest that the development of tradition arising from the fusion of 
horizons in "good conversation" will somehow take us along the "path to truth": 
Rejecting objectivism does not entail embracing relativism. While 
alternative paradigms cannot be objectivistically translated into a 
neutral language and measured against a common set of standards, 
this does not mean that rivals should give up their search for truth and 
all go their own relativistic way. On the contrary, our only path to 
truth lies in the process of contention. It is out of the confrontation 
between two incommensurable theories, their mutual attempts to re- 
interpret and criticize one another, that we can hope to construct 
effective comparisons between them. " 
(Lavoie, 1989, p. 587) 
We find Lavoie's claim that hermeneutics can take us beyond relativism on a path to 
truth, difficult to make sense of within a Gadamerian hermeneutic tradition, which 
recognises all understanding as being historically conditioned. In the paradigm case 
of the hermeneutic problem, an interpreter of a text from a previous culture views the 
past and its texts from her own particular horizon, her own pre-understandings. I Icr 
interpretation of the text therefore involves a fusion of horizons in an interplay of past 
and present. As, in this way of viewing things, any understanding is inevitably 
historically framed and open to subsequent revision, it makes more sense to talk of 
understanding and interpretation in terms of authenticity than in terms of truth. An 
authentic interpretation would entail good reflective use of the interpreter's tradition. 
And the reflective interpreter must be prepared to explore and challenge her own 
prejudices, that is she must endeavour to understand herself. Such understanding will 
be promoted by interpretive confrontation with the past. However, whilst the 
interpreter may challenge and revise particular prejudices she has no basis for 
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challenging the authority of her entire tradition - the tradition can not be transcended, 
even through reflection - it is the ground of our being. 
Lavoie insists that the Gadamerian view that "'we live wholly within a 
language, ' does not ... constitute a 
form of 'linguistic relativism"', such as that 
suggested by the by the Sapir and Whorf Hypothesis. Nonetheless, the hermeneutic 
view does maintain that understanding is always relative to a particular horizon of 
pre-understandings, and that the meta-institution carrying forward our pre- 
understandings is language. Following Davidson we have some difficulty making 
sense of Lavoie's talk of "alternative paradigms" and the confrontation of 
"incommensurable theories". We understand Lavoie to mean that translation is 
possible but not by some objective standard; the interpreter must translate by the 
standards of her own tradition. What we find to be missing in this view is proper 
Davidsonian recognition of (i) the primary role of the concept of truth in facilitating 
translation, (ii) the role of the objective world in causing or constituting meaning. 
Other advocates of a hermeneutic approach to accounting seem more prepared 
to be unequivocal in accepting its implication that we give up the search for truth: 
Boland recommends an hermeneutic approach to accounting research and urges that 
we should relinquish "the quest for universal truth and be content to engage in good, 
interesting conversations" (Boland, 1989, p. 601). It may be that Lavoie intends to 
suggest the possibility of a movement beyond the constraints of the Gadamerian 
position; His analysis does little to elucidate such a possibility. 
40. Habermas criticizes the ontological priority which Gadamerian hermeneutics gives 
to tradition: For Gadamer, understanding always presupposes the structure of 
prejudices of an ongoing consensus. Whilst individual elements of a tradition may be 
questioned, the priority given to tradition allows no basis for development of 
criticism of the consensus as a whole: 
"It is a hermeneutical requirement that we refer to a concrete pre- 
understanding which itself, in the last analysis, goes back to the 
process of socialization, i. e. the introduction into a shared tradition. 
None of them is in principle beyond criticism; but neither can they be 
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questioned abstractly. This would only be possible if we could 
examine a consensus that had been achieved through mutual 
understanding by, as it were looking into it from the side and 
subjecting it, behind the backs of the participants, to renewed 
demands for legitimation. But we can only make demands of this 
kind in the face of participants by entering into dialogue with them. 
In this case we submit, yet again, to the hermeneutic demand to 
accept, for the time being, the clarifying consensus which the 
resumed dialogue might arrive at, as a supporting agreement. It would 
be senseless to abstractly suspect this agreement, which admittedly, 
is contingent, of being false consciousness since we cannot transcend 
the dialogue that we are. This leads Gadamer to conclude to the 
ontological priority of linguistic tradition over all possible critique; 
we can consequently criticize specific traditions only on the basis that 
we are part of the comprehensive context of the tradition of 
language. " 
(liabermas 1971, p. 204) 
Habermas is not suggesting that Gadamer's hermeneutics puts the contents of 
tradition entirely beyond criticism, but rather that it allows no basis for questioning 
of the legitimacy of the tradition as such. Such a questioning would necessarily entail 
engagement in dialogue with its participants and hence submission, at least for the 
time being, to the ongoing consensus. It makes no sense in such a case to suspect the 
consensus, because it can not be transcended. Gadamer gives us no way to step 
outside our tradition and no standard against which to judge the supporting 
consensus. It seems that we must be accepted the authority of the tradition. Indeed 
Gadamer wants to rehabilitate authority and tradition, and justify a presupposition of 
their legitimacy. He argues that the enlightenment opposition of reason and freedom 
to authority and tradition overlooks the possibility that authority may be a source of 
truth. He wants to justify a "prejudice in favour of the legitimacy of prejudices (or 
prejudgments) validated by tradition" (Habermas, 1967, p. 170), by arguing that 
authority is ultimately based on knowledge. Authority and knowledge are not 
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opposed, in fact, they coincide: 
"The Enlightenment's distinction between faith in authority and using 
one's own reason is, in itself, legitimate. If the prestige of authority 
displaces ones own judgment, then authority is in fact a source of 
prejudices. But this does not preclude it being a source of truth, and 
that is what the Enlightenment failed to see when it denigrated all 
authority. ... In 
fact the denigration of authority was not the only 
prejudice established by the enlightenment. It also distorted the very 
conception of reason and freedom, the concept of authority could be 
viewed as diametrically opposed to reason and freedom: to be in fact 
blind obedience. ... But this 
is not the essence of authority ... the 
authority of persons is ultimately based not on subjection and 
abdication of reason but on an act of acknowledgement and 
knowledge - the knowledge, namely, that the other is superior to 
oneself in judgment and insight and that for this reason his judgment 
takes precedence. ... Indeed, authority 
has to do not with obedience 
but rather with knowledge. " 
(Gadamcr, 1960, p. 279) 
Habermas challenges the uncritical acceptance of the validity of tradition. lie argues 
that the consensus on which authority is based does not arise in free circumstances 
but rather through historical processes characterized by domination and force, 
circumstances that systematically distort "the dialogue that we arc": 
"The dogmatic recognition of tradition, and this means the acceptance 
of the truth claims of this tradition, can be equated with knowledge 
itself only when freedom from force and unrestricted agreement about 
tradition have already been secured within this tradition. Gadamer's 
argument pre-supposes that legitimizing recognition and the 
consensus on which authority is founded can arise and develop free 
from force. The experience of distorted communication contradicts 
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this pre-supposition. Force can, in any case, acquire permanence only 
through the objective semblance of an unforced pseudo- 
communicative agreement. Force that is legitimated in such a way we 
call, with Max Weber, authority. It is for this reason that there has to 
be that principle proviso of a universal agreement free from 
domination in order to make the fundamental distinction between 
dogmatic recognition and true consensus. Reason, in the sense of the 
principle of rational discourse, represents the rock which factual 
authorities have so far been more likely to crash against than build 
upon. " 
(liabcrmas 1971, pp. 207-208) 
By taking language to be the sole meta-institution and treating tradition as self 
sufficient, Gadamer fails to recognise either their dependency on other social 
processes or their ideological role in sustaining and legitimising relations of 
systematic inequality and domination: 
"There is good reason to conceive language as a kind of meta- 
institution on which all social institutions depend. ... But clearly this 
meta-institution of language as tradition is dependent in turn on social 
processes that cannot be reduced to normative relationships. 
Language is also the medium of domination and social power. It 
serves to legitimate relationships of organized force. In so far as 
legitimations do not articulate the power relationships whose 
institutionalisation they make possible, insofar as the relationship is 
merely manifested in the legitimation, language is also ideological. 
In that case it is not so much a question of deception in language as 
deception with language as such. 
(liabcrmas, 1967, p. 172) 
Habermas thinks that a Gademarian hermeneutics, which urges the necessity of 
submission to authority and tradition, would be unable to reveal "deceptions with 
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language as such" which sustain relations of domination. We may face not merely 
local error or failure of understanding, but a system of deception. The systematic 
distortions that underpin language, are likely to go unrecognized by an hermeneutic 
approach constrained to truth expressed at the level of social consensus and by the 
structure of prejudices legitimised as tradition: 
"If I understand correctly, then Gadamer is of the opinion that the 
hermeneutical clarification of incomprehensible or misunderstood 
expressions always has to lead us back to a consensus that has already 
been reliably established through converging tradition. This tradition 
is objective in relation to us in the sense that we cannot confront it 
with a principled claim to truth. The prcjudgemcntal structure of 
understanding not only prohibits us from questioning the factually 
established consensus which underlies our misunderstanding and 
incomprehension, but makes such an undertaking appear senseless" 
(liabcrmas, 1971, p. 204) 
Because the forces driving and distorting consensus arise outside language, a 
hermeneutic analysis, in itself, will not reveal them. Only a systematic (albeit 
hermeneutically informed) analysis of the underlying realities, will give access to the 
deception within language. Analysis must respect the grounding of language in the 
material world and the lived relations of the production of our lives. In so far as the 
hermeneutic tradition follows Gadamer in seeing language as the essence of tradition, 
it risks descending into naive "linguistic idealism", which reduces the conception of 
our relation to the world to a matter of intersubjectivc ideas and practices circulating 
in language: 
"An interpretive sociology that hypostatizes language as the subject 
of life forms and of tradition binds itself to the idealist presupposition 
that linguistically articulated consciousness determines the material 
being of life-practice. But the objective context of social action is not 
reducible to the dimension of intersubjectively intended and 
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symbolically intended meaning. The linguistic infrastructure of 
society is a moment in a complex that, however symbolically 
mediated, is also constituted by the constraints of reality: by the 
constraints of external nature which enters into the procedures of 
technological exploitation, and by constraints of inner nature which 
is reflected in the repression of social relationships of power. 
(11abermas, 1967, p. 173-174) 
Habermas thinks that commitment to the rehabilitation of authority in Gadamerian 
hermeneutics, and its acceptance of the final validity of tradition, prevents its full 
recognition of the ideological status of tradition and language, and of the capacity of 
reflection to challenge and modify tradition: 
"Against this stand the insight that the reflective appropriation of 
tradition breaks the quasi-natural substance of tradition and alters the 
position of subjects within it ... when reflection understands the 
genesis of the tradition from which it proceeds and to which it 
returns, the dogmatism of Life-praxis is shaken. " 
(Ilabermas, 1967, p168) 
Habermas thinks that science can provide the critical autonomy / distance, from 
tradition, necessary for critical reflection on the interests and forces underlying the 
development of tradition. And he believes that the advance of science and the 
scientific mentality has shaken the grip and continuity of tradition in our society and 
considerably altered our relation to it. We are better able to sec tradition for what it 
is and less accepting of the claims of authority. The inability of hcrmcncutics to 
acknowledge the power of reflection encourages and supports traditional relations of 
domination and exploitation. Habermas wants to argue that through reflection and 
communicative reason we may distinguish between a consensus which has been 
imposed by dominative force and a consensus openly and rationally accepted: 
"Substantiality disintegrates in reflection, because the latter not only 
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confirms but breaks dogmatic forces. Authority and knowledge do not 
converge. Certainly, knowledge is rooted in actual tradition; it 
remains bound to contingent conditions ... But as reflection recalls 
that path of authority through which the grammars of language games 
were learned dogmatically as rules of worldview and action, authority 
can be stripped of that in it that was mere domination and dissolved 
into the less coercive force of insight and rational decision. " 
(Habermas, 1967, p. 170) 
By insisting that authority and knowledge coincide Gadamer undercuts the 
possibility of critique "anything that might challenge the legitimacy of tradition must 
be regarded as a form of non-knowledge. ... For hermeneutics tradition is always 
ultimately right" (How, 1995, p. 143-144). 
Habermas accepts that our pre-understandings condition all our 
understandings, he recognises language as a meta-institution that lends symbolic 
structure to all social action, and he certainly thinks that hermeneutic analysis has the 
potential to help reveal those structures which frame our understanding and 
knowledge. But he wants to insist, against Gadamer, that critical reflection which lays 
bare the structure of tradition and its pattern of development should fundamentally 
alter our relation to tradition and curtail our capacity to accept the authority of 
prejudices. After reflection we can no longer take the authority of tradition for 
granted. Habermas' aim is not to deny the critical value of hermeneutic analysis, as 
such. He wants to reject the "linguistic idealism" he finds in Gadamerian 
Hermeneutics; its tendency to absolutize language, and hence its inability to confront 
the realities of force, technology, and domination operating behind language. There 
is a moral dimension to Habermas' insistence on the power of reflection. lie objects 
to the determinist strain in Gadamer's thought, which privileges tradition and seems 
to deny the possibility that human beings might shake-off the grip of their tradition 
and achieve self-determination. Habermas also attacks the similar denigration of the 
liberative potential of reflection that he identifies in the post-structuralist tradition. 
Habermas does not think that we can find an Archimedian point somewhere 
outside our own culture from which we might obtain the leverage to critique our own 
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tradition. There is no'outside', and no possibility of a'Gods eye view': 
"It is, of course, true that criticism is always tied to the context of 
tradition which it reflects. Gadamer's hermeneutic reservations are 
justified against monological self-certainty that merely arrogates to 
itself the title of critique. There is no validation of depth- 
hermeneutical interpretation outside of the self-reflection of all 
participants that is successfully achieved in a dialogue. " 
(Iiabermas, 1971, p. 209) 
Habermas does, however, think that we can retain the ideal of objectivity in the social 
sciences, and much of his work has been directed towards showing how we might 
move beyond the tradition bound pluralism of a Gadamcrian hermeneutics. I labcrmas 
thinks that truth and objectivity interpretation / knowledge can emerge in the 
consensus achieved through rational discourse in conditions of free and unconstrained 
dialogue; in "ideal speech". He believes every act of communication anticipates the 
possibility of an 'ideal speech' situation, the possibility of dialogic consensus 
orientated to truth: 
"A critically enlightened hermeneutic that differentiates between 
insight and delusion incorporates the meta-hermeneutic awareness of 
the conditions for the possibility of systematically distorted 
communication. It connects the process of understanding to the 
principle of rational discourse, according to which truth would only 
be guaranteed by that kind of consensus which was achieved under 
the idealized conditions of unlimited communication free from 
domination and could be maintained over time. ... If the 
understanding of meaning is not to remain a fortiori indifferent 
towards the idea of truth then we have to anticipate, together with the 
concept of a kind of truth which measures itself on an idealized 
consensus achieved in unlimited communication free from 
domination, also the structures of solidarity co-extensive in 
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communication free from force. Truth is that characteristic 
compulsion towards unforced universal recognition; the latter is itself 
tied to an ideal speech situation. i. e. a form of life, which makes 
possible unforced universal agreement. " 
(11abermas, 1971, pp. 205-206) 
41. Even theorists like Manicas (1993) who seek to advance realist views of accounting's 
possibilities, are apt to understate the strength of those foundations. Manicas, for 
example, seems to suggests that accounting as a critical social science has to 
acknowledge: "that it lacks any sort of secure foundations" (Manicas, 1993, p. 157). 
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1. Conflict over the allocation of goods seldom remains on a bluntly practical level. 
Typically such conflict will be expressed in ethical terms: "if the parties want to settle 
it by ordered speech rather than by violence, they will invoke more substantive 
judgements, usually of justice, and the children will talk of fairness and the heroes 
of precedence" (Williams, 1985, pp. 133-134). 
2. Williams (1985, pp. 142-143) identifies three conditions of propositional knowlcdgc: 
(a) the judgement made must be believed, (b) the judgement must be true, and (c) the 
beliefs acquired must "track the truth", so that it is no accident that the beliefs 
acquired are true, and in different circumstances, a different true belief would be 
acquired. 
3. The fact of convergence in Western science is reasonably uncontroversial. I Iowever, 
critics of Williams position, including Rorty (1980, p. 344-345), would argue that 
such convergence is not best explained as a convergence guided by how things arc, 
but rather as a socio-cultural effect (see Rorty, 1991, p. 58). Rorty's hostility to 
Williams' view seems to reflect his resistance to the full import of the Davidsonian 
notion that the content of many of our beliefs, and particularly our perspectival 
beliefs, is effectively determined by their distal causes in the world (sec Davidson 
1999, pp. 18-19). 
4. Williams is conscious of the apparent paradox entailed in this statement. One might 
argue that if the locals' statements are true then the observer can correctly say that 
they are true. He notes that his view may seem to conflict with Tarski's convention 
T (the disquotational principle), but argues that, in fact, there is no conflict (Sec 
Williams, 1985, pp. 143-145). 
5. In view of the level of opposition raised by some of the more controversial aspects 
of the 1995 exposure draft Statement of Principles, the ASB agreed to consult more 
fully before proceeding with the development of a final statement (ASB, 1996, p. 1), 
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and a revised exposure draft (ASB, 1999a), responsive to criticism of the earlier draft, 
was issued prior to the issue of a final version of the Statement of Principles (ASB, 
1999d). 
6. The draft Statement of Principles defined gains and losses as increases or decreases 
in ownership interest, other than those relating to contributions from or distributions 
to owners (ASB, 1995b, para. 3.47), and defined ownership interest itself as the 
entity's assets less its liabilities (ASB, 1995b, para. 3.39). 
7. ASB's Statement of Principles generally draws heavily on the FASB Conceptual 
Framework project: The ASB acknowledge that their framework is "based on the 
International Accounting Standards Committee's (IASC) 'Framework for the 
Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements. ... (Which) was in turn based 
on the US Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) pioneering work on its 
Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts" (ASB, 1999a, preface). 
8. The positive accounting researcher moves into the position of detached observer 
rather than participant in a way of life, and hence is unwilling to use the normative 
language of the participants. Many critics of positive accounting research would 
argue that the positive approach does not in fact succeed in eliminating normative 
theory from accounting research but merely suppress its recognition (see Tinker, 
1982). 
9. If we allow that members of an unreflective society may have ethical knowledge 
when they correctly apply their concepts using appropriate criteria, and we therefore 
agree that there can be ethical knowledge at the unreflective level. And if we accept 
that ethical reflection tends to undermine thick ethical concepts, and that reflection 
itself can not give us ethical knowledge, then we can say that "reflection can destroy 
knowledge" (Williams, 1985, pp. 145-148). 
10. A thick ethical concepts may survive reflection "just in the sense that that we would 
not have encountered any considerations that led us to give it up, lose hold on it, or 
291 
Notes to chapter 3: Objectivity in Accounting - the Case of Deferred Tax 
simply drift away from it" (Williams, 1995, p. 206). Survival in this sense does not 
mean that the concept will somehow be validated by reflection in anything like the 
way that scientific perspectival knowledge can be justified by explanation. 
11. For fuller analysis of the relevance of Habermas' work for accounting scc, for 
example; Laughlin, 1987; Arrington, & Puxty, 1991; Power & Laughlin, 1996. 
12. Habermas adumbrates a transcendental-pragmatic justification of (U), but dots not 
himself present its formal derivation. See Rehg (1997) for an outlinc and critical 
discussion of the formal derivation of (U). 
13. For fuller discussion of the relationship between the views of i iabcmias and Davidson 
see Schatzki, (1986), Baynes, (1990), and Hoy (1994). 
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of External Financial Reporting 
1. We follow Davidson's advice, and accept that we should: 
"... not say that truth is correspondence, coherence, warranted 
assertibility, ideally justified assertibility, what is accepted in the 
conversation of the right people, what science will end up 
maintaining, what explains the convergence on single theories in 
science, or the success of our ordinary beliefs. " 
(Davidson, 1990, p. 309) 
2. Correspondence theories of truth have historically tended to be realist, and many 
philosophers including Davidson (1990, p. 308) have written as if the correspondence 
theory of truth implied realism. Searle, for example, suggests that "On a normal 
interpretation, the correspondence theory implies realism since it implies that there 
is a reality to which statements correspond if they are true" (Searle, 1995, p. 154). We 
understand realism to be the thesis that certain things exist independently of mind, 
and we accept that correspondence theories of truth are not necessarily intrinsically 
realist; Strictly speaking, a correspondence theory "requires that a certain state of 
affairs x obtains, but not that it obtain independently of mind. It is perfectly possible 
to hold that truth consists in correspondence with facts and to hold also that facts are 
mind-dependent entities" (Kirkham, 1992, p. 133-134). Nevertheless, without realism 
the thesis of correspondence is weak, and almost all theorists who arc attracted to 
correspondence theories of truth prefer a substantial version of the thesis entailing 
realism. 
3. Davidson uses a line of argument, initially advanced by Frege (1892) to show that "... 
if a statement corresponds to one fact, it corresponds to all" (Davidson, 1969, p. 42), 
in which case, we can not explain truth in terms of correspondence to facts. 
4. Metaphysical realism is a term used by Putnam to describe the conjunction of the 
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following theses: (i) The ontological thesis that reality exists independently of our 
representations of it. (ii) The epistemological thesis that there is one correct scheme 
for describing reality. And (iii) the thesis that truth consists in the correspondence 
between representation and representation-independent reality: 
"... the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent 
objects. There is exactly one true and complete description of 'the 
way the world is'. Truth involves some sort of correspondence 
relation between words or thought-signs and external things and sets 
of things. " 
(Putnam, 1981, p. 49) 
Searle does not accept that there is one correct scheme for describing the world. 
5. Rorty enthusiastically claims Davidson's rejection of scheme-content dualism as 
supportive of his own pragmatist position: "his repudiation of ... the idea that 
something like 'mind' or 'language' can bear some relation such as 'fitting' or 
'organizing' the world ... makes 
it tempting to see Davidson as belonging to the 
American pragmatist tradition" (Rorty, 1986, p. 333). 
6. Morgan clearly rejects external realism; He does not think, as Shapiro does, that 
"external reality exists independently of the financial statements that attempt to 
represent it" (Shapiro, 1997, p. 167). Morgan seems to take a thoroughly idealist 
position, drawing inspiration directly form Berkley (see Morgan, 1988, p. 482). 
Berkley's views are commonly interpreted as a reaction against Locke's empiricism 
- the thesis that the mind is furnished with ideas by experience (sensory mediation). 
Berkley was particularly opposed to the radical scepticism that Locke's empiricism 
seemed to invite: If all we have is our ideas, what is to guarantee that any of them arc 
actually in touch with the world? Berkley's answer was to deny the existence of 
matter. He maintained that the ordinary objects of experience are just "collections of 
ideas", radical scepticism then becomes impossible because it makes no sense to 
argue that things might not be as they appear. Berkley then faces an issue of what 
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causes our ideas? He deals with this question by invoking God. Shapiro's willingness 
to enlist idealist and social constructionist thinking is made all the more surprising 
by the fact that John Searle explicitly defends his realism against the antircalist 
challenge of "phenomenalist idealism" and "social constructionism", (see Searle, 
1995, pp. 183-197). 
7. Just a few paragraphs prior the passage quoted by Shapiro in both his 1997 and 1998 
papers, Rorty explicitly points out that antirepresentationalists like himself who sec 
objectivity in teens of intersubjectivity have no use for the notion of correspondence: 
"(T)hose who wish to reduce objectivity to solidarity - call them 
"pragmatists" - do not require either a metaphysics or an 
epistemology. They view truth as, in William James' phrase, what is 
good for us to believe. So they do not need an account of a relation 
between beliefs and objects called 'correspondence, ' nor an account 
of human cognitive abilities which ensures that our species is capable 
of entering into that relation. " 
(Rorty, 1991, pp. 22-23) 
8. Rorty's own `cautionary' use of the concept of truth, (sec Rorty, 1986 & 1995), 
suggests that he himself "knows that there is a difference between our beliefs being 
justified and our beliefs being true" (Davidson, 1999, p. 18). And once it is accepted 
that truth differs from justification, one must surely acknowledge that "there has to 
be something about truth that you don't understand when you understand `all about' 
justification" (Davidson, 1999, p. 18). 
9. In recent times, "postmodernism", in its many guises, has overtaken scientism and 
become the dominant mode of moral scepticism; we might now, more usually, think 
of discourse ethics as a response to postmodernism. 
At the ideal limit a "balanced" modernization process is posited in 
which the three fundamental spheres of social reproduction can at all 
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times be mediated by communicative action, that is, action which 
explicitly raises claims to truth, rightness and sincerity within 
institutional contexts in which such claims may be consensually 
resolved. This involves something like sustaining the lines of 
substantive public accountability between quasi-autonomous sub- 
systems, such as the economy, and the public sphere of dialogue and 
debate concerning fundamental ends. " 
(Power & Laughlin, 1996, p. 444) 
10. The transcendental-pragmatic justification of (U), we have discussed here, does not 
constitute proof or ultimate justification of discourse ethics. Rather, it locates 
discourse ethics "among the reconstructive sciences concerned with the rational bases 
of knowing, speaking, and acting" (Habermas, 1983, p. 98). 
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In the revised 1999 draft of the SoP, the ASB is rather more guarded in its advocacy 
of current value accounting. However, the Board does continue to express its faith 
that current values will often be the most relevant measurement basis (ASB, 1999a, 
para. 6.24), and that markets may develop'so as to make current values more reliable 
and relevant (ASB, 1999a, para. 6.25). 
2. In view of recent international moves towards a single performance statement, the 
ASB's revised 1999 draft of the SoP does not discuss the relative roles of a profit and 
loss statement and a statement of total recognised gains and losses. Ilowever it 
remains clear that the ASB continue to view income/performance from proprietary 
perspective which understands income in terms of change in the owners' wealth: 
"The difference (between the opening and closing balance sheets, 
adjusted for capital contributions and distributions) is equal to the 
total of all components of financial performance,... " 
(ASB, 1999b para. 13) 
3. The ASB's revised 1999 draft of the SoP is less explicit than the 1995 draft in 
advocacy of a "real terms" capital maintenance model. However, consistent with "real 
terms", it does imply that adjustment for both general and specific price change might 
be appropriate in times of inflation (ASB, 1999a, para. 6.43). 
4. Our purposes here could have been equally well served through the exploration of 
various other accounting issues. In accounting for stock option compensation we have 
selected an issue where the reporting entity issue is salient and obvious. It is equally 
obvious in many group accounting issues. Presently UK GAAP seems to apply 
proprietary and entity perspectives on a quite arbitrary basis to group accounting 
issues. Consider FRS2's treatment of disposals versus its treatment of intra group 
trading: 
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"Where the group decreases its stake in an undertaking whether or not 
it continues to be a subsidiary undertaking, a profit or loss generally 
arises. Consolidated financial statements are prepared from the 
perspective of investors in the parent undertaking of the group. Where 
the group disposes of part of its interest in a subsidiary undertaking 
it transacts directly with third parties and a profit or loss for the group 
arises and is reported in the consolidated financial statements. This 
can be contrasted with the treatment of intra-group transactions where 
no profit or loss arises for the group as a whole because the 
transaction involves only undertakings included in the consolidation 
and under common control and does not directly involve any third 
party. " 
(ASB, 1992b, para. 91) 
5. 
In para. 91 the entity perspective prevails for treatment of intra group trading whereas 
a proprietary perspective is taken on the treatment of the disposal of an interest in a 
subsidiary. The justification given for the adoption of different perspectives is, 
obviously flimsy; How we define the entity will affect our identification of 'third 
parties'. We might have hoped that the ASB's SoP project might have helped us 
resolve such confusions and contradiction. In fact the SoP gives little guidance. The 
Board, surely rather disingenuously, suggest that: "Deciding which perspective to use 
as a basis for accounting for subsidiaries depends on the relative usefulness of the 
information each provides" (ASB, 1995b, para. 7.19). But how should we 
conceptualise usefulness? From the perspective of a "wide range of users" (ASB, 
1995b, para. 1.1) or as collapsed down to the perspective of the providers of capital 
(Ernst & Young, 1996b, p. 273)? The alternative perspectives on the definition of the 
reporting entity, tend to privilege the information needs of alternative user groups: 
"whose presumed "perspective" should be incorporated into the measurement of 
enterprise performance" (FASB, 1990, para. 140). 
The FASB, found this issue critical to its project on accounting for stock 
compensation: 
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"... advocates of the opposing views on the nature of an enterprise's 
contractual obligation to issue its own stock at a specified price -a 
call option written on its own stock - generally view the relationship 
between an enterprise and its owners differently. " 
(FASB, 1990, para. 15). 
Appendix B of the FASB's Discussion Memorandum, Distinguishing between 
Liability and Equity Instruments and Accounting for Instruments with Characteristics 
of Both, (FASB, 1990) is devoted to discussion of this issue. 
6. We will also avoid any detailed discussion of recognition and measurement issues. 
However it is interesting to note that the draft SoP includes provisions, (which some 
commentators argue would be more fittingly included in an accounting standard), 
which would mean that under the SoP recognition would have to await the 
employees' delivery of service: 
"When either party to a transaction has performed, the assets and 
liabilities arising from that performance should be recognised. Thus 
if payment is made before delivery of stock, an asset representing the 
claim on the supplier is recognised. More usually, delivery will be the 
first act of performance and the stock and an obligation to pay for it 
will be recognised at that time. In the case of property being acquired 
under a long-term contract the project and related obligations are 
recognised as the contractor performs. Performance has not occurred, 
conversely, in respect of future services of employment, and so no 
asset or liability should be recognised. ... " 
(ASB, 1995b, para. 4.19) 
The ASB give no justification for the treatment of "future employment services" 
which they propose. The FASB dealing with the same issue, come to a different 
conclusion supported by more careful reasoning: 
299 
Notes to chapter 5: The Reporting Entity as Divided Subject 
"Fully executory contracts under which neither party has begun to 
fulfil its obligations are usually not recognized as assets, liabilities, 
or equity in financial statements. Once an employee stock-option is 
granted, however, it no longer is a fully executory contract. The 
employer has already conveyed to the employee the right to benefit 
from future increases in the price of the underlying stock, which is the 
essence of an option. Moreover, the employee begins rendering the 
agreed-upon future service at the grant date. Accordingly, both parties 
have begun to fulfil the terms of the contract, which makes it partially 
executory. Accountants routinely recognize partially executory 
contracts - examples are transactions in debt and equity securities that 
are recognized at the trade date rather than the settlement date. " 
(FASB, 1993, para. 65) 
7. The FASB recognised, in 1988, that it is not possible to resolve accounting for stock 
compensation "without first considering the more fundamental issues in the broader 
project on distinguishing between liabilities and equity" (FASB, 1990, para. 14). 
8. The FASB's Concept Statement 6 definitions of assets and liabilities also refer to "an 
entity". However, para. 24 of Concept Statement 6 defines the "entity" as the 
"business enterprise", economic operating unit; that is the entity is defined in terms 
of entity theory rather than proprietary theory: 
"All elements are defined in relation to a particular entity, which may 
be a business enterprise, an educational or charitable organization, a 
natural person, or the like. " 
(FASB, 1985, para. 24) 
Therefore the FASB are able to clearly conclude that an enterprise's obligation to 
issue stock is not a liability in terms of the FASB conceptual framework: 
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"A call written on an enterprise's own stock fails to exhibit the first 
characteristic of a liability as defined in Concepts Statement 6 
because it does not embody an obligation to transfer the enterprise's 
assets or to provide services to another entity in the future. ... The 
terms of the eventual "exchange" if the option is exercised cannot be 
unfavourable to the enterprise itself, although the terms may well be 
unfavourable to the enterprise's preexisting shareholders - its group 
of stockholders just before the transaction occurs. " 
(FASB, 1990, para. 119) 
9. The measurement date for a stock option is the date at which the share price that 
enters into the final measurement of the option is fixed. Subsequent changes in the 
price of the underlying share will have no effect on the measurement of the option as 
a liability or equity instrument or on the measurement of the related compensation 
cost, (see FASB, 1993, paras. 80-99). 
10. By "proprietors", advocates of the proprietary perspective generally mean "the 
stockholder group existing just before an issue of stock or remaining after a 
repurchase of stock" (FASB, 1990, para. 131). 
11. We believe that financial reporting standard setting in late capitalist societies is 
inevitably 'political'. The development of a conceptual framework for financial 
reporting accounting is in itself a political act; Both the proprietary and entity 
conceptions of the reporting entity are essentially ideological constructs. 
12. Lacan's analysis may be regarded as deeply antibiologistic. He "locates subjectivity 
entirely in language - of which the body becomes merely an effect" (Blum & Nast, 
1996, p. 569). Lacan's antibiologism is considered by some commentators to be a 
weakness. Lefebvre, whilst appropriating much of the Lacanian analytic framework, 
objects to the "logical, epistemological and anthropological priority" it gives 
language over space (Lefebvre, 1974, p. 35-36). Lefebvre sees the Lacanian subject 
as two- dimensional: image and language. And he argues that the material and the 
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political dimensions are typically omitted from such structural analyses: 
In point of fact this approach leaves two areas untouched, one on the 
near side and the other on the far side, so to speak, of the 
readable/visible. On the near side, what is overlooked is the body.... 
For it is by means of the body that space is perceived, lived - and 
produced. On the far side of the readable/visible, and equally absent 
... 
is power. " 
(Lefebvre, 1974, p. 162) 
For other critics, however, the problem with Lacan's analysis is that he fails to 
sufficiently omit the body; and in particular that he is unduly reliant on csscntializcd 
anatomies. For example, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1972) attack what they 
see as Lacan's attempt to ground the subject of the unconscious in private Oedipal 
experience and fantasy. They argue that the unconscious is a social product, and that 
all fantasy is group fantasy. 
13. For Lacan, "the unconscious is neither primordial nor instinctual" (Lacan, 1957, 
p. 170), it exists entirely in the symbolic order of language, it is "the discourse of the 
Other" (Lacan, 1957-58, p. 193). The Lacanian unconscious is not something interior 
to the subject. Rather, it precedes the subject, it is "intersubjective", "transindividual" 
(Lacan, 1953b, p. 49). Lacan equates the subject with the id. The equation is reflected 
in the homophony he exploits between the German term ES (it) and the letter S, the 
symbol by which Lacan designates the subject (Lacan, 1955, p. 129). Lacan conceives 
of the id as the symbolic it, the force at the origin of speech, beyond the imaginary 
false-being of the ego. He stresses that the forces concerned are linguistic not 
primitive biological drives. 
14. In opposition to the imaginary and the symbolic orders, Lacan identifies a third order, 
the real. The real is "that which resists symbolization absolutely" (Lacan, 1953-54, 
p. 66). It is all that it is impossible to imagine or represent symbolically. For example, 
the body is in the real until it is inscribed by language and transformed into a social 
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reality; The symbolic "kills the real". 
15. The mirror stage is not merely a developmental phase. Lacan clearly regards it as part 
of the permanent structure of subjectivity, the paradigm case of the imaginary 
register, (see Evans, 1996, p. 114). 
16 Lacan distinguishes between 'need', 'demand', and 'desire'. Need is biological - the 
human child depends on others for satisfaction of his needs (and needs can be 
satiated). To get the Other's help the infant must articulate his need in language as 
demand, and "in so far as his needs are subjected to demand, they return to him 
alienated" (Lacan, 1958b, p. 286). The infant's demands call the Other to address its 
needs. The presence of the Other takes on significance beyond the satisfaction of 
need - it symbolises the Other's love. Demand then has double function - the 
articulation of need and a call for love. After the need articulated in demand has been 
satisfied a residual will remain - desire - the insatiable craving for love: "Desire 
begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need" 
(Lacan, 1960, p. 311). 
17. The mother as parent is first representative of the symbolic order to the child. She is 
thus, also (m)Other to the child; the big Other of radical alterity - equated with 
language and law. "The Other is, therefore, the locus in which speech is constituted" 
(Lacan, 1955, p. 141), and the mOther is the first occupier of this locus for the child. 
She introduces the child to the symbolic order, by which she is herself bound and 
structured. She introduces the world of rules and regulations, language and law, that 
is, the father's world. 
18 
19. 
What most threatens the child is a "lack of the lack" in the maternal: The fantasy of 
maternal plenitude, the perfect fit between the mother and child's needs. 
The incompatibility of language and desire should not be understood as designating 
desire to some primordial pre-linguistic realm; Desire is inconceivable without 
language, and can only be recognised when it is brought into speech. 
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20. The unity of mOther-child need not be exclusively conceived of in temporal terms, 
it is also a logical or structural moment in the development of the subject. The 
operation of the paternal metaphor is clearly related, in Freudian terms, to the reality 
principle, which does not cancel the pleasure principle but rather directs it in socially 
acceptable ways. The symbolic order blocks the child's pleasurable contact with the 
mother, so that the child is driven to pursue pleasure in more socially acceptable 
ways. The symbolic kills the real and makes of it a socially acceptable reality. 
21. For Lacan, being is constituted through language, and is existence in the symbolic 
order. It is therefore possible for something to exist in the real, without being. Each 
person has an "ineffable, stupid existence" (Lacan, 1957-58, p. 194), an element 
which can not be fully rendered in the symbolic. The subject originates in a lack of 
being (manque-ä-titre), which causes desire, which is always essentially a desire for 
being; "desire is the metonymy of the want-to-be, the ego is the metonymy of desire" 
(Lacan, 1958a, p. 274). 
22. Object a may also be thought of as the little other of schema L, the ego's 
phantasmatic counterpart. In separation the subject becomes split between the ego 
and the unconscious, and the Other is correspondingly divided between object a, a 
remnant of the real, and the lacking Other of the symbolic order. 
23. The symbolic order, the Law, is "grounded in" the prohibition of jouissance; 
"jouissance is forbidden to him who speaks" (Lacan, 1960, p. 319). This prohibition, 
the pleasure principle, acts as a restraint on excitement/enjoyment, which the subject 
rails against. Beyond the prohibition pleasure becomes pain, painful pleasure; 
jouissance. In the subject's entry to the symbolic order, through separation, the 
subject must give up the jouissance associated with union with the mother. It must 
stop trying to be the phallus for the mOther and suffer castration in language: 
"Castration means that jouissance must be refused, so that it can be reached on the 
inverted ladder (1echelle renversee) of the Law of desire" (Lacan, 1960, p. 324). 
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24. The subject projected into fantasy by the process of separation is blocked from 
realising its cause - the Other as desire and language. . 
"This second subordination (to the Other as desire in separation) not 
only closes the effect of the first (subordination to the other as 
language in alienation) in projecting the topology of the subject into 
the instant of fantasy; it seals it, refusing to allow the subject of desire 
to realize that he is an effect of speech, to realize, in other words, that 
he is but the Other's desire. " 
(Lacan, 1964b, p. 265) 
25. In Lacan's work the term neurosis refers to a particular clinical structure. Neurosis is 
the predominant human condition. The neurotic subject follows the pattern of 
alienation and separation we have described in this section of the paper. For Lacan 
the unconscious is instituted on the basis of relations between signifiers, anchored, 
for the neurotic, by the signifier of the Other's desire. The neurotic subject is 
anchored in the sense that all the signifiers used by a neurotic are tied back to the 
subjects master signifiers which Lacan links with the signifier of the Other's desire 
- the name-of-the-father. Every word used by the neurotic speaks of his/her relation 
to the desire of the Other. The neurotic subject is then fully implicated in language. 
The principal alternative to neurosis, psychosis, results from the failure of the 
paternal metaphor. The psychotic fails to assimilate the name-of-the-father into 
his/her symbolic universe, and so the words used by the psychotic are not pinned 
back to the subject; the psychotic is not anchored in language. 
26. The name-of-the-father is a signifier, for Lacan, but it is different from other 
signifiers: It is primally repressed, unpronounceable, and has a certain fixity so that 
it is not fully in the play of language - it can not be substituted or overlapped by other 
signifiers. Essentially the primordial signifier for the firm is dependent upon the 
subject's reaching towards the desire of the other. We are not suggesting that 'the- 
market' is a universal primordial signifier for firms. For some firms the name-of- thc- 
father may be something altogether more mysterious. 
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27. Again we should stress the antibiologistic aspect of Lacan's thought. For Lacan the 
drives are completely removed from biology. They are cultural products of the 
symbolic order. They should not be conceived of as "some ultimate given, something 
archaic, primordial" (Lacan, 1964a, p. 162). Unlike need, drives do not aim at 
satisfaction, but at the repetitive movement around their object. For Lacan every drive 
is ultimately a death drive, they are all repetitive, excessive and finally destructive 
(see Evans, 1996, p. 46-49). 
28. Analysis aims at a kind of deconstruction, it aims to put into motion the meaning of 
the master signifiers. It is tempting to think of the master signifiers as "transcendental 
signifiers". Whilst recognising that no signifier is truly "transcendental", no signifier 
is fully isolated from the flow of language and history, it seems clear that power, for 
example the power of the Other's desire, holds certain signifiers very firmly in place. 
Lacanian analysis is in a sense ideology critique for the subject. Once the master 
signifier has been deconstructed, put in motion, the subject as sedimentation of 
meaning is correspondingly mobilised, its anchorage points in the name-of-the-father 
/ master signifier are loosened. 
29. The translation of "Wo Es war, soll Ich werden" given by the standard English 
translation of Freud's works "Where id was, there ego shall be" (Freud, 1933, p. 80), 
is explicitly rejected by Lacan (1955, p. 128). 
30. An analogous moral imperative is implicit in Marx's theory of history. For Marx too 
man must subjectivize his own history and the living must shake free of the dcad: 
"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they 
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by 
themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and 
transmitted from the past. " 
(Marx, 1851, p. 300) 
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31. The analyst clearly has a role to play in helping the subject on the path beyond 
neurosis. This is not the place for a full discussion of that role; however one or two 
thoughts seem pertinent. In analysis, the analyst will tend to be cast by the subject in 
the role of "the one who knows" the Other as the locus of speech and meaning. In 
attempting to represent itself to the analyst the subject is further alienated; it slips 
behind more language. As a surrogate object a, the analyst will also typically come 
to represent the Other as desire for the subject. The Lacanian analyst will typically 
adopt strategies designed to be to disrupt the neurotic subject's comfortable alienation 
in language. For example, the analyst may unexpectedly halt a session whilst the 
analysand is in the process of providing the explanations which he/she assumes the 
analyst wants to hear. The analysand pushed towards the recognition that he/she does 
not know what the analyst wants, that his/her relation to object a is not quite as he/she 
assumed in fantasy. By confronting the subject with the enigma of the Other's desire, 
the analyst aims to put the subject's relations to the Other as language and desire in 
motion. For the commercial firm the financial analyst may take the part of the 
psycho-analyst. Certainly in their relations with financial analysts many firms will 
be confronted by the enigma of the Other's desire - they will be left wondering "what 
do the analysts want? " 
32. The disappearance of the firm beneath financial signifiers can be understood in terns 
of the colonization of the lifeworld: 
"The colonizing potential of accounting consists not only in the 
instrumental reach of its information system technology but also in 
its capacity to capture organizational self understandings and reframe 
them in accounting terms, thereby insulating accounting from 
systematic inquiry other than in terms of technical success or failure. 
Hence accounting can be regarded as a disciplinary practice ... which 
colonizes areas of social life by creating newly internalized facts and 
vocabularies which potentially undermine the capability of actors to 
question its self-evident mission. " 
(Laughlin & Power, 1996, p. 447) 
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33. 
That colonization effected through the constraint of dominant signifiers imposes 
constraints on the networks of social /communicative relations which sustain and 
allow the development of the identities of the human individuals associated with the 
firm and the firm itself as accountable, responsible, moral agent and subject. In the 
case of the firm the dominance of the financial signifiers threatens to deny the firm's 
subjectivity and reduce it to an irresponsible element of the systemic apparatus. Fuller 
understandings of firm must be developed through its openness to difference and the 
other (including new social movements as Other) - and the Other as the stranger 
within - the unconscious. 
In this paper we have equated transcendence of the profit motive with, the Lacanian 
ethical imperative, the firm as subject's transcendence of its fundamental fantasy. 
With some exceptions in the tradition of Friedman (1970), there is growing 
recognition of the social benefits that might follow a transcendence of the profit 
motive (Arrow, 1973; Sen, 1977,1987; Etzioni, 1988; Singer, 1994). 
We suggest that the conception of the firm as a Lacanian subject, split 
between conscious and unconscious, may be usefully extended in other directions. 
It seems to have relatively direct application at least two spheres. The concept of the 
firm as agent has been as hotly debated in the field of strategic management as in 
ethics. And the linkages and similarities between strategy and moral philosophy have 
been clearly drawn by Singer (1994). He defends the concept of the firm as both 
strategic agent and moral agent, and he argues that moral philosophy might inform 
strategic management and provide a valuable counter-balance to economic 
considerations. We believe that a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective on the firm 
could yield valuable insights in the field of strategic management. 
A number of commentators argue that Law has not been a relatively 
ineffective mean of controlling corporations (see Metzger & Dalton, 1996) and have 
called for enriched perspectives on the firm as moral agent. Metzger and Dalton 
(1996) have argued that legal efforts to control the corporation would stand to gain 
from further ontological inquiry into the nature of the firm. We suggest that Lacanian 
perspective might provide useful insight on the issue of corporate responsibility. The 
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attribution of criminal responsibility generally depends upon two conditions - firstly 
the agent's wrongful action (actus reus) and secondly criminal intent (mens rca). 
Much of the debate concerning corporate moral responsibility has centred on the 
issue of intentionality - whether or not it is possible to establish a corporate "mens 
rea" (see Phillips, 1995). Under the legal principle of identification, the states of 
mind of certain controlling officers of the corporation may be taken to be the state of 
mind of the corporation itself (see Metzger & Dalton, 1996; Moore, 1999). Some 
commentators have argued that the attribution of criminal liability in the absence of 
moral culpability, which the principle of identification facilitates, is ill advised (see 
Metzger, 1996). In our view the Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective may provide 
justification for alternative routes to the attribution of intent to the corporation, for 
example, in circumstances where no intention is formed in the minds of any 
individuals but exists in the firm as subject - perhaps in its unconscious. 
34. We suggest that a fuller recognition of centrality of responsibility for the other and 
the necessity of "The Inclusion of the Other" is becoming more strongly evident in 
some of Habermas' more recent work: 
" If we interpret justice as what is equally good for all, then the 
"good" that has been extended step by step to the "right" forms a 
bridge between justice and solidarity. For universal justice also 
requires that one person should take responsibility for another, and 
even that each person should stand in and answer for a stranger who 
has formed his identity in completely different circumstances and 
who understands himself in terms of other traditions. The remnant of 
good at the core of the right reminds us that moral consciousness 
depends on a particular self-understanding of moral persons who 
recognize that they belong to a particular moral community. All 
individuals who have been socialized into any communicative form 
of life at all belong to this community. Because socialized persons 
can only stabilize their identities through relations of reciprocal 
recognition, their identity is particularly vulnerable and they are 
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consequently in need of special protection. They must be able to 
appeal to a source of authority beyond their own community - G. H. 
Mead speaks in this connection of the "ever wider community. " 
Every concrete community depends on the wider community as its 
"better self, " so to speak. As members of this community, individuals 
expect to be treated equally, while it is assumed at the same time that 
each person regards every other person as "one of us. " From this 
perspective solidarity is simply the reverse side of justice. " 
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